Buonamici, Francesco De motu 1591 Florence la buona_demot_014_la_1591.xml 014.xml

FRANCISCI Bonamici Florentini EPRIMO LOCO PHILOSOPHIAM ordinariam in Almo Gymna&longs;io Pi&longs;ano Profitentis, DE MOTV LIBRI X.

QVIBVS GENERALIA NATVRALIS PHILOSOPHIAE principia &longs;ummo &longs;tudio collecta continentur.

NECNON VNIVERSAE QVAESTIONES AD LIBROS De Phy&longs;ico auditu, de C&ecedil;lo, de Ortu, & Interitu pertinentes explicantur.

MVLTA ITEM ARISTOTELIS LOCA EXPLANANTVR, & Græcorum, Aucrrois, aliorum <27> doctorum &longs;ententiæ ad The&longs;es Peripateticas diriguntur.

ACCESSIT INDEX CAPITVM, RERVMque MEMORABILIVM.

AD FERDINANDVM MEDICEM MAGNVM Etruriæ Ducem Sereni&longs;&longs;imum.

EX SVPERIORVM CONSENSV.

FLORENTIAE, Apud Bartholomæum Sermartellium.MDXCI.

FERDINANDO MED. . R. . CARD. AMPL MAGNOQ ETRVR.

DVCI SERENISSIMO.

FRANCISCVS BONAMICVS A BIFORTO. .P.D.

Sileam ego &longs;olus, & in tanta totius Etruriæ lætitiæ dum omnes boni te vnum &longs;u&longs;piciunt, te in oculis vnum fe­runt & tibi vno con&longs;en&longs;u gratulatur, iaceam torpens, nec aliqua &longs;ignificatione meæ erga te pietatis gaudium meum testificer, ac postquàm meæ lucubrationes multis ab hinc annis inchoatæ, nunc demum ab&longs;olutæ in tua felici&longs;&longs;ima tempora excurrerunt; patris, fratrisque; tui &longs;ingularis in me charitatis monimentum diutius condi patiar? E ve&longs;tris ergo magnificentiæ fontibus ortæ ad te properant, & quæ e&longs;t animi tui benignitas, E cel&longs;itudo in aliquo e&longs;&longs;e apud te loco non dubitant; iure autem tibi debitæ, quòd me &longs;emper alueritis, & honesti&longs;&longs;imo huic meo qualecunque &longs;i ocio con&longs;ulueritis, vt magnæ profecto culpæ &longs;im affinis, ni&longs;i tantis beneficijs antehac prouocatus, quando maiora non po&longs;&longs;um; id quod grati animi officium foret, aliquid olim reponam. Et quanuis hæc tenuuia &longs;int, cle­mentia, gratiaque; tua fretus, ni faciam, vt impudentia potius accu&longs;anda, quàm conatus vl­lus in me de&longs;iderari po&longs;&longs;it. Ac &longs;i quid valet ad hoc perficiendum labor improbus, & in­du&longs;tria, rerum nouarum indagatrix ingenio&longs;a, vt non de&longs;perem, au&longs;pice te, &longs;i non plenis ve­lis in portum, at &longs;ecunda &longs;altem, vt aiunt, nauigatione peruenire po&longs;&longs;e, E &longs;i non vulgo pla cere, cuius iudicia varia, incon&longs;tantia, neque ab omni perturbationis &longs;u&longs;picione libera &longs;unt: tibi tamen & antiquioris, hoc e&longs;t, græcæ Philo&longs;ophiæ cupidis, quod iamdiù &longs;axum voluo, probari; cur enim à te con&longs;ilium meum non laudetur, qui Græcè &longs;cias, & eius linguæ pe­riti&longs;&longs;imos &longs;ummo in honore &longs;emper habueris, tanquam ab iis ip&longs;is omnes &longs;cientiarum fon­tes, atque illi quidem vberes, &longs;alubres, E perennes &longs;caturiant? Cur etiam non ab illis in&longs;ti­tutum meum commendetur, quos ego &longs;olus, & reuereor iam, & colo, quibus vetera &longs;anè, nec tamen antiquata recolo, E vnus quidem non renouo, &longs;ed in tenebris abdita, E demer­&longs;a ad lucem in tuo nomine reuoco: & exempla dome&longs;tica imitatus aliquid po&longs;teritati re­linquere &longs;tudeo, cuius auxilio progrediatur vlterius; E via mon&longs;trata contendat in &longs;um­mum? fuit enim id ciuitati, totique; ditioni tuæ penitus in&longs;itum, & innatum, vt aliquid a&longs;&longs;i duè cogitarent quo domi, forisque; magna gloria apud omnes e&longs;&longs;ent. In hac incunabula, & rudimenta præ&longs;tanti&longs;&longs;imarum artium ab Italia va&longs;tata reperiuntur Picturæ, Sculpturæ, Iurisperitiæ, Poëtices, Oratoriæ; in hac primum auctore Ioanne Boccaccio Græcæ litteræ &longs;unt excultæ. Quàm multa Medicinæ lumina protulit hæc vna ciuitas? quot viros for­ti&longs;&longs;imos? vt hinc maximi Reges, & Duces præ&longs;tanti&longs;&longs;imos, & viros &longs;apienti&longs;&longs;imos ad imperia regenda, tanquam &longs;ocios accer&longs;iuerint. Quocunque me verto, video etiam nunc viros omni virtutum genere exornatos, quibus tanquàm &longs;tellis interstincta ditio tuæ refulge, quæ ceris er ad Cœlum non v&longs;itata, neperuulgata via common&longs;trent. Veter non repetam: &longs;uperat. . ladem onmem antiquitas; tempora no&longs;tra &longs;pecto. Quid in politiorum lier aru genere Victorius quod attig non adamu&longs;&longs;im expoliuit? Quid in arte medica non obtinuit Vidius, qui rem vniuer&longs;am ad tenue &longs;ic elimauit, & dulciter clocut e&longs;t, v&longs;i M&longs;æ eam artem docturæ fui&longs;&longs;ent, non alia certè, quàm Vidij lingua, methodoque; v&longs;uras fui&longs;&longs;e putem? Queties me &longs;uo carmine rapit dulci&longs;&longs;imus cygnus ille Bargæus? quidde Pi is Strozisque; K yrtaeo, uno atque altero Ie. apti&longs;ta dicam? Mitto complures alios E philo&longs;ophos, & poëtas: hos hîc recen&longs;ere placet, qui, quod inceperint, omnino perfecerint; aliisque; exemplum dederint, vt potius ab iis imitandi &longs;int, quam quippiam illorum indu&longs;riæ labore alieno queat accedere. Sed conatum &longs;olum magno in pretio quoque habitum dome&longs;ticis exemplis tibi &longs;ignificare po&longs;&longs;im FERDINANDE Cel&longs;i&longs;&longs;ime. Namquis non &longs;ummis laudibus in cœlum tollat Americum Ve&longs;puccium? Hic ignotas, & periculo&longs;as nauigationes adgre&longs;&longs;us cum primus è multis prouinciis, quæ ad occa&longs;um, meridiem; iacent, aliquot lu&longs;tra&longs;&longs;et; vnde tantum Regum Chri&longs;tianorum opibus acce&longs;&longs;erit, cum &longs;acris, quæ gentibus illis communicata &longs;unt, tum etiam diuitiis, quando merces inde aduectæ, quibus humano generi &longs;alus magno cum commodo pararetur; im­men&longs;a the&longs;aurorum copia, atque ornamenta regia complura ad vos comportata; quia ratio­nem eas lu&longs;irandi præmon&longs;rarit, animosque; incipiendo aliis addiderit; illi orbis parti, quam primus ip&longs;e peragrauit, ex&longs;uo nomine nomen dedit. Ex quo liquidò con&longs;tat præmon&longs;ira­tori plus habitum fu&longs;&longs;e gratiæ non infrequenter, quàm perfectoribus. Prætereo dein­du&longs;iria innumeros alios ciues tuos, qui nouarum artium inuentores maximas copias do­mum retulerunt, vrbem remplis augu&longs;ti&longs;&longs;imis, ædificiis ampli&longs;&longs;imis auxerunt, & imperij fines vni tibi latè propagarunt. Vt non immeritò tu, qui tantos talesque; viros hodie mo­deraris, in maximis Regibus numerari debeas: nam &longs;i magnum ille cen&longs;ebat imperare non auro, &longs;ed habentibus aurum; tu nonmodo iis, quæ po&longs;&longs;ideant homines, neque po&longs;&longs;iden­tibus hominibus imperes; &longs;ed po&longs;&longs;idere &longs;cientes tranquilli&longs;&longs;imè regas. Ego igitur, qui Pe­ripateticam Philo&longs;ophiam non ex riuulis, &longs;ed ex ip&longs;o fonte Ari&longs;totelico mi&longs;&longs;o omni fa­ctionum &longs;tudio nunc in&longs;tituerim haurire, & primus qui inter tuos in hac &longs;ecta libertate recuperata meum iudicium planè &longs;equar; tamet&longs;i non perficiam; cur etiam laude aliqua, quia &longs;im au&longs;us, quia cœperim, dignus non habear? Alij nos &longs;equentur qui indicata ratio­ne, & via magnum huic cœpto afferant incrementum, & id demum con&longs;equantur, quod in omnia tempora clarum, atque illu&longs;ire futurum &longs;it: quæ. n. erè cogitata &longs;unt, diutius con &longs;eruari &longs;olent, nec hominum interitu occidunt, &longs;ed iterantur in immen&longs;um, AEtas finem trophæis affert, imperia collabuntur. Vna veritas perpetuò durat, ad quam cum omnium proximè, quantum hominis ingenium fert, acce&longs;&longs;erit Ari&longs;toteles; nulla erit ætas, nulla gens, nulla religio quæ ip&longs;um nonmodò non tactura, &longs;ed &longs;edulò tractatura, & a&longs;&longs;iduè in manibus habitura &longs;it. Vnde etiam fore confido, vt qui in vnis auctoris huiu&longs;ce ve&longs;tigiis in&longs;i&longs;tat, locum in philo&longs;ophia &longs;it &longs;emper habiturus. Video verò & propemodum auguror te patris tui pij, felicisque; in&longs;tituta tenentem, ita in vna litterarum omnis generis ornamenta incumbere, vt breui talem quendam vi&longs;uri &longs;imus, qui quemadmodum à ciuibus tuis in cæ teris artibus factitatum e&longs;t, qui eas à rudi illa vetu&longs;tate ad pri&longs;tinam illam integritatem &longs;ua indu&longs;tria reuocarunt, ita Peripateticam di&longs;ciplinam ex omni Arabum, no&longs;tratiumque; cultura ad bonam illam, & expolitam &longs;it redacturus. Talia tu commoda cupidis optima­rum artium præ&longs;tas. Quare laudent ciues tui pietatem, magnificentia&mgrave; milites celebrent, temperantiam tui familiares admirentur, iu&longs;titiam, amplitudinemque; omnes &longs;ummis præco­niis tollant; mihi quidem vnum hoc munificentiæ genus dignum videtur, vt omnes oculos in te coniiciant, tu vnus in omnium ore &longs;umma cum tui nominis celebritate iure ver&longs;eris. Tu verè beatus, quia Poëtas, Oratores, Hi&longs;toriographos, Iuri&longs;con&longs;ultos, Theologos, Me­dicos, & Philo&longs;ophos omnibus doctrinis excultos vni tibi contigerit alere, & habere. Quanquàm e&longs;t id iam bonis temporibus inueteratum in ve&longs;tra familia, dome&longs;ticumque; tam factum. Extant etiamnum monumenta ampli&longs;&longs;ima Co&longs;mi, Laurentiique; Medicum com mendata litteris hominum, quos virtutis ergô diuinis beneficiis affecere. Ex quo effectum e&longs;t, vt complura adiumenta ad &longs;cientias eorum opera &longs;uppetierint. Laurentius Platonem per multa &longs;æcula &longs;epultum traxit ab inferis. Narrant etiam Leonem X. .M. b hoc viuendi in&longs;tituto &longs;ic allectum, vt nonmodò bonarum artium &longs;tudia fouerit, &longs;ed viros doctos benigni&longs;&longs;imè complexus fuerit. Accepimus etiam cùm ti vitio quandoque daretur, <09> humi les viros, &longs;ed illos quidem bene doctos oim meritorum genere cumularet, re&longs;pondi&longs;&longs;e &longs;e vir­tute E doctrina præ&longs;tantibus opem libenti&longs;&longs;imè ferre, <09> talem cen&longs;uram veræ nobilitatis e&longs;&longs;e crederet. Ita multos non incitauit tantùm, &longs;ed ad litter arum &longs;tudia recolenda perduxit. Nanque illis temporibus nonmodò &longs;cientiarum v&longs;us euanuerat, verùm planè concider at oem decus eloquentiæ Florentinæ quam &longs;ummo &longs;tudio coluerant Danthes, Petrarcha Boccac­cius, E à viris illis ob&longs;oleta & de&longs;ita frequentabantur, atque aliena &longs;æpius inepti&longs;&longs;imè incul­cari con&longs;ueuerant. Itaque ip&longs;ius opera factum e&longs;t, vt pura illa no&longs;tra lingua reuiui&longs;ceret, & oins optimarum artium cultus po&longs;t longum temporis tractum denique emineret. Hæc veri hoins &longs;unt officia quæ diuinæ virtutis te&longs;tes &longs;empiterni &longs;int, non in&longs;anarum molium &longs;ub&longs;iructio­nes quib. xhauriuntur æraria, vectigalia minuuntur, non &longs;tatuarum locationes quæ cor­porum quidem &longs;imulachra &longs;unt, E imago quædamgloriæ adumbrata, non animorum effigies, E &longs;pecies expre&longs;&longs;a virtutis. Hæc munera verè regia, & admirabilia iis vti viris à quib. in&longs;tituti &longs;ubiecti ritè regi, & optimis morib. nformari valeant, ac per bonis arteis ad con &longs;pectum numinum beatorum efferri, vt ocio &longs;ecuri&longs;&longs;imo fouentes in oinum bonorum fine con­quie&longs;cant, ad quod lex naturæ, hoc e&longs;t, ratio &longs;ummi Dei cunctos reges iubet ad&longs;pirare. Neque n. edit imperia pote&longs;tatesque, Deus, vt luxureges in tanta rerum copia perderentur, neque tanquae immen&longs;a aliqua vorago ciuium patrimonia ab&longs;orberent, nec vt in illos qui &longs;ub eorum imperio &longs;unt, atroci&longs;&longs;imè &longs;æuirent, &longs;ed vt Poëtæ verbis vtar, i(/nalaoi\ a)zetw_si+n u(p) a)utw|, hoc e&longs;t vt gentes rerum ignaras ad &longs;uum cuique bonum actoritate & &longs;apientia dirigerent, cumque; &longs;ibi ip&longs;i &longs;aperent, aliis quoque &longs;apere vellent. Pupugit etiam hæc cura pij felicisque; tui patris animum, quô E erexit duo gymna&longs;ia, vt plurib. ateret aditus ad vires ingenij quas ip&longs;is natura largi&longs;&longs;imè afflaui&longs;&longs;et, E exercendas, & retinendas. Vtor aunt iam &longs;æpiu&longs;cule patris tui viri clari&longs;&longs;imi exemplo, non eo certè con&longs;ilio, vt te inflammem: iam. . hoc &longs;iudium erga litteratos in te radiceis alti&longs;&longs;imas egit, cùm &longs;tirpem genero&longs;am tibi natura conce&longs;&longs;erit, E vitæ rationem dome&longs;tico exemplo conformaris, &longs;ed vt illius qui quidem oinum ætatis &longs;uæ princeps extitit, audiendo præclara facinora in eius imitatione te oblectes, & immortale hoc nomen ad no&longs;tri beneficium cum iucunditate tueare. Nos igitur beati&longs;&longs;imos quibus tuis au&longs;piciis operam philo&longs;ophiæ dare, E natur æ arcanaper&longs;crutari &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;erit. Quocirca maximam nob. ip&longs;is iniuriam faceremus, &longs;i tantam occa&longs;ionem &longs;ineremus elabi de manibus. Nam quod in hi&longs;ce &longs;tudiis plurimum pont, id diuinitus ciuib. populisque; tuis largi&longs;&longs;imè datum e&longs;t, ingenium ad exco gitandum acutum, ad memoriam firmum, E diuturnum; cupiditatem quæ cuncta &longs;&longs;equitur, tu tuo exemplo concita&longs;ti, tuaque; opera concitatam a&longs;&longs;iduè foues. Quocirca verendum non e&longs;t, quin iter quod ad gloriam tu illis o&longs;tendi&longs;ti, E ij &longs;u&longs;cipiant, & &longs;u&longs;ceptum &longs;umma con&longs;tantia teneant: ha bent. . vnde di&longs;cant. Nanque E eandem viam quam maiores tui munitarunt, tu ab ætatis initio &longs;ub Angeliis ingre&longs;&longs;us es, E &longs;ub ei&longs;dem Angeliis con&longs;tanti&longs;simè retines, neque retines tantum, &longs;ed iugiter amplificas, qualia verò &longs;unt in&longs;tituta principum, tales populorum mores e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olent. Verùm quid de te &longs;perandum non e&longs;t Felici&longs;&longs;ime FERDINANDE, qui tibi tanti mune­ris &longs;ocios adiunxeris quorum opera & con&longs;ilio in omni publico priuatoque; officio vtaris vni uer&longs;is animi virtutibus ornatos, &longs;apientia, rerumque; v&longs;u claros, &longs;ingulari clementia in mi &longs;eros, admirabili &longs;eueritate aduer&longs;us &longs;celeratos admodum Illustres Carolum Antonium Puteum Archiepi&longs;copum Pi&longs;anum, Petrum V&longs;imbardum, Ioannem 'B. oncinium, Capponem Capponium, quorum ego patrocinio publicè priuatimque; fultus hoc opus aggre­di au&longs;us &longs;um, laborumque; meorum, immò benignitatis ve&longs;træ te&longs;timonium dare. Verùm mi&longs;&longs;a hæc facio, ad no&longs;tra de&longs;cendo. Quæ &longs;anctior lex, quod maius con&longs;ilium quàm di&longs;ci­plinarum collegia con&longs;titui&longs;&longs;e, vt inter &longs;e collegæ de victoria litigantes concertent alacrius?

Hì proprium decus, & partum indignantur honorem, Ni teneant, vitamque; volunt pro laude paci&longs;ci, Hos &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;us alit, po&longs;&longs;unt, quia po&longs;&longs;e videntur.

Itaque Homeri iudicium nouimus à &longs;apientibus e&longs;&longs;e approbatum, qui exultantem Aga­memnonem primis illis temporibus induxerit. Vly&longs;&longs;e & Achille mirandis inter &longs;e modis al tercantibus, vt v&longs;que etiam ad conuicia euehi &longs;olerent, E Age&longs;ilai prudentiam oim illu&longs;tri laude celebratam qui æmulationem, veluti &longs;timulos quo&longs;dam intulerit reip. c &longs;emper ade&longs;&longs;e &longs;tu duerit, quod inter &longs;e ciues boni contendant, augente &longs;tudia contentione, concordia verò con­ciliante de&longs;idiam. Quo factum e&longs;t, vt viri docti&longs;&longs;imi, quanuis &longs;uos commentarios &longs;uppri­mendo reprehen&longs;ionem &longs;e fugere intelligerent, quia po&longs;teros tanto bono priuare non &longs;olùm iniurium, &longs;ed impium E nefas e&longs;&longs;e iudicarent, quanuis etiam eorum iudicia &longs;ubituri e&longs;&longs;ent, qui forta&longs;&longs;e plus, quàm ip&longs;i de &longs;e intelligerent, aliòque; per cogitationes &longs;uas diuerterent, contenti fuerint, &longs;i ita &longs;ua probarentur, vt tanquàm di&longs;putata contentius aditum ad ve­ritatem patefacerent, cuius qui&longs;que bonus nonmodò &longs;tudio&longs;us, verumetiam curio&longs;us e&longs;&longs;e de bet. Nam latet veritas in profundo, & diuer&longs;is veri&longs;imilibus inuoluta variis etiam mo­dis tentat mentes no&longs;tras, & in diuer&longs;a &longs;tudia rapit. Cùm igitur ego quoque à Cel&longs;i&longs;&longs;imo Patre tuo in ve&longs;tra præelari&longs;&longs;ima collegia fuerim cooptatus & adhuc auctoritate tua negocium publicè docendi &longs;u&longs;tineam, tibi gratias ago immortales, & in eo me laudo, fortu­nati&longs;&longs;imumque; prædico cui datus &longs;it locus ingenij mei vires experiendi, & ea narrandi quæ ocium litterarum merito tuo mihi &longs;uppeditat, & v&longs;u quotidie cogno&longs;cendi partem aliquam veritatis, quam &longs;i po&longs;teritati communicauerim, & grati animi officio erga te functus e&longs;&longs;e videar, & in alios, &longs;i fieri pont (vt e&longs;t humana conditio) boni aliquid contuli&longs;&longs;e. Et quanquae multa me ab incepto deterrebant, cum quia po&longs;teriores cogitationes meliores e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olerent, tum quòd plura in dies experientia rerum magi&longs;tra &longs;apienti&longs;sima docerct, non pauca etiam lectio'iterata librorum, complura nouæ di&longs;ceptationes, E &longs;criptadi&longs;erti&longs;simorum hominum quæ ad meas manus quotidie veniebant; vicit tamen illa cura, vt cæteris, &longs;i po&longs;&longs;um, quoquomodo prode&longs;&longs;em, maximeque;, vt meæ ergate voluntatis aliquod &longs;ignum darem. Acce&longs;&longs;erunt exhor tationes amicorum, qui ex tam diuturnis laboribus aliquid expectabant: nuper ent magnum momentum attulit huic meæ deliberationi, & coram Pi&longs;is, & per litteras eruditi&longs;simus, atque integerrimus vir Thomas Finckius Vuet&longs;pergen&longs;is, cuius iudicium cùm &longs;emper maximi fe cerim, in hoc etiam eius auctoritatem &longs;equi non dubitaui. Quapropter è no&longs;tris &longs;ermonib. atque di&longs;ceptationib. tanquae mundus quidam Empedocleus è lite exortus hic liber ad te rectà con tendit, clientis tui fidem, laborem, &longs;tudium, & indu&longs;triam tibi &longs;ignificat; ob id à te hilarè&longs;e acce ptum iri &longs;perat. oc vnum expetit; id &longs;i fuerit a&longs;&longs;ecutus, alacritatem quoque aliis addet quos iam &longs;ub ei&longs;dem au&longs;piciis edere cogitauimus, vt ad te quam primùm aduolent, & perpe­tuæ erga te pietatis no&longs;træ &longs;int optimi te&longs;tes. Vale. Pi&longs;is XIV. al. Decemb.CIC IC LXXXVII.

INDEX LIBRORVM ET CAPITVM QVAE IN HOC OPERE CONTINENTVR.

PRIMVS LIBER EST DE MVNERE PHILOSOPHI NATVRALIS PROOEMIVM.

FINIS INDICIS CAPITVM QVAE IN HOC VOLVMINE CONTINENTVR.

Generalia qu&ecedil;dam capita tractantur deprincipiis &longs;cie nti&ecedil; natur a-lis. Cap. 1. Pag.3Di&longs;tributio principiorum no&longs;træ methodi ponitur, & leuiter aliqua ad ip&longs;a per-tinentia tanguntur. Cap. 2.5Aggredimur &longs;cientiæ principia, è quibus nonnull con&longs;imiliter adumbran-tur. Cap. 3.14Specialia phy&longs;iologiæ principia ponuntur, & aliqua admonitione per&longs;uaden-tur. Cap. 4.29Vtrùm principia &longs;uperius expo&longs;ita &longs;int ea nota nobis que 1. Phy&longs;. propo&longs;uit Ari&longs;toteles, an non. Cap. 5.34Veterum &longs;ententi&ecedil; quo pacto tractadæ, & vari&ecedil; philo&longs;ophrum &longs;ectz recen&longs;entur. Cap. 6.38Explicatur generatim, quo pacto &longs;cientiarum principia tractentur, & quam viam tenuerit Ari&longs;toteles, dm veterum &longs;ententias de principiis conuellit. Cap. 7.41Sit'ne &longs;ubalternationis affinitas inter phy&longs;icen & primam philo&longs;ophiam. Cap. 8.46Animi habitum præstantia generatim perpenditur, & contemplans actuo&longs;&ecedil; præponitur. Cap. 9.49Comparatur &longs;cientia naturalis cum c&ecedil;teris &longs;cientiis. Cap. 10.53Iure ne Mathematica ex ordine&longs;cientiarum expungantur. Cap. 11.56Accipiat'ne primus philo&longs;ophus à naturali &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas e&longs;&longs;e. Cap. 12.59Genus &longs;ubiectum naturalis philo&longs;ophiæ con&longs;tituitur. Cap. 13.62Quo cau&longs;&longs;arum genere, & quatenus vtatur philo&longs;ophus naturalis. Cap. 14.66Vt&longs;e habeant cau&longs;&longs;æ in prima philo&longs;ophia & mathematicis. Cap. 15.71Auicennæ rationes diluuntur quibus probat materiæprim&ecedil; con&longs;iderationem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olius primi philo&longs;o-phi. Cap. 16.73Vtrùm formæ naturales &longs;i non re, at cogitatione &longs;eparentur à materia, nec'ne. Cap. 17.75Quid &longs;it materia &longs;en&longs;ilis, & quemadmodum in naturali methodo accipienda. Cap. 18.78Quod'nam genus materiæ &longs;umatur in definitionibus naturalibus. Cap. 19.80Compleat'ne materia &longs;en&longs;ilis definitionem naturalem vt pars e&longs;&longs;entiæ, an non. Cap. 20.82Cur è Mathematicis nonnullæ naturales appellentur. Cap. 21.87De potestate eorum communium, quæ dicuntur ad vnum. Cap. 22.89De ordine partium communis ad vnum. Cap. 23.90De methodis compendiaria di&longs;putatio. Cap. 24.94Non nulla ad &longs;ententias veterum pertinentia notantur, & eorum primùm qui ens vnum, & immo-bile po&longs;uerunt. Cap. 25.108Pauca quædam di&longs;&longs;eruntur cum iis qui vnum principium, atque illud quidem mobile e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;ent. Cap. 26.112In eos qui infinita po&longs;uere principia. Cap. 27.113De iis qui principia plura, &longs;ed finita e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;uerunt. Cap. 28.117Vt motum e&longs;&longs;e per&longs;picuum &longs;it, & explicatur eius cognitio per accidens. Cap. 29.121Eadem methodo motum naturalem e&longs;&longs;e demonstratur. Cap. 30.123Tractatur alterum genus cognitionis quod e&longs;t per &longs;e, & docetur, vt illi motus &longs;ubiici po&longs;&longs;it. Cap. 31.124SECVNDVS I. IBER EST DE MATERIA ET EO QVOD EFFICIT MOTVM.Dividitvr ens in actum, & pote&longs;tatem, vt in motus definitione &longs;umitur. Cap. 1.127Percen&longs;entur reliqua motus elementa, & aliqua etiam ad&longs;cribuntur de ratione qua colligitur definitio motus. Cap. 2.129Latiore quadam &longs;pecie definitio motus explanatur. Cap. 3.133exponuntur termini in definitione motus accepti actus, &longs;cilicet, & pote&longs;tas. Cap. 4.134Plura de certo motus gencre di&longs;&longs;eruntur cum Ari&longs;tote is interpretibus. Cap. 5.137Thomi&longs;torum de natura motus &longs;ententia recitatur. Cap. 6.139Confutatur &longs;ententia Thomi&longs;tarum & &longs;eligitur ille motus qui proponitur ad definiendum. Cap. 7.140 Declnaratur &longs;ubiectum motus, & in &longs;ua membra &longs;ecatur; multa etiam de agente adiiciuntur. Cap. 8. Pag.143 Quem idmodum &longs;e babeat motus ad efficiens, & materiam; vbi verum genus motus a&longs;&longs;ignatur. Cap. 9.145 Explic atu babitudo actionis ad agens, & quædam corollaria cum nonnullarum dubitationum &longs;olutio-nibs apponuntur. Cap. 10.147 De termino ad quem paucula quædam, & quemadmodum &longs;e babeat ad motum. Cap. 11.149 Di&longs;put atur an &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;io pertineat ad omnem &longs;peciem motus, ac problema proponitur. vtrum generatio puncto temporis obeatur nec'ne. Cap. 12.153 Expenduntur dicta &longs;ect atorum Auerrois de &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;ione quæ fit in &longs;ubstantia. Cap. 13.157 Ex propria &longs;entena demon&longs;tr atur &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;ionem pertinere ad ortum. Cap. 14.159 Aliqua de form&ecedil; partibus adduntur & quorundam &longs;apiencum dicta cum &longs;uperioribus conciliantur. C. 15.163 Vt inter id quod e&longs;t, & quod non e&longs;t medium &longs;it, & dubitationes aliquæ diluuntur. Cap. 16.165 Examinatur vis illius pronunciati: Mutatinem qu&ecedil; fit in tempore, terminari forma quæ plus, & mi-nus accipiat, & simplicij dictum perpenditur. Cap. 17.168 Queadmodum mutatio &longs;e babeat ad motum. Cap. 18.170 De oppo&longs;itione formarum qu&ecedil; e&longs;&longs;entiam complent qu&ecedil; cæteri &longs;en&longs;erint. Cap. 19.173 De oppo&longs;itione differentiaru, & vtrùm oppo&longs;itio inter differentias efficiat oppo&longs;itionem inter formas. C. 20.175 Quemadodum in &longs;ubtantia &longs;unt contraria. Cap. 21.177 Singul dubitationes tolluntur de oppo&longs;itione &longs;ubctantiarum. Cap. 22.180 De natur progre&longs;&longs;u vbi pote&longs;tas cum actu commutatur. Cap. 23.181 Pro iis qui prima contraria in natura priuatiuè opponi defendunt. Cap. 24.182 Quonam propriè generetur, & quid alij cen&longs;uerint. Cap. 25.185 Sit'ne forma compo&longs;ito perfectior. Cap. 26.187 Auctoris decretum in medio ponitur de eo quod propriè generetur. Cap. 27.188 Quo pacto form&ecedil; producantur, & vari&ecedil; philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ententiærecen&longs;entur. Cap. 28.190 Qui &longs;it animi nostri &longs;en&longs;us de productione formarum. Cap. 29.192 De termińis mutationum cum ab initio tum à fine qu&ecedil;stio proponitur ex &longs;ententia Latinorum. Cap. 30.195 Qu&ecedil; &longs;it germana philo&longs;ophi &longs;ententia de terminis mutation. Cap. 31.197 Dubit ationes aliquæ diluuntur contra nostra decreta de terminis mutationum. Cap. 32.198 Explicantur accidentis termini, & docetur vt in illorum quoque productione non &longs;it primum e&longs;&longs;e. C. 33.200 O&longs;tenditur vtro&longs;que terminos conflare e&longs;&longs;entiam motus; magis tamen terminum ad quem. Cap. 34.201 De co quòd motus &longs;it vnus, & cau&longs;&longs;is continuationis eius. Cap. 35.204 Exquiruntur hoc loco continuationis initia diligentius. Cap. 36.205 Duit at a di&longs;&longs;oluutur contra rationem continuitatis in motu, & afferuntur corollaria qu&ecedil;dam ex dictis. C. 37.207 Recitantur Græcorum, & Arabum opiniones de Ari&longs;totelica demon&longs;tratione 6. Phy&longs;. Cap. 38.208 Quæ Latini de demon&longs;tratione 6. Phy&longs;. dixerint, & quid de illa Peripateticè &longs;tatui conueniat. Cap. 39.210 Nonnula de indiui luo termini&longs;que tractantur quæ lucem afferunt demonstrationi Sexti Phy&longs;. C. 40.212 Complura de indiuidui motu generatim &longs;peciatimque ve&longs;tigantur. Cap. 41.213 Ea declar antur ex quibus vnus ad &longs;peciem motus con&longs;tituitur. Cap. 42.215 Sit'ne aliquod ex iis que motum con&longs;equuntur, vnde varientur &longs;pecies motus. Cap. 43.218 Explanantur ea ex quibus vnus ad numerum motus exi&longs;tit. Cap. 44.220 Ai&longs;ignantur ea quæ ad motuam repugnantiam &longs;pectant generatim. Cap. 45.223 De oppo&longs;itione motuum &longs;igillatim, & quemadmodum ortus, & interitus opponantur. Cap. 46.225 Edi&longs;&longs;eruntur aliqua de oppo&longs;itione motus & quietis. Cap. 47.226 TERTIVS LIBER EST DE RATIONE QVA A FORMA PROFICISCITVR MOTVS. Natvrae &longs;ignificata & incboata quædam hypothe&longs;is affertur. Cap. 1.228 An pla &longs;it natur&ecedil; definitio, nec'ne perquiritur. Cap. 2.233 Aduer&longs;us Auicennam, quod certa &longs;it naturæ definitio po&longs;ita 2. Phy&longs;. Cap. 2.235 Aliqua aduer&longs;us ea qu&ecedil; decreta &longs;unt, de naturæ declaratione dubitantur. Cap. 4.236 Vtrùm definitio naturæ conueniat aliis quæ non &longs;unt natura an eius propria &longs;it. Cap. 5.238 Alia quædam de natur&ecedil; &longs;ignificatis, & e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;cribuntur. Cap. 6.240 Venamur differentiam inter materiam, & formam in eo, quòd &longs;int natur&ecedil;. Cap. 7.242 Quemadmodum pati pertinet ad formam in mutatione &longs;ecundum &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. Cap. 8.244 Vt pati pertineat ad eandem formam in motu qui e&longs;t ad locum. Cap. 9.246 Diluuntur rationes quæ ad alteram partem problematis de vi formæ &longs;olent afferri. Cap. 10.248 Affertur demonctratio VII. Phy&longs;icorum qua probatur nil à &longs;eip&longs;o moueri primò. Cap. 11.251 Dubia contra demon&longs;trationem Aristotelicam VII. Phy&longs; ex Auerroë poti&longs;&longs;imè proponuntur. Cap. 12.253 Expenduntur reliqua dicta Auerrois, & id præcipuè quod attinet ad diu&longs;ionem corporis cale&longs;tis. C. 13.254 Quæ reliqui pro Aristotele dicant de demon&longs;tratione VII. Phy&longs;. Cap. 14.256 Demonstratio VII. Phy&longs;. in &longs;ua primordia re&longs;oluitur, & aliorum argumenta diluuntur. Cap. 15.258 Exploratur genus demon&longs;trationis VII. Phy&longs;. Cap. 16.261 Qutritur de veritate hypothe&longs;eon ad banc ip&longs;am demon&longs;trationem VII. pertinentium. Cap. 17. Pag.263 Proponitur quæ&longs;tio de motu inanimorum. Cap. 18.266 Alexandri &longs;ententia recitatur de modo quo generans mouet. Cap. 19.267 Themiftij, Simplicque. &longs;ententia perpenditur adamu&longs;&longs;im quemadmodum motus à generante fiat. Cap. 20.269 Complura de acta primo di&longs;&longs;eruntur, & proponuntur aliqua de eo quod e&longs;t. Cap. 21.270 In &longs;uperiores &longs;ententias di&longs;&longs;eritur, & ostenditur e&longs;&longs;e ab e&longs;&longs;entia, & accidente differre. Cap. 22.272 Queritur an e&longs;&longs;e &longs;it modus quidam, & cætera afferuntur quæ &longs;unt huius di&longs;ceptationis. Cap. 23.274 Examinatur, quemadmodum e&longs;&longs;e ab e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;eparetur, & aliorum &longs;ententiis confutatis no&longs;tra pronun-ciatur. Cap. 24.277 Dubitationes aliquæ tolluntur ad ea pertinentes quæ de e&longs;&longs;e & e&longs;&longs;entia dicta &longs;unt, & aliæ proponun-tur ad actus vtriu&longs;que naturam &longs;pectantes. Cap. 25.280 Vtrùm omnis actus &longs;ecundus exoriatur exprimo, nec'ne. Cap. 26.281 Vtrùm actus &longs;ecundus &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;it an accidens. Cap. 27.284 Tollitur è medio celebris illa ratio qua ab accidentis natura probatur actun&longs;ecundume&longs;&longs;e accidens. C. 28.286 Exponitur vtrùm energia præter naturam profici&longs;catur ex habitu, an illi nonnunquam antecedas, fi-mul etiam di&longs;&longs;eritur &longs;it'ne duplex habitus, externus. &longs;. & internus. Cap. 29.290 Explicatur quemadmodum facultas omnis actum re&longs;piciat cui&longs;ubiicitur. Cap. 30.292 E quo'nam genere cau&longs;&longs;e &longs;it illa pote&longs;tas qu&ecedil; re&longs;piciat actum. Cap. 31.296 Qu&ecedil;dam dubitationes è medio tollwitur ad functionum natur am &longs;pectantes. Cap. 32.298 Vaetas actionum vnde ducatur. Cap. 33.300 Vtrùm primus actus erumpat in &longs;ecundum per &longs;ui mutationem, an non. Cap. 34.303 Vt motus à generante permánet ad id quod gignitur, auctoris &longs;ententia. Cap. 35.304 Virtus'ne gener antis perpetuò con&longs;eruetur in rei genitæ muneribus præ&longs;tandis. Cap. 36.307 Vtrùm generans aliquo modo mouea preimè, nec'ne. Cap. 37.308 Aliqua de cau&longs;&longs;arum, & effectuum nexu ad&longs;cribuntur, & aliqua loca Aristotelis illu&longs;trantur. Cap. 38.310 Specialis ordo nexusque cau&longs;&longs;arum quantùm ad functioneis in eodem &longs;ubiecto pr&ecedil;&longs;tandas attinet, enar tatur. Cap. 39.313 Quæritur &longs;it'ne forma vetus, an noua principium patibile motus. Cap. 40.315 Recitantur opiones quorundam credentium motum inanimi obiri ab interno principio. Cap. 41.317 Opinio Bur&ecedil;i atq argumenta ex Aristotele contra po&longs;itionem Auerroistarum recitantur. Cap. 42.318 Communiter ij confutantur qui putant inanima quoquo pacto continere in &longs;e ip&longs;is cau&longs;&longs;am quæ faciat motum. Cap. 43.320 Di&longs;&longs;eritur in eos &longs;igillatim qui glo&longs;&longs;ulas adhibent rationibus Aristotelis quas ex VIII. Phy&longs;. recita-uimus. Cap. 44.324 Quòd inaima non diuidantur in partem per &longs;e mouentem, & partem per &longs;e mobilem. Cap. 45.326 Anatura materiæ, form&ecedil;que. demon&longs;tratur inanimum in parteis per &longs;e mouentem ac mobiem non &longs;e-cari. Cap. 46.329 Ari&longs;totelis te&longs;timonio defenditur formam nuila ratione mouere materiam in eodem &longs;ubiecto. Cap. 47.331 Re&longs;pondemus ad nonnullas ationes aduer&longs;ariorum quibus probatur efficiens motum inanimi inter-num e&longs;&longs;e. Cap. 48.334 Exploratur diligentius Burl&ecedil;i iuniorumque. placitum de motu inanimorum. Cap. 49.335 Examinatur ratio VII. Phy&longs;. an'ne pertinere po&longs;&longs;it ad inanimorum motus, & quemadmddum. Cap. 50.337 QVARTVS LIBER EST DE EFFICIENTE E FINE MOTVS ELEMENTI GENITI. Recitantvr in &longs;umma illorum &longs;ententiæ qui dicunt elementum ab extrin&longs;eco moueri. C. 1.341 An omne moucns naturale moueatur, dum mouet, & quomodo. Cap. 2.342 Di&longs;quiritur &longs;igillatim quemadmodum moueatur medium ab inanimo. Cap. 3.344 De mutuis operis quas mobile & medium in mouendo &longs;ibi pr&ecedil;&longs;tant. Cap. 4.345 Quemadmodum id quod e&longs;t in potestate &longs;ecunda, deducatur ad actum à remouente prohibens. Cap. 5.347 De prohibente, & remouente prohibens. Cap. 6.349 Re&longs;istentiæ &longs;pecies exponuntur. Cap. 7.351 Quæritur an fiat motus in vacuo. Cap. 8.353 Rationes, quæ ad vacuum tollendum ab Aristotelicis alienæ afferuntur, aut etiam contra ip&longs;um Ari-stotelem, non &longs;atis valere mon&longs;tratur. Cap. 9.355 An ne vacuum pror&longs;us omni mutationi repugnet, & alia quædam de motu & vacuo dubitantur. C. 10.356 Di&longs;putantur aliqua de re&longs;i&longs;tentia quæ fit in corpore cœle&longs;ti. Cap. 11.358 De officio medij in motu cuiu&longs;que &longs;peciei. Cap. 12.360 De tran&longs;itu elementi iam geniti ex ocio ad negocium, & quæ &longs;it eius prima mutatio. Cap. 13.361 Dubitatio qu&ecedil;dam ex Auerroë deprompta contrà principia motus ab Ari&longs;totele po&longs;ita di&longs;cutitur. C. 14.363 Principio motus elementi iam geniti exponuntur. Cap. 15.364 Quibus modis elementi iam geniti obeatur. Cap. 16.367 Quòd et&longs;i mouetur elementum ab alio, mouctur &longs;ecundum naturam. Cap. 17. Pag.369 Qu&ecedil; &longs;int &longs;pecies motus ab alio quibus elemcutum mouctur, & alia quçdam ad has motuum &longs;pecies du-bitata at&longs;cribuntur. Cap. 18.371 Explicantur duo loca 4. de Calo Textus XXIV. & XXV. Cap. 19.374 Vnde motuum &longs;implictum ratio petatur. Cap. 20.375 Virum motus &longs;ecundum elementum dominans in mixto &longs;implex existat, an non, & cuius nam &longs;it. Cap. 21.378 Anne mixtum motu domin antis elementi concitetur. Cap. 22.380 Affcruntur can&longs;&longs;e motus in mto. Cap. 23.382 Sit ne par elementorum momentum in aliquo mixto, vbi nonnulla Auerrois dicta perpenduntur. Cap. 24.383 Char acteres finis cùm communes, tum proprij traduntur. Cap. 25.385 Animaducrtuur illius dicti vis: Naturam agere propter &longs;inem. Cap. 26.387 Nounull&ecedil; finis proprietates recen&longs;entur. Cap. 27.389 Quinam &longs;it prima cau&longs;&longs;a naturalis appetitus. Cap. 28.391 Soluuntur dubitationes propo&longs;it&ecedil; de appetitu materi&ecedil;. Cap. 29.394 Dubitationes aliqu&ecedil; in medio afferuntur contra decreta de appetitu materi&ecedil;. Cap. 30.396 Vtrum ne moueat finis, quatenus est, an potius quia non &longs;it. Cap. 31.398 Edi&longs;&longs;eritur, quemadmodum finis actu con&longs;istat. Cap. 32.400 Deordine corum quæ di&longs;ponuntur à fine, & quemadmodum afficiat &longs;peciatim ip&longs;e finis, Cap. 33.402 Conucniant' ne in eodem indiuiduo ad idem mobile finis, & efficiens. Cap. 34.403 Sigillatim docetur vt locus &longs;it finis, & aliqua de hoc dubitantur. Cap. 35.406 Sit'ne pr&ecedil;ditus locus naturalis qualitatibus &longs;en&longs;ilibus, & quomodo. Cap. 36.407 Aggredimur qu&ecedil;&longs;tionem qua de cremento natur alis motus in fine di&longs;&longs;eritur. Cap. 37.410 Latinorum &longs;ententi&ecedil; decremento natur alis motus in fine ex ordine recitantur. Cap. 38.412 Quæ nos Peripateticè profitemur de velocitate motus natur alis in fine afferuntur, & di&longs;&longs;oluuntur op-pota. Cap. 39.414 Proponitur ad explicandum locus, atque ordo tractationis adiungitur. Cap. 40.417 Earecen&longs;entur qu&ecedil; &longs;en&longs;us communis attribuit loco. Cap. 41.418 Indagatur via compendiaria definitio loci. Cap. 42.420 Explicatur Textus XXXVII. Quarti Phy&longs;. vbi di&longs;&longs;eritur, vtrùm locus &longs;it distantia nec'ne. Cap. 43.422 Interpretatio Textus XXXVIII. eiu&longs;dem libri quo di&longs;&longs;eritur, an locus &longs;it materia. Cap. 44.424 Quæ &longs;int loca in vniuer&longs;o. Cap. 45.425 Diluuntur nonnull&ecedil; dubitationes qu&ecedil; à natur a loci inuenienda nos auertebant. Cap. 46.427 Vtrùm de omniloco di&longs;&longs;er at Ari&longs;toteles generatim I X. Phy&longs;. an &longs;pecialior ea &longs;peculatio &longs;it. Cap. 47.428 Quemadmodum locus àre mobili &longs;eparetur. Cap. 48.431 Qu&ecedil;ritur de æqualitate loci: quapropter etiam multa de distantia di&longs;putantur contra Philoponum. C. 49.433 Expenduntur rationes Philo&longs;ophi contra Ari&longs;totelem. Cap. 50.435 Di&longs;&longs;eritur vtrùm locus &longs;it &longs;uperficies, nec'ne. Cap. 51.437 De loci repugnantia nonnulla tractantur. Cap. 52.438 Quemadmodum in loco immobilitas accipienda &longs;it. Cap. 53.440 Exploratur D. Thomæ &longs;ententia no&longs;traque defenditur. Cap. 54.441 QVINTVS EST DE LATIONE RECTA SPECIATIM. Qv ae via tenenda &longs;it in explicandis elementorum motibus. Cap. 1.443 Antiquorum, iuniorumque. &longs;ententiæ de loco, & motu terræ recitantur. Cap. 2.444 Veterum opiniones recen&longs;entur de cau&longs;&longs;a cur terra quie&longs;cat. Cap. 3.445 De loco terr&ecedil; contra Pythagor&ecedil;os. Cap. 4.447 De cau&longs;&longs;is motus terr&ecedil; aduer&longs;us antiquos. Cap. 5.448 Aduer&longs;us antiquos de cau&longs;&longs;is quietis terr&ecedil;. Cap. 6.453 De loco terræ nonnulla. Cap. 7.455 Di&longs;&longs;eritur quod nam &longs;it medium ad quod terra &longs;uapte natura mouetur. Cap. 8.457 Nonnulla de definitione granis & leuis afferuntur. Cap. 9.461 Quodgraue, & leue &longs;ecundùm naturam talia &longs;int, non comparatè. Cap. 10.462 Contra veteres, qui&longs;olùm cau&longs;&longs;is grauis, & leuis comparatè perqui&longs;iuerint. Cap. 11.463 Vtrùm definitio grauis, & leuis per motum tradita &longs;it, an per quietem. Cap. 12.465 Soluuntur aubitationes nonnullæ contra definitiones grauis & leuis, atque ibi quædam do generatione montium adiunguntur. Cap. 13.466 Explicatur an'ne grane & leue &longs;it in proprio loco. Cap. 14.468 Alexandri dictum de pote&longs;tate grauis & leuis, & qu&ecedil; cumip&longs;o Themi&longs;tius, et Auerroes di&longs;&longs;erant. C. 15.470 Quòd omnia, quæ rectà mouentur, habeant aliquem motum naturalem. Cap. 16.471 Omnia quæ rectà mouentur grauia aut leuia fore concluditur. Cap. 17.473 Quæritur vtrùm vnius corporis &longs;implicis vnus tantùm, plures'ne &longs;int motus. Cap. 18.474 Spectatur &longs;igillatim vtrùm a&longs;cen&longs;us aqu&ecedil; &longs;it naturalis, an pror&longs;us contra naturam. Cap. 19.476 Auctoris &longs;ententia de aqu&ecedil; a&longs;cen&longs;u pronunciatur, & tolluntur obiectiones. Cap. 20. Pag.477 Cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; qu&ecedil;runtur, ob quas elementa media magis grauia, quàm leuia &longs;int. Cap. 21.478 Edoccntur cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil;, vnde elementa media producuntur. Cap. 22.480 Vtrum aergrautor &longs;it c&ecedil;teris grauibus in &longs;uo loco, an non. Cap. 23.482 Quid dederit locum ei &longs;u&longs;picioni, quòd aer in &longs;uo loco c&ecedil;teris grauior &longs;ie. Cap. 24.483 Dubitationes aliquæ tolluntur, & cau&longs;&longs;a exploratur quorundam problematum adrerum pondera per-tinentium. Cap. 25.485 Explicatur ratio qua cucurbitul&ecedil; trabunt. Cap. 26.487 Vtrùm tractio &longs;erpentis à ceruo inanis auxilio ministretur, nec'ne. Cap. 27.489 Decau&longs;&longs;is adiuuantibus grauitatem & leuitatem. Cap. 28.491 Generalia quædam problemata de his quæ vehuntur in aquis, ex Archimede di&longs;&longs;oluuntur. Cap. 29.492 Aliquot problemata de motib. qui per aquam, velper aerem & aquam communiter fiunt, proponuntur. C. 30.494 Docetur, vt eadem &longs;itratio totius & partis in motibus natur alibus. Cap. 31.497 Vtrùm grauitas, & leuitas &longs;int formæ qu&ecedil; compleant &longs;ub&longs;tantiam corporum &longs;implicium, an non. C. 32.498 Accuratius e&longs;&longs;entia grauitatis leuitati&longs;que conquiritur. Cap. 33.500 Quemadmodum grauitas & leuitas cadant in &longs;en&longs;um. Cap. 34.501 Demotibus præter naturam, & de proiectis contra Platonem. Cap. 35.503 Ari&longs;toielis &longs;nina de proiectorum motu recen&longs;etur, & ea qu&ecedil; contra illam afferri &longs;olent exponuntur. Cap. 36.504 Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententia de proiectorum motu confirmatur. Cap. 37.505 Ea &longs;ignificantur, quæ pro Ari&longs;totele de proiectorum motu dici po&longs;&longs;unt. Cap. 38.507 Ali&ecedil; difficultates, aduer&longs;us Aristotelicam po&longs;itionem de proiectorum motu tolluntur, & aliorum pro-blematum can&longs;&longs;&ecedil; recen&longs;entur. Cap. 39.511 Aliorum &longs;ententiæ recitantur de motu hypeccaumatis. Cap. 40.512 Euertitur noua quædam ratio, qua dilemma Ari&longs;totelis de hypeccaumatis motu colligitur. Cap. 41.513 Auctoris &longs;ententia de hypeccaumatis motu constituitur. Cap. 42.515 Di&longs;&longs;eritur an'ne quies natur alis ante cedat motui violento. Cap. 43.517 Exponitur de quibu&longs;dam con&longs;equentibus motum. Cap. 44.519 Decomp aratione motuum. Cap. 45.520 Recen&longs;entur &longs;ummatim regul&ecedil; proportionum ab Ari&longs;totele conftitutæ. Cap. 46.523 Aliorum &longs;ententiæ de cau&longs;&longs;is proportionis in velocitate motuum quàm breui&longs;&longs;imè recitantur. Cap. 47.524 Nonnullæ è &longs;ententiis &longs;uperioribus de motuum exuperatione confutantur. Cap. 48.526 Defenditur à nonnullis obiectionibus &longs;ententia, quam ip&longs;i de velocitatis cau&longs;&longs;a profitemur. Cap. 49.527 Examinantur aliæ regulæ quas aut contra Ari&longs;totelem aut ex Ari&longs;totele ip&longs;o Latini statuerunt. C. 50.528 Vnde velocitas motus in &longs;patio iudicetur, & ex quo potentiæ atque impotenti&ecedil; termini con&longs;titucndi &longs;int. C. 51.530 Quæ deregulis potentiæ & impotentiæ dubitantur à nonnullis. Cap. 52.532 Quæ de potentiæ, & impotentiæ regulis à Latinis decreta &longs;unt, adnotantur, & dubitata di&longs;&longs;oluuntur. C. 53.534 SEXTVS EST DE CAVSSIS ORTVS ET INTERITVS. Qv Aeritvr an &longs;it generatio, & per accidens e&longs;&longs;e per&longs;uadetur. Cap. 1.536 Aduer&longs;us antiquos qui generationem, ab alteratione non &longs;ecernebant. Cap. 2.538 Contra componentes corpora è planis. Cap. 3.539 Variæ notiones elementi recen&longs;entur, & elementum definitur. Cap. 4.541 Numerus elementorum perquiritur. Cap. 5.543 Utrùm elementa quæ corpora &longs;unt, aterna &longs;int, an intereant aliquando. Cap. 6.544 Explicatio Textus LV. III. de c&ecedil;lo. Cap. 7.545 Cur elementum totum &longs;imul corrumpi non po&longs;&longs;it. Cap. 8.547 Quemadmodum proponatur iterum primo de Generatione qu&ecedil;rendum, an generatio &longs;it. Cap. 9.548 An &longs;it aliquid quod generetur &longs;impliciter. Cap. 10.549 Explicatio quorundam locorum ex 1. Phys. Cap. 11.551 Quemadmodum generatio & corruptio perpetuò &longs;int. Cap. 12.553 Vtrùm &longs;it vna pote&longs;tas ad contraria, nec'ne. Cap. 13.555 Vtrùm corruptio vnius &longs;it altertus generatio, nec'ne. Cap. 14.556 Redduntur cau&longs;&longs;æ, cur è mutatiombus quædam &longs;impliciter appellantur, aliæ quodammodo, & iudicium no&longs;trum ad&longs;cribitur. Cap. 15.557 Adhuc per&longs;equimur cau&longs;&longs;as eiu&longs;dem problematis, & quærimus vtrùm mutationes &longs;emper terminen-tur co quod e&longs;t; an'ne interdum finiantur co quod non e&longs;t. Cap. 16.558 Uera Aristotelis &longs;ententia de eo, quòd corruptio finiatur eo quod non e&longs;t, edi&longs;&longs;eritur. Cap. 17.560 Quemadmodum materia &longs;it vna numero. Cap. 18.562 Differentiæ materi&ecedil; & generis exponuntur. Cap. 19.564 De&longs;imtio generatioms a&longs;&longs;ignatur. Cap. 20.566 Vtrùm potentia &longs;it e&longs;&longs;entia materi&ecedil;, an illi accidat. Cap. 21.567 Di&longs;&longs;eritur &longs;it ne &longs;ignata materiæ pote&longs;tas accidens, an &longs;ubstantia. Cap. 22.570 Diluuntur ea quibus probatur potc&longs;iatem e&longs;&longs;entiam materi&ecedil; non e&longs;&longs;e. Cap. 23. Pag.572 Vtrùm materia per &longs;e &longs;it; an pcudeat in eo, quòd e&longs;t, ex forma. Cap. 24.573 Quemadmodum materia &longs;e habcat ad formam, & quæ &longs;it eius definiendæ ratio. Cap. 25.575 Vtrùm aliquid forma gener ationi præcedat in materia, an &longs;ola ip&longs;a materia &longs;ufficiat. Cap. 26.577 Quemadmodum priuatio &longs;it principium rerum mobilium. Cap. 27.579 Utrùm partes habeant aliquam formam à totius forma &longs;ecretam de prædicamento &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, nec ne, & Latinorum opiniones recen&longs;entur. Cap. 28.581 Argumenta oppo&longs;ita de partium forma diluuntur. Cap. 29.583 Recitantur opiniones aliorum de multitudine formarum. Cap. 30.584 Ali&ecedil; rationes afferuntur ad multitudmen formarum approbandam. & no&longs;tra &longs;ententia recitatur. C. 31.587 Re&longs;pondemus ad obiectiones quæ à Thomistis afferuntur de multitudine formarum. Cap. 32.589 Argumenta D. Thom&ecedil; aduer&longs;us id quod è communiore forma, minu&longs;que communi &longs;iat vnum, tanquam pote&longs;tate & actn. Cap. 33.592 Scotistarum & Pataninorum argumenta de formarum multitudine diluuntur. Cap. 34.593 Zimar&ecedil; argumenta de formarum multitudine percurrimus, & reliqua Scotistarum apponuntur. C. 35.594 Reliqua Scotistarum argumenta de formarum multitudine tolluntur. Cap. 36.595 Ex definitione generationis colligitur, an'ne re&longs;oluatur quod interit, v&longs;que in materiam primam. C. 37.597 Diluuntur obiectiones quæ &longs;olent afferri in eam &longs;ententiam quam nos de &longs;ubstantiæ re&longs;olutione defen-dimus. Cap. 38.599 Dere&longs;olutione accidentium in materiam. Cap. 39.601 Initia generationum fatalium, & qua&longs;i proœmium ad ea quæ de fato complcstitur. Cap. 40.603 Complures antiquorum &longs;ententi&ecedil; de fato brcuiter recitantur. Cap. 41.604 In cos qui omnia nece&longs;&longs;ariò euenire putabant, & generatim & &longs;igillatim di&longs;putatur. Cap. 42.606 Adre&longs;pon&longs;iones eorum qui a&longs;&longs;erunt fatum, nonnulla dicuntur. Cap. 43.608 Aduer&longs;us Pomponatium qui Stoicos defendebat. Cap. 44.609 Vtrùm omnia contingenter, an nece&longs;&longs;ariò fiant. Cap. 45.610 Quid nec e&longs;&longs;arium &longs;it, & eius &longs;pecies, & cau&longs;&longs;æ generatim exponuntur. Cap. 46.612 Explicatur quid nece&longs;&longs;itas &longs;it, vtrum ne res, an modus. Cap. 47.613 Natura contingentis explanatur. Cap. 48.615 Contingentis cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; diligentius explicantur. Cap. 49.617 Auerrois digre&longs;&longs;io explicatur ex T. XLVIII. Secundi Phy&longs;. de contingente ad vtrumlibet. Cap. 50.618 Qu&ecedil; &longs;it anini no&longs;tri &longs;ententia de contingente æqualiter. Cap. 51.619 Tertium caput eiu&longs;dem digre&longs;&longs;ionis expenditur diligenter quo docetur, an nece&longs;&longs;arium & contingens accidente &longs;olo distinguatur. Cap. 52.621 Quæ de fato cen&longs;uerit Aristotcles: & dubitationes nonnull&ecedil; diluuntur. Cap. 53.622 Explicatur ratio nece&longs;&longs;itatis inter cau&longs;&longs;as, & effecta quæ fatalia constituimus. Cap. 54.623 Reliqua argumenta diluuntur, quibus o&longs;tendcbatur fatum, & contingens non congruere. Cap. 55.625 Quæritur definitio monstri. Cap. 56.626 Vtrum ne materies, an efficiens &longs;int mon&longs;tri cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil;. Cap. 57.628 Vtrùm efficiens fine potiatur quodammodo, dum efficit mon&longs;trum, an non. Cap. 58.629 De cau&longs;&longs;is mon&longs;trorum &longs;igillatim. Cap. 59.631 Deperiodorum cau&longs;is in viuentibus. Cap. 60.633 Nonnulla de pro&longs;per a fortuna ex Ari&longs;totelis dictis ad&longs;cribuntur. Cap. 61.635 An à diuer&longs;is ordims eiu&longs;dem cau&longs;&longs;is proximis idem na&longs; po&longs;&longs;it effectus, an alius ex aliis, & complu-ra argumenta ad alteram partem problematis afferuntur. Cap. 62.636 Defenditur altera pars problematis, & diluuntur eæ rationes quibus concludebatur eundem effectum à diuer&longs;is cau&longs;&longs;is na&longs;ci non po&longs;&longs;e. Cap. 63.638 Aliqua notantur ad mutationes elementorum pertinentia. Cap. 64.640 LIBER SEPTIMVS QVIEST DE INCREMENTO. Proponvntvr ea de quibus agendum e&longs;t, & incrementi &longs;ubiectum indagatur. Cap. 1.643 De modo quo fit auctio, & de ip&longs;ius materia. Cap. 2.644 An &longs;it corpus de prædicamento &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Cap. 3.646 Explor antur rones Auerrois in Auicennam, & corpus in prædicamento &longs;ubstantiæ collocatur. Cap. 4.647 Aliæ docti&longs;&longs;imorum virorum rationes recitantur contra corporis formam. Cap. 5.649 Reliquæ rationes contra formam corporis allat&ecedil; diluuntur. Cap. 6.651 Proponitur quæstio de quantitate interminata. Cap. 7.653 In medio potur alia venerum rationes contra quantitatem interminatam. Cap. 8.654 Adea qu&ecedil; de quantitate mterminata contra veteres Aristotelis interpretes dicta &longs;unt. Cap. 9.656 Exponitur opinio no&longs;tra de natura quantitatis interminat&ecedil;, & veterum Peripateticorum auctoritate confirmatur. Cap. 10.659 Ea diluuur qu&ecedil; de inteormmata quantitate dubitata &longs;unt, & ad exitum quæstio perducitur. Cap. 11.663 Aliqua exponuntur de natura quantitatis. Cap. 12. Page.665 Tangimus aliqua de quantitate Mathematica propter Achillini dubitationem. Cap. 13.669 Infimtum in natura, & quibus modis e&longs;&longs;e contingat. Cap. 14.670 Notantur eorum fallaciæ qui contra Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententiam de infinitate decreuerint. Cap. 15.672 De terminis rerum natura con&longs;tantium. Cap. 16.674 De cau&longs;&longs;is efficientibus quantitatem. Cap. 17.775 Ut id quod e&longs;t pote&longs;tate quantum, &longs;it in ortu & auctione. Cap. 18.678 Conditiones communes auctionis exponuntur, & docetur quid nam augeatur. Cap. 19.679 Quid &longs;it id quo augetur, & explicatio T. XXXIV. Primi de Gen. Cap. 20.681 Explicatur Textus libri II. de Anima, & di&longs;&longs;eritur quid e&longs;t id quo nutritur. Cap. 21.683 Quædam ad intelligentiam illius attributi communis afferuntur, vt auctio fiat &longs;ecundum quodlibet &longs;i-gnum. Cap. 22.685 An per &longs;e totum, an partes potius augeantur. Cap. 23.686 Quo fiat auctio &longs;igillotim exponitur. Cap. 24.688 De &longs;ubiecto auctionis, & differentia inter auctionem, & alias eiu&longs;dem generis mutationes. Cap. 25.689 Quæ affinitas inter auctionem, & c&ecedil;teras eiu&longs;dem generis mutationes intercedat. Cap. 26.690 Quemadmodum nutrix & auctrix di&longs;tinguantur. Cap. 27.692 Natura decrementi colligitur ex &longs;upradistis. Cap. 28.694 De fine auctricis vberius di&longs;putatur. Cap. 29.696 Quæ&longs;tio proponitur, an auctio &longs;it motus continuns, & Auerrois opinio recitatur. Cap. 30.697 Explorantur Auerrois dicta defendentis incrementum non e&longs;&longs;e continuum. Cap. 31.999 Quid nobis decrementi continuatione placeat, edi&longs;&longs;eritur, & opiniones aliorum conuelluntur. Cap. 32.700 Vtrùm crementum & decrementum &longs;int continui quidam motus; an &longs;tatus inter vtraque intercedat. C. 33.701 Eius qu&ecedil;&longs;tionis ergò Idem'ne perpetuò con&longs;eruetur id quod cre&longs;cit ab initio v&longs;que ad finem di&longs;&longs;eritur ge neratim, an id quod interit, idem numero reuerti queat. Cap. 34.702 An idem &longs;it ab initio v&longs;que ad extremum id quod augetur, & ad hoc in&longs;titutum Auerrois digre&longs;&longs;io de-claratur. Cap. 35.705 Quemadmodum forma viuentis beneficio caloris, & humoris innati con&longs;eruetur. Cap. 36.708 Euertuntur rationes, quibus probatur idem non e&longs;&longs;e indiuiduum ab initio vitæ v&longs;que ad exitum. Cap. 37.710 Vt id quod augetur, ex qualibet parte fiat matus, & quod partium genus alij po&longs;uerint. Cap. 38.712 Aliorum &longs;ententiis refutatis exponitur quid placeat nobis de eo, quid auctio fiat &longs;ecundum formam C. 39.713 Rationes Philoponi quas in&longs;truxit contra decretum Ari&longs;totelis de natura incrementi diluuntur. C. 40.715 In quam natura &longs;peciem motus rarefactio referenda &longs;it. Cap. 41.717 Rarefactionis definitio perponditur, & purgatur ab obicctis. Cap. 42.719 Quemadmodum rare factione pota vacuum non introducatur. Cap. 43.720 LIBER OCTAVVS QVI EST DE ALTERATIONE. Nonnvlla di&longs;putantur quæ ad accidentium mutationem pertineant generatim, ae pri-mo loco de &longs;ine. Cap. 1.723 Quo ad facultas accidentis generando procedat. Cap. 2.725 Diluuntur rationes quibus oppugnatur accidens in ortu &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; non e&longs;&longs;e in&longs;trumentum. Cap. 3.726 Vtrùm qualitatum &longs;it actio quædam propria, nec quatenus unt in&longs;trumenta &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, an non. Cap. 4.729 In&longs;tituitur quæstio de &longs;trato accidentis, & Auicenn&ecedil; &longs;ententia perpenditur. Cap. 5.731 De concordia accidentis cum &longs;ub&longs;tantia, vbi Simplicij &longs;ententia defenditur. Cap. 6.732 Expenduntur ea quæ de &longs;ubiecto accidentis in vtranque partem di&longs;&longs;eri &longs;olent. Cap. 7.734 Quæritur an duo accidentia quæ numero di&longs;&longs;erunt, in codem &longs;ubiecto con&longs;istere valeant. Cap. 8.735 Ve&longs;tigatur vtrùm pote&longs;tas in qualitatibus, an &longs;ubstantiis reponenda &longs;it. Cap. 9.737 Quæ nos de pote&longs;tatis natura con&longs;tituimus, & obiecta diluuntur. Cap. 10.739 Queritur an'ne &longs;ecundum figuram &longs;it alteratio. Cap. 11.741 Vtrùm alteratio &longs;it ad di&longs;po&longs;itionem & habitum, an alius quidam motus. Cap. 12.743 Quæ veteres de elementorum formis decreuerint. Cap. 13.745 Afferuntur in medio nonnulla quæ pro Gr&ecedil;cis de elementorum formis dici po&longs;&longs;unt. Cap. 14.746 Auerrois &longs;ententia de elementorum formis proponitur. Cap. 15.748 Auerrois &longs;ententia de elementorum forma perpenditur, & id præcipuè, an'ne intendatur, & remit-tatur. Cap. 16.749 Aliqua ex Græcorum dictis afferuntur, & exponitur qui&longs;int animi nostri &longs;en&longs;us de elementorum for-mis. Cap. 17.751 Exploratur vis eius effati, quod vere e&longs;t nulli accidit. Cap. 18.753 Diluuntur reliquæ obiectiones qu&ecedil; contra Græcos de elementorum formis afferri &longs;olent. Cap. 19.755 Sint ne ponendæ octo primæ qualitates in elementis. Cap. 20.756 De ordme primarum qualitatum, carumq gradibus in &longs;ingulis elementis accuratè di&longs;quiritur. Cap. 21.757 Di&longs;&longs;eritur de cans intentionis, & remi&longs;&longs;ionis. Cap. 22.759 Aliæ &longs;ententiæ not antur de cau&longs;&longs;is intentionis & remi&longs;&longs;ionis, & fundamenta po&longs;itionis nostræ iaciun-tur. Cap. 23. Pag.761 Queritur vtrùm contr ariorum partes vnà con&longs;ictant; an'ne inter &longs;e pror&longs;us oppugnent. Cap. 24.763 Ex con&longs;titutis aliquæ dubitationes pelluntur, & nonnulla contra intentionem & remi&longs;&longs;ionem di&longs;putan-tur. Cap. 25.765 Mediorum &longs;peculatio proponitur, & multa de illorum natura tractantur. Cap. 26.767 Sint ne media magis oppo&longs;ita, quàm extrema, & quæ'nam &longs;it eorum con&longs;titutio. Cap. 27.770 Alea quæ contra can&longs;&longs;as intentionis & remi&longs;&longs;ionis obiecta &longs;unt. Cap. 28.772 Explicatur, vt qualitates in corporibus &longs;implicibus &longs;ine contrario plus, & minus accipiant. Cap. 29.774 Ex dictis aliqua de elementoium e&longs;&longs;entia dubitantur. Cap. 30.776 Quemadmodum elementorum formæ distinguantur. Cap. 31.777 Di&longs;&longs;eritur in vtr anque partem de oppo&longs;itione caloris, & frigoris. Cap. 32.779 Vtrùm primæ qualitates materiam per &longs;pecies afficiant, an &longs;pecie nihil opus &longs;it. Cap. 37.781 Affiatur'ne indiuiduum, & quemadmodum. Cap. 34.782 Quædam de alteratione generalia tractantur. Cap. 35.783 Explicatur proprianotio contactus. Cap. 36.784 Utrùm omne agens agat per contactum, an etiam longinquum afficere queat. Cap. 37.785 Vtrùm ea que po&longs;ituram habent, occupent locum, an loci pror&longs;us expertia &longs;int. Cap. 48.787 Can&longs;&longs;e vestigantur actionis & perpe&longs;&longs;ionis. Cap. 39.788 Actionis & affectionis cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;eor&longs;um recen&longs;entur. Cap. 40.789 Quæritur vtrùm idem &longs;e ip&longs;um afficere queat, an ab alio &longs;emper affectio na&longs;catur. Cap. 41.790 Di&longs;&longs;eritur, vtrùm &longs;imile à &longs;imili affici po&longs;&longs;it, an à di&longs;&longs;imili nece&longs;&longs;ariò. Cap. 42.792 Soláne formæ multitudo amplificet actionem. Cap. 43.793 Instituitur di&longs;ceptatio de repa&longs;&longs;ione, & ad fal&longs;am partem problematis argumenta recitantur. Cap. 44.795 Sententi&ecedil; complurium Latinorum derepa&longs;&longs;ione confutantur. Cap. 45.796 Quæ via repa&longs;&longs;ionis ratio defendenda &longs;it. Cap. 46.798 Euertuntur obicctiones quæ contra repa&longs;sionem afferuntur. Cap. 47.800 Ad qu&ecedil;&longs;tionem de mixtura deuenitur, & aliarum &longs;ectarum opiniones recitantur. Cap. 48.802 Quæ de mixtione contra Auicennam di&longs;&longs;eruntur, & reliqua quæ cæteri pro&longs;itentur. Cap. 49.803 Auicennæ dogma de mixtione defenditur. Cap. 50.805 Vtrùm forma mixti di&longs;crepet àtemperamento nec'ne. Cap. 51.807 LIBER NONVS EST DE CONVER SIONE. PRAEFATIO AD FERD. MED. M. ETRVRIAE DVC. SERENISS. De motu generatim di&longs;&longs;eri initio Octaui libri, de Phy&longs;ico auditu. Cap. 1.813 Perpenditur à natura motus, an'ne ip&longs;e generatim perpetuus &longs;it. Cap. 2.814 Soluuntur Peripateticè rationes Philoponi contra Ari&longs;totelem. Cap. 3.816 Exploratur Ari&longs;totelis ratio quæ ab instantis natura dicta e&longs;t. Cap. 4.817 Probatur motum nunquam ce&longs;&longs;aturum à natura motus. Cap. 5.819 Errores veterum, qui mundum cœpi&longs;&longs;e volebant deteguntur, & eorundem dicta quædam refutantur. C. 6.820 Vtrùm ab æterno principio quicquam noui po&longs;&longs;it proximè profici&longs;ci, nec'ne. Cap. 7.822 Quid re&longs;pondeant ad obiecta Peripatetici, quibus aliquid noui proximè ab &ecedil;terno profici&longs;ci probatur, quid ue ad eorum rationes dicendum &longs;it. Cap. 8.824 Utrùm motus animalis fiat ab externo, &longs;it ne pror&longs;us internus. Cap. 9.826 Humanarum actionum primordia ve&longs;tigantur. Cap. 10.828 Quemadmodum motiones in homine obeantur. Cap. 11.829 Enaratur ordo principiorum mouentium in animali. Cap. 12.831 Examinantur argumenta oppo&longs;ita, & libertatis human&ecedil; principia &longs;tatuuntur. Cap. 13.833 Alia nonnulla ad finem attinentia ad&longs;cribuntur. Cap. 14.834 Adiungitur ad ea quæ de prinipus actionis expo&longs;ita &longs;unt, aliquid de altero illo con&longs;ilio, quod non &longs;e-quitur actio. Cap. 15.835 Conclud tur vt motus in rebus &longs;e habeat, quo ad earum &longs;ubiecta, & tempus. Cap. 16.836 Re&longs;olutur ordo mobilium in id quod per &longs;e mouetur. Cap. 17.838 Quar atione, qua'ue &longs;pecie motus id quod e&longs;t per &longs;e mobile moueatur. Cap. 18.839 Quemadmodum &longs;e habeat primum per &longs;e mobile ad &longs;uas parteis. Cap. 19.840 Ratio, qua concluditur e&longs;&longs;e motorem quendam æternum. Cap. 20.841 Concluditur ab&longs;olute primum motorem e&longs;&longs;e, & alia qu&ecedil; ad illu&longs;trandas eas rationes attinent, afferun-tur. Cap. 21.842 Vtrùm via qu&ecedil; vtitur motu, nece&longs;&longs;aria &longs;it ad inueniendas e&longs;&longs;entias à materia &longs;eparatas, an alia qu&ecedil;dam &longs;ubueniat. Cap. 22.846 Vtrùm vna tantùm &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparata &longs;it, nec'ne. Cap. 23. Pag.848 Quemadmodum &longs;e habeant prima mouentia quo ad perfectionem. Cap. 24.851 Quòd &longs;it vnus quidam motus omnium primus, & quis'nam hic &longs;it. Cap. 25.852 Quòd conuer&longs;io &longs;ola continua &longs;it, & prima &longs;pecies lationis. Cap. 26.854 Vtrùm conuer&longs;ioni alius qui&longs;piam motus contrarius &longs;it, nec'ne. Cap. 27.856 Reliqua de motuum repugnantia &longs;ub&longs;cribuntur, & de ratione men&longs;uræ dubitatur. Cap. 28.857 Vtrùm in &longs;emicirculo circulo'ue fiant contrariis motus nec'ne. Cap. 29.860 Denatura centri & loco cœli c&ecedil;terorum &longs;ententiæ recitantur. Cap. 30.863 Aliorum opiniones de loco c&ecedil;li confutantur. Cap. 31.865 Nostra &longs;ententia constituitur de loco cœli. Cap. 32.866 Aliorum &longs;ententiæ conciliantur, & oppo&longs;ita de loco cœli di&longs;&longs;oluuntur. Cap. 33.867 Aggredimur docendum, vt conuer&longs;io men&longs;ura &longs;it aliorum motuum & initia temporis explor antur. Cap. 34.869 Quemadmodum tempus requir at animæ mutationem. Cap. 35.870 Colligitur definitio temporis, & aduer&longs;us illam dubitatur. Cap. 36.872 Denatura in&longs;tantis, eiu&longs;demque. origine nonnulla. Cap. 37.874 Summa temporis definitio colligitur, & contra dubitatur. Cap. 38.875 Cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; qu&ecedil;runtur multarum proprietatum qu&ecedil; tempori ad&longs;cribuntur. Cap. 39.877 Quot modis accipiatur id quod dicitur e&longs;&longs;e in tempore, & vt e&longs;&longs;e motu&longs;it in tempore. Cap. 40.879 De &ecedil;uo nonnulla Peripateticè di&longs;&longs;eruntur. Cap. 41.880 Quemadmodum tempus metiatur quietem. Cap. 42.883 Verùm tempus &longs;ine ope anim&ecedil; &longs;ub&longs;istat, nec'ne. Cap. 43.885 Vtrùm &longs;it idem tempus omuibus commune, an cuiu&longs;que proprium. Cap. 44.887 Explicatio loci cuiu&longs;dam ad extremum 4. Phy&longs;. Cap. 45.888 Edi&longs;&longs;eritur quemadmodum tempus &longs;it men&longs;ura motus. Cap. 49.889 Quid pars, quid &longs;pecies temporis, & cur à &longs;ole metrum temporis accipiendum &longs;it. Cap. 47.891 LIBER DECIMVS EST DE SVBSTANTIIS QVAE MOTVM IN COELO EFFICIVNT. Coelvm non e&longs;&longs;e corpus compo&longs;itum è quattuor elementis. Cap. 1.893 Vtrùm corpora illa quæ elementa vocantur, per &longs;e &longs;eor&longs;um exi&longs;tere queant nec'ne. Cap. 2.895 C&ecedil;lum ignem non e&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;tratur contra Plotinum. Cap. 3.856 Que c&ecedil;li materia &longs;it, quid alij decreuerint. Cap. 4.898 In &longs;uperiora di&longs;putatur, & o&longs;tenditur, vt c&ecedil;lum &longs;e habeat ad alterum principium quod est forma. Cap. 5.900 Exponitur de natura c&ecedil;le&longs;tis &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;igillatim, & ex Auerroe dubitata diluuntur. Cap. 6.902 De eodem & diuer&longs;o, atque ibidem cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; distinctionis afferuntur. Cap. 7.903 Spectatur diligentius quemadmodum materia c&ecedil;li &longs;eparetur àmateria caducorum. Cap. 8.905 Philoponi latinorumque. obiectiones, de materia c&ecedil;li aduer&longs;us Ari&longs;totelem è medio tolluntur. Cap. 9.906 Proponitur quæstio de mundi perpetuitate, & locus quidam Aristotelis examinatur. Cap. 10.909 Variæ philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ententiæ de mundi perpetuitate recitantur. Cap. 11.911 Contra Platonicorum &longs;ententiam de mundi æternitate, & eorum rationes di&longs;&longs;oluuntur. Cap. 12.913 Vrùm quod per &longs;e caducum est, ab alio perpetuum in genere &longs;ubstanti&ecedil; reddi po&longs;&longs;it, nec'ne. Cap. 13.916 Quæritur vtrùm ne accidens ab alio perpetuum reddatur, an intereat nece&longs;&longs;ariò. Cap. 14.919 Aggredimur explicationem quæ&longs;tionis illius, &longs;it'ne mundus vnus, an plures. Cap. 15.921 Qu&ecedil;runtur nonnulla quæ ad vniuer&longs;i perfectionem &longs;pectant. Cap. 16.924 Quemadmodum vnum, & multa &longs;e habeant ad perfectum. Cap. 17.927 Cur orbes quanto plus à primo recedunt, non pluribus motibus ferantur, & cur vna tantum &longs;tella in orbibus inferioribus; infinitæ verò propemodum &longs;int in octaua &longs;phæra, ac quæ&longs;tioni institut&ecedil; finis imponitur. Cap. 18.928 Quæ de mouentium principiorum infinitate Peripatetici decreuerint. Cap. 19.930 Quid ex Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententia de infinitate mouentinm decernendum &longs;it, & argumenta oppo&longs;ita di-luuntur. Cap. 20.932 Vnde petantur initia motus in c&ecedil;lo. Cap. 21.935 Quòd c&ecedil;lum &longs;it animatum, ex communi &longs;en&longs;u philo&longs;ophorum ostenditur. Cap. 22.937 Deo primùm &longs;ubiici animam nece&longs;&longs;ariò. Cap. 23.938 Di&longs;&longs;eritur de po&longs;ituræ differentiis in corpore cœle&longs;ti. Cap. 24.940 Diluuntur ea quæ opponi &longs;olent Ari&longs;toteli de po&longs;itur&ecedil; differentiis. Cap. 25.941 Vtrum'ne idem &longs;it anima c&ecedil;li, & mouens primum, an &longs;ecum necc&longs;&longs;ariò differant. Cap. 26.943 Quid de anima c&ecedil;li Peripateticè defendi po&longs;&longs;e credamus. Cap. 27.944 Dubitationes aliquæ tolluntur è medio quibus decretum de anima c&ecedil;li pote&longs;t oppugnari. Cap. 28.946 Quæritur quod'nam genus animæ &longs;it quod c&ecedil;lo a&longs;&longs;ignatur. Cap. 29.949 Qua'nam tatione moueat motor primus, & in eam partem di&longs;&longs;eritur, quòd moueat vt efficiens. Cap. 30. Pag.950 O&longs;tenditur, Deum ex Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententia mouere &longs;olùm vt &longs;inem. Cap. 31.952 Pergimus ad reliqua vnde & aliorum auctoritate, & dubitatiombus qu bu&longs;dam &longs;ublatis primum mo-uens apud Aristatelem finis vnius rationem habere confirmemus. Cap. 32.955 Explicatur ratio, qua Deus mouet c&ecedil;lum &longs;petiatim. Cap. 33.958 Reprehenduntur argumenta quæ pro altera parte problematis illius afferebantur, qua Deum proba-batur mouere, vt efficiens. Cap. 34.959 Aliæ latinorum rationes perpenduntur, quibus confirmatur etiam Deum e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am efficientem. Cap. 35.961 Vtrùm mouens primùm agens liberum &longs;it, an naturale. Cap. 36.964 Quæritur vtrùm Deus, Ari&longs;totele auctore, aliquid no&longs;catextra&longs;e. Cap. 37.966 Quid Peripateticè dicendum &longs;it ad ea, quæ contra hanc partem problematis, &longs;it'ne in Deo libertas, al-lata &longs;unt. Cap. 38.970 Quem cultum diis philo&longs;ophi veteres adhiberent, & quantum distaret à vero. Cap. 39.972 In&longs;tituitur quæ&longs;tio de ordine mundi, atque ibi proponitur di&longs;putatio, &longs;it ne Deus omnium men&longs;ura. Cap. 40.975 Exquiritur, vnde natura &longs;umatur ratio men&longs;uræ qua rerum perfectionem metimur. Cap. 41.977 Quem admodum ratio men&longs;uræ congruat cum diuina &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Cap. 42.979 Quod nam compo&longs;itionis genus men&longs;uræ &longs;upponatur, vbi multa de compo&longs;itione rationis, & rei di&longs;&longs;e-runtur. Cap. 43.981 Quod nam compo&longs;itionis genus pertineat ad mentes àmateria &longs;olutas. Cap. 44.983 Reuertimur ad explicationem ordinis vniuer&longs;i, ac de Idea nonnulla ponuntur. Cap. 45.988 Ari&longs;totelis placita ab ideis abborrere monstratur, & diluuntur obiecta. Cap. 46.989 Diligentius explicatur quis ordo rerum &longs;it in vniuer&longs;o. Cap. 47.993 De ordine constituto inter Deum & reliqua entia dubitatur, & exponitur &longs;igillatim, vt quodque pen-deat ex ip&longs;o in eo quod e&longs;t. Cap. 48.995 Exponitur ordo qui est in rebus quæ &longs;unt ex Deo, pr&ecedil;cipuè verò in c&ecedil;lo ad inferiora. Cap. 49.998 Multa de eo genere finis qui dicitur rei genitæ, & cui; nec non edi&longs;&longs;eritur, vt homo &longs;it omnium finis. Cap. 50.999 An'ne mala ab vniuer&longs;i ordine arceantur. Cap. 51.1001 Vniuer&longs;alium & primarum cau&longs;&longs;arum munera explicantur. Cap. 52.1003 Quæ bona præ&longs;tent in natur a prim&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;æ Deus & c&ecedil;lum quo'ue differant ab aliis cau&longs;&longs;is. Cap. 53.1006 Illuctratur ratio dininæ gubernationis, & exponitur qualis &longs;it energia primi finis. Cap. 54.1009

ERRATA SIC CORRIGITO. RIMOLOCO PONITVR NVMERVS

Paginarum, &longs;ecundo Littera, tertio numerus Linearum, quarto correctio.

EX PRIMO LIBRO.

3. D 3. Architectoni & &longs;ic vbique 4. e 4. id quod concr. 6. non vid. 11. nil vetet. 6. vt nota. 2, inductiuæ rat. 5. b 11. cre­duntur. 6. e 5. rei &longs;eientia deficiet. 15. ponet. 10. euertetur. 7. d 3. di&longs;cedamus. 6. &longs;ed vel cog. 8. e 7. quòd iud. 12. opera. 7. quippe quòd. 5. præcedit, 12. cuiu&longs;cuiu&longs;modi, h 11. fertur. 10. e 12. materiata. xrish. 13. a 8 pote&longs;tas. 2. hoc. 5. in diantes. 14. e 13. tran&longs;ilimus. 1. iudicari 15. f 9. e&longs;&longs;ent. 18. f 14. &longs;ub&longs;tantiam priorem effe. 2. vox apud. 20. e 13. intnxei(/s.f 10. e)/nqa xai e)/nqa 21. 26. faciendæ. b 3. indicare. 3. creatio. 22. g 8. &longs;it. vlt. u(xosatpaw_s 24. f 4. h( texrh. g 11. dguam. 13. ita fit. 25. b 3. producatur &longs;imile nunquam. 10. fit, vt. 2. nam dicere po&longs;. d 11. Ati&longs;. inter ita. 26. e 1. dum fit. 11. En tibt. 9. niti &longs;emper. 27. c 13 form&ecedil;. 29. a 2. mouet. 14 efficeret. 30. c 9. ab&longs;olutus. 2. &longs;int. 31. c 1. a)ntereidousin. 32. e 11. corrige &longs;ic. ta\de\ge/ner e(/tepa plei_on die/shxen h)\ ta\ ei_dei. g 12. fiant. 34. c 4. an'num. 18. notucre. 1. di&longs;tortæ & per plex&ecedil;. h 2. tu/xw|. 4. audis. 5. quadrate. 37. a 9. quid &longs;it. 38. e 11. &longs;ine. 13. &longs;eparantur. 39. d 5. e\xei politixiw\ 15. cluent. 40. h 12. Huic. 14. u(pomnhmatisou_. 42. h 3. quanquae. 13. 14. ex partenece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e. 43. 27. vnmcilalis. 4 cueta. 12. de­negari. 44. e 8. negantem. 4. 10. &longs;ubalternans. 7. definitas. 45. 23. vt alique d 15. primi. 49 a 8 quanque. 50. e 15. anttquae. f 15. philo&longs;ophiæ. 51. a 12. imitantur artes. 14. earum c 12. medicos. 1. mimhtixai\ 52. f 5. qu&ecedil; quid. 8. liberali. 14. fi neque 53. a 9. d\ ei)xo/na. c 3. a)xribei/as. 13. per&longs;picuitas. 54. e 1. quod ad. 9 pareat. 10. &longs;iqua. 12. Phy&longs;icæ. h 7. tran&longs;cendentiæ. 13­habeant &longs;ubitciuntur & determinantur. 55. d 11. fuerat isie/tw. 56. e 10. qua &longs;unt. 57. d 4. materiæ. 58 f 6. at &longs;ic. 7. xerus gnw/sews. 14. hexagonum. 6. conficitur. 60. g 13. à diuino. 2. &longs;ubaltemantem ad hanc ab alia. 61. c 2. concipiamus. 7. cum & fic vbique 63. b 10. corporc&ecedil;. 64. e 13. corpus. 2. fit. 13. qu&ecedil; ope. 1. e&longs;ficitur &longs;ecundum vt. 4. u(perou/sion. 5. natur&ecedil;. 65. b 14. tum præterea c 11. vt vnum definitioni. 66. e 4. no&longs;te. 68. e 7. effectus. 5. quanque 69. b 8. illarum. 15. eclip&longs;i & &longs;ic vbique 70. f 12. &longs;it & alt. 4. addimus. 8. nanque art. 71. a 11. de prim. 72. g 10. fententiam. 73. c 2. effentiam. 74. e 16. mouentis. g 11. in prima. 85. b 12. modo erit dial. 86. e 7. corrige verba Græca &longs;ic fusilo\s tou/twn. 10. du\tis e(xateros. 14. eius e&longs;&longs;e quod. 87. a 15. pote&longs;t <09> c 8. ex co e&longs;&longs;e ord. 90. g 3. recipiunt. 2. e&longs;&longs;e de &longs;ub&longs;t. 94. e 7. &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ vel acc. 14. omne. 12. c&ecedil;dam quid de. 97. a 2. illu&longs;trentur. 6. &longs;impliciter. 107. c 12. & methodo 109. b 15. verum. 1. Placitis. 110. e 4. qua­dam. 9. careat qu&ecedil; contradicentia &longs;unt at. 111. a 6. &longs;ectatorib. ius. 112. f 9 th_qiw. 113. b 11. formas. 114. h 1. Abdcritic&cgrave;. 115. b 5. &longs;i verò. c 11. accepta. 116. e 9. eademque. 119. c 2. prius natura &longs;it & id. 13. excie&longs;cat. 120. f 11. auhibent. 121. 7. niti per &longs;e. 122. f 8. ginesan. inesai. 124. c 1. cau&longs;&longs;am &.

EX LIBRO SECVNDO.

126. F 7. qua &longs;anè. 11. &longs;ecantur 127. b 13. categorias & &longs;ic vbique. 128. g 10. in diff. 130. e 5. aliquando. 131. a 5. e&longs;&longs;e vn­de, b 3. contracto c 12. mintrat. 132. h 11. mihique. &longs;at. 134. h 1. o)/ntos. 136. e 12. e)/rgou. 137. d 11. &longs;imul. 138. g 5. profc&longs;xi. 14. quæque. 15. di&longs;&longs;oluere. 140. h 1. indicand&ecedil;. 141 a 14. auctio. 8. illuminatio. 142. f 4. exprimatur. 143. c 10. lices. 15. partes. 145. c 2. aliud ni&longs;i forma. 146. g 11. innitatur. 15. cauillum & &longs;ic vbique 147. a 13. 14. qualias. 4. dictum e&longs;t. 13. agens. 148. e 1. mutationi dum à diuer&longs;is obiectis immutatur; ideo. 150. c 9. deductione. 151. c 13. diffiuere. 153. d 15. vt cum. 154. a 13. con&longs;tituimus. h s. i/nesai. 155. c 14. e&longs;&longs;e & in 157 b 3. generabilis. 158. f 15. licet. 159. 22. &longs;unt. 11. mutatio­ne. 160. f 14. intelitgit. 162. f 14. di&longs;cimus. 12. fit. 163. c 10. illarum. 165. a 10. re&longs;olutionem. 12. retum po&longs;tulante. 2. in ip&longs;o. 5. quo puncta. 166. f 3. vt dum. 11. lis inter. 167. d 5. ei&longs;dem. 169. b 2. quæque. d 4. virtutem. 170. c 7. mutatione & quan. 171. a 12. vtiique b 7. quæ int. 3. quoquam. 172. g 5. perpe&longs;sionis pernicio&longs;&ecedil; gen&longs;. 173. b 3. motum proprie &longs;ub&longs;t. 175. a 12. forma. 176. e 1. habcant. 2. conflantur. 12. rationis. 14. nominis. 5. &longs;i vt. 177. a 10. concedamus. 9 ill&ecedil;. 178. e 5. interea. 6. & ap. 7. rationalis &. 179. b 11. quam neg. 14. cui. 4. po&longs;teriore. 180. e 7. e Themi&longs;t. 6. in&longs;tas. 14. hac mach. 15. approbas. 181. c 8. fundentur. 13. neque &longs;ic. 7. canon. 10. priuationes. 12. &longs;icubi. 182. f 13. occidunt. 5. prællet. 183. b 7. &longs;tatue. 12. ab&longs;entia. ctu e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e. 184. e 3. &longs;int. 12 manens. 12. &longs;unt. 185. a 10. con&longs;litutiones. 186. f 15. verè dicat. g 7. dicemus. 4. vis. 187. b 15. potiusque. c 8. per &longs;e ip&longs;am 188. e 3. a\llo. 12. v&longs;us nom. 4. aio infor. 8. materia concr. 15. reftituitur, & intenditur. 189. b 1. tamen for. 14. to\ gino/menon, & o. 190. c 5. 7. capiat. 9 idonea. 191. a 6. plurib. ate­riæ portionibus non. 198. g 8. illuminationis in. 199. a 7. interitus? b 2. quod &longs;uum. 205. b 15. c&ecedil;tcris. 10. vt cius. 206. g 2. &longs;upere&longs;t. 1. naturale. 207. c 9. ibi affl 208. c 8. &longs;en&longs;u. 14. o&longs;&longs;enderimus. 209. b 7. ducitur. 4. &longs;i non in eo gen. t in alio. a 10. e 4. &longs;it per. 11. primò de illo de rel h 7. tribuitis. 212. f 8. con&longs;tat. 10. a&longs;&longs;ecutum e&longs;t. 13. demon&longs;trationis vi. 213. a 15. aliquem. 16. omnia. 3. ibi non &longs;er. 214. e 15. præterea. 6. componeres. 15. mobilis. 217. a 3. e&longs;&longs;e de loco. 9. maneat. c 4. mens no&longs;tra. 12. quoniam motum. 218. g 3. nec magis. 15. cominus. 4. præcederet. 220. e 14. res ip&longs;a. 14. eadem non. 221. c 8. metiri tamet&longs;i. 222. e 12. nancilcatur. 14. quippe <09> propè. 223. a 6. petitur à &longs;axo. 13 priusque. d 13. qua di&longs;p. 14. po&longs;tulat. 225. b 4. ortu. 5. pellat. 6. a&longs;cen&longs;ui. 226. g 7. con&longs;imilem rationem in. 227. b 3. vercor.

EX LIBRO TERTIO.

228 G 10. animus. 14. natura. 229. a 3. fuerit, &. d 5. tran&longs;ilit. 230. e 5. &longs;u&longs;tinens. 14. de ip&longs;o vbi. 5. à reliquis. 231. c 2. Burl&ecedil;us. 6. particulis. 232. e 3. effectus. 7. opere. 6. requiri. 14 &longs;it. 233. a 6. dictum fuit: æger. 8. coque 235. d 4 per­&longs;picuum. 236. h 15. ou)rano\s. 237. c 13. redundat. 238. h 11. in &longs;ub&longs;t. 239. a 2. natura. 24. d 3. &longs;u&longs;ctpiunt. 242. c 2. Hippo­cratis & &longs;ic vbique 11. & &longs;apit. 244. f . natura. 246. c 8. &longs;anari. 247. a 1. &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. c 3. e&longs;&longs;entiali. 248. h 6. quies verò. 249. b 9. materia. 1. inuenerat. 250. g 7. &longs;ignificati. 251. c 14. piæ&longs;erendam. 252. e 3. eum. 4. cum id aut. 10. probationem. g 4. partes. A B. 6. quin fieri. 253. a 5. &longs;ic progre. 11. extenta. 254. f 11. nece&longs;&longs;aria. 255. c 7 approbatam. 14. quae &longs;ubiectum. 256. e 12. illa. 5. oppo&longs;ito. 260. g 2. moueatur. 10. qui fit. 13. dicebant animum e&longs;&longs;ecorpus. 261. c 14. potuit. 14. vera. 262. c 14. per­&longs;picuæ. h 5. &longs;eip&longs;o non moueri primo, & ab alio. 263. d 11. hyeme. . 264. f 3. ordmatim. 7. &longs;icca. 5. tibi &longs;u&longs;p. 15. mota. 265. a 15. &longs;ubactum. 266. g 6 antmales. 267 c 4. calore. 268. e 8. aut vbi. 3. ea. 269. a 4. quid ergo. 15. at certe. 270 g 11. in&longs;it. 271. c 2. e&longs;t ei quod e&longs;t. 6. po&longs;tent. 5. nos qd. 272. e 9. tro/pon. g 11. dehbate h 12. natura po&longs;t. 273. b 2. po&longs;tum. 5. quid &longs;ibi. 274. h 3. notionem. 275. c 1. conuertit. 6. notus. 6. cuius cau&longs;&longs;am. 277. b 10. po&longs;t certè. 278. f 13. forma. 13. ac cedat. 281. c 7. ip&longs;o term. 14. ne pro eo. 282. f 8. contracta. 283. d 4. &longs;en&longs;um pellere. 287. a 2. &longs;ecunda. 3. exagitatam. b 6. po­terat. 1. materia. 14. totam. 288. e 3. &longs;ecus &longs;it. 7. &longs;ecundo de c&ecedil;lo. T. 27. h 6. motus quidam. 8. de&longs;inat. 15. denominatio. 290. g 13. vtium'ne. 291. a 2. potentia quæ 10. ronnes opp. 2. nobis apparet. 292. e 8. habitus illi &longs;upponatur. Quòd. 293. a 3. per &longs;uam for. 12. raro'ne. 13. monemus. 1. alens. 2. quod fit in. 7. tum nego. 294. e 10. habet rationem. 1. fic & illa. 8. &longs;imi­lts. 7. &longs;ecundum &longs;e. 10. habet. 10. 1 pote&longs;tatis. 295. b 15. eum e&longs;&longs;e. 296. g 7. motura e&longs;t vt hoc &longs;ine. 297. d 12. Simplicio. 303. a 1 eas e&longs;&longs;e. 304. g 2. fronoi_n fron. 305. a 15. po&longs;sit in actum. 12. à quo vel quod &longs;em. 306. e 3. Qu&ecedil;cunque verò ca&longs;u &longs;i cutibi fiunta, vt in artifice xinei_, quorum materia pote&longs;t & à &longs;e ip&longs;a moueri eo motu quo &longs;emen mouet. 7. nalitus. 5. inu&longs;tis. 307. d 1. quie&longs;t. 313. b 3. &longs;ic pars. 6. &longs;i per &longs;e. 13. &longs;ecundum quas. 1. hoc aut. 12. &longs;int confirm. 15. accidensm naturam. 314. h 5. Alexandro. 14 gremio. 315. a 6. rex excel. 9. &longs;i deficiatur. 7. is. 316. f 8. aliquam. 1. ita vt ni&longs;i. 13. continuæ. 317. b 5. Prinium quia. 6. denominantur. 12. imper&longs;ecti. 13. plumbeus. 318. f 14. ita monet. 4. materia &longs;uæ 3. 9. b 8 leue &longs;ic. 11. grauitate 321. c 5. animalt primumviuens pro port. 5. mon&longs;trat. 322. g 1. hos mot. 323. a 6. mouere. 324. e in tit. uas ex. 7. quæ ex &longs;e ip&longs;a. 2. in &longs;cupo. 325. a 7 violentiam. 12. quoquo. 6. &longs;emper ab alio. 326. f 14. te&longs;tetur. 1. ratio pro­pria. 12. dictorum. 327. a 17. vt à forma. 7. moueri. 12. pote&longs;tatum. 15. aibitror. 328. g 8. nil perfectè. h 2. in pote&longs;t. 229. b 10. partienda. 10. igitur & materia. 330. e 8 materiæ proxim&ecedil;. 10. forent. 17. moueretur. 11. alterum quidem. g 8. fit e&longs;&longs;e. 9. &longs;u&longs;&longs;iciente. 332. e 7. natura &longs;ic. 15. tibi pl. 3. admittant. 10. &longs;i non re &longs;ep. 336. f 12. auctor hic. 13. &longs;ol&ecedil;. 14. recidat. 339. a 3. carere. 14. commeant. 12. continuas. 10. vbi cum.

EX LIBRO QVARTO.

g 42. H 4. paret. 344. h 9. intermutationem. 346. g 10. nanque admir. 11. repugnantiam. 11. tamen &longs;int. 347. a 16. vt aerem. in tit. ctum à temou. 348. h 6. enim erit. 349. b 8. cuenit. 350. c 1. deicitur. 2. quòd actus. 14. officio &longs;alua pote&longs;tate in fin. f 1. h&ecedil;e quæ imped. 9. ci&longs;iciant. 351. d 15. nitatur. 352. c 10. motum non prof. 13. indicia. 11. illa. 354. g 1. is in infin. h a. ctur. 357. a 8. ab&longs;oluta. Ecce. 4 naturalem. 6. neque ita. 358. c 14. diuer&longs;&ecedil;. g 6. naturaque. 359. a 7. non totius. 1. or­bes. 6. Arittoteles in illis. . e&longs;t idem & agere. 7. iri quoque 360. e 1. explicarit. 9. quou&longs;que vis à. 361. c 3. reddi po&longs;sit 9. &longs;uæ cupid. 1. Theonem. 362. c 9 po&longs;ituræ. f 6. hic in. 363. a 1. cam. 10. vt ip&longs;e. 11. indicandum. 364. g 4. loci. 365. a 16. de potetia. 366. f 5. augmentationé. 367. a 13. Eum quoque b 8. agno&longs;ci. 368. g 11. pote&longs;tatis. 369. a 15. motum. 370. c 2. tractus. g 2. pater igitur ex dictis quòd. 371. d 4. ab corundem elementotum &longs;ub&longs;tantia. 372. c 9 calorem. 373. c 11. patiendt. 374. g 12. quicqu 376 g 1 ergo. 4. mi/geqs. n. 14. defendunt. 381. b 10. vis item. 11. non nego. 382. e 15. in quo ine&longs;t. 10. differui­mus. 12. efficiens. fficcre. 384. f 13. initam. 7. &longs;it in. 385. a 1. lentor. 2. maximus lentor. 11. habita. 14. libratis. 386. f 11. eam e&longs;&longs;e. 4. appeilemus. 6. quod ita. 13. in eo. 15. q alia. 387. b 14. propen&longs;io. 1. natura. 4. efficienti. 5. finis. 14. Æthiopibus. 390. h 7. ca cadit. 391. b 1. Ægidij. 4. quanuis. 1. hos. 2. xrei/ttonos. 392. g 1. formæ. 393. b 1. inter bo­nos. 1. & &longs;i. 394. e 1. dedi&longs;&longs;e. 4. ad coiuncta. 395. c 5. reuoluimur. 396. f 1. gemma. 9. hic motus. 9. blandi. 397. a 2. niti. 11. tutius. 16. audi tu. uod revera. 400. f 5. potratur. 401. b 5. ip&longs;uim. 5. imprimunt. 402. f 6. recuperaturæ. 12. per &longs;en&longs;. g 10. fit at. 8. partibusque. 403. c 11. habeas. 407. d 7. quadam con&longs;tabat quod. 11. &longs;imile. 409. d 6. idem. 410. h 11. e&longs;t ci. 9. paribus. 412. g 13. pro&longs;ectum in forma. 413. a 5. ex coque. nos po&longs;&longs;umus. 415. b 13. natura. 8. Flere. 10. emode­randus. 416. f 13. apparabit. lagitat. 417. c 6. quo ad eius. 5. per accidens. 6. omnino. 419. a 8. quærere. 11. cau&longs;&longs;a. 420. f 13. in not. 421. a 5. tales. 6. &longs;int vnem, vt. 422. h 15. vitio. 424. h 9. continui. 425. a 16. deducimur. 9. vt id. 11. vt non oem corpus &longs;it. 3. ille e&longs;t. 427. a 47. moles. 6. sunt. 8. quantitas. 9. sunt. 428. c 9. quorum locus. 10. &longs;it. 5. fit in. 9. motuum. h 15. fit. 429. a 14. fit. 15. Mathematica. 4. rectà. 430. c 10. repetentem. f 4. efficitur. 4. qu&ecedil;dam. h 15. Mathematico. 431. c 6. acci­dens. 432. c 13. illo. 3. aut. 434. g 7. in eandem aquam in corona quam in aurea ma&longs;&longs;a. 14. qua &longs;unt. 7. e&longs;&longs;e quæ oina. 435. b 11. loco circun. 9. &longs;patium. 436. e 8. verum &longs;it non. 11. tutius. 2. qua. 437. a 7. eandem. b 6. innumera punctacoc. 438. e 3. & locus. 11. & aqu&ecedil;. 439. a 11. genus. 4. &longs;ubiecti. 440. f 4. quomodo. 5. a&longs;&longs;umptum. h 3. de&longs;inito. 8. immobile. 441. c 12. &longs;e.

EX LIBRO QVINTO.

443. C 5. caducarum. 1. motuum. 444. g 1. quibu&longs;dam term. 12. e&longs;&longs;e. 11. a&longs;siduè. 445. a 12. manere. 4. po&longs;&longs;emus. 8. ca­&longs;orem. 1. eum. 446. g 12. materiæ. 447. d 16. habcat. 448 e 9. perfectus. 14. Græci. 4. colum. 10. ob. 11. vacauit. 453. a 15. e&longs;&longs;e confim. 1. &longs;anæ. 2. tum motum. 459. f 8. magnitudinem. 14. feretur. 4. habebant. 9. manent. 458. c 11. ellip&longs;i. g 13 terra. 461. a 3. medium. 462. f 3. minus. 2. e&longs;t terrenæ. 463. a 12 &longs;olum. 1. priuationes. 6. comparantur vt in. 7. qucant. 3. ex his &longs;int quæ &longs;imp. 10. neque ibi. 464. e 6. rationi&longs;que. f 2. pendere. 8. collatum. 13. afferente. 3. ille. 12. aërem in aqua 13. noluit. 3. con&longs;tituere. 465. a 1. minus. 7. cogatur. 2. in&longs;tar. 466. f 1. definitiones. 12. indicant. 13. i(/sasai.g 16. quam illi. 12. præceps. 467. a 10. nubes. 12. omni. 15. diluta. 468. f 3. naturæ cond. 2. defendi. 8. erunt. 7. accidens. 13. e&longs;t ctrcum&longs;. 469. b 14. albi&longs;simum. 14. &longs;iquis. 470. f 4. autem ex. 472. e 1. quod e&longs;t. 11. potitura. 473. a 14. id quod e&longs;t præt. 15. pr&ecedil;ter naturam diutur. o quod &longs;ecundum naturam. 8. qui cx &longs;ecrer. 12. E&longs;t huiu&longs;modi. 475. a 3. i&longs;te 4. illi. 476. f 5 repurgari. 6. machinatam. 13. à leu. 477. b 1. con&longs;ci&longs;cat. 1. aërem. 478. f 15. &longs;i. 480. f 6. liberè. 14. maris. g 4. commemorare. 5. cura &longs;upp. 9 habent: minus. 10. fers. 482. c 13. dela&longs;&longs;atæ. 484. e 3. terra. 3. materiæ. g 5. quin. 13. nunc ad Aucr. 485. c 6. his ob&longs;i&longs;ti. 3. medici. 7. Facit. 486. f 7. &longs;alis. 8. &longs;alis. 9. ouum. 487. b 6. re&longs;per&longs;a. llita. 13. conta­ctum. 488. e 1. den&longs;e&longs;cet 9. &longs;i lana qua. 3. perfungendum h 13. natura. 490. c 2. temporis. 8. acri. 4 organico. 7. humi­da. 491. a 7. cum docet. 12. pyramidem. 14. vero octa hed. 11. vi coact&ecedil;. 493. b 7. demer&longs;a. 11. iri demer. 5. cicun­ferentia. 7. demei&longs;am. 495. c 12. ad id præ&longs;t. 2. exoriatur. 5. oppugnent. 496. f 12. con&longs;titit. 15. æqua. 497. b 13 excu­ditur. 5. partes e&longs;&longs;e. 13. quam exercet. 498. c 10. dimi&longs;&longs;o. 13. quia non materia. 500. e 11. per &longs;e na&longs;e. 14. mobile 502. e 6. æ&longs;timentur. 6. lectoris. 9. vt materia. 15. Fit. 504. f 6. vacui. 11. cau&longs;&longs;æ. g 1. penderet. 505. d 3. afferentur. 506. f 12. explodatur. 507. a 5. proiectio. 15. remotè. 511. b 3. tolerante 512. g 9. hypeccaumati. 513. a 4. compo&longs;itus. 2 ignt. d 4. amplificato. 515. a 15. &longs;iquodam illa. 16. iudicium. 2. ca verèd 516. f 15. mouet. 2. te docuit. 518. e 15. motu præt, g 15. & à cau&longs;sis. 3. inten&longs;um. 9. cidem. 519. d 14. vel ignem. 52. c 14. mon&longs;trat item vt latius. 523. c 13. vt in æqual. d 14. hoc &longs;ic. 524. c 9. &longs;i fuerit. 15. quam. 525. a 4. rom. 6. certi. 1. dela&longs;&longs;ari. 6. cert&ecedil;. 526. g 3. ca quæ. h 4. proportionum. 527. a 11. acre. 5. Phy&longs;icarum. 6 explicatu. 528. e 7. e&longs;t propor. 14. ea quæ æquè. h 15. dupliciter. 529. a 10. veloctorem, 530. e 13. tempori. 15. con&longs;tituto variatur. 531. d 8. vtique. 532. g 11. cen&longs;um. 1. in infinitum. 533. c 14. quàm axem, &longs;eu manub. 15. item &longs;int oportet. 9 continuare.

EX LIBRO SEXTO.

536. H 7. abdita. 539. a 3. exi&longs;timare &longs;i diucr&longs;as. 9. tandem oracula reddat. 541. b 9. eandem. 542 c 5. &longs;it de. 543. d 12. abeant. 544. h 15. careamns &longs;i reliquimus, aut. 548. e 15. &longs;eclis. 550. g 4. eum. 7. fallaciam. 552. f 9. e&longs;t ex in mu&longs;. 15. pri­uationis nomine. 553. d 5. dixerim. 554. h 2. abire. 3. qua quer. 555. a 6. &longs;ubiecto. 6. potentia. 559. d 3. quendam. 14. cum abeant. 560. g 5. dicuntur e&longs;&longs;e. 6. cen&longs;entur. 561. d 9. quæ nupet. 565. a 2. quantas. 3. id e&longs;t. 566. h 7. v&longs;us vt. 567. b 14. genitura. 5. actui contrarium. 568. e 14. ad actum. f 6. at hoc. 11. futuram. 3. & e&longs;t. 12. habitam. 569. a 11. deriuan­tur. 12. materia &longs;it. 570. e 2. ip&longs;ius. 2. accidit. 13. foima. 571. b 10. non tempore. c 2. natura. 572. c 4. oppo&longs;ita. 9. natura. h 7. certi. 573. b 14. naturam. 574. f 10. intelligit. 3. e&longs;&longs;icientis. 575. a 9. modo. 12. &longs;ic. 7. varietur. 11. ab ip&longs;o. 7. tanta. 576. f 1. indicans. 578. f 8. igitur. 1. quanque 579. a 5. aliter fore, vt idem e&longs;&longs;et. 580. e 3. u(/parcin. 4. u(/parcein. 581. c 7. quitria. 582. c 13. habent. 2. munerib. 583. c 14. &longs;iue etiam. 2. a&longs;signari &longs;icut etiam reb. rtificio&longs;is. 584, g 9. a&longs;&longs;ecutæ, h 2. properemus. 585. b 13. conntuenda. 587. a 9. curio&longs;us. 8. &longs;it nec'ne. 588. c 8. præditas &longs;ol. 593. a 11. inferiorum. 2. aimus. 4. e&longs;&longs;entiæ. 594. h 13. præterea. 596. g 7. hic etiam. 597. a 5. atque d 2. vt vtraque 13. repetiatur. 600. g. 1. in materiam. h 1. quàm in homine <09> rel. 4. generatim. 601. a 13. &longs;int. 602. c 7. coque. 603. a 5. nec ab ip&longs;ius. 6. prærepta. 13. memoret. 604. h 12. quod &longs;i non. 605. b 11. &longs;ecere. 10. veiutos. 609. a 14. innitantur. 15. temeie. 610. g 15. appetituum. 611. b 10. eam quæ. c 14. cuenirent. 2. qua&longs;dam. 612. g 14. foret. 613. b 1. &longs;it qui. 7. primum. 9. can&longs;l&ecedil;. c 1. occidere. 1. vis. 614. f 11. prædicati. 15. perfectionis. 615. c 14. determinatè. c 3. tnm vi. 616. f 3. naturæ. h 13. hæc autem in materiæ. po&longs;lunt. 617. a 15. contingentiæ. c 13. vbique 618. f 1. oppo&longs;ita. 619. c 1. ex communt. 620. c 1. in primis. 2. quodam nodo. 7. pa­trare. 621. d 9. &longs;it aliquid. 623. a 1. fato. 1. nimium. 624. g 2. terminum. 625. c 3. verum. 627. b 13. aqua item. 628. g 2. inquiens. 3. materia. 8. &longs;enibus. 13. commodè. 629. a 11. &longs;eae. 13. eum locum. 9. auctoritate. 10. qua vniu. 12. ne hilum. 630. f 13. odit. 631. a 10. laba&longs;cit. 634. g 4. videri. 1. æ&longs;tate. 635. b 6. careant. 13. &longs;implicius. 636. g 4. &longs;uccedere. æc ha­benda e&longs;t bona mala'ue fortuna. &longs;imile. 7. Chymi&longs;tas. 14. arte. 637. a 15. eadem. 12. vel modum d 4. mytulos. 638. c 2. ex &longs;emine & ex. 6. certa. 2. propagantur. 6. vtriu&longs;que g 9. ablationem. 11. immanentem. 640. e 8. &longs;ignificata. 2. arbitra­mur. 641. b 11. di&longs;&longs;iciles. 5. vtriu&longs;que d 13. &longs;i ignis.

EX LIBRO SEPTIMO.

644. g 9. cum veter. 646. g 3. exi&longs;tunt. 647. d 4. complexionem. 649. 21. &longs;entientem. 11. natura. 651. a 7. indicabitur. 5. locumque. d 6. aerem. 652. c 7. è corp. 4. & vi&longs;enda. 653. a 6. Bibuli C&ecedil;&longs;ari&longs;que. ludis. 5. &longs;ubiectum. 12. ratio. 14. co tan­tum nomine. 655. c 2. materia pr&ecedil;cedat. 656. c 12. in &longs;ub&longs;tantia. 5. dictum. 7. quanque 657. a 13. ip&longs;is. 6. earum actus. 658. e 3. quantitas. 14. in &longs;equentib. quoniam varias formas oberrant at. 659. a 13. quæ per. 661. a 7. ob&longs;eruata. 662. e 4. pr&ecedil;­finitur etiam <09> totidem modis actus & pote&longs;tas accipiuntur quot &longs;unt categoriæ. g 7. præmon&longs;tratorem. 664. quod e&longs;t ex fig. g 8. &longs;olet. 665. c 13. vt vna. 669. a 13. decreuerimus. 5. ob&longs;eruari. 670. f 11. video quæ. h 1. æqu&ecedil;. 671. d 3. potiuntur. 5. fignum per &longs;e. 675. c 8. quæque 676. e 1. vt vtr. 7. propo&longs;ita. 12. e&longs;t. 678. g 13. &longs;it actu. 680. e 10. co nomine. 13. &longs;ectioni. g 10. at &longs;i illud verò e&longs;&longs;e. 681. a 6. &longs;oli, c 1. horremus. 6. animatorum. d 7. labe&longs;actetur. 682. g 12. fine & propter aliud; propt. 65. 214 quodlibet &longs;ignum hoc eff. bid. ec tnm. c 8. &longs;en&longs;um. 686. e 12. tum fit. 687. c 5. tn qu&ecedil; plcrunque. 7. profe&longs;lus e&longs;t aliquid 688, g 10. virtutem, &longs;ic, 690. f 13. procedit. 691. a 7. ad auctu. 8, vtri&longs;que. 693. a 13, alentem & aug. 6. i. ug. 12, nunc &longs;ub. d 1. vti, non de&longs;unt qui. 8. natura calor. 694. h 14. actionem. 695. a 5. comminut&ecedil;. 10. in&longs;trumenta. 14. valet. 13. vinen­tib. 15. alimentitij. 696. g 4. &longs;eparatus. 697. b. 14. & qua&longs;i in ipio. 15. nequiuit. 698 h 8. adipi&longs;catur. 699. c 3 fundetur item à nutr, 705. b 6. eædem. 3. hæc nobis. 9. natura dicitur. 706, c 7. formam. 11. The&longs;ei. 12. remorum. 4. adæquat. 8. par té prob. 9. verbis. 707. a 5. atqui. 6. tribueretur. 9. fit per. 11. fit per. 15. certi. 6. e&longs;t auct. 6. nec per &longs;eip&longs;am. con&longs;ueuit. 8. poterunt. 8. quæ &longs;ic. 11. &longs;tatuat. 13. ferunt. 708. g 13. vt eius bene. 14. qualitate talem hoc e&longs;t, h 4. motiones. 11. refici. 17. patiente conuenit inter. 709. a 10. permcet. 6. materiam qu&ecedil; toto. 710. f 7. debeat. n tit. uertuntur. 712. e 16. ab il­lis. 4. huc. 7. di&longs;&longs;ecetur nullo. 9. ne exh. 713. b 15. niti. 1. partib. ont. 714. c 6. in quo primo. 13. po&longs;simus. 715. a 6. abjtu. 16. vt exhaur. 5. Byzantij. 11. Fui&longs;&longs;ent. 716. f 6. videre e&longs;t. 7. ex qua. 9. augentur. 717. a 4. planum quod. 13. certa. d 4. cum effic. 8. ab&longs;entia. 12. primoque. 16. altero. 718. c 4. tamque. 5. Sed hæc. 8. neque hæc. 719. a 16. quale. 9. adnexa. 16, mutationem. 12. fuet. 720. e 3. quantitatis. 5. &longs;it calidius. 10. quae quod. 2. nec plurib. 16. cau&longs;&longs;am. 15. quae ab. 721. a 4. &longs;uccedente. 9. naturam. 15. fuerint. 722. e 4. præter naturam. 8. pote&longs;t. 14. den&longs;atum.

EX LIBRO OCTAVO.

723. C 10. a)lloi/wsis, a)lloi_on &longs;emper lege cum gemino ll. 724. e 9. po&longs;&longs;e&longs;sione. 10. ill&ecedil;. 726. g 14. huius e&longs;t actu. 7. &longs;ub­&longs;tantiæ. 12. & à c&ecedil;ter. 16. Eri&longs;&longs;ic s. 727. c 15. nexum. 1. propter &longs;e fines. 2. po&longs;teriora. 14. &longs;pecta. 728. e 6. &longs;ic ordin. 4. fit fieri. 10. impedientia. 729. c 11. motus qui. 16. illarum. 730. h 8. &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;u. 732. f 14. inueniendum. 733. c 11. actus ac­cidentis ex actu. 734. e 8. totam. 4. rationis. 737. b 7. acris. 738. h 16. hoc meo. 739. b 13. qualitati. 740. f 9. ac generib. h 17. mendis. 743. b 12. innitatur. 15. cum tamen. 745. b 12. quam. 746. e 16. ip&longs;e. 10. tertio. 747. b 11. aut verò 13. upre&longs;&longs;ui. 7. intendi. 749. b 4. ab&longs;olute. 750. f 12. profe&longs;si. 4. vsquae. h 15. nemo. 752. e 8. reparari. 754. c 6. item. 755. c 5. fic &longs;olum. 8. per actum &longs;ecundum. 756. fin tit. lem&ecedil;ntis. 8. mouentur. 9. deletur. 757. d 12. effecta. 758, e 2. &longs;en&longs;um 4. &longs;uperiora. 7. Ari&longs;totelea. 6. remi&longs;siorem. 8. vt mos. 759. b 5. nix. 6. cos exi&longs;tit, 12. materiæ. d 5. obtinebat. 760. g 12. ad illas. 761. a 5. perfectioris. 8. colorum. 762. e 7. nobis. 4. permi&longs;&longs;ione. 763. b 4. fit. 11. pictoribus. 14. non &longs;it. 4. philo­&longs;ophotum. 764. f 7. eget. 10. contracto. 766. e 5. vt ternuni. 13. halitus. 15. halitus. 767. c 8. acutam. 14. donare. 15­&longs;cquitur. 768. c 11. non e&longs;t. 770 g 3. mucronc. 771. b 6. & nigro. 7. anacla&longs;i. 772. f 8. contraria &. g 2. vim. 16. ex æquo. 773. b 14. accipiet. 774. f 14. qualitates. 7. ponantur. 14. ambig&longs;as. 775. a 10. quo ex. 1. &longs;int. 3. conditione tantum. 777. a 14. &longs;en&longs;iles. 15. & fine. 778. e 3. hos bon. 6. defendes. 779. a 3. & &longs;unt. 8. atque c 4. in his e&longs;t. 14. nullius. 17. ita. 780. g 1. repa&longs;sio. 2. vtriu&longs;que 3. priore. 15. benefica. 4. communicat. &longs;unt entia. 781. c 9. acrem. 10. propriore. 782 e 16. fundum. 17. non pote&longs;t. 783. b 13. contractam. 17. accidenti. 784. e 10. quæalij. 11. innitatur. 8. perhibetur. 10. producenda. 785 a 2. po&longs;itura. 5. &longs;it vt. 16. quos tamen. 786. g 14. luminis. 10. duer&longs;a. 787. a 3. nulla. 788. f 15 potiri. 16. terminos omnes. 789. b 11. fuerit. 16. nimium. 10. vel ex extr. 790. e 4. ob camque. rem. 14. primæ. 15. euidentior. 791. a 7. ab altero. 15. &longs;pectari. 792. g 11. &longs;ummè. 794. e 11. infigantur. 8. vnum. 795. d 5. fuerint. 796. g 7. gonu xnh/­ms. 797. a 8. debilitatum. 9. ni&longs;u. 4. pa/qous &. 9. omni. 8. naturalis. 798. g 6. explicata. 11. è voto. 4. contrariis. 6. præ&longs;tantia. 12. quidé actu. 799. a 12. eou&longs;que. d 8. denominationes. 800. h 6. circum. 801. a 1. facilis. 7. forma. 802. e 2. ab illis. 4. quorum. 803. a 2. candem. 805 a 2. cuncta igituŕ. c 8. coniuctis. 2. fuerint. 806. e 10. & ne clem. 2. vt &longs;i 807. a 8. motu. d 6. perhibetur. 808. h 15. pr&ecedil;&longs;tat. 809. a 11. motus.

EX LIBRO NONO.

814. F 3. ille fuer. 6. Si quem. 815. a 9. hoc e&longs;t. 3. ip&longs;um. 816 g 13. tantum. 817. b 14. dicta. 13. aut fit. 14. dcderit. 818. f 8. terminum. 9. conuexum. 819. c 13. motui. 820. f 14. abeant. 821. a 13. nulla enim ratio. 9. teporem. 5. lis ami­citia'ue. 822. f 2. &longs;ed. 1. gnauiter. 823. a 5. re&longs;pondeas. 824. e 7. &longs;it minus. 10. iudicantium. 16. cau&longs;&longs;a. 825. a 12. effc­ctuum. ffectuum, & cau&longs;t. 3. excel&longs;æ. 11. diluam ag. 829. c 8. optimæ. 830. e 1. coniecturam. 11. morti&longs;que. 831. a 5. ni prius. d 14. exagitatio. 832. g 3. quoad tamen. 7. propinquius. 833. d 1. cogno&longs;cat. 834. g 5. incœpto. 4. feriendo. 835. b 8. &longs;ie quoque c 5. Ne igitur. 836. f 2. fecerint. 837. c 6. indicat. 838. e 15. per &longs;&ecedil; mouere aut mou. 9. vt in homin. 1. & id in iis à prouc. 11. at qui hoc. 13. &longs;it id. 839. a 15. illa. 10. qua exord. 7 qua ratione. 8. duab. 15. à parte. 840. f 5. i. mplius repon. 2. tangeret. 841. d 11. ip&longs;um. 842. f 2. perpetua. 3. e&longs;&longs;e potius. 11. nanque etiam. 845. a 12. cœlo. 12. perno&longs;cen­das. 849. a 13. Hunc ctiam. 11. Tum. 2. vt color in ir. 851. a 9. te&longs;tantur. 11. expetit. 83. a 5. autem ad locum omnib. 854. e 12 oppo&longs;itam. 11. quod certè. 856. g 10. conditionib. 13. erit eadem materia. 857. d 10 lucem aff. 859. d 10. continentur. 860. d 10. ac phy&longs;. 861. b 13. Calippo. 12. a&longs;&longs;cucratur. 862. g 5. totius primus. 863. c 4. aliam. 864. c 1. offen­dat. 9 obtineat. 11. motum aggr. 12. 13. qui vere triplic. 865. b 6. partes. 2. quæ pote&longs;tati &longs;ubcitur. 866. g 15 <09> aimad. 867. a 3. fit vt 868. e 12. 13. obiiciebatur. 869. a 11. con&longs;entienter. b 9. cau&longs;&longs;a vel in &longs;patij difformitate, vel in mou. 6. a ccedit. 870. f 15. con&longs;tituitis? h 16. fit in &longs;om. 871. d 9. motum. 871. f 2. offeret. 873. d 12. Tertium. 874. h 8. &longs;anè vidctur. 875. a 4. diuerla. 16. punctus. 876. h 4. ne&longs;citur. 877. b 4. Quanuis autem hic. 3. duplicetur. 13. in tit. empori. 878. e 13. qualitates. 879. b 12. e&longs;&longs;entiæ. 881. c 4. videntur. 13. &longs;egiegatus. 882. e 3. accommodare. 7. tempori obn. 884. f 13. mo­tus. 10. moueatur. 885. b 9. perfectioris. 888. c 8. cur item. 12. decas. 889. c 16. natura. 10. e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;t. 891. a 1. ha­bebant. 6. po&longs;sts. 7. my&longs;ticè.

EX LIBRO DECIMO.

892. F 5. hine. 12. in&longs;pectione. 894. e 3. dominante &longs;ic. 16. abeat oppugnare. 16. pullulant. 7. pote&longs;t. t a in marg. a &longs;ecun do de cœlo. T. 44. 12. annis. 896. e 14. <09> a&longs;sid. 4. liber. 5. &longs;implicem. 897. a 5. vt phy&longs;. 6. quid tantum. 5. luceant. 899. a 11. pote&longs;tas. 2. manant. 6. vt primum. 2. a materia. 900. e 1. <09> quorum. 902. e 9. exacta. 14. intelligantur. 903. d 11. ducitur. 904. e 1. ip&longs;e vnum. 11. Pau&longs;onem. f 14. Hic tibi. 905. a 1. ignoratur. 13. quidam perfectiores. 906. e 4. demon&longs;trant. 7. e&longs;t g 7. illique. 907. a 3. alteram qua. 12. &longs;it eius. 11. ac real. 988. e 13. ad actum à pote&longs;tate. 15. Ægidio. g 13. nece&longs;&longs;ariò. 909. a 10. ex &longs;ubiecto. 13. modum. eq Perip. 910. f 10. ip&longs;e tibi. 4. &. 911. a 16. generatione g 4. &longs;it quan. 916. e 12. potiendam. 15. Lyc&ecedil;i. 7. &longs;uff. 11. at. 917. a 8. comparari. 918. f 16. Atid. 920. f 7. po&longs;&longs;e. 6. &longs;ic. 921. a 9. perpetuus. 13. materiæ. 922. f 2. hic e&longs;t. 10. mtelligetur. 924. f 11. hyppopotamum & &longs;ic vbique 13. multa. 2. &longs;uppe­ditant. 927 a 14. Indicabat. 5. fal&longs;a. 1. exce&longs;set. 928. e 11. nummus. 4. nummus vnus nummus ad decem multò. 929. a 2. &longs;uperiore. 3. voco. 14. &longs;upremus. 9. primum. 11. &longs;iquis eius. 933. b 5. duab. 935. d 4. motas di&longs;. 936. e 4. optimæ affe. 11. labores. 13. frouphtikas. 397. a 3. pnrhxoon. 938. e 1. Græcis &longs;i, 14. quam. 15. vna omnis. 2. beatitatis'ue. 12. at mob. 939. a 15. motum e&longs;&longs;e. e)ne/rg. b 9. non habcant &longs;ociam. on po&longs;&longs;unt. 10. oporteat. 2. vniu&longs;modi. 941. c 13. &longs;imilis. 942. f 13. &longs;imile. 15. vbi. 13. quartum. 943. c 6. &longs;ic &. 945. c 11. naturam. 946. c 5. eflc cta. 10. quia &longs;ola. 4. nos con­turb. 5. ex his verò. 947. a 15. vt etiam. 4. eandemque. c 5. di&longs;tinguat pr&ecedil;&longs;entes. 948. c 2. verò. f 12. e&longs;ficacitas. 9. re&longs;pi­ciat. 949. a 15. ill&ecedil;. fit. 950. f 7. cum valeat. 14. Lyc&ecedil;o. 951. a 1. verò b 7. calida. 15. quod mouetur. 952. e 9. po&longs;&longs;et contr. 15. diuiduum. 2. vt efficiens, itaque vt finis. 8. concludit. 953. b 2. vim 8. &longs;i h&ecedil;c. 7. vt aliud. 954. f 10. quem cum. 2. memento. 955. b8. fuit. 8. Phy&longs;. c 10. probet d 16. verlaretur. 956. e 1 debeat. 14. opponit. 15. e&longs;&longs;entia. 11 eas &longs;tr. h 3. naturæ indicari. 958. g 13. cos 14. Ethici. 16. animalis. 959 b 1. vnum quod e&longs;t 5. differentem c 15. cogitat. 5. con­coepit. 960. g 15. animæ actum. 961. c 1. Dens. 962. c 5. &longs;int. 9. ip&longs;is Deo. 11. Sic ergo. 964. f 3. ædificator 967. b 8. natura quicquid. 968. e 1. etenim cau&longs;&longs;a. 972. e 10. maleficum. g 8. pertineret. 17. coleret. 973. a 3. petens. 12 cumula­ti&longs;simè. 974 e &longs;tam quic. 976. h 2 nos e&longs;&longs;e. 981. b 16. princeps. 2. in vno. 982. e 10. di&longs;&longs;oluitur in mat. 985. a 6. compo&longs;itio ine&longs;t. 988, c 9. & in intell. 989. a 9. producuntur. 11. æterna 14. ni&longs;i forma. 10. idearum v&longs;us. 13. illa ctiam. 14. ex eo cau&longs; &longs;am. 990. f 12. ab&longs;trahant. 2. communicat. 991. c 1. fit alia. 4. fota. 992 e 16. operationem. 993. b 2. cum &longs;it. . in tit. quodque. 994. e 6. fit capa x. 9. reluptatem. 13. pr&ecedil;ftitura. 995. a 10. cau&longs;&longs;a qua quom. 996. f 16. promouet. 997. d 7. ille ent, 998.h 17. Pherecy den puto. 999. b 9. communicatricem. d 2. eam partic. 1000. 25. pr&ecedil;&longs;tare non po&longs;&longs;. 9. bonæ val. 2. Pammonem. 1003. a 13. papo/in pasatpo. b 13. cum his 14. in eo. 13. habeant'ne. 1004. g 1. à primis. 12. motus aùt. 1005. b 8. ade­ptum. 1006. e 10. officia. 14. Cholcodea, 1007. a 10. functionum. 3. 4. &longs;in vt de cau&longs;&longs;a proxima, & efficiente 1008. e 10. ia. 12. apparabit. 1009. b 10. motionis. 4. dirigantur. 5. limitantur. 7. Hyda&longs;pes. 14. cultam. doration, 1010. g 13. &longs;alus. 1011. moueb. 5. angu&longs;ti&longs;sima. 11. tibi ip&longs;i charis.

Gr&ecedil;ca, ne lectores erratorum multitudine terrerent, humanitati diligentiæque. eorum commendantur.

FRANCISCI BONAMICI PHILOSOPHI FLORENTINI IN PISANO GYMNASIO PROFITENTIS.

DE MOTV LIBER PRIMVS.

DE MVNERE PHILOSOPHI NATVRALIS.

Proœmium.

MOTVS initia cau&longs;&longs;aque. venari proximè opero&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e atque diffi­cile, & multa de ip&longs;o volumina à Peripateticorum principe edita re&longs;tantur, & labores &longs;ummi, quos vniuer&longs;a philo&longs;ophorum &longs;cho­la in eius explicationem contuli&longs;&longs;e per&longs;picitur. Nam &longs;iue copia theo firmatum &longs;pectetur, &longs;iue &longs;ubtilitas & ob&longs;curitas: hæc omnia planè in motus e&longs;&longs;entia ve&longs;tiganda nobis &longs;e&longs;e obiiciunt: etenim per&longs;i&longs;tit parum motus; nec eius aliud quicquam, ni&longs;i pars aliqua, atque illa

quidem lubrica, nilque. &longs;tabilis obtinens, quin potius indiuiduus qui­dam finis eius tantummodò extat; vt facillimè elabatur: tum etiam <09> multa complectitur, quæ naturis inter &longs;e di&longs;creta tantam caligi­nem offundunt, vt inter philo&longs;ophos admodùm procliue &longs;it variari. Augebat quoque difficultatem, quia plurima flagitaret, vt con&longs;titui po&longs;&longs;et. Nullum enim cau&longs;­&longs;&ecedil; genus exi&longs;tit, ex quo non pendeat motus: tempus item locumque. re&longs;picit. &longs;ingula verò com­plura nobis &longs;uppeditant quidem, quæ dicamus; &longs;ed ea certè plena &longs;alebrarum & dubitationis; verùm quæ præclaram philo&longs;ophandi occa&longs;ionem præbeant &longs;tudio&longs;is veritatis. Quare non minus audaciæ forta&longs;&longs;e nobis ad&longs;cribetur, qui tantum negocium pertentare voluimus, quàm de&longs;iderio veri perno&longs;cendi, &longs;tudioque cæteros iuuandi, qui nobi&longs;cum in hanc pulcherrimam, & hone&longs;ti&longs;simam &longs;peculationis arenam de&longs;cenderunt; quæ &longs;emper apud nos potuere plurimum, & ad &longs;e&longs;e trahentia miris modis, à multis vitæ commodis auerterunt, exi&longs;timantes ei, qui &longs;e ad &longs;peculationem contulerit; cuius multò maxima pars e&longs;t quæ de motu ampli&longs;sima præmia proponi, veritatem nimirum, quæ &longs;ola bene in&longs;titutam mentem pa&longs;cit, & fouet, & alioqui fluctuantem &longs;edat, & multò plus denique delectat, quàm laboris immen&longs;itas & anxietas curæ deterreat, eademque. tum &longs;eip&longs;am &longs;uperat, cum ver&longs;atur in rebus hone&longs;ti&longs;simis, in quibus optimo iure contemplatio motus numerari pote&longs;t. His adde quàm &longs;it eius animaduer&longs;io nece&longs;&longs;aria, cùm planè informet methodum naturalem, quæ &longs;ibi propo&longs;uit ad explicandum illud &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genus, in quo fons ine&longs;t & origo motus; hoc aunt lati&longs;simè patet, atque adeò, vt ni&longs;i aciem mentis acerrimè intendas, &longs;olum tibi, inter ea quæ &longs;unt, occurrat, facileque., ni&longs;i diuinitus affleris; nihil aliud e&longs;&longs;e opineris, quàm naturam: ideoque. certam materiæ &longs;ubiectæ rationem in methodo illa ponit: ex quo efficitur, vt cuncta in &longs;cientia natura­li ad eius &longs;tateram reuocari oporteat. Hæc quidem per oina pertinet, quæ &longs;en&longs;ui &longs;ubiiciuntur, & ad omne genus v&longs;us ab homine accomodatur, & qua&longs;i officina qu&ecedil;dam e&longs;t, & in&longs;trumentum, vn­de &longs;upellex diuinæ contemplationis expromatur. Proinde pleraque pars human&ecedil; contemplatio­nis in tractatione motus impenditur. Oper&ecedil;precium ergo facturum eum confido, qui toto pe­ctore negocium de motu &longs;u&longs;cipiat, in eoque. explicando &longs;uam operam collocet. Magna enim prin­cipij vis e&longs;t, vt non &longs;emel à viris &longs;apienti&longs;simis dimidium totius habeatur, imò ip&longs;um &longs;olidum to­tum prædicetur. Itaque cum in omnib. eb. gendis, tum maximè in philo&longs;ophando rerumque. veri­tate ve&longs;tiganda, rationem principiorum habere oportet: &longs;eduloque. aduertendum, quæ'nam & cuiu&longs;­modi principia &longs;tatuantur: &longs;iquidem fundamenti locum occupent in omnibus methodis. Sicut ergo fundamentis rectè con&longs;titutis, reliqua omnia quæ &longs;uper&longs;truuntur, firma permanere & per­petuò durare po&longs;&longs;unt: &longs;i minus; quicquid adiicitur breui corruat nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: &longs;ic de &longs;cienti&ecedil; prin­cipiis, & fundamentis cogitare oportet. Exigua &longs;anè principia &longs;unt; at verò maximè pollent. Ex quo efficitur, vt, quemadmodum in itinere faciendo paruus error ab initio maximus euadit in extremo: &longs;ic principiis in methodo malè fundatis, demum longi&longs;simè aberremus à vero. Vnico enim dato ab&longs;urdo plurima &longs;uccedunt. tque, vt monet Plato, velut in de&longs;cribendis figu­ris mathematicis, &longs;i exiguum quoddam primum ignotum fal&longs;umque. &longs;it, reliqua deinceps multa con&longs;entiunt. Neque verò &longs;ecus de principiorum con&longs;titutione iudicando e&longs;t quàm de con&longs;iliis no&longs;tris euidi&longs;simus ille poëta cen&longs;uerit, ita &longs;cribens.

A

B

E

Siquam rem accures &longs;obriè & frugaliter,

Solet illa rectè &longs;ub manus &longs;uccedere:

Atque ædepol fermè vt qui&longs;que rem accurat &longs;uam,

Sic ei procedit po&longs;t principia. Denique &longs;i malus,

Aut nequam e&longs;t, malè res vertunt quas agit:

Sin autem frugi e&longs;t, eueniunt frugaliter.

Idcirco multùm principiis in&longs;i&longs;tendum, diligenti&longs;simeque. con&longs;iderandum vtrum rectè nec'ne decernantur. is verò probè examinatis & qua&longs;i fundamentis benè iactis cætera cum ip&longs;is con­gruenter &longs;ubiicere &longs;uccedet. No&longs;trum igitur in&longs;titutum e&longs;t nunc naturam motus accuratè per­quirere & qua&longs;i in vnum breue corpus omnia cogere, qu&ecedil; pa&longs;sim ex communi &longs;en&longs;u doctorum di&longs;cu&longs;&longs;a & à philo&longs;ophis acerrimè varieque. di&longs;putata &longs;unt; animique. no&longs;tri &longs;ententias de re ob&longs;cu­ri&longs;sima pronunciare, iudiciumque. no&longs;trum dimi&longs;&longs;o omni partium &longs;tudio liberè, at non licenter interponere; quibus etiam non pauca de no&longs;tro contexuimus; nimis forta&longs;&longs;e confidenter eorum iudicio, qui maximè tribuunt (vt certè faciendum e&longs;t) auctoritati maiorum; verùm &longs;i &longs;ine animo iu­dicare velint, & in intima no&longs;tra pr&ecedil;cordia penetrarint, vt proficiamus nos, & aliis prode&longs;&longs;e po&longs;­&longs;imus, neque pœnas huius audaciæ declinemus, dum no&longs;trorum dictorum reddere rationem, & meliora dicentibus au&longs;cultare parati &longs;umus, atque ip&longs;i pro viribus non omnium auctoritate con­tempta profiteamur, &longs;ed ad iudicia peritiorum exploremus illa, quæ aut o&longs;citante negligentia, aut iniquitate factionum, aut etiam iniuria temporum à pura illa peripatetica di&longs;ciplina, anti­qua illa quidem, non tamen eiu&longs;modi, quæ debuerit, vt iam cœpit, antiquari, tam longo tempo­ris ætatum regionumque. tractu lap&longs;a fuerant: quibus item acce&longs;sit acre &longs;tudium concertationis, quod vnicuique propemodum in&longs;itum e&longs;t, atque innatum. itaque exardet facillimè, & animis no&longs;tris in­h&ecedil;ret tenaci&longs;simè; neque minus di&longs;trahit in diuer&longs;as opiniones, quàm cuiu&longs;que no&longs;trum cupidi­tas ad varia &longs;tudia pro&longs;equenda quacunque vel ent leui de cau&longs;&longs;a, quotidie nos incitet & impellat. Neque item abhorret ab hac pe&longs;te con&longs;uetudo: permagni enim refert, quibus opinionibus qui&longs;que ab initiis &longs;tudiorum &longs;it imbutus: etenim quemadmodum celeriter arripiuntur; ita diutius re­tinentur, & à teneris annis amplexa vehementius amantur. c veluti lanarum colores, quibus &longs;implex ille candor mutatus e&longs;t, elui nequeunt; &longs;ic ea quæ rudes animi perceperunt non &longs;ine &longs;ummo labore excutiuntur, quo fit etiam, vt cætera lentè fa&longs;tidio&longs;eque. probentur; ne dixerim, funditus repudientur & re&longs;puantur. Quamobrem ferunt Theodorum tragœdum nobili&longs;simum nulli concedere con&longs;ue&longs;&longs;e, vt ante &longs;e prodiret in &longs;cenam, quia nimirùm primis auditionibus &longs;pe­ctatorum animi nimium conciliarentur. Nos, quoad potuimus, Ari&longs;totelis vnius ve&longs;tigiis in­h&ecedil;&longs;imus, & ex interpretum &longs;ententiis illas &longs;ecreuimus quas ab ip&longs;o Ari&longs;totele profici&longs;ci, &longs;i non per&longs;picuum &longs;it; at nos ita e&longs;&longs;e per&longs;uadere conati &longs;umus; vt neque etiam nos indu&longs;tria no&longs;tra minus confi&longs;i quàm approbati&longs;simorum hominum auctoritatem &longs;ecuti fui&longs;&longs;e, nec ab eorum &longs;ententia, ni&longs;i coacti di&longs;ce&longs;si&longs;&longs;e iure optimo videri debeamus. Quæcunque tamen ea &longs;int, quæ con&longs;crip&longs;imus, non &longs;ine pertinaci labore confecta &longs;unt. Sæpius enim &longs;æpiu&longs;que. hæc animaduerte­re oportebat: atque vt poëta ille monet (vtar hîc ego auctoritate verbi&longs;que. Platonis) ante retroque. con&longs;picere, ne fortè deciperemur à nobis ip&longs;is: quaquidem fraude nulla magis e&longs;t capitalis: quandò nunquam &longs;eductor abe&longs;t, nec vllo tempore à decepti latere diuellitur: re&longs;que. ip&longs;a &longs;e&longs;e abdidit in profundum. &longs;i quidem ea &longs;it conditio principiorum, vt Tantum.

F

G

H

Sint infra nostros &longs;en&longs;us, tantoque. minora,

Quàm quæ primùm oculi cœptant non po&longs;&longs;e tueri.

Quo circa neque mirùm e&longs;&longs;e debet, &longs;i res aut minus iucunda, aut etiam grauior, difficiliorque. videatur, e&longs;t enim methodi no&longs;træ ianua tri&longs;ti&longs;sima: verùm &longs;i prima tempora toleraueris (qui vnus e&longs;t labor) non dubito, quin mirifica voluptate complearis. tibique. memineris, in cape&longs;&longs;endis phy&longs;ic&ecedil; principiis ita faciendum e&longs;&longs;e, velut iis, quos vexat febris, aut quorum pars aliqua com­putruit, vt enim valeant, amari&longs;simos &longs;uccos bibere coguntur, cibis parcere, aridum quoque ne colluant os frigida cauere; aut, quod grauius e&longs;t, ferrum igne&longs;que. pati: &longs;ic tibi, vt animo valeas, oina ferre audendum e&longs;t; eoque. magis, quo pretium maius e&longs;t animæ quam corpori, cuius morbus e&longs;t in&longs;citia, &longs;alus autem di&longs;ciplina. En igitur naturæ primordia patefacta, quorum explicatione vtêre, &longs;i voles: tu autem velle debebis, quòd res difficiles & tanti ponderis in vniuer&longs;a contem­platione nunquam tractantur &longs;atis. Occa&longs;io vero &longs;cribendi voluminis ab ea controuer&longs;ia &longs;um­pta e&longs;t, qu&ecedil; in Academia Pi&longs;ana inter no&longs;tros collegarumque. auditores ex orta e&longs;t de motu elemen­torum. Sed cùm multa quæ&longs;tio requireret, quæ de motu & natura generatim dicenda e&longs;&longs;ent, primo con&longs;ilio &longs;ecundum &longs;ucce&longs;sit, vt de motu di&longs;ceptaremus vniuersè eiu&longs;que cau&longs;as omnes, & communiter & &longs;peciatim perquireremus, ac &longs;ingulas partes & membra intueremur, cuncta faci­lius percipi po&longs;&longs;e &longs;perantes, &longs;i tota quæ&longs;tio &longs;cribendo explicaretur. Sed ne nimium longa &longs;u­matur oratio, de re ip&longs;a iam dicere incipiamus. Cœptis no&longs;tris Deus a&longs;piret, vt quod illo au­tore velle cœpimus, eodem etiam adiutore con&longs;equamur.

A

Generalia quædam capita tractantur de principiis &longs;cienti&ecedil; naturalis. Cap. I.

OPTIME verò factum e&longs;&longs;e arbitror, &longs;i in hac methodo bonos imitati mathematicos, aliqua veluti fundamenta iaciamus, &longs;uper quib. ædificium hoc, quod tanto conatu &longs;tudioque; moli­mur, extrui valeat. runt verò hæc principia &longs;iue hypothe&longs;es, quibus phy&longs;ici &longs;ine demon&longs;tratione frequentius vtuntur, vt enim docet Proclus principia &longs;ecundum naturam &longs;unt in rebus quidem cau&longs;&longs;a, vt finis; in definitionibus di&longs;tinctio; in demon&longs;trationibus & &longs;cientiis hypothe&longs;es, a quæ ta­met&longs;i ab Ari&longs;totele prætermi&longs;&longs;a nouimus, vt pote per&longs;picua, & &longs;iquando opus fuerit ex analyti­co præcepto v&longs;urpata: b nihilominus prælibanda fuerunt propter illos, qui in hypothe&longs;ibus phy­&longs;icis imprudenter etiam numerant aliquot conclu&longs;iones & &longs;uis locis ab Ari&longs;totele demon&longs;tratas, aut multas item prætereunt, quæ pa&longs;sim ab Ari&longs;totele ip&longs;o, aut &longs;ine admonitione accipiuntur, aut declarantur &longs;olùm; & nulla vi &longs;yllogi&longs;tica allata per&longs;uadentur. Neque tamen exi&longs;times ve­lim, me huc omnia conge&longs;si&longs;&longs;e, quæ à philo&longs;opho naturali &longs;ine demon&longs;tratione &longs;umuntur & &longs;o­lo &longs;en&longs;us auxilio note&longs;cunt, nimis enim putidum atque importunum fui&longs;&longs;et &longs;ingula recen&longs;ere; &longs;ed ea quæ perpetuò &longs;ic &longs;e habent, & ad cape&longs;&longs;enda proxima demon&longs;trationum principia con­ferunt, c vtque alienis verbis vtar, inducunt ad primæ certitudinis ordinem, cuiu&longs;modi non &longs;unt illa quòd homo &longs;edeat, aut tunica &longs;it alba: nihil enim hæc faciunt ad &longs;cientias, quanuis certi&longs;si­ma &longs;int, atque ex iis illa enarrare quæ crebrius occurrunt & &longs;unt veluti radices, vnde tanquam &longs;oboles, complures aliæ pululent. Neque id ob&longs;tabit, quominus in numero hypothe&longs;eon & principiorum, quæ demon&longs;trari non po&longs;sint, aliqua reponantur, de quibus multa di&longs;putari &longs;olent, & plura verba vltrò citroque; haberi. obis enim &longs;atis illud erit, &longs;i ita e&longs;&longs;e crediderint, qui talia pronunciata oppugnant, licet voce aliter autument, d & locis probabilibus, &longs;eu potius &longs;o­phi&longs;ticis rem conficiant, nam parum à nob. oc loco curabuntur: etenim verum cum vero per­petuò congruit: fal&longs;um non modo à vero, &longs;ed à &longs;eip&longs;o per&longs;&ecedil;pe di&longs;&longs;entit. e Quanquam &longs;æpe euenit, vt quædam con&longs;picua &longs;int, &longs;i prima fronte &longs;pectentur; veruntamen intus latebr&ecedil; con­duntur: hæ ni&longs;i intro&longs;piciantur, rei veritatem conturbare po&longs;&longs;unt: vt illa omnia ferè, quæ pri­mo Phy&longs;. ab Ari&longs;totele commemorantur, & in confu&longs;a referuntur, etenim liquet omne id quod fit, ex contrario fieri, &longs;iquis autem opponat materiam veluti non contrarium, ex qua fiat id quod fit, verè opponet & per&longs;uadebit non omne id quod fit, ex contrario con&longs;titui, &longs;ic principium noti&longs;simum concutere videbitur. Verùm nos hîc corticem duntaxat attingemus po&longs;thàc peragraturi rece&longs;&longs;us; iis po&longs;itis qu&ecedil; qui&longs;que vir &longs;ani iudicij & in rerum naturalium con­templatione ver&longs;atus, nec aliena con&longs;uetus audire, &longs;imulque, analytic&ecedil; non ignarus facillimè da­bit. robè &longs;cientes eum, qui mentis imbecillitate laborat, f parùm expertus, g aut ab alia con&longs;uetu­ dine deflexus e&longs;t, & analytica negligens h ea frequenter approbare, quæ phy&longs;icus &longs;aluo &longs;uo iure non admitteret, & illorum demon&longs;trationes quærere, quæ per &longs;e ip&longs;a con&longs;picua &longs;unt, i aut contrà res ob&longs;curas accipere pro noti&longs;simis. Tali igitur auditori principia proponimus, qui futurus &longs;it phy&longs;icus, nec aliarum &longs;cientiarum merita occupare decreuerit; ni&longs;i quantum h&ecedil;c velut à &longs;uperio­re quem &longs;ubalternantem vocant, offerentur, aut etiam velut à mini&longs;tro Architectori, quem pri­mum philo&longs;ophum, aut Theologum volumus e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;uppeditabuntur. Qu&ecedil; pluribus modis pri­mùm di&longs;tribuentur, vt in &longs;uas cla&longs;&longs;es &longs;ine vllo negocio redigi po&longs;sint, deinde in v&longs;um quotidia­num tanquam ex certo penu depromi. Ea verò nos in duo generalia capita partimur. &longs;unt enim principia cognitionis &longs;olum, vel principia cognitionis & rei &longs;imul; &longs;iue complexa &longs;int, &longs;iue incom­plexa, nihil refert, neque enim ita difficiles, aut moro&longs;i &longs;umus, vt ex huiu&longs;modi principiorum ordine incomplexa expungamus; qui nouerimus Ari&longs;totelem ea pronunciare motione ignorata, latere etiam quid &longs;it natura. k e&longs;t igitur motio, vt patet, principium cognitionis, eademque. vt incom­plexum, neque enim quæritur, an hoc vel illud moueatur; &longs;ed motio quid &longs;it, nec quenquam fu­giat e&longs;&longs;e aliquod principium, quo termini cogno&longs;cuntur, ex quib. &longs;truitur demon&longs;tratio, tanquam ex principiis cognitionis, l damus planè principia proxima demon&longs;trationum e&longs;&longs;e complexa, m atque ita ab Ari&longs;totele principium primum demon&longs;trationis in &longs;uas partes fui&longs;&longs;e di&longs;tributum: at, quin incomplexa &longs;int principia, &longs;altem remota demon&longs;trationis & cognitionis a&longs;&longs;erere, mea quidem &longs;ententia, non licet, a & duo prima illorum genera facimus. ognitionis inquàm & cognitionis & e&longs;&longs;e &longs;imul ea quæ &longs;int principia &longs;olius e&longs;&longs;e, nulla &longs;tatuimus, quod quidam aiunt: b quippe qui le­gerimus apud Ari&longs;totelem, c tum denique id concretum e&longs;t ex aliquibus rebus cogno&longs;ci, cum ex quib. & quot con&longs;tet, teneatur. Igitur omnia è quibus aliquid con&longs;tat, &longs;unt principia cognitio­nis eius, nam quanuis ex illo ordine videatur e&longs;&longs;e materia, po&longs;tea docebimus, etiam materiam, vbi fiat intelligenda, principium cognitionis euadere. Principia verò cognitionis tantum illa &longs;unt, quæ nob. ota ab Ari&longs;totele ponuntur; &longs;iue ea &longs;int effectus proprij & per &longs;e, è quibus vt an­tecedentibus demon&longs;tratio &longs;truitur à &longs;igno, & quorum facto quodam gyro mentis, quem regre&longs;­&longs;um, &longs;eu circulum dicunt; intelligitur cau&longs;&longs;a ope demon&longs;trationis ip&longs;ius propter quid e&longs;t. Sine etiam &longs;int alia adiacentia & comitantia rei. d Siquidem nil vertet, opinor, ea quæ &longs;unt nota nobis promi&longs;cuè & communiter ab omnibus &longs;cientiis v&longs;urpari, veluti de motu dictum e&longs;t, e quarum om­nium proprius non pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e motus, cùm toto genere di&longs;tinguantur, veluti naturalis & mathe­matica. emon&longs;trationes autem ip&longs;ius quod e&longs;t aut eiu&longs;dem &longs;int &longs;cientiæ, qu&ecedil; docet cau&longs;&longs;am, f aut vbi vna ad alteram &longs;e habeat, vt inferior ad &longs;uperiorem. Quapropter hoc principiorum genus ab altero &longs;eparatur, quia non obtinet vim cau&longs;&longs;æ. Secundum genus principiorum omne genus cau&longs;&longs;æ complectitur: quandò omnes cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; generatim in demon&longs;trationibus a&longs;&longs;umi queunt, &longs;ed præcipuè pertinet ad interna principia quæ &longs;unt materies & forma: quod tibi qui iam analytica tracta&longs;ti pluribus non exponam, g nec in eo morabor quòd principia cognitionis virtute &longs;olum in demon&longs;tratione contineantur, principia verò rei comprehendantur actu; largior ero in a&longs;&longs;umen­dis principiis cognitionis, & &longs;i quando opus fuerit, vt in demon&longs;tratione quòd e&longs;t, etiam nota no­bis v&longs;urpabo. Quæcunque tamen principia &longs;int, idcirco principia &longs;unt, quia non requiritur eo­rum demon&longs;tratio &longs;impliciter in ea methodo, in qua ponuntur: licet in alia quandoque demon&longs;tra­ri queant, vt &longs;i principia fuerint methodi &longs;ubaltern&ecedil;: nil enim prohibet, quo minus habeant cau&longs;­&longs;as &longs;uperiores, per quas o&longs;tendantur. Verùm in ea methodo, cuius principia &longs;unt, vt aliis modis manife&longs;ta &longs;umuntur. Modi verò multi &longs;unt, ac &longs;i generales omnium modos recen&longs;ere libeat, quibus principia tùm in philo&longs;ophia contemplante, tùm in agente, ac demum in &longs;cientiis, & arti­bus percipiuntur & cogno&longs;cuntur ex Ari&longs;totele recen&longs;ebo & explicabo, h aliquot alij &longs;anè indican­tur; &longs;ed nihil de illis &longs;peciatim dicitur. Vnus e&longs;t qui &longs;olum re&longs;picit eam philo&longs;ophiæ partem, quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in agendo, e&longs;t verò per con&longs;uetudinem: quando nimirum bene maléue agendo &longs;ic aut aliter a&longs;&longs;ueuimus, & ex actionis illius frequentia contrahimus habitum, quo &longs;ic aut aliter iu­dicare cogimur, vt qui furando &longs;æpius eua&longs;it in furem, furtum iudicat bonum, & hoc illi veluti principium e&longs;t con&longs;uetudine partum furtum e&longs;&longs;e bonum. Reliqui modi in omne methodorum genus conuenire po&longs;&longs;unt vt inductio, qua plurium &longs;ingularium &longs;imilitudo colligitur, con&longs;imi­lique modo &longs;en&longs;us. Nanque inductione percipimus, &longs;i ab æquis æqua demantur, æqua e&longs;&longs;e quæ &longs;uper&longs;unt, &longs;en&longs;u cogno&longs;cimus aquam e&longs;&longs;e frigidam, & primas primorum corporum qualitates. Aliis quoque modis principia no&longs;cuntur quos Ari&longs;toteles non exprimit. Sed optimè Auerroes, optimè item Eu&longs;tratius enuclearunt. Auerroes inquiens &longs;ignificari vias illas, quæ nullam vim af­ferunt menti, vt diui&longs;ionem, id quod etiam docuit Ari&longs;toteles, i cùm te&longs;tatus e&longs;t ea, quæ &longs;unt no­ta natura, nobis autem ignota, fieri nobis per&longs;picua diuidendo & re&longs;oluendo illa quæ nobis per­&longs;picua &longs;unt. Additur item &longs;yllogi&longs;mus quem vocant hypotheticum per naturam, in quo nulla extat vis dicti de omni, aut nullo, &longs;ed nece&longs;sitas &longs;ola con&longs;ecutionis, tùm quoque exemplum. præterea &longs;i vera de v&longs;u dialectic&ecedil; prædicat Ari&longs;toteles, k ad idem valebunt arma dialectica. Nam præter c&ecedil;tera multum confert dialectica ad inuentionem principiorum, qu&ecedil; &longs;cienti&ecedil; &longs;ibi &longs;umunt. Valet item ad hoc definitio principiorum, vt frigoris & caloris: quod item Socrates approbauit in principiis exquirendis, imò excogitauit. Nam duo &longs;unt quæ Socrati iure proprio tribui po&longs;­&longs;unt, l inductiue orationes, & definitionum v&longs;us generatim. traque autem ad &longs;cientiæ principia conferunt. Magna etiam vis e&longs;t experientiæ quæ na&longs;citur ex memoria rerum quas &longs;en&longs;us &longs;emel atque iterum &longs;uppeditat: nanque ex repetita &longs;en&longs;ione memoria propagatur: multæ verò eiu&longs;­dem rei memori&ecedil; pote&longs;tatem vnius experientiæ faciunt, m ex experimentis verò primorum prin­cipiorum cognitio gignitur. Itaque generatim id ab Ari&longs;totele pronunciatum. n Principia quæ &longs;e­cundum vnum quodque &longs;unt, experimenti e&longs;&longs;e tradere: o vt puta, a&longs;trologic&ecedil; di&longs;ciplin&ecedil; principia ex a&longs;trologica experientia colliguntur: nanque ob&longs;eruatis apparentibus quantum &longs;atis e&longs;t, inuen­t&ecedil; &longs;unt a&longs;trologic&ecedil; demon&longs;trationes con&longs;imilique. modo principia &longs;e habent in alia quacunque &longs;cien­tia vel arte. Itaque experimentum ea &longs;ubmini&longs;trat, qu&ecedil; verè in&longs;unt in rebus quorum &longs;i nihil omi&longs;&longs;um fuerit, in promptu erit illa demon&longs;trare, qu&ecedil; demon&longs;trationem recipiunt, cuius verò non e&longs;t demon&longs;tratio &longs;uapte natura, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;unt principia quæ nos hoc ip&longs;o tempore tracta­mus, ea manife&longs;ta facere. Quamobrem monente Ari&longs;totele plurimum pote&longs;t in &longs;cientiæ prin­cipiis &longs;tatuendis experientia. Quo miror magis hoc caput ab Auerroe prætermi&longs;&longs;um. Ni&longs;i cum eius a&longs;&longs;eclis defendamus experientiam cum con&longs;uetudine fui&longs;&longs;e numeratam, qua&longs;i idem &longs;int, aut con&longs;uetudinem experientia con&longs;equatur, quippe quòd omnis con&longs;uetudo po&longs;tulet experientiam. Atqui mihi magis iudicium Eu&longs;tratij probatur aliud facientis experientiam à con&longs;uetudine: a quoniam con&longs;uetudo ex actione &longs;uboritur, experientia ex ob&longs;eruatione, & collatione plurium &longs;ingularium con&longs;imilium, vt quòd rhabarbarum purget flauam bilem, in hoc & illo ægroto ex­perimur; nec quicquam propterea con&longs;ueuimus. Quoniam verò dicere po&longs;&longs;es non omnem pla­nè &longs;ed aliquam experientiam cum con&longs;uetudine conuenire, o&longs;tendam ego id e&longs;&longs;e ex euento & fortuitò, non nece&longs;&longs;ario & per &longs;e, quando multæ &longs;unt con&longs;uetudines, quæ &longs;ine vlla aduer&longs;ione, &longs;en&longs;u notitiaúe contrahuntur, veluti quòd &longs;ibi qui&longs;piam vellicet barbam, aut curuus incedat, &longs;ine illis verò nulla experientia con&longs;tare pote&longs;t, quid enim ob&longs;ecrò experimenti facies, ni&longs;i aduerteris? quid aduerteris, ni&longs;i noueris aut &longs;en&longs;eris? Hæc quidem omnia, quæ nuper commemorauimus princi­piorum notitiam faciunt, offerentia terminos menti, quos &longs;imulac ip&longs;a contemplata fuerit, ita e&longs;&longs;e certi&longs;­&longs;imè cogno&longs;cit & maximè credit, & ad eorum normam refert omnia, quæ con&longs;equuntur. Sed cum è principiis rerum nonnulla &longs;int euidentia, neque præmon&longs;tratorem po&longs;tulent, alia recon­dita &longs;int & ignota nobis ea quæ paulò ante recen&longs;uimus, omne principiorum genus amplectun­tur, &longs;iue notum &longs;it nobis &longs;iue ignotum. Verumenimuero con&longs;ilium no&longs;trum e&longs;t in naturalis &longs;cien­tiæ ve&longs;tibulo con&longs;tituere illa quæ &longs;ine acri ratione note&longs;cunt, & in notis nobis collocantur, &longs;iue &longs;int po&longs;teriora, &longs;eu priora natura, quæ de domo quicunque afferre &longs;olet, aut paucis admonitus à præ­ceptore, admittere; quæ in &longs;en&longs;u & experientia poni dicimus, & accipi ita e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olum, quia &longs;cili­cet nulla eorum cau&longs;&longs;a afferatur. Quocirca dictum quoque e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele b quòd ita &longs;it, e&longs;&longs;e principium, non illud &longs;anè, quod legitur 2. Po&longs;t. c & e&longs;t in numero quæ&longs;tionum, quod falsò non­nulli Ethicorum interpretes opinantur; &longs;ed id, quod numeratur in præcognitis. Etenim prin­cipia &longs;ic præno&longs;cuntur, quòd &longs;unt. In phy&longs;icis autem à &longs;en&longs;u, & experientia trahunt originem, his verò nititur inductio, quæ principiis proximè terminatur; vnde mini&longs;terio facultatis &longs;entien­tis opera mentis &longs;uccedit. Hinc pendet vniuer&longs;a fides, qu&ecedil; demon&longs;trationibus habetur, quia per &longs;e credunt, atque ita, vt cæteris, quæ deducuntur ab ip&longs;is, fidem communicent: neque enim cau&longs;­&longs;a vlla e&longs;t, cur vera &longs;int: &longs;ed quod ita principiorum termini &longs;e habent, vt aut indi&longs;&longs;olubili vincu­lo connectantur, aut quòd alter alterius rationem compleat. Ideo no&longs;cimus & credimus, quia nouit mens eorum terminos, vtro&longs;que &longs;en&longs;u indicante, atque ita certò vt de illorum connexione non dubitet. Neque enim volumus e&longs;&longs;entialem illam connexionem quam aiunt imitatores Auerrois, in vno indiuiduo percipi, aut ab vna inductionis particula &longs;ignificari, &longs;ed inductione iam ab&longs;oluta, vt conuenit, quæ illic terminatur, vnde non &longs;uccurrit aliquod indiuiduum aliter &longs;e habens: d mentem protinus illam connexionem e&longs;&longs;entialem per&longs;picere: ob eamque. rem melius affecti &longs;umus ad principia, quàm ad ea, quæ per demon&longs;trationem concepimus. Sed enim, quia primus eorum exortus e&longs;t à &longs;en&longs;u, ip&longs;i verò præ&longs;entantur confu&longs;æ quædam &longs;pecies, & inh&ecedil;rentia cum &longs;ubiectis, quibus inhærent, vt ri&longs;us compos in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, & in linea punctum, atque in &longs;ub­&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ili principium motas. Tum etiam, quòd tamet&longs;i incomplexa &longs;unt principia cogni­tionis, &longs;unt tamen remota: pronunciata verò & propo&longs;itiones &longs;unt proxima principia cognitio­nis, & demon&longs;trationis; ex hoc efficitur, vt non incomplexa pro principiis ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;tatuan­tur; &longs;ed &longs;ub forma hypothe&longs;eon, neque quòd &longs;int &longs;impliciter, vt plurimum pronunciamus; &longs;ed vt inhærentia &longs;umimus, vbi e&longs;&longs;e adiacet, & pr&ecedil;dicatur. Itaque non dicimus &longs;æpius e&longs;&longs;e motum, &longs;eu multitudinem, neque item e&longs;&longs;e naturam; quoniam hæc &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ili non exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ed ita pronunciamus. e Omnia aut quædam moueri: multa e&longs;&longs;e ea, quæ &longs;unt &longs;iue genere, &longs;eu &longs;pe­cie, aut numero, alii&longs;úe differentia modis. &longs;iquidem omnes has di&longs;tinctiones &longs;en&longs;us ip&longs;e patefa­ciat f res &longs;en&longs;iles initia motus in &longs;eip&longs;is habere & c&ecedil;tera huiu&longs;modi. Atque hactenus de gene­ rali principiorum con&longs;titutione dictum &longs;it, ad &longs;pecialia de&longs;cendamus.

B

a 2. in Tim.

b 1. Po&longs;t. T. 25.

c Abuma zar.

C

d 4. Met. T. 9.

e 1. Pri. &longs;eg. 3. 1. Eth. . 9.

f 8. Phy&longs;. Tt. 22. 26.

g 1. Phy&longs;. T. 71. 1. De ortu.

h 2. Met. T. 14. 7. Eth. . 10. De Mem. cap. 3.

i Met. T. 26.

D

k Phy&longs;. T. 1.

l 1. Po&longs;t. T. 6.

m 1 Po&longs;t. Tt. 5. 25.

E

a Zim. Tab. . principia &longs;cienti&ecedil; na­turalis.

b Iand. 1. Phy&longs;. que 7.

c 1. Phy&longs;. T. 35.

d 10. Gran­mat. 1. Po­&longs;ter. . 25.

e 8. Phy&longs;. T. 22.

f 1. Po&longs;t. T. 30.

F

g 1. Ven.

h 1 Eth. cap. 7.

G

i 1. Phy&longs;. T. 3.

k 1. Top. cap. 2.

H

l 8. Met. cap. 4.

m 2. Po&longs;t. T. lt.

n 1. Prin. &longs;eg. 2.

o 1. Met. &longs;um. 1.

A

a 1. de ar­te dicendi cap. 10.

B

b 1. Eth. cap. 7.

c T. 1.

C

d 8. Top.

e 1. Phy&longs;. T. 9. 8. Phy&longs;. T. 22.

f 10. Met. T. 12.

D

Distributio principiorum no&longs;tr&ecedil; methodi ponitur, & leuiter aliqua ad ip&longs;a pertinentia tanguntur. Cap. II.

QVIA methodus omnis ex duabus partibus componitur modo &longs;ciendi nimirùm & &longs;cien­tia. g Nece&longs;&longs;e enim e&longs;t, in quaque methodo no&longs;cere quatenus aliquid tractandum e&longs;t, quibus viis atque rationibus confirmandum, & quo quidque loco di&longs;ponendum. Scientia rem ip&longs;am declarante & definiente, demon&longs;trante, & docente; etiam methodi principia ad h&ecedil;c duo capita commodè referri poterunt; erunt enim aliqua principia, quæ modum &longs;ciendi &longs;pectabunt, nonnulla quæ &longs;cientiam re&longs;picient. Verum &longs;icut in methodo ratio tractandi, &longs;eu modus &longs;ciendi &longs;cientiæ præponendus e&longs;t, h etenim ab&longs;onum e&longs;t vnà &longs;cientiam modumque; &longs;ciendi quærere: &longs;ic de principus, quæ pertinent ad modum tractandi, priore loco verba faciemus. Atque ea qui­dem non pauca &longs;unt, horum primas &longs;ibi vendicat, cum in omni contemplatione, tùm maximè in philo&longs;ophia naturali, quòd ab Ari&longs;totele crebrò pr&ecedil;ceptum & celebratum e&longs;t, &longs;tandum e&longs;&longs;e iu­dicio &longs;en&longs;us. Etenim et&longs;i generale e&longs;t in omni contemplatione &longs;en&longs;us officium: quia nihil e&longs;t in phanta&longs;ia mentéue quod fores &longs;en&longs;uum non pepulerit, &longs;iue ex toto, vt in vera phanta&longs;ia, &longs;iue ex parte, vt in fictione chim&ecedil;ræ, &longs;iuè proximè & per &longs;e, vt plenum, &longs;iue per aliud, vt inane, ac cuiu&longs;que rei &longs;en&longs;u deficiente, eiu&longs;dem quoque in &longs;cientia deficies, nec ni&longs;i de nomine di&longs;putatio fieri po&longs;sit. At hoc in phy&longs;iologia poti&longs;simè requiritur. Nam &longs;i philo&longs;ophus naturalis in rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium con­templatione ver&longs;atur, earum verò nullus melior iudex e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t quàm &longs;en&longs;us a profectò maxi­mum &longs;en&longs;us habebit in hac philo&longs;ophia momentum, v&longs;que adeò, vt qui rerum illarum, quæ &longs;ic euidentes & per&longs;picuæ &longs;unt, velut illud e&longs;t, quòd &longs;it motus, demon&longs;trationem quærit, quæ do­ceat e&longs;&longs;e motum, non po&longs;sit di&longs;cernere id, quod per &longs;e ip&longs;um votum e&longs;t ab eo, quod e&longs;t per &longs;e ob­&longs;curum, nec per&longs;picere, cùm cuiu&longs;que rationis antecedens notius e&longs;&longs;e oporteat eo, quod &longs;equitur; nihil occurrere po&longs;&longs;e, quod fit eo notius, quod ip&longs;e con&longs;equens facit, idcirco &longs;ic mente obc&ecedil;ca­tus e&longs;t, vt ne&longs;ciat quid admittat aut re&longs;puat demon&longs;trationem. b Propterea cum eo compara­tur, qui cæcus e&longs;t ab ortu; cum enim colorum vires ignoret, &longs;iquando di&longs;&longs;erat de illis, &longs;olùm no­mina ponit in medio; quorum nomina &longs;int nota, pror&longs;us ignorat. itaque & ille qui demon&longs;tratio­nem requiret eius quod quippiam moueatur, nominis &longs;olius habebit rationem, nec quid eo no­mine &longs;ignificetur, vtique nouerit. ui certè &longs;i no&longs;&longs;et; tantum abe&longs;t, vt illa demon&longs;trare conare­tur, vt potius in aliorum demon&longs;tratione v&longs;urparet. Multo maior error committetur, &longs;i ratio rei ve&longs;tigabitur, cuius oppo&longs;itum &longs;en&longs;us iudicabit, vt illi fecere, qui vniuer&longs;a quie&longs;cere profiteban­tur, eiu&longs;que. euenti rationes indagabant. c multo enim melius nos habemus ad h&ecedil;c, quæ mon&longs;trat &longs;en&longs;us, quàm &longs;i vlla ratio ad id o&longs;tendendum accommodari po&longs;&longs;et, atque is qui ita progreditur, male iudicat, quid melius peiu&longs;úe &longs;it, quid credendum, & non credendum, nec principium di­&longs;tinguit ab eo quod non e&longs;t principium, d & in &longs;umma rerum ignoratione ver&longs;atur. Etenim ad ali­quod primum a&longs;cendendum e&longs;t, e quod in alia notiora di&longs;&longs;olui nequeat, vnde fides in aliorum confirmationem ducatur aliter, vel ex infinitate principiorum vniuer&longs;a &longs;cientia funditus euerte­retur, aut exordiatur ab ignoto. f Hoc verò primum dictatur à &longs;en&longs;u. Quamobrem qui magis ver­&longs;ati &longs;unt in naturalibus magis recipiunt principia quæ cum rerum natura con&longs;entiant, & valde accommodata &longs;int ad efficiendam &longs;cientiam. &longs;uppeditat enim copia multarum demon&longs;tratio­num, quarum auxilio rem intro&longs;piciant. aque diligenter animaduer&longs;a, con&longs;iderata tarditate iudicium faciant cum ceteroquin illi qui dimi&longs;&longs;a rerum ob&longs;eruatione &longs;olam rationem per&longs;e­quuntur pauca re&longs;picientes de rebus ob&longs;curi&longs;simis ex tempore temereque effutiant. g Siquidem con&longs;entaneum &longs;it iudicare ex euentis, & ex fine poti&longs;simum. Atqui finis &longs;cientiæ naturalis e&longs;t eorum &longs;peculatio, quæ &longs;emper proprie &longs;en&longs;ui &longs;e obijciunt. h quod cum illi non intueantur. n pe&longs;­&longs;imos errores inducuntur. Itaque illa ponenda in hac philo&longs;ophia quæ cum &longs;en&longs;ilibus congruant. Quin &longs;iquando ratio quippiam mon&longs;tret, & po&longs;tea &longs;en&longs;us indicet rem aliter &longs;e habere, &longs;en&longs;ui magis erit quam rationi fides habenda. Solumque rationi illi credendum e&longs;t: &longs;i ea quæ demon­&longs;trantur cum rebus ijs con&longs;entiant, quæ &longs;en&longs;u percipiuntur. i Igitur in hac philo&longs;ophia cuncta ad &longs;en&longs;um referenda erunt. Audi verò tu nunc firmum iudicium Ari&longs;totelis, de con&longs;truendis rationibus ac mea quidem &longs;ententia, in omni philo&longs;ophia generatim, præcipuè verò in natura­li: k iubet enim, vt no&longs;trarum rationum principium non à quauis &longs;ententia: &longs;ed à firmi&longs;sima quaque ducatur huiu&longs;modi verò e&longs;t, quam &longs;emper, e&longs;&longs;e oportet, aut quæ ex con&longs;imilibus o&longs;ten­ditur. Atque vbi duæ &longs;int &longs;ententiæ repugnantes, quarum altera alteram tollat, illa recipienda, quæ firmior: ea verò e&longs;t, quæ credibilior, & quæ &longs;emper citius ab omnibus quàm altera admit­tatur. Itaque & quod ex tali &longs;ententia con&longs;equitur, magis approbandum, & illud repudian­dum, quod efficitur ex oppo&longs;ita. Duoque huius vitij traduntur exempla ab Ari&longs;totele. lterum &longs;anè à di&longs;putatione Parmenidis acceptum, atque alterum à ratione Xenophanis. Atque ille quidem motum &longs;ine vacuo fieri non po&longs;&longs;e &longs;tatuens, ex eo quod vacuum non e&longs;&longs;et, tollebat etiam motum. Et tamen &longs;i hæc &longs;ecum conferantur, & facilius qui&longs;que vacuum e&longs;&longs;e dabit, quàm neget motum. Quapropter accipiendum e&longs;t potius e&longs;&longs;e motum, & ex eo vacuum e&longs;&longs;e conclu­dendum quàm motus vacui &longs;ublatione tollendus. Xenophanes autem &longs;ic ratiocinabatur, ex nihilo nihil fit. Ergo ens infinitum & æternum. Non igitur motus. Tamen qui&longs;que promptius dabit ex nihilo aliquid fieri, vt etiam multi dedere, & fides no&longs;tra pro certo habet quàm reij­ciat motum. Proinde &longs;ic potius concludendum fuerat. Motus e&longs;t. Ergo ex nihilo aliquid fit; quàm vt fecit Xenophanes. & fide nitendum, quam præ&longs;tat &longs;en&longs;us, qui &longs;i quandoque decipitur; non id perpetuo neque in omnibus efficit. Neque verò id huius philo&longs;ophiæ proprium e&longs;t: &longs;ed omnis artis atque &longs;cientiæ apud Ari&longs;totelem. Nam quòd ille futurus &longs;it huius methodi norma per&longs;picuum e&longs;t, ex eo loco, l quo comparat rerum diuinarum cognitionem cum &longs;cientia morta­lium, &longs;iquidem tamet&longs;i pauca admodum de illis a&longs;&longs;erere philo&longs;ophis licet; contemplationis nobilitate compen&longs;et hoc damnum, ac dum eius difficultatis cau&longs;&longs;am reddit, id vniuer&longs;um tri­ buit imbecillitati &longs;en&longs;uum humanorum. Minus enim, inquit, diuinam partem contemplari contingit quòd non multum illius pateat &longs;en&longs;ui, cuius beneficio tum de ea ip&longs;a parte diuina, tum de ijs, qu&ecedil; no&longs;&longs;e cupimus, facultas cogitandi, & indagandi nobis &longs;uppetat. Sed ad alias quoque artes translatum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele huiu&longs;modi pr&ecedil;ceptum, quippe qui clari&longs;simè te&longs;tetur, deficiente aliquo &longs;en&longs;u deperire item cum eo aliquam &longs;cientiam, vt vi&longs;u deficiente colorum, auditu verò &longs;onorum. a Quapropter &longs;i &longs;aluo homine &longs;en&longs;us vniuer&longs;i tollerentur, continuo quo­que omni &longs;cientia priuaremur. Idem quoque mon&longs;trat &longs;cientiæ cuiu&longs;que principia colligi per inductionem, & à &longs;en&longs;u deduci. b Pertinet & eadem norma ad illa principia, quibus vtitur ci­uilis philo&longs;ophus, nam &longs;iue re&longs;piciant rerum veritatem, atque naturam, &longs;iue actionem; in &longs;en­&longs;um nece&longs;&longs;ariò re&longs;oluuntur: quando ad rerum veritatem perno&longs;cendam requiratur inductio, quæ e&longs;t de &longs;en&longs;ilibus; ad actionem verò con&longs;uetudo, c quæ exoritur ex frequenti v&longs;u &longs;ingula­rium. Valeat ergo Parmenides, qui iudicium &longs;en&longs;us omnino detrectat & ita pr&ecedil;cipit impuden­ti&longs;sime, licet habuerit a&longs;&longs;eclam Hippocratem, qui ne&longs;cio qua ratione ductus th_s gnw/mhsi+n, id e&longs;t menti non &longs;en&longs;ui fidere nos voluit.

g Primo de part. an. ap. 1.

h 2. Met. T. 15. Galen. 2. de temp. c. 2.

E

a 4. Mete­or. T. 29.

b 2. Phy&longs;. T. 6.

F

c 8. Phy&longs;. T. 22.

d 8. Phy&longs;. T. 26.

e Galen. ad Hiero­nem. 4. Met. T. 9.

f 1. Po&longs;t. T. 6.

g 1. de Ge­ner. 7. T.

G

h 3. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 61.

i 3. de Ge­ner. n. . 10.

k Lib. e plac. ap. 1.

H

l 1. de par an cap. 5.

A

a 1. Po&longs;t.

b 2. Po&longs;t.

c 1. Eth.

Neu faxit Deus (inquit ille) vt pateat tibi &longs;emita &longs;enus

Neue oculus fallax, aut lingua auri&longs;úe &longs;onora

B

Decipiat, varium ratio det rebus honorem.

Quantò rectius vetus ille quidem inter Latinos, &longs;ed eleganti&longs;simus & iudicio eruditi&longs;simus poëta cecinit ea de &longs;en&longs;u?

Communis dedicat e&longs;&longs;e

Sen&longs;us, cui ni&longs;i prima fides fundata valebit,

Haud erit occultis de rebus, quò referentes

Confirmare animos quicquam ratione queamus.

Nollem hic multus e&longs;&longs;e: veruntamen ad &longs;e rapit me Galenus d & eorum in&longs;citiam redarguens,

qui fidem facere &longs;tudent ex ijs quæ adhuc ignorantur, cum ceteroquin ea quæ &longs;umuntur ad de­mon&longs;trationem vel euidentia &longs;int oportet, vel antea demon&longs;trata: & rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium legitimum iudicem clamans e&longs;&longs;e &longs;en&longs;um, vt pote tactum primarum qualitatum. Nam &longs;i alia via, inquit, &longs;uccurrat, qua illæ no&longs;cuntur, eam quæ&longs;o demon&longs;trent. nauditam enim &longs;apientiam promit­tunt, immo, &longs;i verum fateri licet, &longs;tuporem potius, &longs;i quidem rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium meliorem &longs;e iu­dicem habere putent, quàm &longs;it ip&longs;e &longs;en&longs;us. c &longs;i de rebus &longs;en&longs;ilibus demon&longs;trationes inquirunt, iam de niue di&longs;putandum erit, &longs;it ne candida cen&longs;enda, quemadmodum omnibus apparet: an­atra potius, vt pr&ecedil;dicabat Anaxagoras; & de pice &longs;imiliter: neque enim, &longs;i vi&longs;ui de albo, quod viderit, fides habenda non e&longs;t, de nigro &longs;ine demon&longs;tratione credendum erit. Omnia igitur quæ &longs;en&longs;ui apparent, &longs;i iam fide carere dicunt: nec cygnum e&longs;&longs;e album fateantur, ni&longs;i prius id ratio­ne con&longs;pexerint, neque diem neque Solem. d eundem modum & de voce auribus fidem ab­rogent & de odore naribus & de omni tactili ip&longs;i &longs;en&longs;ui tactus. Quæ &longs;anè nihil di&longs;tant ab hæ &longs;i­tationibus & nugis Pyrrhonianis. Aequum verò fuerat eos qui optimam &longs;ectam in philo&longs;ophia delegi&longs;&longs;ent, quæ primas qualitates per elementa principiaque ponit, non tam de&longs;ciui&longs;&longs;e à com­muni hominum &longs;en&longs;u, vt, quæ omnis demon&longs;trationis principia &longs;unt & quæ &longs;en&longs;ui mentique patent, non cogno&longs;cerent. Et profecto qui&longs;quis de his addubitat, fru&longs;tra de alijs inquirit, vt po­te nil &longs;ibi relinquens, vnde &longs;it incepturus. Sed illud vnum prauorum dogmatum principium e&longs;t, nihil de demon&longs;tratione prius meditatum &longs;imul res ip&longs;as inquirere: veluti, quid nam demon­&longs;tratio &longs;it, demon&longs;trare tentare. Placet &longs;anè mihi Diogenes, qui cùm de motu interrogaretur, nihil quidem re&longs;pondit, &longs;ed &longs;urgens ambulauit, per ip&longs;am euidentiam &longs;ophi&longs;tæ &longs;en&longs;um expro­brans, & planè, qui hæc non norunt egent &longs;en&longs;u, ne dicam pœna, e vt &longs;iquis ignem calidum e&longs;­ &longs;e non &longs;entiat, conijciatur in ignem. Non e&longs;t ocium nunc de fide &longs;en&longs;ibus adhibenda di&longs;putare. Satis &longs;it hunc rerum naturalium e&longs;&longs;e debere normam, & regulam qua cuncta exploremus, f ne­que ab eius iudicio ne latum quidem vnguem di&longs;cedemus. Ei primò vel omnium maximè &longs;e&longs;e offert motus: itaque nos ad contemplationem primus excitauit, cuius cum principia qu&ecedil;rerentur effectum e&longs;t, vt naturalis omnium prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;tatueretur: nec vero quòd omnes &longs;cientiæ motum adhibeant, vel cogitando, vel ex motu ratiocinando, vel etiam ficto motu ad maiorem explicationem, veluti mathematici, dum ex fluxu puncti lineam ex huius item fluxu &longs;uperfi­ciem, & ex &longs;uperficiei fluxu corpus efformant. Neque hæc eò dicimus, quominus arbitremur magnam quoque rationem mentis e&longs;&longs;e habendam: &longs;ed, vt &longs;eligamus illud mentis iudicium de rebus ab&longs;tru&longs;is quas &longs;en&longs;us attingere nequit, quod futurum &longs;it rectum. ale autem erit, &longs;i illa acci­piat, quæ nihil euertant eorum, quæ per &longs;e & propriè &longs;entiuntur, hoc e&longs;t in quorum &longs;en&longs;ione nullus error committitur, quod tum euenit, cum omnia ritè di&longs;po&longs;ita &longs;unt, vt optimè &longs;en&longs;io fiat. Quod &longs;i minus liceat, vt inue&longs;tigatione c&ecedil;le&longs;tium corporum, g locorum ignotorum, & &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiarum quæ &longs;unt liber&ecedil; & &longs;olutæ à materia, quorum aliqua nullo pacto &longs;ubiiciuntur &longs;en&longs;ibus; alia tentare non datum e&longs;t cuique; ad cœlum non peruenit &longs;en&longs;us, aut vnus vi&longs;us, atque ille qui­dem valde infirmus; ita ratio gubernabitur, vt nihil oppugnet ea, quæ verè &longs;entiuntur & veluti noti&longs;sima po&longs;ita iam fuerunt. Et id &longs;i placuit Hyppocrati, ip&longs;um quoque commendabimus, & rationi, non &longs;en&longs;ui confidendum e&longs;&longs;e eo tempore decernemus. Tum verò optimè nobi&longs;cum agetur, &longs;i &longs;en&longs;uum fidem cum ratione, rationemque. cum &longs;en&longs;ibus habeamus. Denique &longs;en&longs;us &longs;it totius phy&longs;icæ principale firmamentum, quo etiam nitantur c&ecedil;tera pronunciata, qu&ecedil; ad&longs;cribentur. Ex eo qui iudicio &longs;en&longs;us &longs;tandum e&longs;t efficitur, vt accidentium cuiu&longs;que rei &longs;peculatio, valde ad­modum conferat ad rerum e&longs;&longs;entias perno&longs;cendas a &longs;iquidem tales oporteat e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;as, quales propagare po&longs;sint ea quæ in&longs;unt. Quanquam alio modo nos in &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notitiam accidentia perducunt. uandò tota &longs;pecies indiuidui recipitur à &longs;en&longs;ibus externis, eademque. ponitur in phan­ta&longs;ia & phanta&longs;ma efficitur, cuius partes &longs;unt accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quæ po&longs;tmodò mentis effi­cientis opere di&longs;cernuntur. Itaque et&longs;i certus e&longs;t progre&longs;&longs;us, à definitione ad accidentia, nem­pe demon&longs;tratiuus: etiam methodus conuer&longs;a multum iuuat ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t. Nam definitio dare quidem &longs;olet occa&longs;ionem adipi&longs;cendi notitiam cau&longs;&longs;arum, ex quibus accidentia rei na&longs;cuntur. ideoque. Ari&longs;toteles qu&ecedil;rebat quid e&longs;&longs;et locus, b vt eorum .&longs;. quæ in loco &longs;unt, cau&longs;­&longs;as inueniret; idemque. ordo tenetur in mathematicis, quæ demon&longs;trationis per&longs;picuitate reliquas omnes excellunt. p&longs;æ enim accidentia quanto per definitiones inueniunt, & cognito quid &longs;it triangulus, aut rectum nobis aperiunt triangulum habere tres angulos æquos duobus rectis, at­que omnino vbi definitio non præ&longs;tet eorum notitiam, quæ in&longs;unt rei, pro dialectica communi & inani habenda e&longs;t. Sed etiam cognitio rudis, &, vt Gr&ecedil;ci dicunt, kata\ fantasi/an ip&longs;orum accidentium aut omnium, aut plurium, nobis &longs;uppeditat, quæ de rerum e&longs;&longs;entia dicamus: non &longs;anè, quia demon&longs;tratiuam cognitionem efficiat; quippe qui omnis demon&longs;trationis principium &longs;it definitio, &longs;ed tamen eiu&longs;modi vt aditum patefaciat ad con&longs;tituendam rei propo&longs;itæ defini­tionem. Propterea de loco di&longs;&longs;erens Ari&longs;toteles accidentia quædam definitioni loci præpo&longs;uit, è quibus po&longs;tea collegit quid e&longs;&longs;et locus. andem quoque viam tenuit, dum incrementi e&longs;&longs;en­tiam exquireret. c eandem item in de&longs;ceptatione de animo voluit ob&longs;eruare, &longs;iquidem ex motu & cognitione vires animi vniuer&longs;as inuenerit & explanarit, vnde, qua&longs;i retrocedens accidentium illorum vim multò certius expo&longs;uit; &, cùm ante definitionem rudi quodam modo nob. otui&longs;­&longs;ent; po&longs;tquàm definitio comperta e&longs;t, accurati&longs;simè euoluit, nimirùm demon&longs;tratione, qua via philo&longs;opho naturali plurimum in&longs;i&longs;tendum e&longs;t, cui &longs;æpius effectus quàm cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;unt notiores. Neque illud ob&longs;tat quod Ari&longs;toteles aliquando reiecerit accidentia, d tanquam inutilia ad defini­ tionem comparandam. Aut etiam prædicarit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam accidenti & natura & cognitione præcedere. e Nanque in Analyticis agebat Ari&longs;toteles de prædicatis illis, quæ &longs;unt partes ip&longs;ius quid e&longs;t. tqui accidentia non &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi. erùm nob. ndicant &longs;olùm partes ip&longs;ius quid e&longs;t, & &longs;ub&longs;tantia cognitione procedit, vt po&longs;teà narrabitur, quia nulla notio pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e acciden­tis, quin includat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam; &longs;ed ea notio confu&longs;a e&longs;t & imperfecta, quod philo&longs;ophi quidam non videntes à vera item ratione pronuntiati præ&longs;entis aberrarunt. Nam lego apud nonnullos talem poni ordinem inter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & accidens. uod ita cognitio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ præcedat acci­denti, quia &longs;it eius cognitio perfectior. unc enim quanque rem cogno&longs;cere videmur, cum eius &longs;ub&longs;tantiam nouimus; vt vbi nouimus quid homo &longs;it, non autem cuiu&longs;modi &longs;it. &longs;ic etiam me­lius cogno&longs;cimus album, quando nouimus quid &longs;it album, quæ videtur e&longs;&longs;e cognitio &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; & e&longs;&longs;entiæ, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;it albi e&longs;&longs;entia, quàm &longs;i ip&longs;um &longs;ub alicuius attributi ratione no&longs;camus. At verò prior e&longs;t origine accidentis notitia quàm &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ: quandoquidem nihil in mente &longs;it, quin prius attigerit &longs;en&longs;um. Atqui &longs;en&longs;us non e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; iudex, &longs;ed vnius accidentis. Quam­obrem &longs;en&longs;ilia qu&ecedil; &longs;unt accidentia, prius à nobis quàm &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cogno&longs;cuntur. Et planè quod &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notitia &longs;it perfectior, inficiari non licet, attamen aliqua de primo capite dubitari po&longs;­&longs;unt. Quandoquidem mihi videtur ille qui hæc effatur, dare accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia percipi à &longs;en&longs;u. tqui ide&longs;t ab&longs;trahere, ab&longs;tractio verò non e&longs;t opus &longs;en&longs;us, &longs;ed mentis. In&longs;uper indiuiduum per &longs;e &longs;en&longs;ile e&longs;t, at &longs;en&longs;ilium iudex e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;us; ergo & indiuidui. Quare, cùm &longs;it indiuiduum è genere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & illius igitur erit &longs;en&longs;us. Cùm ergo ab illo non &longs;egregentur accidentia &longs;en­&longs;ilia, proinde efficitur, vt neque origine accidentium notitia pr&ecedil;cedat cognitioni &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Quinimmo &longs;ic coniuncta e&longs;t accidentis notitia cum cognitione &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, vt be&longs;ti&ecedil; quoque &longs;ub­&longs;tantiam no&longs;cant. Etenim optimè D. homas. f Ni&longs;i be&longs;tiæ no&longs;cerent &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, in eius per­ceptione non deciperentur, vt liquet in alimentis. Neque enim quicquam in eo decipi pote&longs;t, quod pror&longs;us ignorat. Itaque totum indiuiduum, quod e&longs;t veluti ma&longs;&longs;a quædam omnium pr&ecedil;­dicamentorum accipitur à &longs;en&longs;u, & de vniuer&longs;o fert iudicium. Nanque vbi po&longs;teà &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;cenda &longs;it &longs;ub ratione &longs;ola &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, quia &longs;eparatur ab accidentibus, à quibus efficieba­tur &longs;ingularis, non permanet amplius indiuidua, &longs;ed fit vniuer&longs;alis. Nec refert, vtrùm hoc iudi­cium &longs;it &longs;en&longs;us interni, vt nonnulli arbitrantur, an externi: quandò nullum e&longs;t officium &longs;en&longs;us, quod non pendeat ab vtroque; mutuas enim &longs;ibi operas præ&longs;tant. Verum quia non dubitatur id, accidentiaúe valeant ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t, quod philo&longs;ophus naturalis &longs;&ecedil;pi&longs;simè cogi­tur vti demon&longs;trationibus à &longs;igno, hoc tanquam firmamento con&longs;tituto, quæramus de modo quo accidens id efficiat. Omnium &longs;ententi&ecedil; meo quidem iudicio, ad duo capita referri po&longs;&longs;e vi­dentur. a Nonnulli enim accipiunt proportionem inter mentem & ea, quæ mente comprehen­di po&longs;&longs;unt, qualis e&longs;t inter materiam & formam naturalem. Nam veluti materia non accipit formas naturales &longs;ine quadam affectione pr&ecedil;currente nimirum accidentium, &longs;ic mens non po­te&longs;t, inquiunt, accipere formas intelligendas &longs;ine pr&ecedil;cedente affectione, hæc verò accedit per accidentia quæ mouent &longs;en&longs;um. At verò præter id, quod incidunt in errorem communem, quia putant albedinem à &longs;en&longs;u cogno&longs;ci, quando cogno&longs;citur hoc album, ne&longs;cio vtrum mens requirat eiu&longs;modi affectionem nécne: &longs;iquidem mens videatur e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;tas qu&ecedil;, vbi pr&ecedil;&longs;ens fue­rit obiectum, è ve&longs;tigio operatur, & percipit. lagitat &longs;anè phanta&longs;ma, vt mens efficiens habeat. quod illu&longs;tret & intelligendum faciat, &longs;ed vt afficiens, non puto. Namque ea quæ affectionem po&longs;tulant, docet experientia tempore quoque ab&longs;olui. Accedit etiam quod affectio præcedit in eadem materia, in qua debet accipi forma. Sed mens per &longs;e non afficitur, ni&longs;i à re intelligenda, hæc verò iam actu facta vt à mente efficiente, vt ip&longs;i volunt, aut à forma ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ per &longs;e mentem informat. Nihil ergo præcedit in mente, quod afficiat mentem ad intelligendum. Cui quoque rei &longs;ignum e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t quod vti affectio præcedat à minore tenditur ad maius, & ab imperfecto ad perfectum. Atqui mens vbi percepit maius, multò facilius concipit quoque minus. Docent alij &longs;ic accidentia nos in notitiam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ ducere, quia &longs;ub&longs;tantia non po&longs;sit excitare facultates cogno&longs;cendi &longs;ine po&longs;tibus qua&longs;i vtatur animus his accidentibus, vt &longs;ic dixerim, pro vehiculo &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum. Quæ item ratio videtur imperfecta; quia de&longs;iderarem ego mihi explicari modum quo, po&longs;tquàm &longs;ub&longs;tantia per accidentia concepta fuerit, mens &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ no­titiam con&longs;equatur: vt puta, quomodo ex eo quòd Luna lumine priuetur, percipiamus cau&longs;&longs;as & definitionem defectus. Itaque mihi videtur ita &longs;en&longs;i&longs;&longs;e Ari&longs;toteles. Cùm globus ille pr&ecedil;di­camentorum omnium, quod vocamus indiuiduum, pepulit &longs;en&longs;us no&longs;tros, & ex repetitione facta memoria productum e&longs;t vniuer&longs;ale, quod, vt alibi docui, concretum e&longs;t vt album, quan­tum, mobile, re&longs;oluitur à mente in &longs;uas partes & illo inuento &longs;ine quo c&ecedil;tera non exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ed il­lud &longs;ine aliis, hoc verò e&longs;t ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tantia, &longs;iue vt primum excipiens, velut animus, &longs;iue vt cuius e&longs;t aliquod primum excipiens, vt animal, vt po&longs;tea declarabimus, tum concipi &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. Huius autem re&longs;olutionis duo fundamenta e&longs;&longs;e coniicio. rimum analyticum quod traditur ab Ari&longs;totele, cum docet b quemadmodum inuenienda &longs;int ea quæ in&longs;unt quatenus ip&longs;um. Nam proponitur in primis aliquod inue&longs;tigandum, eius vniuer&longs;a attributa percen&longs;entur, & vbi vnum ex illis occurrat, quod ita &longs;e habeat ad attributum, vt eo po&longs;ito primò ponatur, & cum &longs;ublatum fuerit &longs;ecum quoque perimet attributum, id dicimus ine&longs;&longs;e quatenus ip&longs;um, & illam e&longs;&longs;e primam cau&longs;&longs;am & e&longs;&longs;entiam accidentis, quæ prius elucet in demon&longs;tratione, po&longs;tmodo degenerat in quid e&longs;t, & in definitione &longs;umitur. Alterum fundamentum petitur è prima philo&longs;ophia. Quo­niam accidens ita &longs;e habet ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, vt ad ip&longs;am nece&longs;&longs;ariò referatur, & &longs;icut vnum è rela­tiuis &longs;uapte natura notionem affert alterius, &longs;ic accidens affert notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ in qua ine&longs;t; ac primum &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, cum qua comprehenditur, vt album in cygno cogno&longs;citur, aut charta; quia tamen non appiicat &longs;e&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;ariò ad chartam aut cygnum; &longs;ed &longs;ine vtri&longs;que percipi po­te&longs;t, non tamen &longs;ine aliquo, notionem affert &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;impliciter, ad extremum indicat illam &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, cui perpetuò comitatur, vt &longs;ine ip&longs;a non exi&longs;tat, & vbi hoc &longs;it, illa quoque ad&longs;it. oporteat, & per illam cæteris in&longs;it, quæ vbi fuerit euoluta, per &longs;e ip&longs;am patet, & ita lucet, vt acci­dens quoque quod ex ip&longs;a pendet, illu&longs;tret. Quapropter ille progre&longs;&longs;us ab accidentibus ad &longs;ub­&longs;tantias pertinet ad doctrinam confu&longs;am & incohatam, cùm ceteroquin in doctrina di&longs;tincta & ab&longs;oluta accidens ex &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;catur. Neque verò te intelligere velim progre&longs;&longs;um ab accidente ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam eiu&longs;modi e&longs;&longs;e, vt accidens prius &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;catur; neque enim notio relatiui ab alterius notione &longs;eiungitur: &longs;ed cum eo tempore &longs;imul cum accidentibus &longs;ub&longs;tantia no&longs;catur accidentia præ&longs;tant, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia per &longs;e concipi queat. Ita fit, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia & cau&longs;&longs;a per &longs;e po&longs;t primam notionem, quæ auxilio &longs;en&longs;us accedit, vt ens &longs;impliciter accipiatur, & efficiat primam &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; notionem, mox appareat, vt cau&longs;&longs;a, & &longs;ic notionem complexam fa­ciat ex qua principia demon&longs;trationis exi&longs;tunt; vltimo accipiatur, vt quid e&longs;t, & compleat defi­nitionem. Sic igitur accidentia non proximè &longs;ed remotè perducunt ad quid e&longs;t, tùm quòd non &longs;unt pr&ecedil;dicata in quid, &longs;ed ea &longs;ignificant qu&ecedil; pr&ecedil;dicantur in quid; tùm quòd per multos gradus euehi, & regredi oportet mentem no&longs;tram, vt a&longs;&longs;equatur ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t. Non omnia tamen ac­cidentia conducunt ad huiu&longs;modi progre&longs;&longs;um: quippe quod ea, qu&ecedil; &longs;unt per accidens, ide&longs;t, non habent certas cau&longs;&longs;as ex hoc ordine deiiciantur. ùm enim certas cau&longs;&longs;as non habeant, &longs;olum af­ferunt notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;impliciter, quia &longs;ine illa nunquam exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ed nihil amplius, quod e&longs;&longs;entiam rei cuiu&longs;piam re&longs;picere videatur; cùm etiam ab hac & ab illa, & re & mente &longs;euocari po&longs;sint. Oportet igitur vt accidentia &longs;int per &longs;e & hæc, vel &longs;int generis vel alicuius partis eius. quanquam & valent ad hoc &longs;epararim, vt &longs;en&longs;us ad animal digno&longs;cendum; vel etiam coniun­ctim plura, quæ aliquod commune præ&longs;entent, siwdzomlw/ Græci vocant, ide&longs;t concur&longs;um; & &longs;peciatim medici &longs;igna habent, quæ pathognomonica appellant, quorum auxilio certa genera ve­nantur: pluribus &longs;en&longs;ibus vnà de eadem re iudicium facientibus, a neque vno &longs;ufficiente, cùm &longs;in­gula communius aliquod offerant. Proptereà, quanquam notitia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ tempore acciden­tis notitiæ præfertur; aut agitur de doctrina di&longs;tincta, aut præcedere tempore accipiendum pri­uatiuè quòd vnà, nec po&longs;terius &longs;ub&longs;tantia no&longs;catur: nam &longs;iquid antecedit, tamet&longs;i non tempo­re; id e&longs;t, vt aiunt, in&longs;tans naturæ: e&longs;t enim accidens ratio per quam &longs;ub&longs;tantia recipitur à &longs;en&longs;u. Confert item accidens ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t, quòd ex eius natura qu&ecedil; multiplex e&longs;t, vel ma­teriam, vel e)c a)faize\sews, vel etiam xwzikh\, nouimus e&longs;&longs;e triplex definitionum genus, quod vteretur materia &longs;en&longs;ili, quòd materia intelligenda, vel abiiceret omnino materiam. Et hoc in philo&longs;ophia Peripatetica triti&longs;simum. Nam cùm ip&longs;a &longs;it de rebus &longs;en&longs;ilibus principia &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;umere cogitur. At, inquies, materia prima &longs;en&longs;ilis non e&longs;t: & tamen e&longs;t principium rerum &longs;en­&longs;ilium. Con&longs;ueuerunt maiores no&longs;tri re&longs;pondere cau&longs;&longs;as accipi non omnes, &longs;ed propinquas; has enim &longs;olas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;en&longs;iles, quippe quòd in &longs;ingularibus proximè in&longs;ideant. At verò quod docet aliquando philo&longs;ophus monet me, vt &longs;en&longs;ile communius accipiam, ac dicam &longs;en&longs;ile nonmodo id quod &longs;en&longs;ui pote&longs;t &longs;ubiici, &longs;ed quod quoquo pacto re&longs;picit materiam. Proptereà neque Deus, cùm &longs;it auctor motus, effugit hanc con&longs;iderationem: hoc enim modo &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;en&longs;ilium, & cadunt in &longs;en&longs;um; quia &longs;unt principia &longs;en&longs;ilium: vt quanuis per &longs;e non &longs;entiantur, quia fa­ciant &longs;en&longs;ilia, ad &longs;en&longs;ilia referantur, vel vt ferrum, quo fit &longs;anitas, ad &longs;anitatem; vnde item &longs;a­num vocatur. Et rerum quidem &longs;en&longs;ilium &longs;emper & propriè &longs;cientia ponitur vt &longs;ubiecti: ho­rum verò &longs;cientia propriè non e&longs;t. taque nec ea per &longs;e &longs;entiantur oportet; verum &longs;at e&longs;t, vt &longs;en­tiantur eo qui dictus e&longs;t, modo: nec ob id tollitur quin rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium &longs;it &longs;cientia naturalis. & talia &longs;unt etiam remoti&longs;sima à &longs;ingularibus, & vniuer&longs;alia maximè, quod &longs;anè multi philo&longs;o­phi præ&longs;ertim Platonici neglexerunt, quia numeros auctores rerum naturalium fecerint, vel Ideas quas extra materiam e&longs;&longs;e voluere. Parum ab his abfuere Pythagorici. Nanque et&longs;i numeros accepere qui e&longs;&longs;et in &longs;en&longs;ilibus, & eos vt numero &longs;pectarunt, numerorum conditiones illis attri­buentes, ea&longs;que ad res &longs;en&longs;iles applicantes, neque illa ob&longs;eruarunt, quæ in numeris in&longs;unt, qua­tenus materia fundantur, quod eum facere oportebat, qui naturalis &longs;cientiæ principia ve&longs;tiga­ret. Eiu&longs;dem quoque notæ &longs;unt, qui puncta, plana, & figuras rerum naturalium principia po­nunt, è quorum etiam numero fuit Plato, quanquam hi minus errarunt, quòd illa &longs;tatuerunt, è quibus ratio probabilis reddi po&longs;&longs;et aliquorum, quæ conducerent ad motum. Ita eueniet, vt in phy&longs;icis demon&longs;trationibus componendis à primis v&longs;que ad vltimas cau&longs;&longs;as procedere liceat, & accipere item illa quæ &longs;unt nota natura & &longs;ecundum rationem, non &longs;ecundum &longs;en&longs;um, & ea tamen &longs;int principia &longs;en&longs;ilium, nec à phy&longs;ica methodo aliena. Neque enim &longs;ine his vlla de­mon&longs;tratio pote&longs;t ab&longs;olui, &longs;eu prima &longs;int, &longs;eu po&longs;trema: &longs;iue in eadem &longs;erie cau&longs;&longs;arum, &longs;iue in alia: habent nexum quendam in&longs;olubilem & varia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera inter &longs;e & in eodem ordi­ne, ex quo erumpit effectus, & cùm hic &longs;it &longs;ingularis à &longs;ingularis cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; &longs;ocietate neutiquam di­uelluntur, qualia verò &longs;int quibus principatus effectus &longs;it committendus non in omni cau&longs;&longs;arum genere communis ratio fortè poterit a&longs;signari, primas in quibu&longs;dam ferente cau&longs;&longs;a priore &longs;ecun­dum naturam, & remotiore, contrà in aliis. Sed hæc po&longs;tea di&longs;&longs;erentur vberius. In his princi­piis & illud numerabitur: Methodum imitari naturam quo ad eius fieri pote&longs;t. Nam, &longs;i metho­dus e&longs;t &longs;cientia artificio tradita, ars verò naturam, quo ad pote&longs;t imitatur, & inuenit quod ip&longs;a de­&longs;iderat, & &longs;equitur quod o&longs;tendit, methodus quoque nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t imitetur naturam, & eundem progre&longs;&longs;um propemodum faciat. Itaque, veluti natura nihil fru&longs;tra molitur, & ni&longs;i impediatur, ad finem v&longs;quam perducit, ac fine propo&longs;ito mox illa præparat, quibus fine &longs;uo commodè po­tiatur; &longs;ic ars omnia &longs;truit ad v&longs;us humanos, ac &longs;copo con&longs;tituto prius ordine di&longs;ponit deinceps ea &longs;ine quibus con&longs;equentia non con&longs;i&longs;tunt. Ita re&longs;oluendo, prius ab eo quod e&longs;t primum in optatis, ad ea &longs;ine quibus hoc non exi&longs;tit, mox componendo, ab eo &longs;ine quo cætera non con­&longs;tant, progreditur ad finem, eumque ordinem &longs;eruans nihil omittit, nil &longs;uperuacaneum, & inu­tile machinatur. Eodem modo methodus &longs;cientia &longs;ibi propo&longs;ita prius de principiis cogitat tan­quam fundamentis: his &longs;uper&longs;truit demon&longs;trationes in&longs;i&longs;tens ea via qua res dilucidè explicari queat, vt nihil inculcet inane, nihil redundans: neque &longs;ic præcisè eloquatur, vt oratio pariat ob­&longs;curitatem, in id præcipuè collimans, vt auditoris habeat rationem, ad cuius ingenium & captum &longs;ingula referre &longs;tudet. Ad hæc mirificè confert ordo, cuius admonitu nece&longs;&longs;aria per&longs;equitur: vnde etiam &longs;icut in natura vnum quoddam e&longs;t, quod caput e&longs;t vniuer&longs;i ordinis, & ex quo c&ecedil;tera deriuantur: &longs;ic in methodo &longs;olet e&longs;&longs;e vnum principium commune, quod reliquis omnibus &longs;up­ ponatur, & in quod illa re&longs;oluantur, &longs;eu rei principium &longs;it, &longs;eu cognitionis. Ita in prima phi­lo&longs;ophia primum illud. De quolibet verbum e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;erere, vel negare. n Morali bene educatum e&longs;&longs;e, in mathematica continuum diuidi in infinitum, ex hoc quòd inter duo puncta quant&ecedil;uis linea ducantur, quòd in quolibet eius &longs;igno figura de&longs;cribi queat: in arte medica fortè illud. Contrariis contraria curari, in hac no&longs;tra Motum e&longs;&longs;e. Proximè ab ordine e&longs;t via à notis no­bis quæ rerum occultarum tractationem ad rudium aures accommodat, po&longs;tmodo in&longs;trumen­ta, quibus fidem facit & docet. Itaque magis ij laudantur, qui &longs;cientiarum principia finita con­&longs;tituunt, quàm qui infinitatem acceperunt, a vbi eadem vtraque &longs;ecta pr&ecedil;&longs;tare po&longs;sit, ide&longs;t, nos reddere certiores de cunctis problematis qu&ecedil; in con&longs;iderationem naturalem cadere queunt. Atque id non temerè à philo&longs;opho &longs;umptum. Siquidem nihil &longs;ciri po&longs;sit principiis ignoratis. Atqui &longs;i principia fuerint infinita, incerta &longs;int nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. Nanque id quoque tanquam certi&longs;si­mum ratio &longs;umit. b Infinitum qua infinitum e&longs;t, &longs;iue &longs;it numero infinitum, &longs;eu magnitudine, &longs;iue etiam forma, pror&longs;us e&longs;&longs;e ignotum, vt &longs;i formæ infinitæ inter extrema intercedant, c inter­quas oporteat fieri mutationem; &longs;i etiam ab imis ad &longs;umma quibus tanquam terminis pr&ecedil;dica­mentum vnumquodque con&longs;i&longs;tit, d aut cau&longs;&longs;arum progre&longs;&longs;us à proximis ad remotas, e aut vni­ uer&longs;um infinitum, quemadmodum voluit Meli&longs;&longs;us, aut denique multæ &longs;pecies infinitæ, vt cen­&longs;uit Anaxagoras: vel infinita corpu&longs;cula per inane volitantia, vt accepit Democritus; non po­te&longs;t hæc neque &longs;en&longs;us, neque mens pertran&longs;ire, neque comprehendere. Quanquam hîc te mo­nere volumus, infinitum non id ignotum e&longs;&longs;e, quod imperfectum e&longs;t, & perducendum e&longs;t ad aliquem finem, quodque vlterius promoueri pont, vt po&longs;uit Ari&longs;toteles: &longs;ed quod omnem mo­dum finesque. tran&longs;it, vt veteribus placuit. Atque illud quidem, &longs;i pro &longs;ubiecto &longs;umatur, non au­tem pro attributo, hoc e&longs;t id de quo prædicatur infinitum, ignotum e&longs;t: ratio verò infiniti, vt quid &longs;it id quod infinitum dicimus, & nota e&longs;t, & à phy&longs;ico tractatur. Conuenit item in bene in&longs;tituta methodo, ni&longs;i quid certi&longs;simè indicet &longs;en&longs;us, aliqua ratione per&longs;uadere, vel inductio­ne, vbicunque cau&longs;&longs;a non &longs;uccurrat, aut &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;am non habeat; veluti &longs;i ip&longs;um cau&longs;&longs;a foret: ex­plicare definitione, vt talem pateat eius e&longs;&longs;e naturam, qualem accepimus. Nolo tamen te po&longs;tu­lare, definitionem hîc exqui&longs;itam, quæ nulla e&longs;t, ni&longs;i &longs;peciei &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, &longs;ed expo&longs;itione nominis e&longs;&longs;e contentum, & ip&longs;a vi termini, vt factum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele in explicatione principij. f Quòd &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;a po&longs;sit, afferri cau&longs;&longs;am apponere oportet; rerum enim cau&longs;&longs;as habentium nulla cognitio certa e&longs;t &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a. Neque id prohibere valet, quo minus cau&longs;&longs;a reddatur, quia res ita perpe­tuò &longs;e habeat. g Vt enim omne id quod cau&longs;&longs;a vacat, perpetuum e&longs;t, at id non reciprocatur. h Omne id quod perpetuum e&longs;t, cau&longs;&longs;a vacare. Nam quòd triangulus contineat duos rectos, in­hæret perpetuò; atqui cau&longs;&longs;a talis euenti redditur à mathematico, quia nimirùm habeat angu­lum externum æqualem duobus internis è regione con&longs;titutis. Solaque. illa æterna quæ principia &longs;unt, cau&longs;&longs;a vacant: non omnia perpetua generatim. Et cau&longs;&longs;a quæritur, cur duo motus ex ad­uer&longs;o fiant in cœlo quos tamen æternos e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;ica concludit. Si verò non libeat &longs;ubnectere cau&longs;&longs;am, i puta tu, quia non &longs;it eius loci, vel etiam, quòd longiores explicatus habeat, quibus in præ&longs;entia parcendum &longs;it: &longs;altem &longs;ub forma hypothe&longs;eos accipiendum e&longs;t, id quod velis, non ab­&longs;olutè pronunciandum, vel, vt fieri con&longs;ueuit in legibus edicendum. Hæc præcepta &longs;eruans ad­amu&longs;sim præ&longs;tanti&longs;simus doctor, eo nomine celebratur ab Auerroë, quod nihil vnquàm &longs;ine va­lida ratione dixerit. Neque verò quia &longs;emper cau&longs;&longs;am dictis &longs;uis ad&longs;crip&longs;erit, quî enim rerum, qu&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;a vacarent, cau&longs;&longs;a reddi poterat? eiu&longs;dem enim vitij po&longs;&longs;et argui quod ip&longs;e aliis obie­cit, quippe quòd non interno&longs;cerent, quid demon&longs;trationi foret obnoxium, & quid contrà à demon&longs;tratione abhorreret: verùm, quia quicquid con&longs;tituit & accepit, ita di&longs;po&longs;uit, vt cuique redderet id quod &longs;uum e&longs;t, & ratione v&longs;us fuerit, vbi ratio quæreretur, atque illa quidem acri aut leui pro rei tractandæ conditione: quicquid &longs;ine ratione a&longs;&longs;umendum fuerat vel quod e&longs;&longs;et cau&longs;­&longs;a, vel quòd alio quodammodo note&longs;ceret, prout de principiis anteà dictum e&longs;t, tamen non &longs;ine valida ratione pronunciarit, quòd afferre potuit rationem ex illo habitu, qui pertinet ad modos &longs;ciendi ductam, qua commotus hoc cum ratione, illud verò &longs;ine ratione acceperit. Igitur non &longs;ine valida ratione locutus e&longs;t Ari&longs;toteles; &longs;iue ex propriis ip&longs;ius rei principiis duceretur, &longs;iue ex altero habitu, cuius e&longs;t tractare modos &longs;ciendi. Non erit item alienum ab habitus huiu&longs;ce prin­cipiis, &longs;i & hoc adiiciamus, quod frequenti&longs;simè &longs;olet à phy&longs;icis v&longs;urpari. Vnumquoque .&longs;. im­petrare &longs;uam appellationem ab actu. k Non e&longs;t hoc no&longs;trum con&longs;ilium de nominum vi di&longs;&longs;e­rere, &longs;ed illa afferre in medio quæ pertinent ad propo&longs;itionis huiu&longs;ce notitiam. Scire igitur li­cet ea quæ nominibus &longs;ignificantur, ad hæc capita referri, formas, compo&longs;ita, motiones & materiam. l Neque dubium e&longs;t nomen primum &longs;ignificare formam, quoniam verò forma finis e&longs;t vniuer&longs;æ motionis, eademque. e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entia tota, quæ comprehendit materiam quæ cadit in mentem, vtraque autem hæc principia definitione euoluuntur. &longs;i idem &longs;ignificant nomen & definitio; profectò nomen &longs;ic formam &longs;ignificabit, vt vniuer&longs;am notet e&longs;&longs;entiam. amen <09> in e&longs;&longs;entia primæ &longs;unt eius partis, quæ finis e&longs;t totius motionis; ideò nominis notio re&longs;oluetur in formam &longs;impliciter. Itaque cum cætera per formam &longs;ignificentur, & vt re&longs;piciunt formam quæ item e&longs;t finis, rectè dicitur vnumquodque à forma & fine &longs;uum nomen &longs;umere. Quapropter animal animam qu&ecedil; forma e&longs;t, præcipuè &longs;ignificat. a Signo illud e&longs;t, quòd non prius animal appellatur, quae acce&longs;&longs;e­rit anima, &longs;ed embryon, aut &longs;emen. mò non ex forma &longs;impliciter ducitur nomen, &longs;ed vbi iam ex­tirit actus &longs;ecundus, id Ari&longs;totele docentes 5. de Gen. nim. Idem quoque in arte contingit, quan­do non prius appellatur &longs;camnum, quàm ip&longs;i extremam manum artifex impo&longs;uerit, &longs;ed lignum, proximè nomen &longs;ignificat compo&longs;itum, & pari quidem ratione in natura & arte. Et rationi con­&longs;entaneum e&longs;t ens (vtar enim liberius hac voce, quàm politiores hactenus declinarunt, quia lege­rim eam à C. ulio Ce&longs;are fui&longs;&longs;e receptam) ens, inquàm, primùm &longs;ignificare &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, & inter &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ parteis ip&longs;am formam, ob eam cau&longs;sam, quam nuper attulimus, quòd tum ve­quippiam &longs;it non animal. ut equus, &longs;ed ens &longs;impliciter, vbi formam obtinuerit. Con&longs;imilique modo reliqua prædicamenta dicimus primùm notare formam, tum deinde compo&longs;itum. o&longs;­&longs;umus item nominationis huiu&longs;ce originem altius aliquantò repetere, vim prædicamentorum &longs;pectantes: quippe <09> duas habitudines præ&longs;eferant: alteram, qua &longs;ubiecta re&longs;piciunt, in quo­rum ratione in&longs;unt: atque alteram, qua &longs;ub&longs;tantia concipitur. eque enim &longs;ola qualitas hac voce notatur, &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantia qualis: &longs;iquidem accidens ab Ari&longs;totele ponatur in&longs;eparabile, b nec ens &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed ens aliquid, vel aliquo modo & velut aliud quid exi&longs;tens, quia videlicet non &longs;it albedo, &longs;ed album quod e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Vt igitur quantum & quale &longs;unt talia propter formam: ideòque. nomen &longs;ignificat primo formam accidentis, deinde compo&longs;itum in &longs;uo quodque genere (con&longs;tat enim &longs;ingula prædicamenta ex pote&longs;tate & actu proportione) c &longs;ic etiam, vt entia quæ re&longs;piciunt &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, probabile e&longs;t ita dici propter formam, quia &longs;ic dicuntur propter &longs;ub­&longs;tantiam, hæc verò e&longs;t ens propter formam. Ab eadem forma dicitur quoque compo&longs;itum, vt efficiens. (Nam compo&longs;itum e&longs;&longs;e id quod efficit propriè, docebitur in progre&longs;&longs;u) &longs;i vniuo­cum fuerit, vt pleraque e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olent, de quibus regulæ traduntur in methodis: tum quòd habet in &longs;eip&longs;o formam per quam agit, tum quia gratia formæ operatur, & efficiendo tribuit formam. Materia quoque a&longs;&longs;ecuta e&longs;t appellationem &longs;uam à forma; quandoquidem talis pote&longs;tate dicitur, quale e&longs;t actu compo&longs;itum, in quo ine&longs;t forma, vt pote&longs;tate &longs;ub&longs;tantia, pote&longs;tate quantum, & quale. Atque hoc quidem in natura & arte commune e&longs;t, licèt efficientis denominatio non eodem &longs;em­per modo procedat, vt mox apparebit. Etenim libet prius ordinis no&longs;tri cau&longs;&longs;am reddere, ne vi­deamur cum Ari&longs;totele pugnare. uandò nos materiam efficienti po&longs;tpo&longs;uimus & compo&longs;ito, &longs;imulque. compo&longs;itum cum efficiente collocauimus. Ari&longs;toteles autem proximè à forma po&longs;uit materiam, in extremo verò recen&longs;uit efficiens. Atqui nos ordinem nominationis &longs;pectauimus & efficiens cum compo&longs;ito numerauimus, vt partem eius. Ari&longs;toteles autem in phy&longs;icis ordi­nem principij re&longs;piciens, quia materia foret principium, compo&longs;ito ip&longs;am præpo&longs;uit. d in prima verò philo&longs;ophia motui &longs;ubiecit efficiens, e quia cætera ad rei con&longs;titutionem pertinerent mul­tò interius; efficiens externum e&longs;&longs;et, & à rei &longs;ub&longs;tantia remotum. Re&longs;tat vnus motus qui com­plectitur ortum & interitum quem item ab Ari&longs;totele demon&longs;tratur f à fine in natura nuncupationem &longs;umere. amet&longs;i aliter in arte ac natura quandoque contingat. g (neque enim id perpetuum pu­to, vt nonnulli, neque id in Ari&longs;totelici contextus explanatione nece&longs;&longs;arium, neque id nece&longs;&longs;ariò mon&longs;trant verba ip&longs;ius Ari&longs;totelis) &longs;iquidem in arte nominatio motus ab efficiente nonnunquae &longs;umatur; in natura non ab efficiente; &longs;ed, vt reliqua, à fine. Verùm vtcunque &longs;e res habeat, cau&longs;­&longs;am libet indagare, cur ab efficiente, non à fine motus in arte qui e&longs;t effectio, nuncupetur, præci­puè propter Auerroëm qui lib. 4. Collectaneorum rationem quandam reddit, ex nobiliore lo­co, vt potè è 2. Phy&longs;. repetitam cui plurimum tribuit. Ea verò talis e&longs;t. Motum &longs;umere no­men ab eo, cum quo magis conuenit genere. Sed motus in arte cum genere efficientis conue­nit magis. Et motus igitur in arte &longs;umit nomen ab efficiente. Nunc explicandum e&longs;t, quem­admodum effectio cum genere efficientis potius quàm materiæ, &longs;eu formæ conueniat: quandò terminetur forma, & ab ea tanquam complemento contineatur & materia fundetur, in eaque. per­ducatur ad &longs;ummum, ab efficiente verò &longs;egregetur. & videndum quid verba &longs;onent Auerrois. Cau&longs;&longs;æ complures eius differentiæ &longs;olent afferri; varii&longs;que modis Auerrois verba capiuntur ab eius patronis. tenim quidam ait id ab Auerroë non fui&longs;&longs;e verè a&longs;&longs;eueratum motus ab arte factos e&longs;&longs;e ex eodem genere cum efficientibus, quo enim pacto medicatio & ædificatio &longs;unt eiu&longs;dem gene­ris cum medico & ædificatore? &longs;iquidem medicus & ædificator, &longs;eu medicina & ars ædificandi &longs;int habitus: medicatio verò & ædificatio &longs;int pa&longs;siones (& hîc etiam liceat ea voce vti, quam M. arro non e&longs;t a&longs;pernatus) vbi pro forma fluente &longs;umantur: intellige nunc formam fluen­tem eam quæ ab imperfecto ad perfectum promouetur, vt albedinem &longs;ecundi gradus quæ ad quartum e&longs;t deducenda. roptereà &longs;ubiunxi&longs;&longs;e Auerroëm, aut &longs;altem ita videri. Verùm e&longs;to id. At oportebat etiam reddere cau&longs;&longs;am, cur ita videretur. Itaque alij Diui Thom&ecedil; explanationem approbantes putant &longs;pectari ab Auerroë motionem ab arte factam; tum verò e&longs;t effectio quæ­dam eaque. ratione magis e&longs;t affinis efficientis quàm form&ecedil;; ideoque. ab efficiente nuncupationem &longs;umit. tqui generatio qu&ecedil; e&longs;t opus naturæ, e&longs;t affectio & pa&longs;sio, quæ note&longs;cit ex termino ad quem i. uo motio finitur. Veruntamen quia tam in arte quàm in natura idem re &longs;unt, rationeque. &longs;ola actio & pa&longs;sio di&longs;iunguntur; ex hoc efficitur, vt nullum nominationis di&longs;crimen intercedere de­beat inter motus naturales & eos qui fiunt ab arte. Ob&longs;eruant alij formas artis à formis natu­ræ di&longs;crepare, quòd in artis materia nulla pote&longs;tas e&longs;t formæ efficiendæ, neque perfecta, neque imperfecta: formis verò naturalibus pote&longs;tates in materia &longs;upponitur. Idcirco quoniam forma artis tota na&longs;citur ab externo, & proinde motus eius naturalis forma non item, ob eamque. rem ne­que generatio forma artis e&longs;t magis è genere efficientis: contrà verò forma naturalis ex genere finis. roptereà motio quæ fit ab arte, nuncupatur ab efficiente, à fine verò motio naturalis. Et &longs;anè proximè accedit ad verum hæc explicatio. i&longs;i quòd genus videtur acceptum fui&longs;&longs;e li­centius. Neque enim mouens & motus in genere conueniunt, vt dictum e&longs;t. Et e&longs;&longs;entia motus magis termino ad quem, quàm efficiente completur, vt aliàs o&longs;tendemus. Alij nectunt alias cau&longs;&longs;as, atque illas quidem &longs;atis iu&longs;tas, quia &longs;cilicet efficiens naturale conuenit in nomine cum re facienda, artifex verò minimè. hinc fit, vt nomen motus in arte diuer&longs;um queat accipi à nomine finis, in natura non item. Verum mon&longs;trat id licere tantummodo, non tamen docet, cur non accipiatur à fine: quando etiam motus illius e&longs;&longs;entia fine completur. ebuit enim &longs;ic efficere no­menclator; vt cùm &longs;uccurreret finis, vnde nominatio &longs;umeretur in arte, imitando naturam, à fine pariter motum nuncuparet. Po&longs;trema cau&longs;&longs;a, quia mouens in arte con&longs;picuum e&longs;t &longs;ingulare & &longs;en&longs;ile: naturale autem &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ in&longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t. llud e&longs;t notum; hoc ignotum: à notiore verò nominatio &longs;umitur. At qui hæc profitetur, non videt etiam formam, à qua nuncupatur mo­tus, e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam; ideoque. in&longs;en&longs;ilem e&longs;&longs;e & ignotam, vt ergo ab efficiente ignoto non erat acci­pienda nuncupatio: &longs;ic neque à fine, quòd e&longs;&longs;et ignotus. Neque per&longs;picit is, qui hæc dicit, eo­dem modo e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ingulare & &longs;en&longs;ile efficiens in natura &longs;icut in arte. Prætereà, &longs;i hæc cum Auer­roë dicuntur; ni&longs;i turpem repugnantiam inter eius &longs;ententias, quod i&longs;ti nefas arbitrantur, incul­care velint, ea legant quæ idem auctor &longs;crip&longs;it, a vbi re&longs;tatur &longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am hanc in phy&longs;icis expli­ca&longs;&longs;e, talem e&longs;&longs;e docet; qua&longs;i &longs;it eadem quam modo tractamus. “quòd permutatio e&longs;t ge­nus rei, ad quam permutatur virtus: & hæc e&longs;t contrarium plu&longs;quam genus rei ad quam permu­tatur. irtus autem in eis e&longs;t manife&longs;ta magis, quàm in ea, à qua fit permutatio.” Modò videant i&longs;ti, num h&ecedil;c congruant cum iis, quæ narrantur è 2. Phy&longs;. tùm etiam cum cau&longs;sis ante allatis. Equi­dem, vt fateor in his verbis, aut nullam contineri &longs;ententiam, aut eam maximè latêre; vt etiam cer­tò credo nihil h&ecedil;c conuenire cum iis, quæ &longs;cribuntur 2. Phy&longs;. &longs;ic opinor vera &longs;en&longs;i&longs;&longs;e Auerroem & tralatorum culpa loca hæc fui&longs;&longs;e con&longs;purcata; faxitque. Deus, ne alia permulta in tam graui &longs;cri­ptore &longs;int hi&longs;ce con&longs;imilia, ne tantam iacturam philo&longs;ophi facerent. æc certè talia &longs;unt, vt nullus fortè &longs;en&longs;us ex eius verbis elici valeat. Cùm igitur ij, quos ego viderim, nihil afferant quo &longs;atis commodè tueantur Auerroëm; nec eius &longs;ententiam fortè a&longs;&longs;equantur; audeo quoque dicere, neque liceat vllam colligere; auguremur hîc nos; & &longs;imul cau&longs;&longs;am di&longs;criminis illius denomina­tionum certiorem conemur afferre; & cum verbis Auerrois componere &longs;tudeamus. Mihi au­tem videtur eiu&longs;modi varietatis cau&longs;&longs;am ex Philopono colligi po&longs;&longs;e quæ nititur duobus funda­mentis; & primo quidem. Artificem non facere &longs;ibi &longs;imile, quemadmodum facit natura. Quamobrem finis & efficiens idem nomen non habent in arte, &longs;icut habent in natura. Deinde verò. In arte efficiens apparêre, & e&longs;&longs;e con&longs;picuum; finem verò non extare. uod euenire puto in medicina; cum &longs;it ex eo genere artium, qu&ecedil; coniectura vtuntur, in quarum pote&longs;tate finis non e&longs;t po&longs;itus, & &longs;æpe fallit (loquor nunc de fine motionis, non autem de propo&longs;ito, quod e&longs;t in mente artificis: etenim hic &longs;emper obiicitur; & initium e&longs;t vniuer&longs;arum actionum, nec fallit vn­quam.) Ex his efficitur, vt nomen motionis in arte po&longs;sit &longs;umi diuer&longs;um à nomine finis, & idem. ab efficiente tanquam noto deduci. Fortè igitur h&ecedil;c, vt Gr&ecedil;corum fuit expre&longs;&longs;or Auerroës, &longs;i­gnificare volebat, quæ nos locum lap&longs;us aliis iudicantes, audacius. unc veritatis ergo immuta­uimus. Nam quod dicitur, permutationem e&longs;&longs;e genus rei, ad quam virtus permutatur, genus exponimus, quòd habeat cognationem, ac virtutem diw/amin .i. ote&longs;tatem materiæ &longs;ignificari di­cimus: cognationem verò dicimus e&longs;&longs;e permutationis cum forma, ad quam materia tendit. Cùm &longs;ubiicitur. Virtus e&longs;t contrarium magis quàm genus rei, ad quam virtus permutatur. Vir­tutem hîc eodem nomine diw/amin intelligo facultatem efficiendi, b quam &longs;tatuo magis contra­rium, hoc e&longs;t, diuer&longs;um, quam genus rei, ad quam virtus, qu&ecedil; e&longs;t materia, permutatur .i. uam for­ma & finis; vbi noto di&longs;crimen inter finem & formam in arte, de quo dictum e&longs;t &longs;upra, & hanc virtutem notiorem e&longs;&longs;e fateor, quàm eam, in quam fit permutatio, quæ e&longs;t finis. Sic paucis voci­bus immutatis colligo &longs;en&longs;um è verbis Auerrois, quem item contineri arbitror in 2. Phy&longs;. & quod dicitur tanquam per di&longs;iunctionem prolatum, aut famo&longs;um, atque exponitur, quia &longs;ic videatur; id ego credo &longs;ignificari, quod dictum e&longs;t, e&longs;&longs;e notius efficiens, quàm finem & formam in artificiis. Tu nunc boni con&longs;ule. Quicquid tamen &longs;it; ab efficiente tanquam ab actu nominatio petitur. Fuit hoc item in phy&longs;iologia præceptum Ari&longs;totelis, vt illa veluti fundamenta acciperentur a quæ in omnibus naturæ operibus eodem modo &longs;e haberent; quod item non modo à c&ecedil;teris phy&longs;icis in hac methodo v&longs;urpatum fui&longs;&longs;e &longs;u&longs;picari po&longs;&longs;umus; verum etiam ab ip&longs;omet Ari&longs;totele &longs;ine vl­la intermi&longs;sione ob&longs;eruatum fui&longs;&longs;e; cuiu&longs;modi illud e&longs;t. Naturam nihil efficere, quod fru&longs;tra &longs;it; eandem niti in id, quod optimum e&longs;t, de quibus po&longs;thàc &longs;ermo habendus erit; eiu&longs;modi ta­men, vt ab his de c&ecedil;teris debeat accipi fides, tot enim de principiis, quæ ad modum &longs;ciendi perti­nent, dicta &longs;ufficiant.

d 2. De temp. cap. 2.

C

e 1. Top.

D

f Lib. uer&longs;us pla­cita phil. cap. 1.

g 2. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 34.

E

a 2. De An.

b 4. Phy&longs;.

F

c 1. De or­tu.

d 2. Po&longs;t.

G

e 7. Met.

H

f 2. De An.

A

a Iand. 1. de An. que 10.

B

C

b 1. Po&longs;t. C. e vni­uer&longs;.

D

E

a 7. Met. 1. de An.

F

G

H

A

a 1. Phy&longs;. T. 41. 50.

b 1. Phy&longs;. T. 35.

c Lib. e &longs;en&longs;u c. 6.

d 1. Po&longs;t.

e Met.

B

f 1. Phy&longs;. T. 42.

g 8. Phy&longs;. T. 15.

C

h 2. De ge. al. . 4.

i 2. de or­tu T. 42.

D

k 2. Phy&longs;. T. 10. 2. de An. T. 49.

l 8. Met. T. 7.

E

a 2. Phy&longs;. T. 10.

F

b 7. Phy&longs;. T. 14 39.

c 3. Phy&longs;. 1. de an. T. 78.

G

d 2. Phy&longs;.

e 5. Met. Cap. e na­tura.

f 5. Phy&longs;. T. 4.

g 2. Phy&longs;. T. 14.

Cap. I.

H

A

B

a Coll. . 1. 4.

C

D

b De c&ecedil;lo T. 28.

VII.

E

a Libr. e ince&longs;. an. cap. 2.

Aggredimur &longs;cientiæ principia, è quibus nonnulla con&longs;imiliter adumbrantur. Cap. III.

SVCCEDVNT nunc &longs;cientiæ principia, qu&ecedil; nos item iam cum acceptis concordantia &longs;ume­mus; quippe quod vno &longs;en&longs;u niti contendimus, & huc omnia referri volumus in hac me­thodo: neque h&ecedil;c munera tran&longs;ibimus, tamet&longs;i nouimus e&longs;&longs;e complura qu&ecedil; no&longs;tra placita fun­ditus tollant, & euertant planè phy&longs;ica fundamenta.

F

Nos hîc phy&longs;icum agimus, & cau&longs;&longs;as reddere conamur problematum quæ renitenti per&longs;ua­dere &longs;en&longs;u po&longs;simus: quicquid his cancellis excluditur, &longs;ublimiori philo&longs;opho delegamus, & agno&longs;centes quàm parùm opibus humani iudicij freti valeamus, admiranda Dei O. . opera con­templantes vni & &longs;oli, conditori, motori, con&longs;eruatori, rerum vniuer&longs;arum creatori maximas gra­tias agimus & habemus. His &longs;tantibus quæ conuelli nefas e&longs;t de re propo&longs;ita dicere aggredia­mur primùm communiora tractantes, mox ad &longs;pecialia de&longs;cendentes. Neque hîc expectandum e&longs;t, vt omnia generalia numerentur. Nos ea tantum recen&longs;ebimus quæ aliquam declarationem requirunt, quæ verò in omni &longs;cientiarum ordine certa & explorata &longs;unt, vt auditoris mentem nullo modo torqueant, de indu&longs;tria præteribimus, & ea poti&longs;simè con&longs;ectabimur quæ non di­cam maioris ponderis, aut v&longs;us erunt; &longs;ed quorum maior affinitas erit cum rebus naturalibus.

Inter hæc autem illud placet e&longs;&longs;e primum. Omne ens e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam vel accidens, ita vt nulla &longs;it res quæ inter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & accidens intercedat & indicabimus quemadmodum hæc di&longs;tri­butio per omnia pertineat quæ in rerum vniuer&longs;itate exi&longs;tunt, &longs;iue animum re&longs;piciant, &longs;eu cor­pus. In primis autem in hac rudi & inchoata notitia quam modò per&longs;equimur. Ens quod per &longs;en&longs;um &longs;e&longs;e in&longs;inuat, iudicari putamus. taque &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem quæ ex materia formaque. conflata e&longs;t & accidens quod illi inh&ecedil;ret & nouem pr&ecedil;dicamenta complectitur, ea partitione comprehendi volumus, quidquid pr&ecedil;ter hæc exi&longs;tit, non vt notum nobis & vt principium &longs;ta­tuetur; quippe quod longa commentatione opus &longs;it, ad inueniendum aliud &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genus vl­tra &longs;en&longs;ilem. Verùm quicquid in rerum natura extat, quicquid item in no&longs;tram cogitationem cadit, ad hæc duo capita refertur. Neque enim nos induci po&longs;&longs;umus, vt aliter cogitemus, quàm quòd quodcunque e&longs;t, &longs;it &longs;ubiectum, aut in &longs;ubiecto. Itaque quod concipitur, tamet&longs;i non e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis, aut accidens; nihilominus affert nobis notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ vel accidentis. Et planè ratio cogit vt credamus omne quod e&longs;t generatim aut &longs;ubiectum e&longs;&longs;e, aut in &longs;ubiecto, aut &longs;altem ho&longs;ce ip&longs;ius e&longs;&longs;e modos imitari. En tibi Deum; hunc philo&longs;ophia demon&longs;trat vnum e&longs;&longs;e atque adeò &longs;implici&longs;simum, nihil in &longs;eip&longs;o habens quod ab ip&longs;o &longs;egregetur. Itaque nullius &longs;ubiectum, in eo nihil. Et tamen harum rerum nobis familiarium exemplo ducta mens no&longs;tra Deum concipit, & ita cogitat ac &longs;i quidpiam in illo in&longs;it, quamuis nullis &longs;ubiiciatur accidentibus, à &longs;en&longs;uum con&longs;uetudine &longs;e reuocare non valens. Ergo ens etiam, quodcunque &longs;it, aut e&longs;t acci­dens, aut &longs;ub&longs;tantia, aut per modum accidentis &longs;ub&longs;tantiæúe comprehenditur: & vt comprehen­ditur, ita ei&longs;dem figuræ dictionibus exprimitur. Quare audis aliquando Deum u(pezou/sion, & vl­tra &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, & tamen explicas nomine quo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ modus exprimitur; dicis nonnulla e&longs;­&longs;e ad aliquid (vt vulgò fertur) &longs;ecundum famam, & &longs;ecundum dici: &longs;ic illas e&longs;&longs;e non re vera qua­litates, &longs;ed ita modo qualitatis ip&longs;ius proprio notari. Neque ob&longs;tat id quod Scotus opponit, ali­quid obiici menti no&longs;tr&ecedil; quod ignoremus &longs;ub&longs;tantia'ne &longs;it, an accidens, vt de natura luminis op­poni &longs;olet. Nanque et&longs;i ignorauero vtrum &longs;it di&longs;tinctè; non tamen aliam habebo notionem quam quòd &longs;ubiectum &longs;it, aut in &longs;ubiecto, nec vt quiddam ab hi&longs;ce notionibus alienum vllo tempore cogitabo. Opponet aliquis &longs;pecies rerum quæ &longs;unt in anima: neque enim &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, cùm &longs;int in aliquo; neque &longs;unt accidentia, aut formæ quæ in &longs;ubiecto in&longs;ideant quippe quòd ab hoc inh&ecedil;rentium genere &longs;ubiectum nuncupari con&longs;uerit, vt ab albedine album: atqui non albus ani­mus nominatur. Tùm &longs;ecundò Differentiæ non &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;: b eædem prædicantur vniuocè de &longs;ub&longs;tantia: quare neque item &longs;unt accidentia. Tertiò omnia pr&ecedil;dicamenta cùm &longs;ub&longs;tantia, tùm quoque accidentia prædicantur in quid e&longs;t. Sed accidens quod à reliquis vniuer&longs;alibus di­&longs;tinguitur, de nullo pr&ecedil;dicatur in quid: non igitur &longs;ub&longs;tantia vel accidens. At quod ad &longs;pecies attinet; ille qui negat eas e&longs;&longs;e accidentia, &longs;peciei naturam ignorare videtur. Nam &longs;iue &longs;it &longs;en&longs;i­lis, &longs;eu talis, qu&ecedil; mente concipienda &longs;it, e&longs;t actus quidam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cuiu&longs;piam à forma defluens, & aduentitiè: inhærens, vt in aëre lumen à lucido corpore emi&longs;&longs;um. Sic in animo &longs;pecies, & &longs;i­mulachra &longs;e habent. Itaque docet Ari&longs;toteles, has &longs;pecies in &longs;anguine & &longs;piritu in&longs;idere, a & ita menti offerre res à quibus emittuntur vt lumen &longs;olem nobis o&longs;tendit à quo effunditur. Idcirco geminam rationem & vim &longs;pecies obtinent: alteram qna &longs;unt habitus, & ita qualitates, atque alteram, qua &longs;unt &longs;imilitudines & re&longs;pectus, &longs;iue habitudines, qua referunt obiecta. Sunt igitur &longs;pecies accidentia. Neque ita ab&longs;urdum e&longs;t à &longs;pecie facultates animi nominari, quin vi&longs;io co­lorata dicatur, & animus fieri leo & equus; &longs;icut manus cum en&longs;e fit en&longs;is & cum calamo cala­mus: ex quo etiam dicitur forma formarum &longs;ic vt manus organus organorum. Differentiæ quoque ad alterum ex his membris nece&longs;&longs;ariò referuntur: ac &longs;i quo pacto media &longs;int habendæ inter accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ic &longs;tatuendum e&longs;t eas non per vtriu&longs;que extremi negationem, &longs;ed participationem potius eiu&longs;modi e&longs;&longs;e. Nam cùm in prædicamentis in&longs;it ratio duplex; al­tera quidem, qua rerum natura con&longs;tituitur; vnde earum formas proprias, & communes ordi­ne quodam proponunt; altera verò qua formas illas voce declarant, & certa loquendi for­mula &longs;ignificant. Si rem &longs;pectes differentia pror&longs;us e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia: &longs;i verò modum aduertas, quo voce exprimitur, imitatur qualitatem. Non e&longs;t enim in &longs;ubiecto differentia, &longs;ed dicitur de &longs;ubiecto; &longs;ub&longs;tat etiam: quandò aliqua ip&longs;am con&longs;equuntur & peream pertinent ad &longs;ub­&longs;tantiam compo&longs;itam: quamobrem e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum, quòd primò excipit & pars eius quod de­nominatur. Etenim notio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ vtrunque &longs;ubiecti genus amplectitur. &longs;iquidem ani­mus &longs;it &longs;ubiectum, & corpus itidem in quo e&longs;t animus. Id verò, quòd accidens à Porphy­rio de&longs;criptum ab illo accidente &longs;eparetur, quod in entis diui&longs;ione accipimus non prohi­bet, quominus afferat aliquam notionem ex his quæ in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, vel accidente continentur. Nanque accidens, vt e&longs;t aliquid &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;, & vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ic affecta; &longs;ic etiam imaginem &longs;ub­&longs;tantiæ retinet, & eius aliqua ve&longs;tigia qua&longs;i fingit, & imitatur. Ex his a&longs;&longs;equutum e&longs;t, vt prædi­cetur in quid, b & &longs;it ratio &longs;u&longs;cipiendi nonnullas proprietates. Itaque quantum e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entia li­neæ; c idemque. finitatis &longs;ubiectum & æqualitatis particeps; quapropter omnia propter quantum finita vel infinita dicuntur. eferunt ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notionem. eque id, quod ita ine&longs;t in acci­dente, ine&longs;t àc &longs;i foret accidens. uî enim cogitari pote&longs;t aliquod accidens in altero, vt in acciden­te in&longs;idere? &longs;emper enim mens illud ve&longs;tigaret, cui in&longs;idet; & in infinitum producta non habe­ret vbi &longs;i&longs;tere valeret. Sed &longs;ic inh&ecedil;ret, vt in &longs;ubiecto: atque iam hoc notionem &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; præ­&longs;efert. amet&longs;i moneo in ea notione accidentis vnà notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ concipi, & ita cogitari quantum e&longs;&longs;e finitatis &longs;ubiectum: qua&longs;i &longs;ubiectum &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia quanta notionem accidentis &longs;e­paratam non e&longs;&longs;e perpetuò defendens, &longs;ed incomplexam quidem, quia &longs;it vna notio accidentis cum &longs;ub&longs;tantia; ac &longs;i denominatum aliquod cogitemus. Tum verò e&longs;t accidens, & ita definitur à Porphyrio, & in Topicis; quatenus ad aliud refertur, &longs;ine quò &longs;anè non exi&longs;tat, &longs;ed e&longs;&longs;entiali vin­culo non iungatur. Non igitur re, &longs;ed modo & habitudine accidens à c&ecedil;teris vniuer&longs;alibus &longs;epa­ratur, & ab ip&longs;is prædicamentis. Ita fit, vt nulla notio &longs;it quæ fugiat alterutram notionem &longs;ub­&longs;tantiæ vel accidentis. ultò minus aliqua res excluditur illa partitione: quod vereor ne dare cogantur ij, qui elementorum formas intendi & remitti volunt; quia mediam vim obtineant inter accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. Et profectò notio form&ecedil; &longs;emper e&longs;t, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, cùm ip&longs;a multa &longs;u­&longs;tineat, quæ compo&longs;ito impertit. Atqui dices, ita imperfecta e&longs;t, vt accidenti con&longs;imilis e&longs;&longs;e vi­deatur. At non e&longs;t hoc alterius extremi naturam participare, & &longs;ubiacere conditionibus acci­dentis; &longs;ed in genere &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; contineri, & vim retinere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ; &longs;ed eam defeti&longs;centem, & imbecillem, conditiones eiu&longs;dem, licet infimo quodam modo, accipientem. Quare medium non admittunt accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Verumenimuero accidens in nouem genera di&longs;tribui­tur; quod item in omni &longs;cientia, arte, & methodo recipitur, vt per&longs;picuum. Nam lu&longs;tranti quot modis res in mentem no&longs;tram, &longs;eu rectius dixerim, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cadere queant, & quot modis voce explicari, & alteri &longs;ignificari po&longs;sint, hi decem &longs;oli occurrant. Itaque & dialecticus hæc decem principia rerum accipit, & moralis, & philo&longs;ophi omnes, quorum &longs;ingulis vnum par attribuunt contrariorum. Id quod inde arbitror colligi, quia genus e&longs;t vnumquodque ex his principiis quæ pr&ecedil;dicamenta dicuntur; genus autem præ&longs;efert quiddam quod &longs;ecari po&longs;sit in oppo&longs;itas differentias. d Nunc differentia perfectè, ide&longs;t, per extrema interualla &longs;unt ip&longs;a prima contraria: in vnoquoque genere igitur &longs;unt prima contraria; perfectè verò differentia mon&longs;trat inductio, e vt album & nigrum, dulce & amarum, rationis compos, & impos, æquale & in&ecedil;quale. Porrò prima contraria cùm bifariam &longs;umi po&longs;sint vel &longs;ecundum rationem, vel &longs;ecundum rem, ac &longs;ecun­dum rationem quidem forma & priuatio quæ maximo di&longs;tant interuallo, vt nihil longinquius in ordine rerum mens concipere queat, nec quicquam &longs;it, quod minus alterutrius natur&ecedil; &longs;it par­ticeps quàm e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;unt verò &longs;ecundum rationem, quòd con&longs;i&longs;tunt terminis, quibus nihil e&longs;t commune vniuocum, ente .&longs;. & non ente &longs;ecundum rem verò oppo&longs;ita po&longs;itiuè: nanque tali quodam oppo&longs;ito &longs;emper priuatio nititur, ea verò &longs;emper &longs;unt aut in eodem genere, aut diuer­&longs;orum generum, aut ip&longs;a diuer&longs;a genera, &longs;emper tamen in eodem prædicamento. lla nos hic accipimus, quæ &longs;unt prima &longs;ecundum rationem, quæ duo in vnoquoque genere prima defendi­mus: & cùm genus, vel vt prædicatum in quid, vel vt &longs;ubiectum con&longs;iderari po&longs;sit, cùm ex illis item duplex contrariorum genus exi&longs;tat; a ex primo quod appellatur &longs;ecundum formam, ex po­&longs;teriore quod &longs;ecundum materiam; hoc quidem quod præ&longs;efert aliquam vici&longs;situdinem, illud verò immutabile: & &longs;ecundum rationem quoque in vtroque prima contraria formam, & pri­uationem e&longs;&longs;e dicimus, cùm &longs;ecundum rem multa ip&longs;orum paria po&longs;sint exi&longs;tere. inc eiu&longs;dem generis multæ oppo&longs;itæ differentiæ quarum nullus e&longs;t ordo; b veruntamen omnes re&longs;oluuntur in contradictionem, vel oppo&longs;itionem habitus & priuationis, vt rationis particeps, & brutum, in brutum, & non brutum, rationis particeps, & non. Ob eamque rem acceptum e&longs;t &longs;ine pro­batione ab Ari&longs;totele. In vno genere vnum e&longs;&longs;e par contrariorum primum. Hæc, tamet&longs;i pri­mum re&longs;piciunt genus, quod pr&ecedil;dicatur, &longs;iue pertinent ad genus, quod e&longs;t vt &longs;ubiectum & ma­teria; re&longs;piciunt quoque facultates, vt &longs;cientiam & medicinam; quòd ea &longs;it obiecti cuiu&longs;piam, in quo contraria exi&longs;tunt: nimirum corporis humani, quod capax e&longs;t bonæ mal&ecedil;que. valetudinis. Vnum verò contraria non e&longs;&longs;e docemur ex vi terminorum: &longs;iquidem contraria contineant ha­bitudinem quæ non con&longs;i&longs;tit in vno: non e&longs;&longs;e verò plura quàm duo ratio conuincit & &longs;i obijci­tur virtus & medium quæ duobus vitijs & extremis aduer&longs;antur: nam contrarietas, vt &longs;ic dixe­rim, e&longs;t maxima differentia; &longs;i maxima perfecta, &longs;i perfecta finita: quapropter extra illam nihil accipi pote&longs;t. Ergo duo &longs;unt &longs;olum ip&longs;a contraria; aliter vltra extremum aliquid e&longs;&longs;et. Etenim cogitare oportet contraria continere &longs;patium quoddam: veluti terminos, quod indicat &longs;en&longs;us. Omnis autem vnius &longs;patij terminati duo &longs;unt termini non plures: aut enim termini non e&longs;&longs;ent intra illos; & &longs;ic contraria non maximè di&longs;tarent: aut illi termini non e&longs;&longs;et; proinde neque con­traria, &longs;i qua maior e&longs;&longs;et di&longs;tantia. Duo &longs;unt igitur extrema. Ergo & omnis contrarietatis, h&ecedil;c verò contraria &longs;unt. Nec ob&longs;tant medium & virtus. am medium non opponitur extremis vt contrarium, &longs;ed vt ad aliquid: & virtus opponitur vitijs, vt moderatum immoderato, vel vt bo­num malo: nunc mali & immoderati du&ecedil; &longs;unt &longs;pecies plus & minus ex quo exi&longs;tunt vitia. Sed redeo ad illa. Quicquid e&longs;t, e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam vel accidens. odem quoque gradu procedunt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ partes & accidentis: &longs;iquidem partes accidentia accidentia &longs;int, & qualitatis qualita­tes, quanti quanta, & c&ecedil;terorum omnium partes pro ratione. Quamquam nonnulli &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; partes in dubium reuocarunt; & rationibus quibu&longs;dam colligere voluerunt partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum non e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias, eorum ergo rationes diluere placet, ne fortè nos po&longs;tea perturbet. In primis illi accipiunt. In quibu&longs;cunque finis aliquis e&longs;t, huius gratia agitur quod prius e&longs;t, quodque. con­&longs;equitur. Sed animata corpora fiunt è &longs;implicibus & pror&longs;us inanimis. Ergo &longs;implicia & inani­ma animatorum gratia &longs;unt. Itaque illorum forma; &longs;iquidem finis & forma idem &longs;int poti&longs;si­mè in habentibus animam. Signo etiam e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t: nanque vbi &longs;eparentur à toto animato, non amplius eandem &longs;eruant rationem, &longs;ed ambiguè talia &longs;unt, nec digitus amputatus amplius digi­tus appellatur. Deinde mixta inanima carent fine: non ergo &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Probatur verò antecedens. uòd de illis di&longs;&longs;erens Ari&longs;toteles efficiens expo&longs;uit & materiam: de illorum fine meminit nu&longs;quam. uod verò con&longs;equitur, ita colligitur. Nam quicquid e&longs;t vel e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia vel accidens. At accidentia fiunt ex con&longs;equente; neque finem omnino habent: ergo quicquid habet finem e&longs;t nece&longs;&longs;ariò &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Po&longs;tremò lapides & metalla putre&longs;cunt &longs;olùm & ita cor­rumpuntur; atque aliter ac animalia, ip&longs;a enim prius corrumpuntur, po&longs;tea putre&longs;cunt. uòd &longs;i non corrumpuntur; nec generantur igitur. &longs;i non generantur: ergo neque &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt, &longs;iqui­dem generatio &longs;it propria &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum. Sed enim mihi videtur Ari&longs;toteles etiam cum &longs;ub&longs;tan­tijs partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ numerare, & tradere notas, quibus eas digno&longs;camus e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias, quo­modocunque &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ partes. uando no&longs;ti partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ dupliciter e&longs;&longs;e, vel quæ cor­poris totius molem compleant, quas integrantes cum c&ecedil;teris vocare liceat, vel eas quibus e&longs;&longs;en­tia continetur. Nam &longs;i integrantes accipias, ob&longs;eruabis eas collocari in natura con&longs;tantibus, quæ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt, at differunt ab accidentibus quæ &longs;unt ex natura. c hæc verò ex materia & forma componuntur quæ per &longs;e &longs;unt; & idcirco illa etiam quæ con&longs;tantur ex his, &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;unt, per&longs;pi­cuè verò numerantur in &longs;ub&longs;tantiis d c&ecedil;li elementorum animantiumque. partes ab Ari&longs;totele. e &longs;i rur­ &longs;us in&longs;picias e&longs;&longs;enti&ecedil; partes. æ quoque tanquam membra &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ recen&longs;entur: cùm &longs;ub&longs;tan­tia triplex &longs;it, compo&longs;itum, forma, & materia, quæ &longs;unt partes compo&longs;iti. Idem quoque Ari&longs;to­teles illa monet e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias, f qu&ecedil; non &longs;unt in &longs;ubiecto; &longs;ed elementorum, metallorum, viuen­tiumque. partes non &longs;unt in &longs;ubiecto, eædemque. &longs;unt hoc aliquid. ur ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ non erunt? Docuit item partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;ub&longs;tantias e&longs;&longs;e quandoquidem id quod &longs;e habet vt accidens, & e&longs;t in &longs;ubiecto, non e&longs;t pars: v&longs;que adeo vt neque credam partem quanti in quanto e&longs;&longs;e vt acci­ dens, nec partem qualis in quali & idem alibi te&longs;tatus e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ partes e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias: aliter efficitur, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia fieret è non &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Neque argumentationes diluere mea quidem &longs;en­tentia difficile e&longs;t; &longs;iquidem in prima &longs;ub&longs;it fallacia ab eo, quod e&longs;t quodammodo ad id quod e&longs;t &longs;impliciter. Nanque & &longs;i animus e&longs;t inanimorum finis, quòd per varias mutationes, & fata promoueri po&longs;sint ad formam nobili&longs;simam, & hoc poti&longs;simè natura re&longs;piciat; at non de&longs;erit illa, neque &longs;poliat omni forma, neque ex omni gradu &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ deturbat. Et videt qui&longs;que ho­minem e&longs;&longs;e cui tanquam fini reliqua natura parauerit: nihilominus &longs;ingula per &longs;e con&longs;tituit, vt etiam extra hominem &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tere queant. Animus igitur e&longs;t finis, &longs;ed remotus, alius e&longs;t finis pro­prius, qui item in ordine &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ collocatur, quo neque cetera carent qu&ecedil; non viuunt. Neque eorum finis e&longs;t animus &longs;impliciter: &longs;ed tum finis e&longs;t, cùm &longs;ic ip&longs;a di&longs;po&longs;uit alma parens natura, vt talis forma proximè po&longs;sit induci, veluti finis marmoris non e&longs;t &longs;tatua, ni&longs;i, cùm iam marmor expoliri cœpit; nihilominus per proprium finem propriamque formam exi&longs;tit. Confirmatio quoque fallax e&longs;t præ&longs;eferens errorem in con&longs;equente. Nanque & &longs;i partes à toto &longs;eiunctæ &longs;unt ambiguè animalia &longs;eu partes, at non &longs;unt ambiguè &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Accipitur item mixta inanima carere fine. Tùm etiam ponitur accidens carere fine. Et &longs;anè accidens fine careat, non nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t; vt os pellucidum e&longs;t, ne offendamus. Fal&longs;umque. e&longs;t mixta carere fine. Nam &longs;i partes ani­malium futur&ecedil; &longs;int; iam animus pr&ecedil;&longs;to e&longs;t. &longs;i minus; at tum per propriam formam exi&longs;tunt. Neque fines i&longs;ti ab Ari&longs;totele pr&ecedil;termi&longs;si &longs;unt, vt primo de part. nim. a Id planè verum e&longs;t eo­rum formas latere magis quo ad elementa propius accedunt. Quanquam, &longs;i formam &longs;yllo­gi&longs;mi &longs;pectemus, impotens e&longs;t, quippe quæ &longs;ic complicetur. Omne accidens caret fine. Mixta inanima carent fine. Sunt igitur accidentia. Ex eo quod form&ecedil; latent, extat temperies, per quam formæ de&longs;cribantur; fit, vt putredinis illorum ratio duntaxat habeatur, nulla interitus. uidens enim temperies e&longs;t, forma autem &longs;ubob&longs;cura. Nil ergo medium habent accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia: ordinem planè habent; &longs;ed medio vacant. Nanque &longs;ub&longs;tantia prior e&longs;t accidente omnibus mo­dis, b &longs;i &longs;impliciter accipiatur. uando neque re neque ratione &longs;eparatur accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia, &longs;i &longs;en&longs;um con&longs;ulimus, quem no&longs;træ methodi normam e&longs;&longs;e volumus. &longs;emper igitur rationem &longs;ub­&longs;tantiæ flagitat, plurimumque. tempore con&longs;equitur, quòd accidens illi &longs;uperueniat, quod iam e&longs;t in actu. Sed &longs;i proprium &longs;it perpetuoque. inhærens, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notio dicitur antecedere, quando­quidem &longs;ine illo &longs;ub&longs;tantia concipi pote&longs;t. i&longs;i tempus fortè non vt vulgò conuenit; &longs;ed vt non­nunquam apud veteres metaphoricè pro nobilitate præ&longs;tantiaque. &longs;umatur. dem enim valet ma­ximè honorandum, & vetu&longs;ti&longs;simum c. Propterea quoque Galenus d ob venerationem &longs;olitus e&longs;t vocare Hippocratem palaio\n, ide&longs;t veterem. Neque præcurrentes affectiones ob&longs;tant, quæ rei generandæ anteire videantur: nanque illa &longs;ub&longs;tantia nituntur, quæ interit, dum altera gene­ratur. Itaque &longs;ub&longs;tantia accidenti &longs;impliciter antecedit, vt phy&longs;icè &longs;umi queat, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam ex non &longs;ub&longs;tantia fieri non po&longs;&longs;e; e quòd &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; nihil antecedat. Quare & hoc in principijs re­ponetur, cùm ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;ine ratione &longs;umatur, qua&longs;i cum proximo effato idem valeat. Cum &longs;ub&longs;tantia prior &longs;it omnibus modis accidente, patet etiam, accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparari non po&longs;­&longs;e, neque reip&longs;a, neque cogitatione. tque adeo, vt nonmodo quod &longs;it, quod e&longs;t actu e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;iue exi&longs;tere, & quod Gr&ecedil;corum vulgus u)pa/zxein appellat, verumetiam quòd &longs;it, ide&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entiam obtineat, quæ per definitionem explicatur, acceptum &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; referat. E&longs;t enim acci­dens in &longs;ubiecto, ide&longs;t ita in alio, vt e&longs;&longs;e nequeat &longs;ine illo in quo e&longs;t, non tamen vt pars, & e&longs;t aliud quid exi&longs;tens, non &longs;cilicet per &longs;e, &longs;ed per aliud, non quantitas, &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantia quanta, & in &longs;ub&longs;tantiam denique re&longs;oluitur. Nec cogitari pote&longs;t accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia; &longs;iquidem e&longs;&longs;e in &longs;ubiecto &longs;it eius natura à qua accidentis ratio diuelli nequit f. Inconueniens enim e&longs;t (inquit Ari­ &longs;toteles) ip&longs;um &longs;eparare, &longs;i oportet inconueniens dicere id, quod fieri nequit. ullum enim aliorum &longs;eparari pote&longs;t pr&ecedil;ter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam: nanque omnia de &longs;ubiecto dicuntur ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Nec id menti &longs;uccedere pote&longs;t; cùm &longs;it inconueniens illa mens quæ quærit ea quæ fieri nequeunt, & id aggre­ditur quod effici non pote&longs;t. Valet ad id quoque firmandum, quòd multò magis &longs;unt formæ na­turales quàm accidentia, neque tamen formæ naturales à materia motuque. &longs;eparantur, multo mi­nus igitur accidentia præ&longs;ertim quæ &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;unt: neque mens (vt mea fert &longs;ententia) rerum na­turas immutare pote&longs;t. Sed accipiat hic Ari&longs;toteles &longs;egregationem, quam natura præ&longs;tat de ea quæ mentis opera cogitando fit, nihil agat. Atqui neque accidens citra &longs;ub&longs;tantiam cogitare licet. Te&longs;tem apello Themi&longs;tium qui monet, ne cogitatione quidem accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;e, re autem multo minus. Sub&longs;tantia planè à ceterorum generum vniuer&longs;itate pote&longs;t &longs;epa­rari non &longs;anè quod accidentibus omnino &longs;en&longs;ilis &longs;ub&longs;tantia nudetur: &longs;ed, quia &longs;ub&longs;tantia vna ea­demque. ad numerum permanens, modo hoc modo illud accipiat. Deinde quæ mens &longs;euocare po­te&longs;t rem à &longs;ua quidditate? &longs;imile enim foret ac &longs;i hominem aliud e&longs;&longs;e cogitarem, quàm animal ratione vtens. Cùm ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantia compleat quidditatem accidentis planum quod accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia non pote&longs;t ab&longs;olui, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam verò &longs;impliciter accipio non ignarus ab hac vel illa &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;pecie accidens, & cogitatione & re &longs;eiungi po&longs;&longs;e, vt ab homine album. Fortè re&longs;pon­debis. Accidens præ&longs;eferre geminam notionem, alteram quidem qua e&longs;t accidens, hoc e&longs;t in &longs;ubiecto, & &longs;ic accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogitari non po&longs;&longs;e fateberis; ita enim e&longs;t ad aliquid ne­ce&longs;&longs;ariò; alteram verò qua e&longs;t ens & in vniuer&longs;itate naturæ, &longs;ic pones in ip&longs;o non contineri &longs;ub­&longs;tantiam. Itaque & accidens non denominatiuè, &longs;ed nonnunquam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ modo per dictio­nem exprimitur. dem quoque definitur. At definitio non entis &longs;olùm, &longs;ed entis per &longs;e exi&longs;tit. Et ratio confirmat. Siquidem exceptis ijs quæ &longs;unt ad aliquid, reliqua &longs;unt entia ab&longs;oluta ergò à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparatur accidens: aliter ens ab&longs;olutum non e&longs;&longs;et. Deinde accidens habet proprium genus, & propriam differentiam quæ ex eadem &longs;erie &longs;umuntur, per quæ definitur. taque &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogitatur. Attamen hoc neutiquam à Peripatetico probari po&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eo. uando­quidem notio entis aut generalis quædam accipitur, qua complectitur ea quæ in &longs;ubiecto &longs;unt, & ea qu&ecedil; non &longs;unt in &longs;ubiecto. ut manet entis ratio in &longs;uis partibus vt non multò po&longs;t indica­bimus. &longs;ed quomodocunque ens vniuocè dicetur de &longs;uis partibus & &longs;ecus ac con&longs;tituerit Ari&longs;to­teles. Etenim e&longs;&longs;e in &longs;ubiecto & non e&longs;&longs;e tanquam contradicentia diuidunt omne ens. lterum ergo ex his ens &longs;it, nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. Accipiatur nunc accidens vt ens, idemque. non, vt in &longs;ubiecto e&longs;t, concipiatur à nobis, aliter in eius notione comprehenderetur &longs;ubiectum; ergo eadem erit notio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ & accidentis, &longs;iue entium omnium, in &longs;ubiectò nimirum non e&longs;&longs;e. Itaque ens vni­uocè complectetur omnes &longs;uas partes. multoque. magis &longs;i rationem quandam communem cogi­temus quæ partibus eius communicetur. Verùm audiamus etiam Ari&longs;totelem, qui tractans ac­cidens, vt ens ip&longs;um à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparari non po&longs;&longs;e docet a, vbi etiam de accidentis definitione meminit. Ita enim, inquit, &longs;e habet definitio vt quodquid e&longs;t. Ceterùm quod quid e&longs;t non e&longs;t vniu&longs;modi; &longs;ed vnius primò nempè &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, ceterorum ex con&longs;ecutione & &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;impli­citer, accidentium quodammodo, & propè &longs;icuti Logici dicere &longs;olent, non ens e&longs;&longs;e ens non quia &longs;impliciter &longs;it non ens, &longs;ed quia non &longs;it quodammodo, videlicet priuatio entis, nanque, & non ens &longs;i&longs;tit mentem; & qui audit, quodammodo quie&longs;cit qua&longs;i re&longs;pondeat illi certa notio reique. &longs;i­militudo, vt reliquis nominibus &longs;ic & accidentia non dicimus e&longs;&longs;e quantitatem, aut qualitatem, &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quantam &longs;ub&longs;tantiam qualem. Vnde infert Ari&longs;toteles definitiones e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiæ &longs;impliciter, aliorum verò quodammodo. Rur&longs;us a&longs;&longs;erit b &longs;iue nos vnum totum accipiamus &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem cum accidentibus, &longs;iue etiam &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & accidentia non vt eiu&longs;dem rei partes, &longs;ed vt ordine quodam con&longs;titutas, &longs;ub&longs;tantia prior e&longs;t reliquis: illa enim non &longs;unt &longs;im­pliciter, quantum & quale, verum qualitates & motus &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, nec aliter &longs;e habent (&longs;æpè enim ea vox apud Ari&longs;totelem &longs;umitur, vt nota comparationis) ac non album aut non rectum, neque enim hæc per &longs;e &longs;unt, &longs;ed propter album & rectum, & eorum priuationes, nec &longs;unt entia &longs;impliciter, non ad aliud, ni&longs;i quòd &longs;unt aliquid &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Vides igitur & accidentia con&longs;ide­rata vt &longs;unt entia, non ab&longs;olui à &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Si in eo quod &longs;unt non exi&longs;tunt &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia, con­&longs;equens item e&longs;t, vt per &longs;ub&longs;tantiam definiantur. adem enim &longs;olent e&longs;&longs;e principia cur exi&longs;tat res, & quæ in definitione &longs;umuntur. Igitur & quòd &longs;it & quid &longs;it à &longs;ub&longs;tantia redundat in accidens. Atque vt de eo quod e&longs;t accidens in primis verba faciamus. lanum e&longs;t ip&longs;um ita &longs;e habere ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, vt in &longs;ubiecto quòd e&longs;t dupliciter. el enim e&longs;t vt primum excipiens & alteri tra­dens quod Latini vocant inh&ecedil;&longs;ionis, vel cuius e&longs;t aliqua pars primò excipiens, quod denomina­tionis appellare con&longs;uerunt, e&longs;t verò compo&longs;itum, vt vita ine&longs;t in animali per animum animus primum excipit vitam po&longs;t communicat ip&longs;am animali ex hoc &longs;ubiectorum genere po&longs;&longs;unt e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;æ omnes, à quibus aliquod attributum proximè pendet. ttamen ita &longs;e habent, vt materiam imitentur in eo quòd vt materia &longs;e habet ad id, ex quo quiddam nece&longs;&longs;ario con&longs;equitur. t ad rubiginem ferrum &longs;ic & cau&longs;&longs;æ ad effecta, idcirco ex his con&longs;tituitur medium demon&longs;trationis. Similique modo accidentis e&longs;&longs;entia pendet à &longs;ub&longs;tantia. uoniam h&ecedil;c principia con&longs;tituunt ac­cidentia, vt ex eorum definitione patet, vbi è demon&longs;tratione elicitur. Et profectò &longs;ic rationi con&longs;entaneum e&longs;t. Nanque vbi primum quidpiam alicui conuenit, c&ecedil;teris ab illo communica­tur. Sed quid e&longs;t primùm e&longs;t ip&longs;ius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Ab illa igitur de&longs;cendit in accidens. Oppones hic tu accidens quod exprimitur figura dictionis quæ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ conueniat. b&longs;eruabis ip&longs;um, quatenus definiri pote&longs;t, &longs;ic verò vt non in alio, &longs;ed vt per &longs;e exi&longs;tens accipitur. An h&ecedil;c non pro­hibent quominus accidens cum &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogitetur. &longs;ed id præ&longs;tant &longs;olùm, vt menti &longs;ubijciant in primis ip&longs;um accidens. Neque ordinem naturæ peruertunt, &longs;ed ordinem concipiendi mu­tant. Nanque eadem natura e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quantæ, & quantitatis. &longs;iquidem quantitas non e&longs;t &longs;impliciter &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quantitas. At qui concipit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quantam, primum &longs;ubijcit quantitati &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & quantum vult e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; attributum, qui uerò concipit quantita­tem, concipit eam quidem, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quantitatem; &longs;ed cùm duo &longs;int ratione diuer&longs;a, quan­titas & &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quantitatem primo vult intueri. ua&longs;i &longs;pectet non quid &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;implici­ter eueniat, &longs;ed quid, quatenus e&longs;t quanta. Quare ab&longs;tractum nihil aliud efficit quàm vt de­ terminet notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ per notionem accidentis. & hoc modo fit ab&longs;tractio mathemati­ca, non autem quia quantitas &longs;impliciter à mathematico con&longs;ideretur, &longs;ed quia quantitatis &longs;ub­&longs;tantiæ ratio quidem habeatur, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ verò nequaquam. Ita & hoc e&longs;t, quod ad definiendum proponitur, non quantitas &longs;impliciter: &longs;ed quantitas &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & ita concipitur ab&longs;tractum, & ob eam cau&longs;&longs;am figuram dictionis immutat. Quòd opponitur e&longs;&longs;e nouem prædicamenta ab­&longs;oluta nec in habitudine po&longs;ita. acile intelligetur, vt verum &longs;it, &longs;i vim ab&longs;oluti explanemus. Porrò ab&longs;olutum illud e&longs;t, quod ita ex &longs;e e&longs;t, vt à nullo pendeat, neque vt &longs;it, neque vt con&longs;er­uetur. Inter ea verò, quæ &longs;unt in vniuer&longs;o proprium, ide&longs;t, D. . M. t à nullo pendeat, &longs;ed ex &longs;eip&longs;o &longs;it ex illo cetera &longs;int. & &longs;ic in eo re&longs;pectus ine&longs;t, non vt quicquam extra &longs;e re&longs;piciat; &longs;ed vt re&longs;piciatur à c&ecedil;teris, Secundo modo etiam id quod re&longs;picit aliud à &longs;e pote&longs;t dici ab&longs;olutum, &longs;iquando non re&longs;piciat aliquid, à quo pendeat vt con&longs;tituente, ide&longs;t, vt à materia, vel forma. Sic quoque &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt ab&longs;olutè, quòd tamet&longs;i à Deo pendent, non ita pendent ab ip&longs;o, tan­quam materialiter &longs;u&longs;tentante. Tertio ab&longs;olutum illud e&longs;t, quod, & &longs;i pendet ab alio, tamen non con&longs;tituitur ex alio &longs;uppo&longs;ito, ide&longs;t, habet in eodem &longs;uppo&longs;ito cau&longs;&longs;as omnes per quas exi­&longs;tit. Ab&longs;olutum quoque dici po&longs;&longs;e videtur, quatenus habet certum &longs;uum modum quo e&longs;t, qui non petitur aliunde quàm ex &longs;e: omne enim prædicamentum habet &longs;uum e&longs;&longs;e & &longs;uum quid e&longs;t quo di&longs;cernitur ab alio, licet nunquam ab&longs;oluatur à &longs;ub&longs;tantia, a ita vt pertineat id etiam commu­niter ad relatiua, & generatim & &longs;peciatim, vt etiam &longs;eruus & &longs;i pendet à domino, habet &longs;uam certam rationem per quam &longs;eruus e&longs;t vt humilitatem & obedientiam. Hoc igitur & tertio mo­do dicimus accidentia e&longs;&longs;e res ab&longs;olutas, &longs;ecus ac ea dicamus, quæ &longs;unt ad aliquid. tenim &longs;er­uus in Dauo non habet cau&longs;&longs;as omnes, per quas exi&longs;tit: ni&longs;i enim fuerit Simo dominus; neque etiam &longs;eruus e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t. c &longs;i eundem patrem & filium e&longs;&longs;e fingamus, non habet tamen in &longs;e ip­&longs;o cau&longs;&longs;as quod &longs;it, &longs;ed adhuc ex alio pendebit vt pater, & ut filius ex alio. At album & quan­tum in eo &longs;unt, quod album e&longs;t, & quantum; & illius &longs;unt qualitas & quantitas, in quo &longs;unt; ita vt, & &longs;i nihil aliud exi&longs;tat; &longs;int nihilominus album & quantum, non &longs;ic &longs;eruus exi&longs;tit, &longs;ed aliud præterea flagitat numero diuer&longs;um, ad quod referatur. Obijcitur accidens definiri po&longs;&longs;e per terminos eiu&longs;dem pr&ecedil;dicamenti qua&longs;i &longs;it ab&longs;olutum quoddam. At nonne idem iudicium de genere, & differentia faciemus? etenim & color e&longs;t alicuius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & di&longs;gregare vi&longs;um e&longs;t actio cuiu&longs;dam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ & in recto pronunciatur vt id notetur, quod mens primùm re&longs;pi­cit altero non exclu&longs;o. Tùm etiam hæc e&longs;t pars definitionis, quæ additamento &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; com­plecta e&longs;t, & cum definitio &longs;oleat illud euoluere, quod nomen confusè &longs;ignificat; dicemus etiam confusè &longs;ub&longs;tantiam accidentis nomine &longs;ignificari. Quare &longs;ub&longs;tantia in definitione accidentis non ita &longs;umitur qua&longs;i extrin&longs;ecum quiddam, &longs;ed etiam in accidentis ip&longs;ius &longs;implici notione con­tinetur. uia &longs;it accidens aliquid illius. b id ine&longs;&longs;e & inh&ecedil;rere notionem con&longs;tituit accidentis, vt vides. Si &longs;ub&longs;tantia nunquam fit ex non &longs;ub&longs;tantia; profectò multò minus ex nihilo fiet. Hic e&longs;t communis omnium phy&longs;icorum con&longs;en&longs;us, atque ita ab Ari&longs;totele approbatus, vt ope­r&ecedil;pretium fore non putarit, &longs;i id conficeret argumentis; in eo quoque &longs;ecum melius agi putans, &longs;i vnum &longs;en&longs;um con&longs;uleret qui nu&longs;quam ex nihilo quicquam fieri iudicaret quàm &longs;i rationes per&longs;equi vellet, quas &longs;anè multas ad hoc ip&longs;um firmandum quia corroga&longs;&longs;et Epicureus ille; Lu­cretius bellè quidem, &longs;i lepôrem carminum &longs;pectes; &longs;i ius methodi requiras, operam lu&longs;i&longs;&longs;e po­tius quàm compendium feci&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;ebis. Nil autem mirum quòd propter a)paidousia/n Analy­ticorum (fuit autem commune vitium vniuer&longs;æ antiquitati) à demon&longs;trandis certa non di&longs;tin­guebant. Ceterùm quòd ex nihilo nihil fieri con&longs;titutum e&longs;&longs;et: & &longs;i Ari&longs;toteles oculos inten­di&longs;&longs;e videtur in materiam; at primo intuitu materia non extabat, & ijdem philo&longs;ophi, qui nihil ex nihilo fieri autumabant, ne&longs;ciuere materiam. Quapropter ex nihilo intelligendum erat quod cunctis erat per&longs;picuum, ex eo quod actu non e&longs;&longs;et, &longs;iue id &longs;imile foret, vt cen&longs;uit Anaxa­goras, &longs;iue contrarium, vt plerique &longs;tatuerunt. Cuius item iudicij fuit: vt ex nihilo fit nihil, ita quoque nihil in nihilum re&longs;olui, &longs;ed in non contrarium.

I.

G

H

Obiectio prima.

C. &longs;ub&longs;t.

II.

III.

Ad I.

A

a Libr. e Mem. . 3.

Ad II.

B

Ad III.

b 7. Met.

c 1. Phy&longs;. T. 29.

C

D

d 10. Met. Tt. 13. 14.

e 10. Met. T. 24.

E

a Alex. 10. Met.

b 1. de Par. ac. 7. Met.

F

G

I.

II.

III.

H

c 2. Phy&longs;. ab initio.

d 3. De c&ecedil;l. T. 1.

e 8. Met. T. 1.

f 5. Met. T. 5.

A

Ad I.

Ad II.

B

a 1. De or.

Ad III.

b 7. Met. tit. 4.

C

c 1. Met. &longs;um. 2. c. 1.

d Met. . 6.

e 1. Phy&longs;. Tit. 52.

f 1. Phy&longs;. Tit. 14.

D

E

I.

II.

III.

F

a 7. Met. tit. 14.

b 12. Met. tit. 1.

G

H

Ad I.

A

Ad II.

B

a 7. Met.

Ad III.

C

D

Quandò aliud ex alio reficit natura: nec vllam

Rem gigni patitur, ni&longs;i morte adiuta aliena.

Hoc ita creditum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele, vt multa &longs;uper hoc fundamento in vniuer&longs;a &longs;ua philo&longs;o­phia &longs;truxerit: vt qui &longs;u&longs;picentur Ari&longs;totelem non dicam noui&longs;&longs;e, &longs;ed approba&longs;&longs;e creationem; ij parum viderint de rebus Ari&longs;totelicis. Quinimmo ne&longs;cio &longs;atis'ne exercitati &longs;int in naturali philo&longs;ophia, qui humana ratione creationem colligi po&longs;&longs;e arbitrantur. Nimium confidimus nobis ip&longs;is; non per&longs;picimus non po&longs;&longs;e homuncionem ad tam alta my&longs;teria peruenire. aiore luce opus e&longs;t. Nam quòd aliquid de creatione &longs;ubodoratus &longs;it Ari&longs;toteles; ip&longs;emet a&longs;&longs;eruit qui etiam multorum opinionem extiti&longs;&longs;e profitetur, He&longs;iodique. verba citat in eam &longs;ententiam quòd principiò genitum &longs;it chaos, tùm deinde tellus, proximè autem amor, chaos verò & terra ex ni­hilo facta fuerint. Aliosque. multos commemorat qui dicunt e&longs;&longs;e nihil, &longs;ed omnia fieri; fieri verò ex non entibus & prætereà vulgarem opinionem ex non ente, aut ex nihilo aliquid fieri fui&longs;&longs;e te­&longs;tatur. Quinimmo ibidem monet nos Ari&longs;toteles non e&longs;&longs;e eo placito liberè vtendum; nimirum nihil ex nihilo fieri; cùm &longs;it comprehen&longs;io quædam quam accepimus rerum &longs;uperficiem &longs;olam &longs;pectando, non autem &longs;crutando interius. Attamen & &longs;i ignota non erat creatio; neutiquam tamen approbata. Et He&longs;iodus numeratur in Theologis; ex quo efficitur, vt quod aliquando dixit Ari&longs;toteles tou/s pe(ifu/sews. intelligat propriè phy&longs;icos cum ceteroquin alij multi qui non &longs;unt phy&longs;ici, de natura &longs;e &longs;cribere profiteantur, &longs;ed nos hic phy&longs;icum agimus, et&longs;i verbis Ari&longs;to­telis vti licet, vt cernas, quæ nobis con&longs;tituenda &longs;unt, illiu&longs;modi fore, vt nos humano modo ve­limus habere ad credendum. & validiorem Theologo delegemus; illud in animo &longs;emper ha­bentes Chri&longs;tianam pietatem e&longs;&longs;e talem, vt &longs;ola &longs;uo iure principia ponere po&longs;sit, nec aliunde mutuare; memores eò non peruenire &longs;en&longs;um quem omnium humanarum artium autorem e&longs;&longs;e vult Ari&longs;toteles. Nanque & ip&longs;e docet veritatis & fidei principium duplex e&longs;&longs;e, quorum alterum e&longs;t mens, alterum mente &longs;ublimius, nempe Deus, qui motiones efficit in ijs quos e\utei_s ide&longs;t, felices appellant, & &longs;anè multò admirabiliores quàm illi &longs;int qui duce ratione rebus gerendis vtuntur. Hoc principium à diuini&longs;simo poèta &longs;ignificatum, vbi Ni&longs;us Euryalum alloquitur

E

Dij'ne hunc ardorem mentibus addunt.

F

Euryale? An &longs;ua cuique Deus fit dira cupido?

E&longs;t & aliud principium, quod &longs;uperat mentem, atra nimirum bilis qua qui agitantur; &longs;upra captum hominis præno&longs;cunt, & futura præ&longs;agiunt. Sed nos humano modo nunc loquimur. Porrò humanum morem, qui &longs;it, docet Laert. monetque. Pyrrhone illo v&longs;um fui&longs;&longs;e Hippocratem, & longè antè Homerum. &longs;t verò hic ambiguus, & qui in vtranque partem facilè trahi po&longs;sit, & vbi denique contradicere liceat. Itaque Homerus.

*stzepth/ me\n glw_ss) e\si\ bzwtw_n, pole/es ) e)/ni mu/qoi.

Lingua volubilis e&longs;t; hominum verbisque. referta &

e)pe/wn polu\s no/mos e)/uqa, kai\ e/uqa.

Verborum hinc atque hinc ingens e&longs;t copia cuiuis

Atque ille quidem congruens e&longs;t rebus naturalibus quæ propter infinitatem materiæ nece&longs;­&longs;itatem difficilè admittunt. Itaque ex nihilo nihil fieri recipimus. Attamen & ex nihilo nihil fieri &longs;ic contingit, vt ex eo quoque nonnihil fieri po&longs;sit. Quocirca etiam laudatur Parmenides a qui id quod fit, ex non ente fieri dixerit, & o&longs;ten&longs;um e&longs;t priuationem, quæ e&longs;t per &longs;e non ens,

in omnem mutationem nece&longs;&longs;ariò conuenire. Verùm non idcirco creatio quamuis &longs;ecundum veritatem credenda conceditur ab Ari&longs;totele. &longs;iquidem id quod fit, non ex nihilo &longs;impliciter & per &longs;e (quod creatio requirit) efficiatur; &longs;ed ex euento; & quatenus &longs;ube&longs;t materia priuationi. Proptereà di&longs;tinguendum fuit, vt ex nihilo nihil, & vt ex illo quippiam fieri po&longs;&longs;et; neque illò perueniebat &longs;en&longs;us: quapropter etiam longiore di&longs;qui&longs;itione opus fuit, vt no&longs;ceretur. Hoc er­go &longs;it principium phy&longs;icum ex nihilo nihil; vt oppo&longs;itum &longs;impliciter à phy&longs;ico doctore &longs;it repu­diandum, vtpotè quod ex eo na&longs;catur &longs;yllogi&longs;mus contrariæ deceptionis. Quamobrem hoc lo­co &longs;uccurrit vt admiremur eos qui phy&longs;icè, aut etiam Ari&longs;totelicè oppo&longs;itum huius perorare &longs;e po&longs;&longs;e con&longs;idant; nec è fontibus pietatis hauriant. Sed cùm id conficiant argumentis, quibus plu­ra no&longs;tr&ecedil; methodi principia &longs;upponuntur; muneris quoque no&longs;tri e&longs;t ad illa aliquid dicere: &longs;unt enim ea nobis di&longs;&longs;oluenda, quæ qui&longs;piam è principijs ducta probatione, fallaci conclu&longs;ione effi­ciat b. Neque verò hic ego dubitabo, quin &longs;tudio pietatis adducti &longs;ancti&longs;simi viri conferant in hunc locum &longs;uos conatus; neque &longs;tudium reprehendo. mihique. ab ijs non recedere certum e&longs;t in eo quod religio iu&longs;sit. &longs;ed quantum ego rem ita &longs;e habere noui, tantum dubito phy&longs;icè ne confici queat.

a 1. Phy&longs;. Tit. 79.

G

g 1. Phy&longs;. T. 11.

H

Multa &longs;anè contrà afferuntur illa, hoc loco attingam qu&ecedil; &longs;ub initio no&longs;træ methodi exitum fa­cilè inuenient: &longs;iqua maiorem eruditionem diligentiam've po&longs;tulabunt, eò reijciam, vbi de mo­tus &ecedil;ternitate di&longs;&longs;eretur. Hæc verò inter alia afferuntur. Modus agendi &longs;equitur modum quo

res e&longs;t: & quale e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e cuique. rei, talis e&longs;t actio. Sed Deus in eo quod e&longs;t, à nullo pendet, nihil pr&ecedil;requirit, aut præ&longs;upponit: ergo nec in agendo. Hæc e&longs;t etiam notio Dei naturaliter animis in&longs;ita & impre&longs;&longs;a. Deum e&longs;&longs;e ens primum, perfectum, à nullo pendens, per &longs;e &longs;ufficiens, nullius indigum; ergo per &longs;e &longs;ufficit ad agendum: itaque non eget &longs;ubiecto. Affertur & illud. Deum e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am omnium rerum: ceteroqui pr&ecedil;ter Deum aliquid e&longs;&longs;et &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a, habens e&longs;&longs;e à &longs;e: id verò fieri nequit: neque enim omnia penderent à Deo. Sed multa &longs;unt, vt materia prima, c&ecedil;li, mentes beat&ecedil; quæ non potuerunt habere e&longs;&longs;e à Deo ex materia per motum: per creationem igitur. Quòd &longs;i accipias huiu&longs;modi res habere e&longs;&longs;e à Deo ex æterno tempore. Atqui id creatio­ni non ob&longs;tat: eius enim ratio po&longs;ita e&longs;t in eo quòd &longs;it ex non &longs;ubiecto non autem quòd de nouo exi&longs;tat. Immo &longs;i potuit hoc ex æterno tempore efficere, poterit etiam nunc & fortè multo ma­gis; & quo æternum non æterno difficilius e&longs;t. In productione quoque cuiu&longs;que &longs;ingularis, vt hominis, &longs;emen e&longs;t prius, quàm homo ille: &longs;impliciter tamen homo e&longs;t &longs;emine prior, &longs;icut actus & perfectum priora &longs;unt pote&longs;tate & imperfecto. Itaque generatio hominis vt homo e&longs;t, non eget &longs;emine, cùm &longs;it homo &longs;impliciter &longs;emine prior. Igitur alium modum productionis habe­bit nimirum per creationem. Memini etiam me legi&longs;&longs;e apud quo&longs;dam &longs;criptores hac via con­firmari po&longs;&longs;e creationem: &longs;iquidem hæc quæ natura &longs;unt, alicuius rei gratia fiant à natura: ergo prius aliquam notionem extiti&longs;&longs;e in effectore nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: in hoc igitur rei facienda ratio ex qua res extitêre: quapropter creatio. Hæc quidem ingeniosè excogitata: veruntamen eiu&longs;modi, qu&ecedil; Ari&longs;totelis principijs aduer&longs;entur huic tu rei nunc cau&longs;&longs;as accipe. Nam quantum e&longs;t de prima ratione, videtur in ea committi peccatum à &longs;ecundum quid ad &longs;impliciter. Etenim ex actioni­bus quæ Deo manife&longs;tè tribuuntur (ex ijs enim qu&ecedil; à quoque &longs;ani iudicij facilè dabuntur, no&longs;tram di&longs;ceptationem, quoad licebit, peragemus) aliquæ &longs;unt ip&longs;ius propriæ, vt contemplari &longs;eip&longs;um, nobis enim liquet hoc in nobis ip&longs;is experientibus contemplationem externæ rei nullius egêre: aliæ cum corpore communicantes, vt mouere & ambulare: ac verum quidem e&longs;t actiones pro­prias imitari e&longs;&longs;entiam; de communibus aliter &longs;entiendum e&longs;t. Ex illo igitur quòd aliquæ fun­ctiones &longs;ine corpore exercentur, quæ &longs;anè propriæ &longs;unt; infertur, omnes &longs;ine corpore exerceri po&longs;&longs;e, quanuis &longs;int communes. & ex eo, quòd agit contemplando &longs;ine corpore, concluditur ip­&longs;um pror&longs;us &longs;ine corpore agere quodcunque & &longs;impliciter. onuenientiam igitur, & &longs;imilitudi­nem actionum omnium, quas Deo tribuunt, vel &longs;en&longs;u, vel inductione iudicare oportebat. At­qui non licet. Nec qui&longs;quam Peripateticus aliam Dei propriam actionem cognouit quàm &longs;ui contemplationem. Eodem propemodum vitio &longs;ecunda ratio laborat. Damus enim planè Deum e&longs;&longs;e ens primum, omnium ab&longs;oluti&longs;simum, nullius indigum, & non egêre &longs;ubiecto ad agendum: &longs;ed addimus ad præ&longs;tandum propriam actionem quam dicimus e&longs;&longs;e contemplatio­nem: quòd &longs;i fuerit actio communis, adhuc exquiret phy&longs;icus confirmationem talis a&longs;&longs;umpti quam à &longs;en&longs;u peti po&longs;&longs;e negamus. In tertia verò ratione duo &longs;e&longs;e offerunt &longs;pectanda, quorum primum e&longs;t. Impetrare, vt aliquid &longs;it à Deo Peripateticè, non modo e&longs;t per motum, velut ea, qu&ecedil; generantur a&longs;siduè, qu&ecedil; ex iugi c&ecedil;li conuer&longs;ione producuntur, illam verò Deus &longs;olus præ­&longs;tat: verùm quoque e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e perfectum, quod &longs;cilicet &longs;ine ip&longs;o non exi&longs;tat in actu &longs;ecundo, nec proprio munere fungatur &longs;ine præ&longs;entia Dei; veluti Legatus e&longs;t homo quidem per &longs;e; &longs;ed per eius virtutem, qui legauit, in dignitate con&longs;titutus e&longs;t, & fungitur legatione. Alterum e&longs;t, quod ratio phy&longs;ica conuincit, aliquid e&longs;&longs;e æternum per &longs;e præter Deum O. . Quibus po&longs;itis in ar­gumento duplex vitium latet. &longs;iquidem in argumento vitium illud quod e&longs;t ex ignotis proce­dere committatur a, dum &longs;umitur nihil præter Deum e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;e æternum; &longs;ed omnia vel per motum extiti&longs;&longs;e, vel creationem; idque inter phy&longs;icos &longs;en&longs;um per&longs;equentes & Theologos à lu­mine Diuino illu&longs;tratos e&longs;t maximè controuer&longs;um, accipiunt Theologi nullum e&longs;&longs;e huiu&longs;modi. concluditur à phy&longs;ico tale rerum genus reperiri. Cùm igitur id a&longs;&longs;umant Theologi quod à phy­&longs;ico dubitatur, immò cui concluditur oppo&longs;itum: patet hîc e&longs;&longs;e progre&longs;&longs;um ex ignotis qui mo­dus e&longs;t non probandi propo&longs;itum. Deinde cùm phy&longs;ici probent e&longs;&longs;e tertium genus eorum &longs;ci­licet, quæ cùm &longs;int æterna; pendent tamen à Deo; ine&longs;t in argumento fallacia con&longs;equentis. Etenim negabit phy&longs;icus ille quem nos in hac methodo imitamur. Quicquid e&longs;t à Deo, aut e&longs;&longs;e per motum, aut per creationem. &longs;ed tertium modum adijciet vt puta e&longs;&longs;e formaliter eo, &longs;. po&longs;ito vt hoc &longs;it, non effectiuè. ita cùm diui&longs;ionis membra non omnia fuerint accepta: con&longs;tat nullam e&longs;&longs;e vim argumenti illius hypothetici ex diui&longs;ione con&longs;tructi. Iam verò &longs;i datur id, quod acce­pimus, e&longs;&longs;e aliquod æternum per &longs;e pr&ecedil;ter Deum O. . patet profectò parum po&longs;&longs;e apud reni­tentem id quod ad&longs;cribitur de æterna illa creatione, & quòd eiu&longs;dem immò maioris virtutis e&longs;t ex &ecedil;terno creare, quàm ex initio cuiu&longs;piam temporis. &longs;iquidem ibi &longs;emper exi&longs;tat materia, qu&ecedil; &longs;up­ponatur; nec requiratur vlla mutatio vt &longs;int; cùm per &longs;e exi&longs;tant ab æterno quæ vtraque in noua creatione con&longs;titui nece&longs;&longs;e fuit. Neque aliud certè arguet quod oratio ponatur ab æterno, ni&longs;i quòd ex Deo &longs;int aliqua formaliter, quod non negamus, &longs;ed planè volumus e&longs;&longs;e creationem. In quarta ratione notemus, in omni generatione duo principia requiri, actum &longs;cilicet & pote&longs;tatem, & pote&longs;tas quidem e&longs;t &longs;ingularis, & æqualiter re&longs;piciens e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e. Actus e&longs;t determina­tus & po&longs;itus e&longs;t in e&longs;&longs;e: quapropter æternus e&longs;t per &longs;e. ec, quatenus actus, vnquam generationi redditur obnoxius b. Itaque generatur hic homo qui quidem ex &longs;emine procreatur. omo vt actus æternus e&longs;t. Inde igitur creatio non inferetur: at illud, quod ad extremum propo&longs;uimus; &longs;atis foret iis qui Peripateticè profitentur; &longs;i rationis illius autor &longs;e illa Peripatetica non habere te&longs;tatus e&longs;&longs;et. Verùm quia nihil e&longs;t non Peripateticum, quod ratione, quæ iudicium &longs;en&longs;us non euertat, approbari pote&longs;t; officium quoque Peripatetici videtur e&longs;&longs;e vim explorare rationis illius. Igitur, cùm &longs;umitur ea quæ &longs;unt natura, e&longs;&longs;e alicuius rei gratia; fatemur in iis, quæ fiunt: cum etiam in natura &longs;it id, cuius gratia &longs;int nonnulla. Cùm etiam ponitur eorum quæ &longs;unt alicuius gratia notionem, &longs;eu rationem quandam in effectore antecedere; notionem &longs;anè damus in iis quæ fiunt ab humana voluntate; in iis verò quæ fiunt à natura &longs;olam rationem concedimus, qu&ecedil; adæquet formam: atque illam quidem tribuimus cau&longs;sis efficientibus particularibus, non vni­uer&longs;alibus vt c&ecedil;lo & Deo, cùm illam mentem Ari&longs;totelis fui&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eamus cau&longs;&longs;as vniuer&longs;ales ita &longs;e extuli&longs;&longs;e ab his inferioribus vt illorum gratia nihil agant; nec rationibus oppo&longs;itis aliud in­duci po&longs;&longs;um vt credam, quod &longs;uo loco tractabitur. C&ecedil;terùm detur hoc, ne &longs;imus moro&longs;i nimium. Fateamur item ex ea ratione produci id quod fit, at quòd ex nihilo negamus. Etenim, ex ea ra­tione fit id, quod fit, vt efficiente, vel con&longs;tituente efficiens: at verò id ego dicam ab efficiente produci, &longs;ed ex materia. Quocirca probandum fuit efficiens per talem rationem &longs;ine materia po&longs;&longs;e producere; qu&ecedil; vniuer&longs;a peruicax, & qui &longs;e duci patitur à &longs;en&longs;u & experientiis, quod Phy­&longs;ici faciunt; & inficiabitur, & conuinci non poterit. Hæ non eò dicta &longs;unt à nob. t creationem euerteremus, &longs;ed vt ab Ari&longs;totele & phy&longs;icis haud approbatam fui&longs;&longs;e per&longs;piceres, & agno&longs;ceres altius &longs;e&longs;e extuli&longs;&longs;e no&longs;træ &longs;alutis initia quàm vt à phy&longs;ico. ationibus quæ &longs;en&longs;u niterentur, at­tingi po&longs;&longs;ent; atque vt doceremus id e&longs;&longs;e principium in hac methodo, vnde omnia quæ in hac philo&longs;ophia colligerentur repugnantia veritati, per eius inficiationem liberrimè negarentur, quòd oppo&longs;itum diuino beneficio multò magis e&longs;&longs;et per&longs;picuum: neque iis vllo modo no&longs;tra mens adhære&longs;ceret. Nec me latet, cùm hic nonnulla ex Peripateticorum fontibus hau&longs;ta fui&longs;&longs;e, tùm etiam alia pr&ecedil;termi&longs;&longs;a, quæ &longs;olent in confirmationem eiu&longs;dem theorematis afferri; de quibus phy&longs;ico adhuc plura dicenda forent. os omnia &longs;uo loco declarabimus, eo nunc contenti; quòd ex nihilo nihil fieri, pro principio philo&longs;ophiæ naturalis ab Ari&longs;totele con&longs;titutum fuerit, & ni­hil ex hac philo&longs;ophia depromi po&longs;sit, quod ip&longs;um demoliatur. Tertium effatum naturale pr&ecedil;­cipua naturæ munera quæ cuique &longs;unt euidentia continebit. a quanquam innumerabilia &longs;unt, in decem capita digerentur. Itaque ea quæ fiunt, aut à natura fiunt, aut à nobis, aut ab aliis cau&longs;­&longs;is, vtputa ca&longs;u, & fortuna. A nobis ea quæ fiunt, incertos exitus habent, & à no&longs;tra voluntate profici&longs;centia, quemadmodum facultas e&longs;t mutabilis & incon&longs;tans, ita & ortum & euentum con­&longs;imiles obtinent. Eorum quæ &longs;emper aut frequenter eueniunt, cau&longs;&longs;am nemo, ni&longs;i fortè Em­pedocleus fortunæ ad&longs;crip&longs;erit; vt quòd &longs;emper hyeme pluat; aut quòd &longs;ub cane &longs;it æ&longs;tus: &longs;ed &longs;i pluat, dum &longs;ub cane &longs;ol e&longs;t, aut &longs;i media hyeme nos æ&longs;tus inuadat. Re&longs;tat igitur, vt eorum &longs;it auctor ip&longs;a natura, quæ plurimum &longs;emperúe fiunt eodem modo, & ea &longs;ecundum naturam fieri optimo iure dicentur quæ maxima ex parte fient: hoc e&longs;t in pluribus eiu&longs;dem &longs;peciei &longs;ingularib. & frequentius, aut &longs;emper: naturale enim e&longs;t cane&longs;cere, licet in &longs;enectute contingat, quod om­nis homo ferè, cùm venerit ad &longs;enectutem, cane&longs;cit, & naturalis hyeme pluuia, quia &longs;it frequen­tior in ea tempe&longs;tate, & iis poti&longs;simè natura con&longs;i&longs;tit quæ non &longs;emper &longs;unt; horum enim maxi­ma pars e&longs;t. Itaque Ptolemæus e)/ulogon relinquebat phy&longs;icis, non a)nagkai_on. Sed & illa &longs;unt &longs;ecundum naturam, quæ certis quibu&longs;dam interuallis repetuntur, vt æ&longs;tas & hyems: quo­niam circuitus ille perpetuitatem habeat in tali &longs;ucce&longs;sione po&longs;itam: &longs;emper enim &longs;ui &longs;imilis e&longs;t illa &longs;ucce&longs;sio. Natura quoque &longs;unt eclip&longs;is &longs;olis & lunæ, quæ tamen neque &longs;emper neque fre­quenter exi&longs;tunt. Veruntamen, cum cau&longs;sis illis concurrentibus nece&longs;&longs;ario fiant, cau&longs;&longs;arum ve­rò certus fit reditus, & circuitio & tempe&longs;tates & eclip&longs;is in perpetuis numerari queunt. At verò &longs;i natura e&longs;t eorum cau&longs;&longs;a quæ plurimum &longs;emperúe fiunt: & ea, quæ natura &longs;unt, plurimum &longs;emperúe contingunt. gitur ea quæ non &longs;emper plurimumúe eueniunt, non &longs;unt natura. Atqui violenta &longs;unt naturæ contraria; non ergo plurimum &longs;emperúe contingunt. Etenim &longs;i contraria naturæ plurimum, aut &longs;emper euenirent non e&longs;&longs;et natura de iis qu&ecedil; plurimum, &longs;ed rarò, aut nun­quam exi&longs;tunt; id verò fieri nequit. Nihil etiam fru&longs;tra efficiunt Deus & natura cuius &longs;cilicet non &longs;it aliquod munus, officium, vel v&longs;us, nihil ocio&longs;um, nihil redundans vt calceus ille fru&longs;tra e&longs;&longs;et, quo, cùm non e&longs;&longs;et habilis & aptus ad pedem, vti non po&longs;&longs;em. Natura, inquàm, illa quæ po­&longs;ita e&longs;t in nexu cau&longs;&longs;arum, vis &longs;cilicet per omnia corpora penetrans, & &longs;ine ratione ciens & exci­piens motus in corporibus nece&longs;&longs;arios, & Deus omnium princeps, à quo omnes i&longs;ti motus re­guntur & gubernantur, cur&longs;us a&longs;trorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vici&longs;situdines ordinesque. con&longs;eruantur. Deus igitur & natura nihil fru&longs;tra moliuntur cunctis rebus v&longs;um exhiben­do, quo &longs;eip&longs;a tueantur & in mundi theatrum conferant, & ad hominis v&longs;um præcipuè; quo &longs;anè vinculo mundi partes ad&longs;trictæ, &longs;iquid &longs;eor&longs;um detrimenti capiunt ab externo, vniuer&longs;am tamen naturam quæ &longs;ingula corpora cohibet, labefactare non po&longs;&longs;unt. Proinde vbi vnum &longs;uf­ficiat in&longs;trumentum, a non &longs;olet ip&longs;um natura geminare: neque fortè, &longs;i geminetur; officia natu­ræ minus impediret, & grauitarem afferret quàm mole&longs;tia nos afficiat &longs;extus digitus quem ma­nui natura peccans affinxerit. Itaque vbi commodè id effici potuerit; ad officia complura abu­titur vno eodemque. in&longs;trumento, vt lingua ad gu&longs;tatum, b & locutionem, & ore in habentibus pulmonem ad cibi &longs;umptionem, & re&longs;pirationem. t nihil planè &longs;ine optima ratione feci&longs;&longs;e vi­deatur. Neque verò, quia natura &longs;it vis quæ ratione vtatur, iam enim ratione vti e&longs;t animæ, non naturæ. Natura porrò u)potatikw_s & ex &longs;ua natura & e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ine cognitione agit pro fine con&longs;equendo; & &longs;iquo pacto collocetur e)nlogikai_s dunamesi\n ide&longs;t in facultatibus ratiocinanti­bus, non e&longs;t ideo, quia ratiocinans agat; &longs;ed vel quòd agendo proce&longs;&longs;um rationis imitetur; vel quia nil pror&longs;us efficiat; cuius non optima ratio po&longs;sit afferri quæ petitur à duobus initijs: alte­ro quidem, quod aliter effici non potuerit: atque id à materia ducitur, vt quòd cornigera careant dentibus &longs;uperioribus: neque enim materia, cùm abierit in cornua, &longs;uppetit dentibus, aut quòd ita fieri præ&longs;titerit: hoc verò pendet à fine ex quibus omnis rerum naturalium ordo deriuatur, & cunctorum &longs;en&longs;ilium commen&longs;us conuenienti&longs;simus exi&longs;tit quem generali nomine lo\gon& rationem licet appellare. Quamobrem &longs;ic omnia di&longs;pen&longs;antur in vniuer&longs;o, vt vis illa com­munis & vniuer&longs;alis quæ &longs;cilicet per omnia pertinet, tamet&longs;i tum &longs;uum robur o&longs;tentat atque, vt ita dixerim, &longs;apientiam, cùm animal producere aggreditur: non &longs;ine &longs;ummo iudicio cum pru­dente patre familias ab Ari&longs;totele conferatur. a Vt enim ille nihil amittit ex quo facere aliquid commodi po&longs;sit, & ita di&longs;pen&longs;at in cura rei familiaris, vt optimus cibus liberis præbeatur, dete­rior &longs;eruis, omnium pe&longs;simus &longs;ociis animalibus, &longs;ic in ortu ip&longs;o natura ex materia &longs;ynceri&longs;sima carnem & aliorum &longs;en&longs;uum corpora conficit: in excrementis o&longs;&longs;a, pilos & reliqua generis eiu&longs;­dem con&longs;tituit. Ab his tu de c&ecedil;teris iudicium facito. Nil igitur in natura, quin illius v&longs;us, aut vnus, aut plures indicari po&longs;sint quo, &longs;i careat, aliter habendum non erit, quam manus mortua, &longs;ine lapidea quæ &longs;olo nomine &longs;unt manus, ratione verò non item. Nam cuncta officio, & pote­&longs;tate definiuntur, b quibus &longs;i priuentur, iam non amplius eadem reputanda, &longs;ed ambiguè. Quan­quam vnum rei vnius v&longs;um pro natura expectare oportet qui quidem &longs;it præcipuus. Sic enim optimè in&longs;trumenta proficiunt, &longs;i eorum &longs;ingula non multis officiis, &longs;ed vni de&longs;eruiant. Neque tale quippiam natura facit, vt fabri ferrarij propter inopiam & penixw_s, ide&longs;t more pauperum gladium delphicum. c quo & ad &longs;acra peragenda victimasque. &longs;ecandas & ad c&ecedil;dendos &longs;onteis vterentur. ec vt illi qui propter frugalitatem veru fabricabant, quo item lucerna figeretur: ex quo dicebatur o)beliskolu/xnion d nomine &longs;cilicet, vtrunque &longs;ignificante officium. Atque arti quidem materia deficere pote&longs;t; natura copiis omnibus affluit & abundat: itaque vnam rem vni muneri delegat; & &longs;iqui alij v&longs;us o&longs;tendantur, huic vni quodam modo &longs;eruiunt, vt aliàs o&longs;ten­demus. Cùm verò nonnunquam eueniat, vt plura quidem officia, veruntamen non &longs;e&longs;e vici&longs;­&longs;im re&longs;picientia pr&ecedil;&longs;to &longs;int; quid enim gu&longs;tui cum locutione, aut re&longs;pirationi cum alimento? &longs;ic natura rebus omnibus prudenti&longs;simè con&longs;uluit quæ propter melius ita effecerit: id verò &longs;ic con­tingit, quòd vnum præ&longs;tat officium, quia nece&longs;&longs;arium &longs;it; alterum commoditatis ergò &longs;ubiungit. Nece&longs;&longs;arius enim fuerat gu&longs;tatus: quippe quòd animal &longs;u&longs;tineri non po&longs;&longs;et, ni&longs;i aleretur, alimen­ti verò &longs;en&longs;us e&longs;t gu&longs;tus qui quidem in perfectis perfectus e&longs;&longs;e perhibetur, & imperfectus in im­perfectis. s item nece&longs;&longs;arium, vt eo &longs;umatur alimentum. &longs;ed ita fabricatus e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;us ille, vt non alio in&longs;trumento, aut loco natura locutioni melius prouidere potuerit. Sic etiam po&longs;tquàm ore cibus erat capiendus, indè quoque perbellè valuit &longs;ubuenire calori &longs;piratum efficiens per quem exhalare po&longs;&longs;et, ne copia &longs;uffocatus extingueretur, & animal enecaret. Neque hic talpæ oculos, aut muli genitalia commemorare oportet, quorum nullus &longs;it v&longs;us in rerum natura. &longs;unt enim hæc orbata & imperfecta, quòd efficientium progre&longs;&longs;us impediuntur &longs;uperante materia. t ta­met&longs;i efficientia &longs;ummum conficere &longs;tudent; ex hac materia non aliud po&longs;sint efficere, neque rem vlterius promouere: non &longs;ecus àc &longs;i optimus pi&longs;tor panem candidi&longs;simum ex hordeo, &longs;icut è tritico vellet interere. Neque enim ad eum candorem &longs;e perduci hordei materia pateretur. quanuis &longs;u&longs;picandum non &longs;it, naturam rei potiori con&longs;ului&longs;&longs;e quam tamen, &longs;i pr&ecedil;&longs;tare voluerit, illud mali perpetuo &longs;it affixum, vt &longs;i cui legislatori ciuitatem ex opulentis con&longs;tituere libeat, ade­runt nece&longs;&longs;ario pauperes, qui diuitum erunt a&longs;&longs;eclæ e. Multi enim &longs;unt, qui diuitum ope indi­ geant. Vnde illud e&longs;t Simonidis poëtæ dictum de &longs;apientibus & diuitibus. Nam cum Hieronis Syracu&longs;arum regis vxor, aliquando rogaret Simonidem, vtrum melius e&longs;&longs;et fieri &longs;apientem, an diuitem? ille re&longs;pondit è ve&longs;tigio, fieri diuitem. uoniam viri &longs;apientes diuitum domos frequen­tarent, & ab iis nece&longs;&longs;aria ad humanum victum petere cogerentur. Facit igitur ea natura, &longs;eu vi­detur potius facere fru&longs;trà; quoniam, vt faceret id, quod in eo genere optimum foret, parum hoc mali admittere coacta e&longs;t. Atque id quidem rarò contingit, vt in tanta mole non videatur e&longs;&longs;e curandum. Neque hoc ip&longs;um etiam præter naturam &longs;impliciter, quippe quòd ex materiæ ne­ce&longs;sitate proueniat. Nil igitur fru&longs;tra natura & Deus efficiunt. Ex eo quoque fonte dimanat, quòd nihil idem per &longs;e e&longs;&longs;e, & ab alio fieri queat; quo pronuntiato v&longs;us e&longs;t Ari&longs;toteles 1. de An. idque generatim &longs;ump&longs;it; &longs;iue ab aliquo, vt ab efficiente, &longs;iue vt à fine penderet: nam quid opus e&longs;t, vt quod ex &longs;e habet, ab alio mendicetur? præterquàm quòd eueniret, vt contradicentia con­&longs;i&longs;terent: &longs;iquidem: quatenus ex &longs;e iam haberet; quatenus ex alio; deficeret. Verùm neque etiam f deficere Deus & natura &longs;olent in nece&longs;&longs;ariis. c &longs;iquando hoc eueniat, id incerto quodam ca&longs;u fit, quo materia quidem contumax e&longs;t; nec ritè eam tractantibus obedit: verùm, quia non pen­det ex nece&longs;sitate materiæ, non perpetuum e&longs;t, velut illa quæ de talpa & mulo pronunciauimus; &longs;ed infinitum, vt quòd &longs;ine digitis homo oriatur. H&ecedil;c verò &longs;unt præter naturam &longs;impliciter, & ad mon&longs;tra referuntur. Neque verò illud mon&longs;trum e&longs;t, quòd mulus non propaget, & talpa non cernat. &longs;emper enim &longs;ic euenit, aut plurimum; & &longs;ecundum naturam igitur. Sed quòd hic &longs;ine oculis, aut digitis oriatur, infrequens e&longs;t: itaque præter naturam. C&ecedil;terùm de hi&longs;ce differentiis pluribus po&longs;teà di&longs;&longs;eretur. At verò &longs;i non abundat natura, neque deficit; certè complebit om­nia quæcunque aggredietur, vt omnibus &longs;uis numeris & partibus ab&longs;oluta &longs;int quæ quidem pro cuiu&longs;que rei ratione de&longs;iderantur. Nil igitur erit in natura (ni&longs;i quæ vis ib&longs;titit) imperfectum; quando ad extremum &longs;ui motus natura peruenerit. Neque &longs;olùm; quia naturæ mouentis offi­cia non amplius flagiter: verùm etiam, quod in eo genere &longs;ummum &longs;it & extremum quo natura queat a&longs;pirare. Et verò vt negari non pote&longs;t, in omni rerum in&longs;titutione e&longs;&longs;e aliquid extremum, atque perfectum, pictura enim & fabrica c&ecedil;ter&ecedil;que. artes habent quendam ab&longs;oluti operis effectum: &longs;ic in vite & homine dandum e&longs;t naturam &longs;uo quodam itinere peruenire ad extremum quod in eo genere &longs;it præ&longs;tanti&longs;simum, atque illud e&longs;t, vt &longs;uo quæque res munere fungatur, veluti quòd plantæ fructum ferant, & animalia con&longs;imile generare po&longs;sint. Quocirca neque etiam videtur aggredi id quod &longs;e adepturam non &longs;perat, cùm perpetuò contendat in finem, quo impo&longs;ito tum res ab&longs;oluta e&longs;t: hic &longs;i tollatur, iam non habebit natura quo properet. cquid igitur cau&longs;&longs;æ, cur mouere incipiat? &longs;emper enim malè habebit & fru&longs;tra laborabit. ræ&longs;tat ergo quie&longs;cere. Verun­tamen, cùm ex artibus aliquæ naturam imitentur, vt pictura, nonnullæ &longs;uppleant & perficiant ea, qu&ecedil; natura non pote&longs;t, vt chirurgica, neque enim natura pote&longs;t os luxatum componere; &longs;ic h(texunin agricultura u(phetei_ th_|fu/sei, vt in&longs;itione & &longs;tercoratione a non igitur (dicet qui&longs;piam.) natura cuncta perficiet, quæ natura exi&longs;tunt. Ni&longs;i dicamus artem &longs;ic perficere ea, quæ &longs;unt na­tura, quatenus &longs;ine illius ope natura non po&longs;&longs;et opera &longs;ua pr&ecedil;&longs;tare; qua&longs;i ars in operis partem ac­cipiatur, quandò non &longs;ubmini&longs;trat ars agendi patiendiúe facultatem rebus naturalibus: &longs;ed ap­plicat agentia ad patientia, & è medio tollit impedimenta. is expeditis, natura tum per &longs;e ip­&longs;am operatur, vt o&longs;&longs;a conglutinat. Itaque medicina aliæque. artes naturæ mini&longs;træ dicuntur. Quinimmo, &longs;i rem ip&longs;am diligentius ob&longs;erues, natura perficit ea quæ fiunt ab arte. b Ecce &longs;erit agricola, is vere pluuiam exoptat qu&ecedil; promoueat &longs;egetes, & &longs;olem, qui &ecedil;&longs;tate maturet; atque ita &longs;ementem accommodat ad anni tempe&longs;tates, vt cum frugum profectu congruant. Aedificator etiam fa&longs;tigium conficit fornicatum, quia lapides nutu pondereque. proprio pr&ecedil;grauantes, conten­dendo ad centrum, & &longs;e&longs;e vici&longs;sim comprimendo, redduntur immobiles. Itaque iam hic ars perfectis vtitur; &longs;ed quoniam aptat ad v&longs;us humanos; etiam perficere perhibetur. Ergo &longs;impli­citer perfectio profici&longs;citur à natura quam ita per&longs;equitur, vt ab eo progre&longs;&longs;u ne digito quidem recedat. Itaque ars etiam naturæ motibus ob&longs;equitur & hunc illi opponit, vt vim naturæ &longs;upe­rantis reprimens c varios & multiplices v&longs;us exhibere po&longs;sit. At verò perfectionem præ&longs;tat na­tura, quòd vnaquæque res naturalis &longs;ic agit; quia &longs;ic natura comparata e&longs;t. Et (ni pror&longs;us fallor) aliter &longs;e res habet atque in c&ecedil;teris, quorum v&longs;us aliquis e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olet. Siquidem alia &longs;unt huiu&longs;mo­di, vt ijs vtamur; at nos i&longs;tis vtimur quia &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi: exempli gratia, &longs;ic frenum e&longs;t compa­ratum, vt eques illo vtatur. t id fabricatur ex ferro, quia ferrum tale e&longs;t, vt eo po&longs;sit vti in illo officio pr&ecedil;&longs;tando. Quapropter opinor in iis qu&ecedil; &longs;truuntur, vt cæteris v&longs;ui &longs;int, quarum artium v&longs;us e&longs;t proprius, eas e&longs;&longs;e præferendas: &longs;ic in cæteris vbi v&longs;us &longs;it, quia &longs;int huiu&longs;modi rem aliter &longs;e habere puto, nimirum cedere illam, quæ vtatur. ut ita di&longs;tingueres ex v&longs;u fieri bonas; aut quòd iis vtamur; quia bonæ &longs;unt eæ quidem vtente &longs;unt imperfectiores, has etiam antecellere vtenti non inconuenit. Ita &longs;it, vt naturam &longs;emper arti pr&ecedil;ponam; aut &longs;iquid &longs;uperioris agno&longs;cam in v&longs;u rerum naturalium, id ego hominem faciam, qui & ip&longs;e e&longs;t præ&longs;tanti&longs;sima natura, cui om­nia quodammodo nata e&longs;&longs;e docent philo&longs;ophi d de qua re aliàs. Sed redeamus ad naturam. Ea &longs;anè quemadmodum antè monuimus, eundem tenorem perpetuò &longs;eruat, quippe quæ &longs;implex &longs;it, nec varios v&longs;us re&longs;piciat, &longs;ed id &longs;olummodo, quod &longs;uum ip&longs;ius proprium e&longs;t. Itaque &longs;em­per ignis a&longs;cendit, & vbi in &longs;uperiorem locum peruenerit, ibi quoque manet &longs;uapte natura: ter­ra item de&longs;cendit ad centrum in quo perpetuò quie&longs;ceret, ni&longs;i ob&longs;tatet cau&longs;&longs;a violans. c &longs;i &longs;ecus eueniat, externa aliqua cau&longs;&longs;a pote&longs;t a&longs;signari varietatis illius, neque enim id iam amplius e&longs;t pro­ratione naturæ, vt &longs;i terra maneat in loco &longs;uperiore, aut è loco &longs;uo moueatur: & cau&longs;&longs;a reddi pote&longs;t, cur de&longs;cendat nunc, mox autem quie&longs;cat. llud enim e&longs;t naturæ imperfectæ, qu&ecedil; ad per­fectionem tendit, hoc iam eius qu&ecedil; perfectionem &longs;uam con&longs;ecuta fuerit. Semper ergo &longs;ui &longs;imi­lis e&longs;t ip&longs;a natura, vt etiam de con&longs;imilibus idem iudicium non ab&longs;urdè fiat, aut item afferenda ratio, cur ordo ille fuerit immutatus; vt puta &longs;i ratio per&longs;uadet ex a&longs;tris vnum e&longs;&longs;e rotundum, idem quoque iudicium de c&ecedil;teris ferre oportebit, aut di&longs;criminis ratio reddenda. Sic cùm commune &longs;it compluribus animalibus habere cor, & in quibu&longs;dam, vt in auibus ob&longs;eruemus, ip&longs;um primò produci eodem modo de c&ecedil;teris iudicabimus: ni&longs;i cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;uccurrat, cur in re con&longs;imili diuer&longs;um in&longs;titutum natura tenuerit. c ni&longs;i ratio &longs;ubueniat pertinacis omnino animi &longs;it id quod con&longs;tat in &longs;imili, non approbare. Ex quo efficitur, vt nonnunquam &longs;ic argumentatus fuerit Ari&longs;toteles. Id ita euenit in hoc. Et in omnibus igitur. a Quia natura &longs;implex e&longs;t & vniformis, neque vites &longs;uas remittit, ni&longs;i à contrariis affligatur; neque habet in &longs;e principium quoddam, &longs;eu facultatem cuius ope nunc aliquid accipiat, re&longs;puat aliàs; neque cur id magis nunc quàm mox expetat. cuiu&longs;modi in homine reperitur quam voluntatem dicimus. dcirco &longs;emper nititur in &longs;ummum quod pote&longs;t. Et cùm ea &longs;it contrariorum vis, vt &longs;e&longs;e vici&longs;sim retundant; probabile quoque e&longs;t ip&longs;am plus ab initio valere quàm in progre&longs;&longs;u; nihilominus, quia principio materia repugnat & plagas quæ ab efficiente infliguntur, fortiter repellit; neque facilè induci pote&longs;t vt de&longs;erat il­lam formam, qua cum diutius con&longs;ueuit; minor e&longs;t ab initio progre&longs;&longs;us. At verò cùm materia bonum illud, quod ab efficiente obiicitur, c&ecedil;perit degu&longs;tare, libenter etiam cedit imperanti, & qua&longs;i vires addens efficienti, magis proficit. (&longs;emper enim bene mobilior ad virtutem fit etiam quodcunque incrementum &longs;ump&longs;erit à principio) b ac &longs;i demum contrario dominetur efficiens ad illum perfectionis gradum promouet, quem, vel in &longs;e habet, &longs;ibi &longs;imile in &longs;pecie producens, &longs;i fuerit vniuocum; (quicquid enim deficit, materiæ prohibentisque. vitio tribuendum) vel con­tinet virtute, & modo quodam præ&longs;tantiore quàm &longs;i actu po&longs;sideret tantum eo tempore confe­rens, quantum materia pote&longs;t accipere. Nanque & id &longs;en&longs;us o&longs;tendit e&longs;&longs;e duo cau&longs;&longs;arum gene­ra, quorum vnum &longs;it vniuocum, vt cùm homo hominem gignit, alterum verò quod ab Ari&longs;to­tele nominatur actus, &longs;iue perfectio; &longs;iquidem vibex à baculo non &longs;ibi &longs;imili producatur. un­quam prouehit vlterius: ni&longs;i fortè habilitas materiæ tanta fuerit, vt paullo momento po&longs;sit im­pelli. Nam facilius e&longs;t voluere globum quàm cubum. Itaque nihil agit vltra gradum &longs;uum; efficiens quidem vniuocum nihilo plus contribuens quàm in &longs;e habeat; materia verò non acci­piens, ni&longs;i id quod ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tinere pote&longs;t, vbi efficiens &longs;it diuer&longs;um. c &longs;iquando &longs;ecus appareat. cauendum e&longs;t ne forte &longs;it accidens: nanque album per accidens efficit animal, neúe etiam in&longs;tru­mentum; huius verò proprium e&longs;t, vt alterius virtute munitum moueat. taque illius beneficio plus multo pote&longs;t quàm per &longs;e ip&longs;um valeret. ut ne id propen&longs;ioni materiæ &longs;it ad&longs;cribendum: quia &longs;æpe &longs;it vt ip&longs;a per &longs;e moueatur eodem modo, quo ab efficiente moueretur. c ideoque. paullo momento plurimum impellitur. Proinde monebat Galenus d nonnulla exiguum con&longs;ecuta momentum maximos progre&longs;&longs;us interdum facere. uare et&longs;i vera propo&longs;itio; propter id quod na&longs;citur ex euento, facta dubia probationem aliquam po&longs;tulare vi&longs;a e&longs;t: itaque &longs;ic confirmari potuit. um quòd eius oppo&longs;itum tollit aliud principium quod e&longs;t euidenti&longs;simum. omnes enim fatentur vniuer&longs;a ex Deo e&longs;&longs;e, eumque. e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am omnium perfecti&longs;simam. tqui non valeret, ex ip&longs;o &longs;unt omnia, ergo e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;a perfecti&longs;sima, nam dicet quanuis dicere po&longs;&longs;et aliquis, id quod e&longs;t perfectius, ab eo produci, quod e&longs;t imperfectius, tum item &longs;i effectus quàm cau&longs;&longs;a perfectior e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;et: diuidamus cogitatione effectum in duo, nempe in id quo &longs;ecundum perfectionem adæquat &longs;uam cau&longs;&longs;am, & in id quod exuperat: quæro vnde'nam habeat effectus ille exuperantiam, non ex &longs;e: quia quicquid e&longs;t in effectu, habet cau&longs;&longs;am, non à cau&longs;sis: quia nihil dat, quod non habet actu, &longs;eu virtute, Quòd &longs;iquando par fuerit, aut propemodum vtriu&longs;que contrarij robur & agen­tis & patientis, in tertium vtraque &longs;imul degenerant. Omnis verò efficientis promotio &longs;en&longs;im paullatimque. fit, vt non appareat vllo vnquàm tempore naturam ab extremo ad extremum facere mutationem, ni&longs;i per certa & conuenientia media feratur. Nam &longs;icuti bonus grammaticus ac­cipiens puerum informandum prius vocem componere docet; deinde mon&longs;trat vocum notas; tum in&longs;tituit ad orationem &longs;truendam, ad extremum tradit præcepta ornatè loquendi: &longs;ic natu­ra per debitos apparatus ab imo ad &longs;ummum procedit. Neque tantum ordinatus i&longs;te progre&longs;­&longs;us in rebus producendis ob&longs;eruatur; verùm &longs;i ordinem quoque rerum &longs;pectes, ab imo quod e&longs;t propemodum nihil, ad &longs;ummum per interualla conuenientia procedit. C&ecedil;terùm de hoc aliàs. Nunc illud &longs;peculemur, quemadmodum natura efficiendo media tran&longs;eat. Id autem accipien­dum nobis e&longs;t, cùm in habentibus intentionem & remi&longs;sionem, tùm in omnibus aliis mutationi­bus per &longs;e, quæ &longs;cilicet non pendent ex alia mutatione, etenim ex eo dexter cùm ego tibi &longs;im, fio &longs;ini&longs;ter; non &longs;anè, quia muter; &longs;ed quòd tu ip&longs;e moueris: at verò albus fio, aliquid ip&longs;e accipiens, & in me ip&longs;o facta perturbatione. e De his ergo mutationibus loquor. In omnibus autem acci­pio per hæc tempora, quod pluribus po&longs;teà perpendetur, ine&longs;&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;ario quædam media, &longs;eu gradus quo&longs;dam, &longs;eu materiæ proce&longs;&longs;us & pote&longs;tatis, quibus ab imo & non ente ad &longs;ummum & oppo&longs;itum perducatur, vt cùm à primo gradu ad octauum albedo &longs;it prouehenda, natura à pri­mo ad &longs;ecundum, mox ad tertium, & &longs;ic ordinatè procedendo producit albedinem. H&ecedil;c quidem media &longs;unt, quæ vocat Ari&longs;toteles. f ita definiens. In quod prius aptum natura e&longs;t perue­nire id quod mutatur, quàm in quod vltimum mutatur, &longs;ecundum naturam continuè mutatio­nem patiens, vbi mutatio vult e&longs;&longs;e continua, non intermi&longs;&longs;a; &longs;iquidem, vbi intermittatur, illud momentum, in quo mutatio ce&longs;&longs;at, iam extremum e&longs;t, quo res iam mutata e&longs;t & exi&longs;tit, non am­plius mutatur. c &longs;iquid ip&longs;i re&longs;pondeat, quod &longs;it &longs;ecundum naturam, ide&longs;t forma: &longs;in minus; e&longs;t quiddam imperfectum. uamquàm de hoc po&longs;tea tractabitur. & cùm hoc inter, &longs;it, dum &longs;it motus, iam liquet ip&longs;um non pertinere ad formam & actum, &longs;ed ad pote&longs;tatem & materiam. Quapropter non e&longs;t cur expectes media, &longs;icut viride & rufum; nam &longs;unt h&ecedil;c aliquid actus; nec omnino ea media, quæ formæ dicuntur; &longs;ed media, quæ &longs;unt pote&longs;tatis & materiæ, qu&ecedil; dicuntur tran&longs;itus. Itaque cùm in omni motu &longs;it aliqua pote&longs;tas, cuius actus quidam imperfectus e&longs;t motus: planum e&longs;t, quòd in omni motu &longs;eu mutatione per &longs;e tale medium intercedit. Id omne percurren­dum e&longs;t, nec quicquam pr&ecedil;tereundum, modo ea &longs;e deinceps &longs;uaptè natura con&longs;equantur. eoque. modo à pote&longs;tate ad actum totis viribus natura contendit. Hinc efficitur, vt ea quæ origine ante­cedunt, &longs;int imperfectiora, & ea demum po&longs;tremò loco natura perficiat quorum productio diffi­cilior & v&longs;us maior. ùm enim eiu&longs;modi &longs;int, multa flagitant ex quibus &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tant. Mitto hîc ea quæ &longs;unt origine quidem priora; &longs;ed eius ingenij, vt ab illis c&ecedil;tera, tanquam à cau&longs;&longs;a principe pen­deant, vel vt i de cordis ortu Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententia fertur. Atqui & hæc item pluribus aliàs, à pro­po&longs;ito ne di&longs;cedamus. Atque ea quidem, quæ natura producit, ita procedunt, vt perficiatur im­perfectum paullatim proficiens, donec ad &longs;ummum peruenerit. At verò &longs;ic ea quæ intercedunt, connexa &longs;unt, vt po&longs;terius &longs;ine po&longs; non exi&longs;tat, quemadmodum paries &longs;ine fundamentis. ceterum & illa omnia quæ antecedunt, ita &longs;e re&longs;piciunt, vt proximè antecedens &longs;it gratia con&longs;equentis. & vniuer&longs;a &longs;imul, eius gratia quod omnium extremum e&longs;t. Nanque omnia quæ &longs;trùit & molitur &ecedil;di­ficator, &longs;unt gratia domus: &longs;ed parietes gratia tecti, fundamenta gratia parietum. Itaque priora natura &longs;unt dupliciter, vel origine, vel perfectione ex quibus ille ordo na&longs;citur, qui à natura non &longs;ecus &longs;eparari nequit, quàm lumen à Sole. Ex illo enim vinculo quo colligatæ &longs;unt res naturales, id na&longs;citur vt hoc ex hoc ita pendeat, vt nec ex alio pendêre po&longs;sit, nec aliud ex illo. Etenim, &longs;i fa­&longs;tigium imponendum e&longs;t, nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t parietes extruantur: & ob id extruuntur parietes, vt imponi queat, nec &longs;ine parietibus extaret fa&longs;tigium: neque item erigeret parietes ædificator, ni&longs;i vellet iis ip&longs;um imponi. Atque ita rata &longs;unt tempora & vices quibus i&longs;tiu&longs;modi opera à natura admini­&longs;trantur, vt ni&longs;i quid violens ob&longs;tet, eundem &longs;emper &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;um atque exitum qu&ecedil;que res habitu­ra videatur. Ea tibi tempora præfinita, quibus embryon in vtero formatur & exit in luminis oras atque aliud maris, aliud f&ecedil;min&ecedil;. vides ætatum progre&longs;&longs;us inuariabiles. on&longs;picis etiam &longs;ucce&longs;siones tempe&longs;tatum &longs;umma con&longs;tantia gubernatas quæ cùm à certo naturæ principe regantur, varietatem illam &ecedil;quabilem in mundo inferiore progignunt. Me nunc rerum vici&longs;situdines; conuerte te ad rerum gradus contemplandos, ita di&longs;po&longs;ita &longs;anè &longs;unt vniuer&longs;i membra, vt quo altius &longs;e &longs;u&longs;tulerunt, eo quoque pr&ecedil;&longs;tantiora &longs;int. ciem intende in ea omnia ex quibus vniuer&longs;a rerum e&longs;&longs;entia coale­&longs;cit; &longs;ic à &longs;ummo ad ima naturam progredi per&longs;picies, vt paruo quodam interuallo &longs;ingulæ natur&ecedil; di&longs;cretæ, vniuer&longs;am e&longs;&longs;entiæ latitudinem compleant, nihil inane relinquant, nullam intercapedinem faciant, & &longs;ingula &longs;uis partibus & numeris ab&longs;oluta &longs;unt, & &longs;uis quæque locis officiisque. di&longs;pen&longs;a­ta, vt æqui&longs;simè naturam in&longs;ti&longs;simam venerabilis ille &longs;enex appellarit. a Nam &longs;i pro merito cuique pro&longs;picere ac di&longs;tribuere in&longs;titiæ officium e&longs;t; cùm id optimè natura præ&longs;titerit, iure in&longs;ti&longs;sima per­hiberi pote&longs;t, & tanquam legislator ille cui leges à Deo dictatæ fuerint, ordine admirabili cuncta di&longs;ponens & cuique &longs;uum tribuens, &longs;eruat illud iu&longs;titiæ genus, quod di&longs;tributiuum vocant: &longs;ic de natura ip&longs;a confitendum e&longs;t. Quocirca & ip&longs;a e&longs;t vera rerum ratio, b hoc e&longs;t verus ordinis auctor & quicquid pr&ecedil;ter rationem i&longs;tam exi&longs;tit, e&longs;t omnino pr&ecedil;ter naturam. Itaque infinitum, quia po­&longs;itum e&longs;t extra omnem rationem, ab ip&longs;a natura non recipitur. rdo enim cuiu&longs;que proprius e&longs;t natura &longs;en&longs;ilium qui citra rationem non con&longs;i&longs;tit, in infinito verò ratio nulla, neque ad &longs;eip&longs;um, neque ad aliud. Ita enim qu&ecedil;que res in natura &longs;e habet, vt pro illa ratione <04>ducatur, qu&ecedil; con&longs;tat iis numeris, de quibus explicatum e&longs;t nuper, & qui aut &longs;emper, aut plurimum ob&longs;eruantur. &ecedil;c autem po&longs;ita e&longs;t in ratione materi&ecedil; ad formam & finem, ex quib. &longs;en&longs;ilia conflata &longs;unt. taque ordo, non natura qu&ecedil; motus initium e&longs;t, &longs;ed natura .i. atio &longs;tatuetur, quinto natur&ecedil; &longs;ignificato, de quo alibi dicetur. Ni&longs;i etiam tu habitudinem materi&ecedil; ad formam e&longs;&longs;e velis cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;entialem productionis rerum naturalium, quod po­&longs;tea di&longs;putandum e&longs;t. Nam &longs;i ita naturam &longs;ump&longs;eris, facilè concedemus, ordinem e&longs;&longs;e naturam .i. princi­pium originis: quippe qui complectatur vtra&longs;que cau&longs;&longs;as, ex quib. er &longs;e exi&longs;tit compo&longs;itum. qunocunque ordo proprius e&longs;t natura rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium, quo illa qu&ecedil; carent, pr&ecedil;ter naturam habenda erunt, ea verò &longs;unt, qu&ecedil; rarò eueniunt, & incertos exitus in&longs;uper obtinent. Vbi ordo, ibi primum quidpiam; vbi pri­mum, ibi quoque vnum. Proinde cum ordo &longs;it maximè naturalis, videtur nece&longs;&longs;ariò con&longs;equi naturam ni&longs;i &longs;emper in vnum, contendere in finem & abhorrere ab infinito c ita vt quantum æternitatem exquirit, tmm quoque re&longs;puat infinitum. Nam quod &ecedil;ternum e&longs;t, totum &longs;imul exi&longs;tit, &longs;emper &longs;uo fine potitur, à qui­bus infinitum longi&longs;simè abe&longs;t, particulatim exoriens & nunquam ad finem perueniens. Et cum duobus principiis vniuer&longs;a rerum natura contineatur, actu nimirum & pote&longs;tate, è quib. ctus vnus e&longs;t & vno videlicet e&longs;&longs;e terminatur; pote&longs;tas, ni&longs;i &longs;umatur ambiguè, ea verò e&longs;t, quæ conuenit cum actu, vt euenit in æternis, in quibus idem &longs;unt e&longs;&longs;e & po&longs;&longs;e: pote&longs;tas, inquàm, re&longs;picit oppo&longs;ita, nihilo &longs;ecius ita re&longs;picit oppo&longs;ita pote&longs;tas, vt ex iis vnum poti&longs;simè &longs;pectet, alterum vel propter illud, vel etiam per accidens veluti pote&longs;tas ine&longs;t in materia ad e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e: &longs;ed planè materia appetit e&longs;&longs;e, non e&longs;&longs;e autem &longs;ic appetit, vt illud quod expetit, e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit. Neque verò re perturbet, quòd Ari&longs;toteles vno determinarit pote&longs;tates rationis exortes, & ob id ab iis &longs;egregarit, quæ ratione participant. &longs;iquidem pote&longs;tates rationis exortes &longs;int, vel actuo&longs;æ, vel patibiles: atque actuo&longs;os quidem vno determinantur; nos autem de patibilibus in pr&ecedil;&longs;entia di&longs;putamus: ill&ecedil; quidem vnum re&longs;piciunt: at no&longs;tra pote&longs;tas accipit oppo&longs;ita vici&longs;sim. Cùm verò materia &longs;it partibilis & quo­dammodo præ&longs;eferat infinitatem quæ di&longs;per&longs;a in vnum à forma colligitur. dcirco tendere ad vnum erit formam ver&longs;us progredi, & contra regredi ad materiam idem erit, ac per&longs;equi infini­tum. Si ergo natura declinat infinitum & ad vnum propen&longs;a e&longs;t; planum quod tendere ad for­mam pror&longs;us erit naturale; progredi ad materiam non naturale cen&longs;ebitur, aut &longs;altem non na­turale &longs;impliciter & &longs;ic in melius tendet, & in ip&longs;um perpetuò collimabit, vt quoad eius fieri po­te&longs;t, præ&longs;tet id quod melius e&longs;t a ex iis quæcunque rerum &longs;tatui contingunt, ni&longs;i aliter efficere cogatur ex nece&longs;sitate materiæ. &longs;iquidem rubiginem inferro nolit efficere; &longs;ed ferrum ex tali ten­peramento con&longs;tat, vt ip&longs;um rubigo nece&longs;&longs;ariò con&longs;equatur. Atque hic melioris &longs;copus &longs;ic po­te&longs;t apud naturam, vt etiam rebus ad aliud in&longs;titutis ad aliquod bonum fine mque. abutatur, vt cum in animali nece&longs;&longs;e &longs;it e&longs;&longs;e aliquos meatus, vnde redundantiæ repurgentur, ei&longs;dem quoque natu­ra melioris finisque. gratia, nimirum propagationis, vt alterum tale producatur, quale ip&longs;um e&longs;t, abu&longs;a &longs;it. At verò ea quæ pote&longs;t exhibere natura, vel æterna &longs;unt, vel caduca, quæ &longs;anè plu&longs;quam &longs;pecie &longs;eparantur. æc vt natura di&longs;iuncta &longs;unt; &longs;ic varijs &longs;unt obnoxia legibus, id enim quod in æternis effici pote&longs;t æternum e&longs;t: quod verò in caducis ex iis &longs;&ecedil;pe exi&longs;tit, quæ varietatem reci­piunt; eodemque. diuino in&longs;tinctu concitata natura, rem minorem maiori potiorique. accommodat, non contrà maiorem nobiliorenque. minori. & id quod inferius e&longs;t, vult in&longs;eruire &longs;uperiori, & cuique. recta ratione vtenti, &longs;ua parat in&longs;trumenta; nec prius in&longs;trumenta fabricatur quam de vten­te cogitauerit. Nam &longs;icuti rectius tibia mu&longs;ico præbetur quàm tibiam po&longs;sidenti, peritia tibias inflandi: &longs;ic etiam natura facit. Itaque non immeritò reprehenditur Anaxagoras qui rationem allaturus, cur homo omnium e&longs;&longs;et animalium prudenti&longs;simus, eam exponebat quòd manus ha­beret. c rectè quidem, &longs;i rationem, vt &longs;ignum exquirebat: &longs;ed &longs;i veras cau&longs;&longs;as quæ&longs;tionis indaga­bat; recta ratio po&longs;tulat, vt idcirco fateamur homini datas e&longs;&longs;e manus, quia &longs;it animal prudenti&longs;­simum. b Atque ita melius e&longs;t. Semper igitur deterius gratia melioris: idque. ita generale, vt per artes & naturam &ecedil;què pertineat. Itaque &longs;apientes pacis cau&longs;&longs;a bellum gerunt; c laborem &longs;pe otij &longs;u&longs;tentant. Sed requirat hoc loco qui&longs;piam, &longs;it ne cau&longs;&longs;a hoc quod dicimus e&longs;&longs;e melius; an po­tius effectus, & cum cau&longs;&longs;a ponatur. uod nam cau&longs;&longs;æ genus &longs;it; & quemadmodum cau&longs;&longs;æ offi­cio fungatur. Et planè inficiari non licet, hoc ab Ari&longs;totele inter cau&longs;&longs;arum genera recen&longs;eri: in­quit enim &longs;e habere quàm pote&longs;t optimè cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;e. d eamque. tam pr&ecedil;cipuam exi&longs;tima&longs;&longs;e vide­tur, vt nece&longs;&longs;e &longs;it, &longs;i melius hoc modo foret: ita quoque &longs;e habere naturam: qua&longs;i nulla prior cau&longs;&longs;a afferri queat: ideo iure optimo non &longs;eiungetur à fine, hanc enim omnium cau&longs;&longs;am poti&longs;si­mam ponit vnu&longs;qui&longs;que artifex, &longs;ed præcipue naturalis. Ita verò &longs;e habet vt finis. Nam cùm &longs;it in vniuer&longs;o primum quoddam immortale, & ineffabile, &longs;impliciter ens, & &longs;impliciter bonum; ex hoc c&ecedil;tera impetrant quòd &longs;int, & quòd bona &longs;int quodam tamen ordine, vt quæ naturam, &longs;iue e&longs;&longs;entiam illam magis imitantur: perfectiora melioraque. &longs;int, huiu&longs;modi verò &longs;unt actus & &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quæ actu &longs;unt, primum materiæ exortes, deinde materiatæ: atque illæ quidem è tri­plici &longs;erie corpora c&ecedil;le&longs;tia, forma & indiuidua, quibus e&longs;&longs;e & bonitas impertita &longs;unt miris mo­dis. tque adeo, vt vniuer&longs;a rerum latitudo gradibus omnibus completa &longs;it quos aliqua nota di­&longs;tinctos excipere pote&longs;t. Ergo quod e&longs;t, & quod bonum e&longs;t, cùm &longs;uoptè ingenio &longs;it finis & ex­petendum; efficitur, vt natura &longs;emper expetat id quod melius e&longs;t, & quàm maximè præ&longs;tare co­netur ita &longs;uum finem adeptura. A &longs;uperioribus ergo principiis hoc cau&longs;&longs;æ genus extitit, & de­&longs;cendit quodammodo c&ecedil;litus. Itaque &longs;ine errore natura producit, & vt melius non po&longs;sit. c &longs;i­quis corrigere aliquid volet, vt turpi&longs;simus ille Momus, aut deterius faciet, aut id quod fieri non potuit, optabit. Sic cùm melius &longs;it e&longs;&longs;e quàm non e&longs;&longs;e, natura potius ine&longs;&longs;e quàm non e&longs;&longs;e contendet: & &longs;i poterit; æternum numero faciet; &longs;i minus, vt æternum &longs;ucce&longs;sione &longs;it, & &longs;pecie, curabit; nihil minus, quam &longs;ibi perniciem molietur, ni&longs;i fortè per accidens; vt ignis qui, cum in aliena materia con&longs;i&longs;tat, eaque. nece&longs;&longs;ariò nutriatur; &longs;i permanere velit, eam quoque nece&longs;&longs;ariò con­&longs;umit; itaque & nece&longs;&longs;ariò necem &longs;ibi parat. & quia res tùm perfecta e&longs;t, cum iis muneribus fun­gi pote&longs;t, quibus ip&longs;am natura de&longs;tinauit, id &longs;ummopere expetet; atque expetet, &longs;iquando non ha­beat, aut &longs;i non eo modo habeat, quo bene e&longs;t; ac &longs;i obtinuerit; tanquàm in oportuno diuer&longs;orio requie&longs;cet. Hic autem finis cum forma congruit, cuius cùm tantum &longs;it momentum in natur&ecedil; operibus etiam nos admonet & impellit in iis ve&longs;tigandis, vt maiorem formæ rationem habeamus, quàm materiæ, quod veteres philo&longs;ophi non per&longs;picientes toto c&ecedil;lo aberrarunt. il enim aliud quàm materiam, naturam e&longs;&longs;e crediderunt, formas habuere pro accidentibus ac &longs;i quod aliud prin­ cipium po&longs;uere præter materiam, mouens erat, &longs;iue amor, vt cen&longs;uit Parmenides, a &longs;iue (vt me­ minit Cicero b) &longs;tephane à coronæ &longs;imilitudine dicta, hoc e&longs;t, continens ardore lucis orbis, qui cingit c&ecedil;lum quem appellat Deum: aut etiam mens, vt putauit Anaxagoras, vel lis & amicitia quas potuit Epedocles; licet ad illa confugiant vt tragici poët&ecedil;, cum explicare argumenti exitum non po&longs;&longs;unt. Igitur cùm illis certandum fuit & error eorum confutandus. d verò cum omni indu&longs;tria confectum fuerit ab Ari&longs;totele; facit quominus ego credam &longs;ententiam c&ecedil;teroqui ve­ri&longs;simam nempe. Naturam e&longs;&longs;e aut agere gratia rei cuiu&longs;piam, cum principiis e&longs;&longs;e numerandam. Neque verò mihi placet quod aliqui defendunt, non directò certisque. rationibus, &longs;ed elenchicè tractari &longs;ententiam illam qua ratione liceat inire certamen cum iis qui principia refutant. Etenim &longs;i di&longs;putationis illius progre&longs;&longs;um animaduertas; ex propriis eius methodi principiis rem quo­que confectam fui&longs;&longs;e reperies, & aliqua vt vera a&longs;&longs;umpta, non data; qui mos &longs;cientiarum pro­prius e&longs;t; neque vt illò tendentia quò elenchica confutatio dirigitur (huius enim &longs;copi &longs;unt quin­que repugnantia, fal&longs;um, inopinabile, &longs;olœci&longs;mus, & nugatio) &longs;ed vt o&longs;tendentia &longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e & &longs;en&longs;u munita qui certus e&longs;t index in phy&longs;icis; & eiu&longs;modi qu&ecedil; in illa principia re&longs;olui po&longs;sint, qu&ecedil; phy­&longs;icus pro certi&longs;simis accipit. Et indicat hoc propo&longs;itio quæ&longs;tionis quæ per notum exponitur qu&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;am &longs;ignificat, nimirum io/ti, ide&longs;t quamobrem qua, tamet&longs;i optimi autores v&longs;i &longs;int pro &longs;im­plici, quæ e&longs;t o_ti, ide&longs;t quòd, nihilominus à nobis pro cau&longs;&longs;a accipienda e&longs;t, eo quòd indicat o/ be/ltion, & melius quòd finem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;uprà docuimus; eaque. &longs;e profitetur afferre Ari&longs;toteles, vt dubitationem &longs;oluat: at qui dubitationum &longs;olutiones &longs;unt ea quæ demon&longs;trantur. Itaque non elenchicè, &longs;ed phy&longs;icè tractatum fuit hoc theorema. Planum e&longs;t quidem e&longs;&longs;e finem, & ex hac cau&longs;&longs;a reddi po&longs;&longs;e rationem complurium problematum: liquet etiam methodos accipere qua­tuor genera cau&longs;&longs;arum: &longs;ed illud ob&longs;curum & inquirendum; &longs;it'ne aliquis finis, cuius ergò natu­ra operetur: & an &longs;olus materiæ cur&longs;us, vt antiqui voluerunt; ea præ&longs;tet, quæ fini tribuit in na­tura philo&longs;ophus. Idcirco mea quidem &longs;ententia erit hoc non principium, &longs;ed theorema. Natu­ram agere cuiu&longs;piam rei gratia. Tritum quoque illud e&longs;t apud philo&longs;ophos naturales cau&longs;&longs;am ei præferri cuius e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;a. Nunc cau&longs;&longs;a multis modis ea re&longs;picit quorum e&longs;t auctor. Etenim vel in nomine & ratione conuenit, vt cum filio pater, vel actus e&longs;t & perfectio: rur&longs;us cau&longs;&longs;a vel e&longs;t in mente, vel in reip&longs;a: tum tertiò cau&longs;&longs;a vel princeps e&longs;t, vel in&longs;trumentum. Prætereà cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t aut pote&longs;tas, aut actus. Po&longs;tremò cau&longs;&longs;a pertinet ad e&longs;&longs;e, cùm vbi quippiam gignitur; tùm etiam po&longs;tquam genitum e&longs;t: nanque operatio iam e&longs;t rei genitæ &cum fine cen&longs;eri &longs;olet. Atqui per­&longs;picuum e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;am illam quæ perfectio nuncupatur, modo quodam nobiliore quàm cau&longs;&longs;as vniuocas, effecta &longs;ua continere, ob eamque. rem ip&longs;is quoque præ&longs;tantiores e&longs;&longs;e, po&longs;tquam ex illius gremio, vt ita dicam, effu&longs;a fuerint. Cau&longs;&longs;as item in mente, qualem ponimus e&longs;&longs;entiam, quæ defi­nitione explicatur, ip&longs;i rei quæ exi&longs;tit, præponendas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;uo loco docebimus, interim pro hypo­the&longs;i &longs;tatuatur. Omnes etiam confitentur actum pote&longs;tati, vt imperfecto perfectum præcedere, & cùm materia &longs;it pote&longs;tas, c&ecedil;ter&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;int actus generatim, materiam excipiunt quæ &longs;ola pro­pter imperfectionem non &longs;it effectui præferenda; quapropter etiam cùm agens actu exi&longs;tat, pa­tiens verò &longs;it pote&longs;tate; agens patienti &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia præponunt. b eamque. rem quia &longs;e habet in&longs;trumentum ad cau&longs;&longs;am principem vt patiens ad agens, eodem indicio perhibemus in&longs;trumen­tum non modo cau&longs;&longs;æ mouenti po&longs;tponendum, verùm etiam effectui po&longs;tponi po&longs;&longs;e; vt &longs;i effe­ctus à cau&longs;&longs;a vniuoca producatur, proptereà &longs;emen, licet imperfectum; cau&longs;&longs;a hominis quæ res e&longs;t perfecta, e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t, cum à meliore principio de&longs;cendat, quod e&longs;t homo alter qui actu e&longs;t, at­que perfectus. Ideoque. notabat veteres Ari&longs;toteles, quia rationem optimi hone&longs;ti&longs;simi & pr&ecedil;&longs;tan­ti&longs;simi principiis denegarent, c quòd ex &longs;emine virum na&longs;ci per&longs;picerent, hoc verò imperfectum e&longs;&longs;et. eque intelligerent &longs;emen non e&longs;&longs;e principium, &longs;ed in&longs;trumentum quod ex alio penderet: id autem perfectum e&longs;&longs;et, cum actu exi&longs;teret à quo &longs;emen pararetur. Itaque principium optimum, & hone&longs;ti&longs;simum e&longs;t. Et certè ita &longs;it nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t; cùm actus &longs;it principium &longs;impliciter. Nam ma­teria quoque cùm &longs;it potentia, principiorum numero excluditur. d Hæc quidem à nob. con&longs;en­tienter cum c&ecedil;teris a&longs;&longs;eruntur. De vniuocis, & fine non conuenit: apparet enim eandem e&longs;&longs;e con­ditionem Sophroni&longs;ci patris & Socratis filij; atque omnino generatim, cùm vna &longs;ub&longs;tantia indi­uidua gignat alteram, nec vna &longs;it magis minusúe &longs;ub&longs;tantia quàm altera, neutram e&longs;&longs;e præferen­dam. Prætereà cum finis &longs;it vel generationis, vel rei genit&ecedil;, quia rei genitæ finem in ordine acci­dentium collocant, ea verò &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cedunt omnibus modis, & hoc etiam cau&longs;&longs;æ genus effe­ctui & illi cuius e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;a, præferendum non e&longs;&longs;e ducunt. Nos contrà in vniuocis etiam cau&longs;&longs;as effectibus anteponimus; quippe qui cau&longs;&longs;as in actu contemplemur. ùm enim cau&longs;&longs;æ verè &longs;unt: atqui cau&longs;&longs;æ in actu cum re conferuntur quæ e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t & gignitur, nec dum exi&longs;tit. taque ne­ce&longs;&longs;ariò præ&longs;tant. Po&longs;teà longo &longs;ermone nob. &longs;tendendum e&longs;t functiones e&longs;&longs;e ex ordine formarum, & vt actus cum pote&longs;tate conferri. Quamobrem & ab hoc v&longs;que ad illa tempora &longs;uper&longs;edeamus. &longs;atis hoc &longs;it, quòd &longs;i actus &longs;ecundus e&longs;t perfectior; actio quoque in ip&longs;o efficiente inerit, vt perfectio. Rur&longs;us cùm efficiens & finis bifariam &longs;e re&longs;piciant, & vt in optatis, atque vt imponitur ab effi­ciente materiæ; & illo quidem modo monet finis; altero pendet ex efficiente, quæ con&longs;iderantur ex his cau&longs;sis, quatenus mouent, alias excellunt, quare finis, dum mouet, e&longs;t nobilior, & effi­ciens, dum parat finem, antecellit, Sic dum res fit, & mouens, quatenus mouet; &longs;emper e&longs;t eo; quod fit, præ&longs;tantius, & eo quod mouetur ab ip&longs;o, &longs;iue fuerit pa&longs;sio quæ afferat interitum, &longs;eu perficiens; quòd inter id, quod mouet, & quod mouetur, &longs;emper quatenus huiu&longs;modi &longs;unt, in­tercedit ratio pote&longs;tatis & actus, ob id hoc principium generale redditur, quemadmodum etiam a&longs;&longs;umptum fuit aliquando ab Ari&longs;totele. a At verò etiam &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;a præferatur effectui, multis ta­men &longs;imilitudinum notis cau&longs;&longs;a & effectus inu&longs;ta &longs;unt. Vnde etiam &longs;olet extare effatum com­mune philo&longs;ophis & medicis. Similem differentiam in cau&longs;&longs;a efficere &longs;imilem differentiam in effectu. b Et verò multa &longs;unt quæ communiter vtri&longs;que in&longs;unt. Nam cau&longs;&longs;æ per &longs;e effectus per &longs;e producunt, eæ quæ per accidens con&longs;imiliter con&longs;tituunt effectus per accidens. Sic cau&longs;sis actu effecta actu re&longs;pondent, c & cum cau&longs;sis pote&longs;tate, congruunt effectus, qui e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;unt. Si cau&longs;&longs;æ item communes effectus communes exi&longs;tunt: quod &longs;i &longs;ingulares fuerint; effectus quo­que &longs;ingulares erunt. Ita etiam perpetuorum cau&longs;&longs;as perpetuas e&longs;&longs;e credendum e&longs;t d & &longs;en&longs;ilium &longs;en&longs;iles, &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;as proximas accipiamus. Sed extat præcipuè &longs;imilitudo inter agentia vniuoca; &longs;i vniuoca propriè &longs;umantur, &longs;iquidem illorum proprium &longs;it efficere perpetuò tale, qualia ip&longs;a: exi&longs;tunt, vt &longs;iquid etiam &longs;it, quod ab alio fiat, vbi fiat per &longs;e & per verum motum, &longs;emper à &longs;i­mili producatur. e Ita calidum à calido propagatur, & à quanto quantum, &longs;ub&longs;tantia con&longs;imi­liter à &longs;ub&longs;tantia: atque ita quidem, vt à &longs;pecie &longs;pecies, & genus à genere producatur. Nam fit homo animal & viuens homo ab homine; animal ab animali, viuens à viuente generatur. & ab eodem omnia hæc; quòd idem homo e&longs;t & animal & viuens. Ab alio verò cau&longs;&longs;arum genere, quod e&longs;t non vniuocum ob cau&longs;&longs;æ præ&longs;tantiam &longs;imilis effectus gigni neutiquam pote&longs;t. Itaque re&longs;tat &longs;olus materiæ formæque. con&longs;en&longs;us; &longs;iquidem tantum efficiat agens non vniuocum, quan­tum materia &longs;u&longs;tinere valet: neque enim ex hac materia equum verbig. aceret, &longs;ed apem neque ex eadem materia virum produceret. Itaque optimè dicitur, pro materiæ merito formas exhi­beri; quandò lumen aliter in pellucido recipiatur atque in opaco, vel polito corpore: ita vt, quan­uis materia coërceatur à forma terminante eius infinitatem; materia quoque temperet & limi­tet formæ conditiones & vires efficientis: & quod forma efficere melius; hæc contra reddat de­terius. Noui equidem à philo&longs;ophis multos de rebus hi&longs;ce &longs;ermones haberi: c&ecedil;terùm quia non ad veritatem conuellendam, &longs;ed ad eorum explanationem afferuntur. tque ita retinentur, vt tanquam vera defendantur eorumque. omnium in phy&longs;ica creberrimus v&longs;us e&longs;t, ea nos itidem more hypothe&longs;eon paucis conficere voluimus. Ac de generalibus phy&longs;iologiæ principiis ha­ctenus dixi&longs;&longs;e &longs;it &longs;atis.

Ratio I.

II.

III.

IIII.

A

V.

Ad I.

B

Ad II.

Ad III.

C

a 2. Prior.

D

Ad IIII.

b 9. Met. Tit. 17.

E

F

III.

I.

G

II.

H

a 1. Polit. c. 5.

b 1. de An. Tit. 88. lib. de ep. . 2. 2. de part. an. . 16. 17.

A

a 2. De ge­ner. Anim. c. 4. Nota hic no&longs;tram in­terpr&ecedil;ta­tionem.

B

b 1. Polit. cap. 2.

c 1. Polit. cap. 1.

d 4. de par. an. ap. 6.

C

e 2. Rhet.

D

T. 43.

III.

f 5. De ge. an. ap. l. 3 De An. T. 45.

E

IV.

F

a Theoph. 1. de cau&longs;&longs;. plan. . 19.

b Auer. 2. Phy&longs;. T. 77

V.

G

c que Mac.

d 1. Pol. c. 5.

H

A

VI.

a 2. de c&ecedil;­lo T. 59.

b Præd.

B

c 7. Met. T. 31.

d 2. de temp.

C

VII.

D

e c. e &longs;ub.

f 5. Phy&longs;. T. 2.

E

VIII.

F

G

a Hippoe. Gal. 5. de vi&longs;u part. c. 4.

b 8. Phy&longs;. T. 15. 63. 3. de c&ecedil;l. T. 24.

H

IX.

c 1. de Ge. an. . 1.

A

a Lib. e 2. o. e ince­&longs;tu anim. c. 2. 10. 2. de part. an. . 14. Gal. 4. de v&longs;u part. c. 17. 4. de part. an. . 9. 1. de Gen. an. . 4. 2 de Gen. an. . 4. 10. Met. T. lt. 8. Phy&longs;. T. 56.

B

b 4. de par. an. . 10.

c 7. Polit. c. 4.

C

d 2. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 34.

D

a 1. Met.

E

b 1. De na.

F

IIII.

G

c 12. Met. T. 40.

H

d 3. De An. T. 19.

A

V.

a 3. de An.

b Gal. ib. de drm pul.

c 2. Phy&longs;.

d 3. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 61.

B

e Probl.

C

Specialia phy&longs;iologi&ecedil; principia ponuntur; & aliqua admonitione per&longs;uadentur. Cap. IIII.

MOX ad propria veniamus, & non longè ab in&longs;tituto &longs;ermone di&longs;cedentes cau&longs;&longs;arum. quoque naturam &longs;pecialius exploremus. Proximum igitur iis quæ diximus, e&longs;t vt con­uenientiam pote&longs;tatis & actus exponamus: & hæc po&longs;ita e&longs;t in multis quorum momentum in omni philo&longs;ophia maximum e&longs;t. Neque verò dubium e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t pote&longs;tatem hi&longs;ce primis di­&longs;tingui differentiis remoto nimirum & proximo, quis enim aquam dicat e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;e phialam, ni&longs;i concedat adhuc nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;&longs;e multas interuenire mutationes, vt phiala fieri queat? nam prius in vitrum cogatur oportet, idemque. lique&longs;cat, mox efficiatur phiala. At idem non inficiabitur vitrum liquefactum in phialam &longs;ine vllius mutationis interuentu mutari. & tum verè aliquid po&longs;&longs;e fieri intelliget, cum nihil aliud flagitari videat ad id, vt phiala fiat. ùm verò illa erit pote&longs;tas proxi­ma & vltima qua po&longs;ita res exi&longs;tit è ve&longs;tigio. f C&ecedil;terùm in actu quoque gradus i&longs;ti quodam mo­do ob&longs;eruari po&longs;&longs;unt. ltimus enim atque perfectus cum vltima pote&longs;tate cohæret, quicquid antecedit, actus ille e&longs;t imperfectus, qui cum motu coniunctus e&longs;t, aliquid ab&longs;oluti præ&longs;eferens in accidentibus in &longs;ub&longs;tantia formæ nihil attingens, quia &longs;it pror&longs;us indiuidua. Quapropter etiam &longs;ic erit actus proximus, &longs;iue extremus atque remotus. Dicimus item è pote&longs;tatibus per­fectas e&longs;&longs;e nonnullas, alias imperfectas: ita quoque actus perfectos & imperfectos numerari con­&longs;ue&longs;&longs;e: imperfectos autem illos vocari qui &longs;unt cum aliquo motu coniuncti, vt diuidi in conti­nuo, quod nunquam eò peruenit, vt diui&longs;um &longs;it. uòd homo qui gignebatur, genitus &longs;it; ille e&longs;t actus perfectus. Atqui &longs;ecum congruunt differentiæ pote&longs;tatis & actus. Nam cùm pote&longs;tas actum re&longs;piciat generatim; remota cum remoto actu coniuncta erit; proxima & extrema cum actu proximo & extremo. Tum etiam pote&longs;tas imperfecta &longs;p&ecedil;ctabit actum imperfectum, per­fecta verò perfectum. Ex quo item tanta exi&longs;tit inter vtraque naturæ cognatio, vt quicquid pa­tiendo potentia valet, tantundem actus pr&ecedil;&longs;tare po&longs;sit; g c&ecedil;teroqui fru&longs;tra e&longs;&longs;et aliquid in natura, quod ip&longs;i maximè repugnat, vt dictum e&longs;t. Quamquam nos hanc propo&longs;itionem de facto con­cedimus (vt fertur) non de habilitate, & pote&longs;tatem communiter accipimus, non pro habitudi­ne natiua non ignari multa contingere formæ, cau&longs;&longs;a materiæ, quæ naturam ip&longs;ius oppugnent. tantum abe&longs;t vt ad illa &longs;it propen&longs;a. Ex eodem quoque fonte deriuatur illud. uippe cùm po­te&longs;tas cum actu conueniat in eo quòd pari gradu a remotis v&longs;que ad proxima procedant. Actus effici in patiente bene affecto. a Nam quòminus affectum fuerit patiens, eò magis ab actu di&longs;ta­bit; quo plures &longs;ubierit mutationes, paucioresque. relinquantur; eo propior erit actus ille perfe­ctus; vbi nulla amplius mutatio relinquatur, iam aderit actus omnibus &longs;uis numeris & partibus ab&longs;olutis. Sic ergo conueriunt pote&longs;tas & actus. Eiu&longs;dem quoque notæ e&longs;t. Si vna cau&longs;&longs;a fue­rit, vnum item futurum effectum; quodidem valet, ac &longs;i dixerimus, ab vno non ni&longs;i vnum pro­fici&longs;ci. Hoc quidem vt pronuntiatum accipitur ab Ari&longs;totele: tamet&longs;i propter varias opiniones philo&longs;ophorum abiit in theorema. Veruntamen nos hic rem totam certis legibus ad&longs;tringemus quæ facile concedentur; alibi, &longs;iquando opportunum fuerit, cum aliis di&longs;&longs;erturi. Ac primum quidem credimus hoc effatum omne cau&longs;&longs;arum genus complecti: neque de fine & efficiente du­bium e&longs;t apud c&ecedil;teros etiam, modò conditiones adhibeantur quæ &longs;uis locis exponentur: neque minus de forma dubitandum e&longs;t, quandò res vna maximè e&longs;t propter formam eademque. cum fi­ne & efficiente con&longs;entit. redo item eandem e&longs;&longs;e rationem materiæ, quamuis ab ea multitudo na&longs;catur: etenim et&longs;i multitudinem facit, &longs;i naturæ &longs;uæ dimittatur: attamen in&longs;tinctu meliore con­citata in vnum, quoad pote&longs;t, contendit, nempè in formam. Nunc doceamus, vt in omnibus cau&longs;sis id defendi valeat. Ac primum accipientes cau&longs;&longs;as naturales voluntate dimi&longs;&longs;a quam ex æquo oppo&longs;ita re&longs;picere confitemur, eas per &longs;e &longs;pectemus, vt non operantur ex accidente vt pro­ximè, vt præcipuè, non vt in&longs;trumenta; &longs;iquidem &longs;axum à natura feratur in &longs;uum locum, idemque. cadendo viatorem feriat; &longs;ed cadit quidem, vt cùm in &longs;uum locum peruenerit, ibi quie&longs;cat; via­torem lædit per accidens. & frigus hyeme cogendo calorem, per calorem calorem facit. c pin­nas ad volatum dedit aui natura; &longs;ed illis abutitur ad corpus contegendum. Calor per &longs;e proxi­mè & principaliter calorem producit; idemque. calorem gignit pro virium &longs;uarum ratione: pro­pterea quòd teporem efficiat, vel quòd impediatur, vel vt via &longs;it in calorem. Prætereà na&longs;citur vnum, quod poti&longs;simum &longs;it ab vna cau&longs;&longs;a; multa verò, quæ illi quodammodo &longs;eruiant. b eamque. rem, quia vis formatrix habet quidem varias pote&longs;tates, & multa &longs;ibi &longs;truit quibus vtatur; vnum tamen e&longs;t quo peruenire &longs;tudet, in planta &longs;anè, vt vitam largiatur in equo, vt vim &longs;entiendi pro­ducat, & propter illud vnum, quod a&longs;&longs;equi conatur, c&ecedil;tera molitur vt vni illi &longs;eruientia & ad ip&longs;um in&longs;tituta. Atque ita vnum e&longs;t quod vult, vt non plura, quæ &longs;it ordinis eiu&longs;dem ab eadem cau&longs;&longs;a profici&longs;ci queant, quomodo etiam &longs;upradictum e&longs;t de materia quæ, &longs;i re&longs;picit oppo&longs;ita, at ex illis vnum e&longs;t præcipuum, alterum per accidens, & propter illud. Vnum quoque ab vno in eodem genere cau&longs;&longs;æ: nihil enim vetat idem à pluribus de&longs;cendere cau&longs;sis diuer&longs;i generis. Vnum quoque ab vno e&longs;t per &longs;e, ni&longs;i ob&longs;tet impedimentum, aut repugnantia materiæ. Nam &longs;ic &longs;æpe fit, vt ab eodem habitu vna actio na&longs;catur; &longs;ed ab impedimento & contrario interpelletur. Re­quiritur etiam vt cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;ub eadem habitudine ponantur. Nam præ&longs;entia formæ producit, ab­&longs;entia affert interitum; & nauta vigilans e&longs;t autor &longs;alutis, dormiens verò pernicij cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t: ac Sol accedens calorem facit, frigus verò dum recedit. Cùm verò cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;ic &longs;e habeant, vt aut sunai/tia, ide&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;as adiuuantes po&longs;tulent, aut aliqua pendeant ex ip&longs;is; vnum quoque &longs;em­per &longs;ingulæ per &longs;e conficiunt: &longs;iqua varietas exoritur, reliquis erit ad&longs;cribenda. Sic Sol vnum calorem producit, eodem tamen aquea liquat & fundit, terrea cogit, ita etiam calor &longs;eu natiuus, &longs;iue etiam auctus, cùm pro virium &longs;uarum ratione &longs;ummum producere queat; nonnunquàm, vtile efficit, noxium aliàs, quòd pro ratione &longs;uæ naturæ agens præ&longs;tat id, quod &longs;i ad alterum re­feratur; non bene ad ip&longs;um &longs;e habet, vt cum coquendo pituitam gignit &longs;anguinem, &longs;i &longs;anguinem coquat, efficit bilem flauam, aut atram, agit hîc quidem &longs;ecundum naturam, &longs;ed propter cau&longs;­&longs;as adiuuantes alterum facit quod &longs;ecundum naturam non e&longs;t, nec quidem &longs;uam, &longs;ed illius, ad quod in&longs;tiruitur. Eodem modo, cùm Deus vnus omnino &longs;it, variis rebus, diuer&longs;is modis imper­tit e&longs;&longs;e. Non igitur ab eo na&longs;citur vlla varietas, aut multiplicitas; &longs;ed à participantibus vniuer&longs;a profici&longs;citur. Itaque non acciperem illam conditionem quam à nonnullis imponi intelligo, Deum (vt Ari&longs;toteli placere puto) vnum quidem e&longs;&longs;e propter e&longs;&longs;entiam, multiplici verò facultare pol­lere; ideoque. ab eo deriuari complura: &longs;ed quia c&ecedil;tera quæ pendent ex illo, non æqualiter idem bonum accipiunt; hinc varia munera illius extare, quanuis &longs;it &longs;impliciter vnus. Atque harum legum impo&longs;itio nobis id efficiet, quod dici &longs;olet. Ab vno vt vnum e&longs;t, non ni&longs;i vnum po&longs;&longs;e deduci.

D

f 9. Met.

g Auer. 1. De celo.

E

a 2. De An. T. 24. 26.

II.

F

G

H

Si igitur ab vno, quà vnum e&longs;t duntaxat, vnum deriuatur; planum e&longs;t quòd &longs;i contrariorum cau&longs;&longs;a vnica e&longs;t, de quocunque genere accipiatur (vna enim materia contrariorum e&longs;t, vnumque. efficiens) eam e&longs;&longs;e remotam. roximas igitur contrariorum cau&longs;&longs;as dicemus e&longs;&longs;e contrarias, at­que ita di&longs;iunctas, vt nullo vnquam tempore con&longs;i&longs;tere queant; &longs;ed altera &longs;emper alteri perniciem feret; & cùm &longs;ub eodem genere maximo interuallo di&longs;tent, a maximum verò vnum &longs;it; ita fit, vt nihil &longs;ibi contrarium e&longs;&longs;e valeat, & contrarium vni &longs;olum e&longs;&longs;e queat: etenim ni&longs;i vnum foret, id quod ponitur maximum, aliquid &longs;eip&longs;o maius haberet. ut igitur hoc vnum maximum fo­ret, & ita contrarium e&longs;&longs;et. anque maximum e&longs;&longs;e interuallum inter ea quæ &longs;unt generis eiu&longs;dem, & quæ finiunt illud contraria vocari, non e&longs;t dubitandum. &longs;i minus ita infinitum, neque maxi­mum, neque ab&longs;olutum. ec contrarium igitur: in illo enim finis quidam nece&longs;&longs;ariò concipitur. Ex his paret actum & pote&longs;tatem non e&longs;&longs;e contraria, neque motum & terminum ad quem ten­dit. am pote&longs;tas in actum dirigitur, ita vt ex illis vnum per &longs;e fiat; & motus tantum abe&longs;t vt à termino corrumpatur, vt perficiatur maximè ab ip&longs;o. c &longs;iquid ine&longs;t inter ip&longs;a oppo&longs;iti; id a&longs;cri­bendum e&longs;t priuationi cum qua e&longs;t coniuncta pote&longs;tas, quæ &longs;anè forma præ&longs;ente corrumpitur. Ab his quæ ponuntur extrema illius &longs;patij quod finitur contrariis, alia quoque contraria na&longs;cun­tur, at non perfectè neque &longs;impliciter contraria; &longs;ed quodammodo, & qua&longs;i media; verùm hæc plura e&longs;&longs;e non e&longs;t ab&longs;urdum. Atqui perfectè ac &longs;impliciter vnum vni contrarium e&longs;t. Nec qui&longs;­quam medium opponat duobus extremis; neque enim illa e&longs;t oppo&longs;itio contrariorum de qua nunc agimus; &longs;ed po&longs;ita e&longs;t in priuatione, in qua etiam æquale & inæquale con&longs;i&longs;tunt. Nam ne­que etiam hæc contraria &longs;unt, b &longs;ed con&longs;imili ratione priuationem præ&longs;eferunt. e fortè &longs;u&longs;pice­ris medium & extrema, vt vnum vni opponi, tanquam contraria. Hæc nos affirmatione &longs;igni­ficari volumus. taque nudum, quòd affirmatione &longs;ignificatur, licet &longs;it priuans; ab Ari&longs;totele con­trarium ponitur: & cùm in eodem genere &longs;int, genus autem à materia ducitur in qua pote&longs;tas exi&longs;tit ad contraria, viam ad &longs;e vici&longs;sim habent. Itaque illa quæ in genere conueniunt, &longs;ecum commutantur: quæ toto genere &longs;eparantur, vt in materia di&longs;crepant; &longs;ic quoque nullam ad &longs;e&longs;e pote&longs;tatem obtinuetunt, nec commutantur igitur. Proptereà neque quantum in quale muta­tur, cùm genera diuer&longs;a &longs;int. ec quale omne tran&longs;it in alterum; &longs;icuti &longs;apor in odorem, cùm &longs;int genera diuer&longs;a. &longs;olaque. illa &longs;ecum commutantur quæ in genere proximo, hoc e&longs;t, in materia pro­xima conuenere. Proinde ita &longs;e habent contraria, vt vnum actu &longs;ingula &longs;int, &longs;ed pote&longs;tate alte­rum. &longs;t enim actu calidum, in potentia frigidum. Atque ita ex hi&longs;ce principiis con&longs;titui contraria puto, vt ni&longs;i mihi aliter dicens Ari&longs;toteles obiiciatur; aut opponatur certa demon&longs;tratio; procon­&longs;tanti&longs;simo habeam, &longs;i tres i&longs;tæ conditiones ad hibeantur; illa nece&longs;&longs;ariò fore contraria. aximè &longs;ub eodem genere di&longs;tare; affirmatione notari; & ad &longs;e&longs;e mutuam pote&longs;tatem habere. c Proinde &longs;ecum certant; & &longs;ibiinuicem machinantur interitum. eliqua &longs;anè, vt (vnis relatiuis exceptis: ip&longs;a enim &longs;ola &longs;e &longs;u&longs;tinent vici&longs;sim & a)ntezeidusin) non con&longs;i&longs;tunt: attamen non oppugnant. Hæc verò vel per &longs;e &longs;unt, vel per accidens, & quidem &longs;pecie diuer&longs;a contraria &longs;unt, &longs;i per &longs;e con­traria &longs;int, vt album & nigrum in genere colorum, & in genere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, &longs;i per &longs;e in &longs;int in &longs;ub­&longs;tantia, &longs;i minus: etiam eadem &longs;pecie e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;unt, vt iidem contrarij colores in homine. Quare, cùm per &longs;e, mortale & immortale &longs;int in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, in eadem &longs;pecie con&longs;i&longs;tere nequeunt. er &longs;e verò &longs;unt, quia nece&longs;&longs;ariò in&longs;unt: nam quod mortale e&longs;t, caducum &longs;it nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t; immortale verò perpetuò con&longs;eruatur. Quòd autem &longs;int contraria per&longs;picuum e&longs;t; quoniam immortale e&longs;t pri­uatio, ea verò e&longs;t impotentia definita, & cum aliquo actu coniuncta, vnde &longs;ignificatur affirmatio­ne; eademque. in eodem genere maximo interuallo ab oppo&longs;ita forma &longs;egregatur. Nam quòd plus quàm genere &longs;egregentur, aut etiam genere, non dum &longs;icuti manife&longs;tum &longs;umimus. Illud &longs;olum ex Ari&longs;totele &longs;uccurrit quod a&longs;&longs;erere liceat, quæ genere di&longs;crepant, apparêre quidem con­traria, veruntamen eo quòd &longs;ecum conferri nequeant & longi&longs;simè di&longs;tent, neque inter ea maxi­ma po&longs;sit a&longs;signari di&longs;tantia quæ requiritur in contrariis, non e&longs;&longs;e contraria &longs;impliciter; ad extre­mum videtur inferre mortale & immortale genere &longs;eparari; ac nos &longs;i genus &longs;ubalternum intel­ligere velimus, quod &longs;ub eandem &longs;eriem cadat, non repugnabimus. &longs;i prædicamentum &longs;eriemque. variam &longs;umimus, ex Ari&longs;totelis ip&longs;ius verbis colligi po&longs;&longs;e negamus. c &longs;pecie &longs;olum ab Ari&longs;tote­le inter &longs;e di&longs;tingui fatemur: ita enim rationem &longs;uam complectitur. Contraria &longs;pecie differunt. Mortale & immortale contraria &longs;unt. A&longs;&longs;umptionem verò probat. Siquidem priuatio &longs;it quæ­dam impotentia definita. Quid ergo aliud ex his inferri pote&longs;t, quàm quòd mortale & immor­tale &longs;pecie di&longs;iungantur? itaque pro eo, qd habet contextus Ari&longs;totelicus. d genere diuer&longs;a &longs;pecie legendum puto. Hæc verò omnia iubeo te diligenter ob&longs;eruare: ni&longs;i enim aduertas; oratio per­plexa qua v&longs;us e&longs;t Ari&longs;toteles; negotium tibi exhibere po&longs;&longs;et. ræ&longs;ertim quòd Græci interpretis auxilio de&longs;tituti &longs;umus in eo loco. Quamquam neque ip&longs;e animaduertit, vbi Ari&longs;toteles docuit genere differentia in contrariis numerari, quòd eorum maxima differentia foret, hæc e&longs;&longs;e referen­da ad ea, quæ paullò ante dixerat videri, Ari&longs;toteles; ideoque. in illum errorem inductus e&longs;t, quòd maximè di&longs;tarent ea quæ genere differunt: neque vidit eam di&longs;tantiam ab Ari&longs;totele, velut infi­nitam poni, vnde contrariorum ratio tollitur. ec enim via pote&longs;t intercedere inter genere toto differentia quæ &longs;ola re&longs;tat inter ea quæ genere conueniunt. Et verò cur magis di&longs;tet quantum à &longs;ub&longs;tantia quàm di&longs;tet qualitas, aut vllum aliud ex reliquis prædicamentis? Cùm verò po&longs;teà doceret Ari&longs;toteles o&longs;ten&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e extra genus non e&longs;&longs;e differentias, neque ip&longs;e verba Ari&longs;totelis accepi&longs;&longs;et in eum &longs;en&longs;um, quòd di&longs;tantia foret infinita, idem quoque repugnantiam maximam inter Ari&longs;totelis dicta inculcare coactus e&longs;t, putans, quod ibi inferretur aduer&longs;um ea quæ &longs;uprà con&longs;tituta fuerant; pertinere ad illa quæ &longs;ubalterna &longs;unt, cùm c&ecedil;teroqui &longs;uperiora generali&longs;simis accommodarentur. d verò vniuer&longs;am Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententiam peruertebat. uandò ea quæ diffe­runt; aliquo differunt: generali&longs;sima nullo differunt, &longs;ed diuer&longs;a &longs;unt, hoc e&longs;t &longs;eip&longs;is di&longs;tinguun­tur, ideoque. ex ip&longs;is dialectici fabricant propo&longs;itiones medio vacantes; a ea quæ &longs;ub ip&longs;is exi&longs;tunt, per illa &longs;eparantur; itaque magis propriè differunt; huic verò oppo&longs;itum autore Alexandro pro­nuntia&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles. Potuit verò eos fallere dictum illud Ari&longs;totelis in extremo X. ui cùm eos confuta&longs;&longs;et qui ponerent ideas æternas, & quæ eiu&longs;dem rationis e&longs;&longs;ent cum &longs;ingularibus “ta\ tina\ ip&longs;e ibi vocat. llud adiungit ta)de/ge/nei. (tezaplei_on dis/fhxen, h)/ta\ei_dei/.” ide&longs;t ea ver&ogravequæ genere diuer&longs;a &longs;unt; magis di&longs;tant, quàm ea quæ &longs;pecie. ua&longs;i antea perora&longs;&longs;et æternum à caduco genere di&longs;crepare. Verùm neque hæc cum proximè dictis cohæreant nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t, neque ex ante con&longs;titutis nece&longs;&longs;ariò colliguntur. &longs;ed videntur potius &longs;epararim fui&longs;&longs;e allata: nam cùm de di&longs;tantia contrariorum & eorum quæ &longs;pecie &longs;egregantur, &longs;atis &longs;uperque. di&longs;putatum foret; ea &longs;ubiungenda quæ ad genera diuer&longs;a pertinerent, vt ab&longs;olueretur di&longs;putatio de oppo&longs;itis; itaque docuit ea plus quàm &longs;pecie differentia di&longs;tare. Nam quæ &longs;pecie differunt, habent in quo conue­niant, nempe genus; non &longs;ic; quæ genere &longs;eparantur. Ergo illa &longs;ub eodem genere &longs;ummiam obti­nuere di&longs;tantiam, hæc infinito quodam interuallo &longs;eiunguntur. Quamquam mirum videri po­te&longs;t, &longs;i di&longs;tant multò magis ea qu&ecedil; genere &longs;egregantur quàm ea quæ &longs;pecie; quæ &longs;pecie di&longs;tinguun­tur, in eodem &longs;ubiecto non con&longs;i&longs;tere; quæ verò genere &longs;eiugantur, etiam complura e&longs;&longs;e in eodem indiuiduo: in eodem enim Socrate e&longs;t & &longs;ub&longs;tantia, & quantum, & quale, & omnia prædicamen­ta. ec tamen idem albus & niger, aut ratione vtens, aut carens. An ita dicemus hæc magis e&longs;&longs;en­tia, & natura di&longs;tingui quàm ea quæ &longs;unt contraria generis eiu&longs;dem, nullam enim e&longs;&longs;enti&ecedil; partem habent in qua conueniant: at &longs;ubiecto & materia quæ non e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entiæ pars, propter eius habili­tatem ad omnes formas di&longs;tant minus; contraria propter in&longs;itam priuationem alterius quæ ine&longs;t in altero, non modo e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ecernuntur, &longs;ed etiam &longs;ubiecto: repugnant enim, & &longs;e&longs;e ex eodem &longs;ubiecto pellunt vici&longs;sim; illa e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;anè di&longs;crepant; &longs;ed non continentia priuationem, ni&longs;i for­maliter ea differre dicamus, quòd vnum non &longs;it id quod e&longs;t alterum; nullam repugnantiam pr&ecedil;­&longs;eferunt: &longs;ic & &longs;ub&longs;tantia & quantum &longs;imul e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t; licet tota e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparetur à quantitate. Ergo æternum & caducum &longs;pecie &longs;ola di&longs;tinguitur, non etiam genere. Quamobrem et&longs;i Auerroës ea plus quàm genere di&longs;tare con&longs;tituit; aut extremis illis X. erbis cum aliis e&longs;t de­ceptus, aut aliò ab interpretibus eius verba torquentur, atque ip&longs;e velit. b inquit enim plus quàm &longs;pecie; ergo etiam plus quàm genere. uis id dabit? & videtur illud volui&longs;&longs;e tantum quod diffe­rant plus quàm &longs;pecie &longs;peciali&longs;sima; nanque æternum & caducum de multis &longs;pecie differentibus prædicantur &longs;ignum e&longs;to, quòd addit e&longs;&longs;e contraria, quæ &longs;ub eodem genere collocantur. Venit & id mihi in mentem in locum Ari&longs;totelis irrep&longs;i&longs;&longs;e quandam mendulam, & pro eo quod legitur ta\ ei)/dei/, legendum e&longs;&longs;e ta\ei)/dh, ide&longs;t, ideas, & hunc e&longs;&longs;e illorum verborum &longs;en&longs;um, quod vel idea e&longs;t eiu&longs;dem &longs;peciei cum indiuiduis, vel ad &longs;ummam &longs;pecie &longs;peciali&longs;sima &longs;egregatur. &longs;ed æternum & caducum genere (&longs;ubalterno) di&longs;crepant; hæc verò maior e&longs;t di&longs;crepantia quàm &longs;pecierum &longs;peciali&longs;simarum: ergo non differunt ide&ecedil; ab indiuiduis vt immortale à caduco. Ex mixtura contrariorum fit plus & minus. d autem &longs;ic accipiendum e&longs;t, vt faciant contraria circum idem &longs;ubiectum, & vt eadem &longs;pecies con&longs;eruetur, vt in accidentibus v&longs;uuenire &longs;olet: nanque &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiæ &longs;ic &longs;e habent, vt quoque minimo dempto, vel addito &longs;pecies, non &longs;ecus ac numeri dempta, vel addita vnitate mutentur. Inde natum e&longs;t tritum illud pronuntiatum in accidentibus plus & minus &longs;peciem non immutare, quod tamen ab Ari&longs;totele negatum e&longs;t c (eum verò &longs;ecutus e&longs;t Theophra&longs;tus, à quo Simplicius) in animi affectionibus quæ in quadam mediocritate collocan­tur, ex hac &longs;i exce&longs;&longs;erint, in vitia conuertuntur. Atque etiam plus & minus ad &longs;ub&longs;tantias per­tinere pote&longs;t & ad alia complura &longs;ine participatione contrarij; nanque indiuidua &longs;ub&longs;tantia ma­gis e&longs;t, quàm &longs;ecunda, &longs;imiliter accidens quiddam minus e&longs;t quàm &longs;ub&longs;tantia; verum id à Gr&ecedil;cis kaq) u(fesi_n th_s fu/sews, ide&longs;t, &longs;ecundum naturæ humilitatem appellatum e&longs;t; vbi quoque res &longs;uis quidem partibus ab&longs;oluta e&longs;t, &longs;ed deficit tanti&longs;per à &longs;ummo; nec latitudinem complet eius quod e&longs;t &longs;impliciter in eo genere: nam quantum perfectum e&longs;t; neque ideo pollet ea perfe­ctione quam agno&longs;cimus in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, eiu&longs;modi tamen, quæ &longs;ibi conueniat. Sed po&longs;tea quibus & quomodo &longs;ingula aptentur. Hoc item ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;emel atque iterum acceptum e&longs;t. d Si quod ex duobus &longs;it conflatum; vbi alterum exi&longs;tere &longs;eor&longs;um queat; alterum quoque &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;e. t, &longs;i hydromeli ex aqua & melle componitur, ac mel ab&longs;olutum ab aqua exi&longs;tit, nece&longs;&longs;e item e&longs;t aqua &longs;eparetur à melle. At verò, &longs;i &longs;ententiam hanc ita generaliter accipiamus, e vereor, ne veritas illius minuatur: quippe quòd, tamet&longs;i &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparatur ab accidente, non idcirco accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparatur. Præterea ne tollatur eius v&longs;us. Nam &longs;i vtrunque &longs;eparatum e&longs;&longs;e velint, id pro comperto accipiunt quod inquirimus: ex hac enim propo&longs;itione alterum ex illis &longs;eor&longs;um exi&longs;tere conamur o&longs;tendere; atqui &longs;i ita &longs;umatur, e&longs;t principium, non conclu&longs;io. Nec non id mihi veniebat in mentem, Ari&longs;totelem, vbicunque eiu&longs;modi propo&longs;itionem &longs;ump&longs;i&longs;&longs;et; per­petuò ad mouentia & mobilia accommoda&longs;&longs;e: a quin &longs;i audiamus Alexandrum; eam quoque &longs;pecialius &longs;umptam fui&longs;&longs;e dicemus; nempe in motu c&ecedil;le&longs;ti &longs;olùm in quo mobile &longs;impliciter e&longs;t; quippe orbes planetarum, & mouens, & mobile &longs;imul &longs;ph&ecedil;ra &longs;cilicet inerrans, & primum mouens ab omni corpore &longs;egregatum. Accedit quòd &longs;i generaliter & indefinitè accipiamus vnum &longs;eiu­gatum; poterit intelligi primum; at non efficitur inde, vt po&longs;terius ab&longs;olutum &longs;it. Sed quoniam negare non po&longs;&longs;umus, quin, &longs;i rerum e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;pectetur, accidentis item e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;eparata &longs;it ab e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, alia enim e&longs;t vtriu&longs;que e&longs;&longs;entia: quia tamen non efficeret Ari&longs;toteles id quod in&longs;tituerat: etenim primum motorem à corpore c&ecedil;le&longs;ti non e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;olùm, &longs;ed re &longs;ecretum o&longs;ten­dere volebat: idcirco dicemus Ari&longs;totelem de rei &longs;epararione verba facere, & in eam partem ac­cipiemus effatum, vt &longs;i de priore dubium &longs;it, &longs;it'ne &longs;eparatum; à po&longs;terioris &longs;epararione conclu­damus etiam prius e&longs;&longs;e ab&longs;olutum; idque. rerum natura patietur. Nam &longs;i po&longs;terius ex aliquo pen­det, idque. per &longs;e &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tit; multò magis exi&longs;tet per &longs;e prius; quia non pendeat ex alio. tque illud po&longs;terius, &longs;ic ab altero &longs;eparari debere putamus, vt ab aliis omnibus ab&longs;olutum &longs;it. Idcirco etiam &longs;i materia &longs;eparetur à forma: quia non &longs;impliciter à forma &longs;eparatur, neque formam (de mate­riata nunc agimus) à materia liberam e&longs;&longs;e continget. Vbi igitur ab&longs;olutum &longs;it po&longs;terius; prius item multò magis ab&longs;olutum &longs;it, nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. b&longs;olutum, inquam, vt &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tens, non autem, vt e&longs;&longs;entiæ priuilegio, &longs;iue functionis ab alio pendet. Nam Socrates e&longs;t res ab&longs;oluta, quia con&longs;i&longs;tit partibus vniuer&longs;is, ex quibus illud deriuatur, quod dicimus u)pazxei_n, ide&longs;t, exi&longs;tere. Quòd &longs;i pendeat ab alio, tanquam mouente; nil veritati propo&longs;itionis ob&longs;tat, modò cau&longs;&longs;as internas & affectus, vt in &longs;ubiecto, velut patiente in&longs;unt, c&ecedil;teris cogitatione &longs;euocatis aduertamus, non excludentes à Deo reliqua pendere, propterea quòd &longs;int, aut quòd illum imitando operentur: illud verò ap­probantes, quòd primum quod &longs;eparatum e&longs;&longs;e colligere &longs;tudemus, ab&longs;olutum quoque &longs;it & à nullo pendeat ex con&longs;equentibus, neque vt &longs;it, neque vt operetur. Sed illud mihi placet magis hæc non generatim, &longs;ed appo&longs;itè ad motum primum pronuntiata fui&longs;&longs;e ab Ari&longs;totele. Et illud item ab Ari&longs;totele receptum. b Ex pote&longs;tate & actu, &longs;iue è materia & forma aut ex corpore, & animo vnum fieri per &longs;e, cuius nulla demon&longs;tratio po&longs;sit afferri, quippe quòd ea &longs;it illorum vis & natura, nec in alia principia re&longs;oluatur. Nam quamuis Ari&longs;toteles olim pronuntiarit oppo&longs;i­tum in medio afferens aliud principium, c per quod vnum fiat ex illis; rem ip&longs;am &longs;pectat, dum fit: tunc enim requiritur efficiens quod iungat hæc duo principia diuer&longs;a; & finis cuius gratia &longs;ic agat efficiens; nos autem hîc verba facimus de re, po&longs;tquàm genita e&longs;t & interna principia &longs;cru­tamur; Vnum igitur fit ex illis non vt colla, glutine, aut clauo, neque item compo&longs;itione, aut con­tinuatione; &longs;ed quòd pote&longs;tas e&longs;t res quæ perfectionem po&longs;tulat, eius autem perfectio e&longs;t actus; eodemque. modo materia &longs;e habet ad formam, & corpus animalis ad animam. oc totum, inquam, e&longs;t ex eorum natura. Cùm enim e&longs;&longs;e dicatur multis modis, vt pote&longs;tate & actu; illud verè e&longs;t quod e&longs;t actus, vnde impetrarunt alia quòd &longs;int. Cùm ergo materia &longs;it pote&longs;tas, forma verò actus, materia per &longs;e non con&longs;tat, &longs;ed &longs;ocietatem formæ requirit, vt &longs;it: &longs;ic etiam corpus organi­cum, quia potentia vitam habet, non actu, vt eam habeat, animæ præ&longs;entia opus e&longs;t. Quoniam igitur oportet vt illi pr&ecedil;&longs;to &longs;it forma, huic autem animus; &longs;i e&longs;&longs;e debent: idcirco vnum fit ex ma­teria & forma. Et per analogiam ad hæc quòd certum efficiens incutiat actum certo &longs;ubiecto, quod item indemon&longs;trabile te&longs;tatur e&longs;&longs;e Philo&longs;ophus, d quippe quòd hæc &longs;it eorum natura. In rebus etiam natura con&longs;tantibus certa e&longs;t & determinata ratio magnitudinis, & paruitatis, cùm vt forma con&longs;i&longs;tat, tùm etiam vt efficienti parere valeat: nanque et&longs;i materiæ cau&longs;&longs;a diui&longs;io procedit in infinitum; at vbi illa ratio corrumpatur; intereat forma nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t priuata in&longs;trumen­tis quibus &longs;uis muneribus fungi debebat: neque enim patitur natura aliquid otio&longs;um. Et debita conueniensque. rei magnitudo de&longs;ideratur in patiente; quandò magna magnam vim pro ratione corporis habentia valdè re&longs;i&longs;tunt, parua eludunt agentia. e Etiam con&longs;tat naturam gignendo à principio ad principium tendere nempe ab efficiente quod e&longs;t actu, ad finem & formam quæ &longs;unt ratione & e&longs;&longs;entia priora, licet vltima generatione. f Hinc efficitur vt res aliter in natura &longs;e ha­beat, dum fit, ac po&longs;tquàm facta fuerit: nam quæ po&longs;teriora generatione, hæc &longs;unt natura prio­ra, & contra quæ prius natura &longs;unt ea &longs;int vltima generatione. Hæc de communibus phy&longs;io­logiæ totius effatis dicere libuit quæ maioris ponderis e&longs;&longs;e intelligeremus, quibus theoremata fundarentur quæ de motu generatim in&longs;tituimus, alia reiicientes ad illa, quæ de reliqua re natu­rali &longs;cribere cogitamus.

III.

A

a 10. Met. T. 13.

b 10. Met. T. 19.

B

c 10. Met. T. 26.

C

D

d Bis in eo­dem T. 26

E

a 1. Po&longs;t.

F

G

b Di&longs;. Di&longs;pu. 2. Sol. 1.

IV.

H

c 8. Eth. c. lt. lib. pezi­paqw_n.

d 8. Phy&longs;. 12. Met. T. 35.

V.

e Zim. Theo. 174.

A

a 12. Met.

B

b 8. Met. T. lt. 2. de An. T. 7.

VI.

C

c 2. de Ge. T. 51.

d 2. de An.

D

e 1. De ort.

f 2. de Par. c. 1.

Vtrùm principia &longs;uperius expo&longs;ita &longs;int ea nota nobis quæ I. hy&longs;. propo&longs;uit Ari&longs;toteles an non. Cap. V.

E

ATQVE ea quidem nob. ota &longs;unt annum illa, à quibus initium &longs;u&ecedil; phy&longs;iologi&ecedil; &longs;ump&longs;it Ari&longs;toteles? Equidem neque hæc excepta fui&longs;&longs;e puto, neque &longs;ola comprehen&longs;a; &longs;ed aliud genus eorum quæ &longs;int nota nob. b Ari&longs;totele proponi credo quæ re&longs;oluentes manu duceremur in eorum notitiam, quæ nobis ignota forent, & cùm &longs;impliciter nota e&longs;&longs;ent; nobis quoque nota fie­rent: vbi verò notui&longs;&longs;ent, lucem rebus afferrent quæ licet no&longs;cerentur à nob. &longs;impliciter, tamen ignorabantur; ita enim no&longs;cebantur à nob. t &longs;en&longs;ui &longs;e&longs;e offerebant; & cum cau&longs;&longs;as haberent ex quibus apt&ecedil; e&longs;&longs;ent, &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a no&longs;cebantur; rerum verò cau&longs;&longs;as habentium legitima cognitio pa­ratur auxilio cau&longs;&longs;arum: &longs;ed his inuentis per re&longs;olutionem eorum quæ &longs;unt nota nob. dhibito quodam gyro rationis, in iis agno&longs;cuntur ea vici&longs;sim quæ nob. ota &longs;unt. t &longs;i hydromeli &longs;ubij­ceretur oculis no&longs;tris, id rotum &longs;pectaremus, neque tamen intelligeremus quid e&longs;&longs;et, quibusúe ex partibus con&longs;taret; &longs;epla&longs;iarius verò ip&longs;um accipiens in mel & aquam re&longs;olueret, ex hydromeli­te quidem mel, & aquam digno&longs;ceret, & ex iis hydromelitos e&longs;&longs;entiam indicaret. Atque hic qui­dem progre&longs;&longs;us accommodatur ad omnia quæ nobis nota &longs;unt, ni&longs;i fortè eadem &longs;int nobis, &

na­tura nota, quemadmodum euenire &longs;olet in mathematicis. &longs;ed apud phy&longs;icum &longs;anè pauca, ne di­xerim nulla, &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi. Cùm verò communiter hoc conueniat in illa omnia quæ nob. nota &longs;unt; nos hîc &longs;peciem quandam tractare volumus, vbi videre quoque oportet, quo hæc quibus de nunc agimus à c&ecedil;teris &longs;eiungantur, & quodnam peculiare propriumque. præ&longs;eferant quod attinet ad eorum con&longs;titutionem & modum quo nobis afferunt auxilium ad reliqua co­gno&longs;cenda qu&ecedil; ignoramus; ac principia primùm, quæ cùm &longs;e&longs;e demer&longs;erint in profundum, à no­&longs;tris &longs;en&longs;ibus longi&longs;simè rece&longs;&longs;erunt, vt iis optimè per&longs;pectis, illa vnde primùm voluere, pro­bè intelligerentur. ntè enim erat inchoata illorum cognitio, quippe ex &longs;en&longs;u & per accidens; po­&longs;tea perfecta & per &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as, mox alia quæ cùm pendeant ex illis, à nob. ullo pacto cogno­&longs;cuntur; neque enim &longs;entimus ea, quæ in centrum mundi &longs;e&longs;e abdidere; &longs;ed ratio dictat ibi quid­dam e&longs;&longs;e torpidi&longs;simum; quia nimirum maximè omnium di&longs;tet à c&ecedil;lo à quo calor ad elementa permanat. a verò deducitur ex iis principiis quæ nob. ntea patefacta fuerant. Hæc ergo &longs;peciali quodam nomine confu&longs;a vocauit Ari&longs;toteles, Græcè sugkexume/na e&longs;t verò apud Græcos ea vox frequenti&longs;sima qua &longs;ignificatur res conturbata & non pura, vt &longs;pecies confu&longs;æ dicerentur imagines illæ quæ apparent in aquis, vbi concitantur, a&longs;piciuntur enim di&longs;tortis & perplexis, vt certam nullam delineationem præferre videantur. uin ita exiles &longs;unt, vt ægrè di&longs;cerni po&longs;sint. atque h&ecedil; quidem huiu&longs;modi e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olent in pueris, dum ab immoderato calore &longs;anguis &longs;piritusque. turbantur, con&longs;imiles in ebriis exi&longs;tunt. Sic te&longs;tabatur Ari&longs;toteles, gentem aliquam ab ortu notam a quandam, &longs;tigma ip&longs;e vocat, in humeris habere, eamque. in auis apparui&longs;&longs;e di&longs;tinctam, po&longs;t modo in nepotibus reliquum e&longs;&longs;e nigrum quoddam confu&longs;um, vt di&longs;cernere non liceret, nota'ne foret, an potius imago notæ. Eodem quoque modo cùm redderet cau&longs;&longs;am Philo&longs;ophus, b cur nati &longs;imiles interdum parentibus e&longs;&longs;ent, nonnunquàm matribus, ac nepotes auis aut auiis docet ex longiore nepotum &longs;ucce&longs;sione figuras maiorum confundi, & proce&longs;&longs;u temporis ita conturba­ri, vt nulli amplius affinium, aut con&longs;anguineorum &longs;imiles &longs;int. Verùm quod ad rem no&longs;tram pertinet, cùm Galenus, tùm etiam Ari&longs;toteles v&longs;i &longs;unt huiu&longs;cemodi voce, &longs;ignificantes doctrinam rudem & inchoatam c quam item alio nomine a)o/zison, ide&longs;t indefinitam ip&longs;e appellauit. & opponit confu&longs;o to\n diozismo\n, ide&longs;t di&longs;tinctionem. Planius adhuc idem Galenus d mentionem faciens de doctrina qu&ecedil; tradenda e&longs;t rudibus, conferre docet in compluribus indefinitum & con­fu&longs;um magis quàm dihzq zwme/non, ide&longs;t di&longs;tinctum, vbi &longs;cilicet id profundæ &longs;peculationis & prolixiorum &longs;ermonum & longioris temporis indigeat quod item alio nomine tu/aw, ide&longs;t ru­dius dictum & oppo&longs;itum ei, quod e&longs;t exqui&longs;itum, ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;ignificatum fui&longs;&longs;e nouimus. M. ullius e sugkexome/non, & ao/zison, confu&longs;um incertumque. reddidit. Audit igitur, quid &longs;ibi velit in methodo confu&longs;um. Sed enim hoc in omnem di&longs;putationem quadram pote&longs;t, &longs;iue &longs;it de principiis, &longs;iue de rebus quæ pendent ex ip&longs;is. Atqui nunc aduertamus quæ velit Ari&longs;tote­les e&longs;&longs;e confu&longs;a f quorum v&longs;us &longs;it in principiis euoluendis. Hæc, &longs;i rerum ip&longs;arum conditionem &longs;pectes; illa generatim vocantur quæ vix à nob. ogno&longs;cuntur, hoc e&longs;t, vt tamet&longs;i ea no&longs;camus, quòd &longs;int; cùm habeant cau&longs;&longs;as; imperfectè tamen cogno&longs;cuntur, quòd eorum cau&longs;&longs;æ ignoran­tur. taque cùm con&longs;tent ex cau&longs;sis; non fuerit error opinor, &longs;i etiam siw/qeta, ide&longs;t compo&longs;ita nuncupentur: præ&longs;ertim quòd habemus graui&longs;simos huius loci interpretes Alexandrum, Sim­plicium, & Auerroëm qui confu&longs;a interpretantur compo&longs;ita. Quapropter etiam nos facilitatis ergò confu&longs;a tran&longs;umemus in compo&longs;ita. & ea partiemur in tria membra, ea &longs;cilicet quæ &longs;unt compo&longs;ita compo&longs;itione formali, reali, & logica. ormali quidem compo&longs;itione intelligentes e&longs;­&longs;e compo&longs;ita illa, quorum rationi &longs;upponitur alterius ratio, veluti rationi accidentis ratio &longs;ub­ &longs;tantiæ &longs;upponitur: realis autem compo&longs;itio e&longs;t in partibus &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;ubiectis quæ ex materia formaque. exi&longs;tunt. Compo&longs;itionem logicam compo&longs;itionem vel rationum, vt &longs;ubiectarum par­tium in genere; continet enim genus in &longs;e vniuer&longs;o quodam modo & virtute rationem &longs;uarum partium, vel etiam à ratione factam, cùm &longs;impliciter, & &longs;ine vlla conditione &longs;umitur id quod cum aliqua lege & modo audiendum e&longs;t. Ex horum numero &longs;unt &longs;ententiæ veterum. Omnium horum v&longs;us e&longs;t in omni doctrina, & in phy&longs;ica præcipuè. Nam 7. Met. lla repo&longs;uit in notis nobis quo­rum auxilio principiorum notitia paretur quæ parum participant ip&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e, tamen ea &longs;ic habe­re compertum e&longs;t, quamuis cau&longs;&longs;a lateat; hæc &longs;unt accidentia & inhærentia rebus: parum enim con&longs;i&longs;tunt; quia non per &longs;e, &longs;ed in &longs;ub&longs;tantia con&longs;i&longs;tunt; & cùm cau&longs;&longs;as habeant, &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a verò no&longs;cantur, exiliter admodum cogno&longs;cuntur. Ex eodem ordine &longs;unt compo&longs;ita ex materia, & quæcunque &longs;unt hoc aliquid: quandò compo&longs;ita multò minus participent ip&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e quàm for­ma: nam con&longs;tant ex materia &longs;en&longs;ili quæ e&longs;t potentia, non actu, & per &longs;e ip&longs;a &longs;unt caduca atque mortalia. uibus omnibus vtitur &longs;cientia naturalis, dum ab iis qu&ecedil; in&longs;unt in loco, vel incremento eorum venatur e&longs;&longs;entiam, & auxilio motus inuenit materiam, functionis ope formam, atque ex in&longs;pectione partium corporis animæ naturam ve&longs;tigat. Valet multum (vt de tertia compo&longs;itione dicam) genus ad aperiendas differentias, & partes &longs;ubiectas: etenim ex eo, qua&longs;i ex toto earum ratio communis o&longs;tenditur, quæ partiendo illu&longs;tratur; & cuique propria redditur; vt dum in ani­mali &longs;en&longs;um motumque. per&longs;picimus; & varios &longs;en&longs;uum gradus variosque. modos progrediendi no­tantes animalium &longs;pecies con&longs;tituimus. Illorum certè fructus maximus quæ generatim & ab&longs;o­lutè pronunciata fuerunt; hæc enim cùm per experientiam nobis notuerint; facilè creduntur; eoque. maximè, quòd vniuersè vera &longs;unt; quia tamen flagitant modum; patiunt imperfectam quan­dam cognitionem quæ tùm ab&longs;oluitur, &longs;i debitum modum addideris: ex illo enim quòd nouimus omne quod fit, fieri ex eo quod e&longs;t; & ex eo quod non e&longs;t, collegimus materiam quæ partim e&longs;t, partim non e&longs;t. Sed his omnibus veterum &longs;ententiarum expen&longs;io præponitur. ubet enim phi­lo&longs;ophus, a vt principiorum probationes colligamus ex rationibus adhibitis te&longs;timoniis, exem­plisque. apparentibus. In quibus &longs;i cum dicendis omnes homines con&longs;entire videantur, optimum. Si minus quodammodo quidem omnino, quod ab opinione deducti facient. abet enim vnu&longs;­qui&longs;que peculiare quoddam procliue ad veritatem ex quibus nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t aliquo pacto demon­&longs;trare de ip&longs;is; ex iis enim quæ verè &longs;anè dicuntur, at non per&longs;picuè procedentibus exi&longs;tet & id quod e&longs;t per&longs;picuè, tran&longs;umentibus &longs;emper ea quæ &longs;unt notiora inter illa quæ confusè dici con­&longs;ueuerunt. b Itaque ex ordiri vult tractationem à primis, quæ non per&longs;picuè dicuntur, &longs;tudentibus po&longs;t inuenire per&longs;picuè quid e&longs;t illud de quo laboramus, vt in morali quid e&longs;t beaticudo; in qua quidem tractatione accipit hoc in quo con&longs;entiunt omnes, eam nimirùm e&longs;&longs;e bonum præ&longs;tanti&longs;­&longs;imum. c eandem methodi rationem non modo in ea di&longs;ceptatione de beatitudine ob&longs;eruandam e&longs;&longs;e monet; &longs;ed in aliis omnibus in quibus aliquid rei propo&longs;itæ cogno&longs;centes ea quærimus quæ ne&longs;cimus. Quamobrem oportere per ea quæ verè quidem pronunciantur, non autem per&longs;picuè, eruere conari quod verè e&longs;t & per&longs;picuè. Hæc nos igitur ea dicimus e&longs;&longs;e quæ nonmodo in ethi­cis, &longs;ed in philo&longs;ophia quæ &longs;equitur naturalem, & in phy&longs;ica proponit nob. Ari&longs;toteles, vt eorum auxilio principiorum notitiam comparemus, omnium con&longs;en&longs;um fundamentum firmi&longs;simum e&longs;&longs;e putantes; ac &longs;i non omnes &longs;anè con&longs;entiant, conari tamen o&longs;tendere, vt ea dicere volui&longs;&longs;e vi­deantur, quæ &longs;i mon&longs;trata fuerint, propter innatam propen&longs;ionem ad veritatem facillimè nobis concedentur. taque tran&longs;umptis, ide&longs;t, ad bonum &longs;en&longs;um deductis iis quæ verè quidem, &longs;ed ob­&longs;curè pronunciantur, &longs;cientiarum prima principia comperiemus. Ex his multa &longs;unt, vt illa con­traria e&longs;&longs;e principia, eademque. non contraria; con&longs;imiliter ex non ente, aut ex ente fieri id quod fit, quæ cùm vniuersè vera &longs;int, ob&longs;curè tamen dicuntur. æc &longs;i illu&longs;trentur, & in bonam partem accipiantur, & accommodentur ad ea quæ verè & cum ratione con&longs;tituta fuerunt; vera pror&longs;us habebuntur; & in iis principiorum natura elucebit. d Atque hic e&longs;t modus omnium apti&longs;simus ad di&longs;&longs;oluendas dubitationes, & tollenda contraria; nam &longs;ic omnia quæ videntur in e&longs;&longs;e, con&longs;eruan­tur, & quæ contraria cen&longs;entur; mon&longs;trantur di&longs;tinguendo non e&longs;&longs;e contraria: &longs;ic enim verè pro­nunciantur, aliter non verè, vt verbis Ari&longs;totelis vtar. Itaque hæc quæ veteres a&longs;&longs;ump&longs;erunt, ea nota nobis e&longs;&longs;e arbitror, vnde via muniatur qua po&longs;simus ad principia nobis ignota peruenire. Proinde fuit con&longs;uetudo philo&longs;ophi veterum &longs;ententias in exordio cuiu&longs;que methodi &longs;edulò di&longs;cutere, quòd veritatem, &longs;i non planè eloquuntur, at balbutiunt. & cùm maiore ex parte veræ &longs;int: nanque &longs;en&longs;ibus plerunque fundantur; non difficile e&longs;t illas repurgare; e idque. in omni me­thodo conandum: præterquàm quòd &longs;i inde ducatur initium; vitatur negotium congrediendi cum imperitis, nec omnia reuocanda &longs;unt in controuer&longs;iam, cùm aliqua item ex illis periti rece­perint quorum iudicium videtur e&longs;&longs;e approbandum, & præcipuè veterum de principiis, f quòd enim veteres ortui rerum viciniores e&longs;&longs;ent, vim principiorum magis tenere potuerint; quia periti principia cominus intuentur. Accedit eodem, quòd &longs;uppeditant veterum dicta copiam theore­ matum: quandò artes omnes per incrementa quædam productæ &longs;unt a quoque artificè ad illas aliquid addente. Confu&longs;a igitur nobis nota &longs;unt; ea verò &longs;e habent vt tota. Quare cùm &longs;en&longs;ui notius &longs;it totum quàm partes; à notis autem nobis ex in&longs;tinctu naturæ procedendum &longs;it; à toto ad partes progredi cogimur. taquediuidendo paratur notitia partium qu&ecedil; certa e&longs;t atque di&longs;tin­cta: vt enim primo intuitu ampli&longs;simas ædes a&longs;picimus; nec tamen quid commen&longs;i; quid com­modi, aut artificiosè di&longs;po&longs;iti contineant intelligere valemus; tùm verò probè h&ecedil;c omnia percipi­mus, cùm qu&ecedil;que. particulatim &longs;peculamur, atque lu&longs;tramus: &longs;icitem euenit in &longs;cientiis. ortex re­rum nobis apparet, penetralia latent; h&ecedil;c animo peragrare oportet, &longs;i rem accuratè tenere voluë­ris. Vniuer&longs;alis illa notitia tupw/dhs & rudis e&longs;t; non &longs;ufficit; ad partes veniendum e&longs;t quibus perlu&longs;tratis vniuer&longs;a rei notitia completur. Idem quoque confirmat auctoritas Ari&longs;totelis b qui inuehitur in antiquos, quòd de natura quidem vniuersè di&longs;&longs;ererent; partes eius intactas omitte­rent; quanquàm id difficultatis &longs;ignum po&longs;uit. ius verba hæc &longs;unt, quæ propter interpr&ecedil;tes ani­maduertenda propono o\ o(lon e_xein, me/zos de\ mh\ diw\aw, ide&longs;t, totum verò obtinere: partem autem non po&longs;&longs;e, indicium difficultatis, & hoc e&longs;t illud totum, vnde ad &longs;ingularia procedere iu­bet diuidendo Ari&longs;toteles; c diuidimus autem vel propriè genus in &longs;uas &longs;pecies per oppo&longs;itas dif­ferentias; vel re&longs;oluimus effectus & compo&longs;ita in &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as, &longs;eu complexas, &longs;iue incomplexas; vel adhibita conditione di&longs;tinguimus; vel diiudicamus; & verùm à fal&longs;o di&longs;cernimus. Et planè totum quodcunque illud &longs;it nobis e&longs;t euidentius: etenim de partibus quanti per&longs;picuum e&longs;t, & genus &longs;pecie notius e&longs;t, prius enim nouimus hoc e&longs;&longs;e animal, quàm tale animal; & tota &longs;pecies per nomen indicatur, e&longs;&longs;entiæ verò partes definitione eluce&longs;cunt, diuidit enim definitio totam &longs;peciem in kaqe/kauta, ide&longs;t in &longs;ingularia, non &longs;anè indiuidua, &longs;ed partes e&longs;&longs;enti&ecedil; quæ &longs;imul om­nes in nomine ip&longs;o continebantur. & vniuer&longs;ale etiam quod magna ex parte verum e&longs;t, nobis no­tius e&longs;t, non tamen accuratè notum, ni&longs;i ip&longs;um in partes &longs;uas di&longs;tinxeris, & quod verum e&longs;t à falsò &longs;eparaueris. Et hoc equidem ab Ari&longs;totele notatum fui&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eo, vnde peteret initia phy&longs;icæ quæ nos cum totis in modo, vt dialectici dicunt, non &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a numeramus. &longs;iquidem, &longs;i &longs;ubiecta re­&longs;picias, per vniuer&longs;a pertinent; &longs;i tamen partes ip&longs;ius aduertas, non &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed cum modo vera e&longs;&longs;e intelliges. tputa, vniuersè verum e&longs;t in omni generatione contrarium ex contrario fie­ri, non tamen &longs;impliciter; quia non omni ex parte fit ex contrario; &longs;ed aliqua pars exi&longs;tit in eo quod fit, quæ contraria non e&longs;t. Sic quicquid fit, ex non ente fit; non tamen omnes eius partes ex non ente fiunt, &longs;ed aliquæ ex ente; nec omnibus modis ac &longs;impliciter fit ex ente, aut ex non ente; &longs;ed partim ex ente, partim ex non ente, & ex ente hoc modo, illo verò ex non ente, ex quibus exi&longs;tunt propo&longs;itiones quæ magna ex parte veræ exi&longs;tunt; non quia tales &longs;int eo quòd vt pluri­mùm, vt fortè in dialecticis; &longs;ed quia non omni ex parte, nec omnibus modis, & vt dici &longs;olet, &longs;im­pliciter. uas item nos in logicis non iniuria collocabimus; quippè quòd communiter veræ &longs;int & vniuer&longs;ales, quòd partes vniuer&longs;as minimè complectantur; ad proprias tamen partibus ip&longs;is di&longs;tinctis atque &longs;ecretis optimè reduci queant: nam tum ver&ecedil; omni ex parte exi&longs;tunt. t quòd, quicquid fit, partim fiat ex contrario, partim ex non contrario. erum e&longs;t vndequaque, quo etiam probè per&longs;pecto principiorum vis nece&longs;&longs;ariò patebit; & cuncta illu&longs;trabit, tùm qu&ecedil; prius confusè no&longs;cebantur, tùm etiam quæ nobis ob&longs;cura &longs;unt ex iis quæ pendent ab ip&longs;is. Atque hic erit pro­ce&longs;&longs;us ab vniuer&longs;is ad &longs;ingula, dimi&longs;sis indiuiduis quæ nullo modo &longs;unt &longs;cientiæ partes. d & hac via &longs;iue per circulum illum, quem regre&longs;&longs;um vocant, nota nobis ex notis natura cogno&longs;cuntur, &longs;iue notis principiis, recta demon&longs;tratione, rerum per &longs;e & nobis ignotarum notitia comparatur. Neque enim &longs;emper effectus per&longs;picui &longs;unt. Iam verò quòd &longs;ingularia non &longs;ola dicantur indiui­dua, patet: nam &longs;ingularia &longs;pecies generis alicuius dicuntur: e nec non res materiatæ ad differentiam rerum quæ &longs;unt ab omni materia &longs;egregatæ, vel per e&longs;&longs;entiam, vel per indifferentiam, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;unt vniuer&longs;alia logica, vel primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, triplex e&longs;t enim ab&longs;tractio phy&longs;ica, &longs;cilicet ab in­diuiduis, mathematica à materia &longs;en&longs;ili; & metaphy&longs;ica ab omni genere materiæ, quam item lo­gica imitatur: his hoc modo ab&longs;tractis &longs;ingularia opponuntur. & Auerroës &longs;ingulare nuncupa&longs;&longs;e videtur omne, quod di&longs;tinguitur à compo&longs;ito. f te&longs;tatur enim ip&longs;e cogitatiuam non componere intelligibilia &longs;ingularia, cùm tamen profe&longs;&longs;us &longs;it cogitatiuæ munus e&longs;&longs;e di&longs;currere de indiuiduis; itaque nuncupata e&longs;t mens particularis. b eam cau&longs;&longs;am igitur, vt tollamus ex Auerroë repugnan­tiam, &longs;ic verba eius doctoris interpr&ecedil;tabimur, cogitatiuam non componere &longs;ingularia intelligibi­lia, ide&longs;t terminos &longs;implices qui &longs;unt partes compo&longs;itorum vniuer&longs;alium. Ideoque. Zimara quod in phy&longs;icis a&longs;&longs;ecutus non e&longs;t, tandem loco alieno; & vbi minus oportuit, veram vocis interpr&ecedil;ta­tionem commentus e&longs;t. o&longs;dem &longs;implices terminos &longs;ingularia vocauit Ari&longs;toteles, cùm admonuit definitionem diuidere in &longs;ingularia. Ab his igitur quæ rudia &longs;unt & inchoata natura perpetuò progreditur, & dum rerum productioni vacat, & dum dirigit nos ad &longs;cientiam. Nam primùm in vtero certus &longs;anguis concre&longs;cit; inde quædam carnis moles exi&longs;tit; mox paullatim incipit deli­neari; ad extremum ab&longs;oluitur, vt nihil addi prætereà po&longs;sit. Hic autem progre&longs;&longs;us cum erudi­ ti&longs;simè & eleganti&longs;simè fuerit expo&longs;itus à M. ullio a in omni genere notitiæ, nihil nocebit (opinor) &longs;i in hunc locum apti&longs;simè illius verba conferantur. Ip&longs;e igitur primum de iis agens in quibus appetitus exercetur, ea &longs;cribit quæ certè ex media philo&longs;ophia deprompta fui&longs;&longs;e fatebe­ris, & cum placitis Ari&longs;totelis maximè congruentia. De prima ergo hominis con&longs;titutione di­&longs;putans &longs;ic ait. “Hanc initio con&longs;titutionem confu&longs;am habet & incertam, vt tantummodo &longs;e tueatur, qualecunque &longs;it.” Iam enim accepimus, omne animal &longs;eip&longs;um diligere, & &longs;imulac or­tum e&longs;t, id agere, vt &longs;e con&longs;eruet, quòd hic primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus à natu­ra datur, &longs;e vt con&longs;eruet, atque ita &longs;it affectum, vt optimè &longs;ecundum naturam e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit. &longs;e in­quàm tantummodo tueatur, qualecunque &longs;it. “&longs;ed nec quid fit, nec quid po&longs;sit, nec quid ip&longs;ius natura &longs;it, intelligit. Cùm autem proce&longs;sit paullulum, & quatenus, quicquid &longs;e attingat, ad &longs;eque. pertineat, per&longs;picere cœpit. ùm &longs;en&longs;im incipit progredi, &longs;e &longs;eque. agno&longs;cere & intelligere, quam ob cau&longs;am habeat eum quem diximus, animi appetitum: cœptatque. & ea quæ naturæ apta &longs;en­tit, appetere & propul&longs;are contraria.” Sed illud pror&longs;us diuinum quod ex Accio profitetur, vnde contemplationis origo deducta e&longs;t, qua &longs;e&longs;e v&longs;que ad Deum Optimum Maximum, &longs;olus homo euexit ab ignorantiæ gradu per admirationem eorum quæ &longs;en&longs;ibus & confusè &longs;ubiiceren­tur, ad exqui&longs;itam & di&longs;tinctam notitiam rerum procedens, & &longs;ummas eorum cau&longs;&longs;as attin­gens. Ecce pa&longs;tores He&longs;peridum, Columbi nauem, pan&longs;is velis ad littus appellere con&longs;piciunt: rem nouam procul admirantur; quid e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit ignorant; in&longs;ulam moueri &longs;u&longs;picantur. ut con­citari nimbum, propè Deos illam vehi cen&longs;ent. taque &longs;ecum fremunt, Quare, vt apud Accium pa&longs;tor ille qui nauem nunquàm ante viderat, “vt procul diuinum & nouum vehiculum Argo­nautarum è monte con&longs;pexit, primò admirans & perterritus loquitur: &longs;ic & ip&longs;i murmurant hoc modo.”

F

G

a 7. De hi&longs;. anim. . 6.

b 4. de Ge. an. . 3.

c 2. De die. crit. . 1.

d 3. de cau. p c. 3. Pi. ibao 7. de rep.

H

e 5. de fin.

f 1. ad Eu. c. 3.

A

B

a 1. ad Eu. c. 3.

C

b 1. ad Eu. c. 4.

c 2. ad Eu. c. 3.

D

d 7. ad Eu. c. 1.

e 1. de Au. T. 19.

f 1. Met.

a 2. Elen. 1. Rhet. 2. Met.

E

b 2. Met. c. 1.

c 1. Phy&longs;. T. 4.

F

G

d Auer. 1. Phy&longs;. T. 5.

e 1. de par. anim. . 3. 12. Met. T. 4.

H

f 3. de An. c. 33.

A

a 5. De fin.

B

-Tanta moles labitur

“Fremebunda ex alto ingenti &longs;onitu & &longs;piritu:

Præ &longs;e vndas voluit: vertices vi &longs;u&longs;citat:

Ruit prolap&longs;a: pelagus re&longs;pergit: reflat:

Ita dum interruptum credas nimbum voluier,

Dum quod &longs;ublime ventis expul&longs;um rapi

Saxum aut procellis, vel globo&longs;os turbines

Exi&longs;tere ictos vndis concur&longs;antibus,

Ni&longs;i quas terre&longs;tres pontus &longs;trages conciet:

C

Aut fortè Triton fu&longs;cina euertens &longs;pecus,

Subter radices penitus vndanti in freto

Molem ex profundo &longs;axeam ad cœlum vomit.”

Dubitat primo, quæ &longs;it ea natura, quam cernit ignotam: idemque iuuenibus vi&longs;is, auditoque nautico cantu,

Sicuti inciti atque alacres ro&longs;tris perfremunt

Delphini -Item alia multa.

“-Syluani melo

Con&longs;imilem ad aures cantum & auditum refert.&rdquo Ergo vt hîc primo a&longs;pectu inanimum quiddam &longs;en&longs;uque vacuum &longs;e putat cernere,; pò&longs;t autem &longs;ignis certioribus quale &longs;it id de quo dubitauerat incipit &longs;u&longs;picari: &longs;ic philo&longs;ophi & vniuersè omnes qui ex ignorantia traducuntur ad &longs;cientiam, primo a&longs;pectu mundi conturbati, cùm po&longs;teà vidi&longs;&longs;ent motus eius finitos & æqua­biles, omniaque ratis ordinibus moderata, immutabilique. con&longs;tantia, intellexere ine&longs;&longs;e aliquem, non &longs;olum habitatorem in hac cœle&longs;ti ac diuina domo, &longs;ed etiam rectorem & gubernatorem,

& tanquàm architectum tanti operis & tanti muneris. Hæc M. ullius præceptorem Platonem imitatus qui oculos ex tam admirabilium rerum con&longs;pectu nobis ad Dei cognitionem duces optimos extiti&longs;&longs;e prædicauit. Ita ergo peruenitur ad ea quæ &longs;unt nota natura, &longs;iue &longs;impliciter, & per &longs;e nota, fortè etiam &longs;ecundum naturam quæ dici &longs;olent maximè vniuer&longs;alia; quòd per plura pertinere &longs;olent. Quanquam vereor, ne quod di&longs;crimen inter hæc exi&longs;tat: neque &longs;olum in eo quòd ita propter varias cau&longs;&longs;as appellentur; “verum etiam quòd reip&longs;a di&longs;tinguantur.” Etenim natura nota & per &longs;e, illa dicere con&longs;ueuimus, quæ ex aliis tanquam ex fidem facienti­bus &longs;olum; non vt explicantibus quid, aut cur &longs;int, colligantur. mmò cùm primum ex notis nobis indicata &longs;unt, in &longs;eip&longs;is &longs;uæ lucis & veritatis cau&longs;&longs;as habent, atque illas quidem ita effica­ces, vt lucem veritatemque afferant iis quæ na&longs;cuntur ex ip&longs;is; quapropter ex ip&longs;is illa note&longs;ce­re opus e&longs;t: & planè non hæc ex notis nobis, vt nota nobis ex ip&longs;is apta &longs;unt. Cùm enim cognitio no&longs;tra à &longs;en&longs;u nece&longs;&longs;ariò ducat originem, per &longs;en&longs;ilia quæ po&longs;teriora &longs;unt, tran&longs;eundum e&longs;t. t &longs;i mens aut &longs;pecies obiecta libera foret à materia, progre&longs;&longs;us hic vtique nece&longs;&longs;arius non e&longs;&longs;et. Signo illud e&longs;to, quòd mens in habitu, quam fœcundam vocant, ab iis incipit quæ &longs;unt nota natura. Verùm &longs;en&longs;ilia & effectus ita &longs;e habent, vt ni&longs;i è cau&longs;sis illis cogno&longs;ci nequeant. Itaque etiam no­ta &longs;impliciter appellantur, quòd menti bene affectæ nota &longs;unt, qua&longs;i certi&longs;sima &longs;int; vt &longs;i aliter e&longs;&longs;e videantur; non rei &longs;anè, &longs;ed menti non benè affectæ &longs;it ad&longs;cribendum. ec &longs;ecus àc dulce &longs;impliciter illud iudicetur, quod gu&longs;tatui bene &longs;ano tale apparet, quòd &longs;i &longs;ecus appareat; non id rei vitium e&longs;t, &longs;ed gu&longs;tatus. itium pelle, iam dulce apparebit. Atque hæc ab&longs;olutè reip&longs;a & na­tura priora e&longs;&longs;e puto, quomodocunque priora &longs;int, vel origine, vel perfectione, quia &longs;int cau&longs;&longs;æ. C&ecedil;terùm notiora & priora &longs;ecundum rationem, nil vetat e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;teriora natura. a &longs;iquidem ea quæ hoc modo priora &longs;unt, ita &longs;int, quòd à c&ecedil;teris per indifferentiam &longs;eparari queant, hoc e&longs;t, vt &longs;int hoc vel illo definitè concipi po&longs;sint, nec eorum cognitio plus ex hoc quàm alio pendeat. vt ens quantum non plus quàm quale &longs;ignificat, ita &longs;e habent vniuer&longs;alia, qu&ecedil; prædicantur in quid. &longs;unt enim prima &longs;ecundum rationem, quòd ab intelligentia &longs;ingularium &longs;uperantur: At cùm ex his quæ per indifferentiam communia &longs;unt, quæ prædicantur in quid &longs;int princi­pia rei, formalia &longs;unt item natura priora; quæ verò communia &longs;unt ad vnum (quod po&longs;teà mon­&longs;trabitur) &longs;int apta ex &longs;uis partibus &longs;ubiectis, hæc priora tantummodò erunt ratione; re autem & natura po&longs;teriora. Nil igitur prohibet quominus ea quæ &longs;unt ratione priora, &longs;int po&longs;teriora na­tura. Quamobrem patet hæc non e&longs;&longs;e nota &longs;impliciter, neque &longs;uaptè natura nota. uinimmò il­lorum cognitionem ex aliorum notitia nece&longs;&longs;ariò pendere. Illa igitur quo priora natura &longs;unt, neque &longs;ecundum rationem &longs;olum, verum etiam reip&longs;a priora, &longs;unt illa principia quæ per nota nobis exquirimus, & in methodorum fronte per&longs;equimur in eorum ve&longs;tigatione &longs;ententias ve­terum &longs;crutantes, & qu&ecedil; verè dicta &longs;unt ob&longs;curè tamen explanantes & cuncta in bonum &longs;en&longs;um transferentes. uam &longs;anè partem in methodo ne&longs;cio'num condemnandi &longs;imus, &longs;i reiiciamus ad principium &longs;cientiæ, quæ e&longs;t mens qua terminos & principia cogno&longs;cimus: nanque et&longs;i compa­ret aliquis progre&longs;&longs;us rationis: is demum mente finitur. Quòd &longs;i opponas eandem e&longs;&longs;e verorum demon&longs;trationem & confutationem fal&longs;orum. b Quare, cum demon&longs;tratio &longs;it &longs;cientis. gitur eam partem fore &longs;cientiæ. Re&longs;pondebo, &longs;i fuerit di&longs;ceptatio de principiis in aliqua &longs;cientia pri­mis: quia non pote&longs;t eorum &longs;cientia tradi progre&longs;&longs;um quidem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;apientiæ vel dialecticum: eius verò terminum fore mentem; &longs;ecus, &longs;i di&longs;&longs;eramus de his quæ non &longs;unt prima, vel pendent à principiis, quòd horum pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;tratio quæ item &longs;i probabilia fuerint; propter ma­gnum lumen principiorum, multò fidei plus efficiunt quàm &longs;i demon&longs;trationis certi&longs;simæ vis adhiberetur; e&longs;t enim demon&longs;tratio rerum per &longs;e ignotarum; ideò multam operam flagitant, vt & per&longs;piciantur & credantur per &longs;e nihil afferentia lucis. Neque de omnibus e&longs;t &longs;electio veri cum demon&longs;tratione, verùm de iis quæ &longs;unt ex principiis, aut demon&longs;tratio communiter accipi­tur pro omni genere probationis. Sic ergo nota nobis in primo phy&longs;iologiæ limine ab Ari&longs;to­tele &longs;umpta e&longs;&longs;e defendimus.

D

E

a 13. Met. c. 2.

F

b 1. de c&ecedil;­lo T. 100.

G

Veterum &longs;ententiæ quo pacto tractande, & variæ philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ectæ recen&longs;entur. Cap. VI.

IN quaque di&longs;ceptatione magnus v&longs;us haberi &longs;olet ex di&longs;cu&longs;sione &longs;ententiarum quas alij pro­fe&longs;si fuerint, ac mea quidem &longs;ententia multas ob cau&longs;&longs;as, quarum aliquæ &longs;anè ab Ari&longs;totele recitantur: attamen & vna maximè nece&longs;&longs;aria mihi &longs;uccurrit quam neque in po&longs;tremis haben­dam e&longs;&longs;e iudico. Talis autem e&longs;t. Nimirum in &longs;cientia facienda præcipuè con&longs;ulendum e&longs;&longs;e ca­ptui di&longs;centis. Neque enim eadem di&longs;cipulo nota &longs;unt, ac præceptori; &longs;iquidem præceptor ve­ra rerum principia no&longs;cat, & explicationem rei ab ip&longs;ius propria natura po&longs;sit exordiri. i&longs;cipu­lus contrà, cum rudior &longs;it, multis eget tanquam apparatibus quibus erudiatur, & tanti&longs;per infor­metur, dum vera principia rerum a&longs;&longs;equatur, & apud ip&longs;um plus &longs;æpè pote&longs;t auctoritas quàm quæuis efficax ratio. In euoluendis igitur aliorum &longs;ententiis multa deteguntur quæ mentem di&longs;cipuli præparent ad concipienda principia quæ veterum auctoritas probabilia facit. Tùm etiam rerum natura cognitu perdifficilis e&longs;t; & quamuis vna &longs;it vnius rei &longs;cientia, quæ ducitur ex principiis quæ veri&longs;sima certi&longs;simaque. &longs;int; neque omnia &longs;cientiæ &longs;unt obnoxia; nec &longs;i &longs;ciri queant, ab omnibus eodem modo tenentur; cum varia mihi tibique. eiu&longs;dem rei euenta & attri­buta &longs;e&longs;e obtulerint ex quibus iudicia variantur. Itaque non idem ab vnoquoque principium di&longs;ciplinæ &longs;olet adhiberi. Fit igitur, vt &longs;i varia principia quæ in mentem veniunt ex aduer­&longs;ione plurium &longs;ententiarum, in promptu &longs;int; & id &longs;uccurrere po&longs;sit quod impleat animum auditoris: & illud etiam, quod &longs;it maximè accommodatum, ad docendum quod &longs;cili­cet ab auditore facilè capiatur, & vera rei principia mon&longs;tret. Aliæ quoque talis con&longs;ilij cau&longs;&longs;æ po&longs;&longs;unt afferri, ita enim tractantur, vt à nobis &longs;uprà dictum e&longs;t de primis illis cogita­tionibus rudibus &longs;cilicet & inchoatis, vt quid in illis veri continetur, accipi po&longs;sit; illud re­pudiari, quod ine&longs;t fal&longs;i. Proinde in iis ita ver&longs;andum, vt medici in corporum curatione; &longs;icu­ti enim ip&longs;i non nutriunt, nisi corpus a prauis humoribus repurgarint: &longs;ic neque ali debet ani­mus; ni&longs;i ante pellantur errores. Efficitur item, vt in veram &longs;ententiam po&longs;sit qui&longs;que trahi facilius, quo maior philo&longs;ophorum con&longs;en&longs;us exi&longs;tat; erit verò hoc expeditius quo plura ex in­hærentibus & comitantibus explorentur, atque illa quidem quæ videantur aduer&longs;a (nam nece&longs;­&longs;ariæ contrariorum conclu&longs;iones & rationes, qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones &longs;unt de contrariis) patiunt enim dubita­tionem; dubitatio verò copiam facit, & dum animum huc & illuc conuertit, viam mon&longs;trat ad inueniendum quod qu&ecedil;ritur, cùm ita eueniat, vt ex aduer&longs;orum collatione quod plus valeat ob­&longs;eruari po&longs;sit, & ex oppo&longs;itarum rationum conflictu, non &longs;ecus àc ignis ex attritu &longs;ilicis, excutia­tur veritas, & fallaciarum cau&longs;&longs;æ facilius detegantur, vnde omnis ignorantiæ caligo di&longs;pellitur. Neque enim oratio vera &longs;olùm e&longs;&longs;e debet; &longs;ed aperienda quoque cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t, cur &longs;al&longs;a pro veris habita &longs;int. ùm ita fiat, vt ratio per quam fal&longs;a colligebantur, probabilis &longs;anè, verùm non nece&longs;­&longs;aria videatur. Proptereà vero tum magis adhære&longs;cimus. Oppo&longs;ita enim (vt fertur) in proximo magis elucent. Ex hac igitur verorum collatione cum fal&longs;is id facilè &longs;uccedit quod optat in addi&longs;cente Philo&longs;ophus. ta enim principia vera cogno&longs;cit & credit, vt ijs oppo&longs;ita fal&longs;a pror&longs;us exi&longs;timet; ex quo efficitur immutabilis; id quod &longs;cientis e&longs;t maximè proprium. Nec reticendum illud e&longs;t quòd aliqui ratione in&longs;i&longs;tunt, nonnulli, quorum minus per&longs;picaæ e&longs;t ingenium, apparentibus. a verò &longs;&ecedil;pè &longs;ecum pugnare contingit, ex quo &longs;ententiæ repugnantes oriuntur. Igitur ob eam cau&longs;­&longs;am rationes & apparentia &longs;unt conferenda, &longs;&ecedil;piusque. apparentia con&longs;ectanda &longs;unt quàm retinen­dæ rationes: a &longs;i verò pugnent cum apparentibus eas &longs;oluere oportebit. Nunc autem ni&longs;i illas &longs;oluere liceat, fidem iis habere cogimur, & inuiti decipimur. Tùm etiam quia verum ex fal&longs;is col­ligi pote&longs;t, conclu&longs;ionis cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;pectandæ &longs;unt; ne fortè id quod concluditur, illi tribuatur ex quo, non pendet. Prætereà maiorem auctoritatem habebunt ea quæ dicentur apud illos qui antè au­diuerint rationes earum &longs;ententiarum quæ controuer&longs;iam faciunt. b Nam &longs;ic rectiores iudices habebimur, &longs;i omnium cau&longs;&longs;as audiamus. Arbitros enim præ&longs;tare nos oportet, non aduer&longs;arios, &longs;i iudicando verum inuenire volumus. Cæterùm prætereà, quæ valent ad rectè iudicandum, il­lud ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;criptum e&longs;t, ea videnda e&longs;&longs;e quæ dixerint alij, ne &longs;i decepti fuerint, in ei&longs;dem ver­&longs;emur erroribus. & &longs;i quod nobis commune cum illis decretum &longs;it, ne priuatim mole&longs;tiam nobis ip&longs;is exhibeat, c dum c&ecedil;teros adiutores habemus; & pro nobis pugnare paratostur; qua&longs;i &longs;oli tantam quæ&longs;tionem &longs;u&longs;tinere non valeamus, itaque ad excu&longs;ationem &longs;ocios qu&ecedil;rimus; & crimen nobis volumus cum alijs e&longs;&longs;e commune: neque id affine culpæ habendum e&longs;t; quia tamet&longs;i nihil de il­la quæ&longs;tione &longs;uccurrit quod aliter con&longs;titui po&longs;sit; gratum tamen e&longs;&longs;e debet non modò per om­nia melius; &longs;ed quòd aliqua &longs;anè meliora faciamus, alia verò non deteriora, &longs;i melius non licuerit. Hic quidem no&longs;tri con&longs;ilij fructus. Verumenimuerò, cùm variis modis &longs;ententiæ philo&longs;ophorum tractari &longs;oleant, & di&longs;&longs;olui rationes quibus confirmantur & probabiliter & demon&longs;tratiue; non de&longs;unt etiam (vt commune e&longs;t omnibus falli) qui &longs;e cauillis inuoluant, quibus cùm &longs;e extricare ne&longs;ciant, multa commini&longs;cuntur quæ toto cœlo di&longs;tent à vero. Nonnulli item demon&longs;trationi­bus vtantur quæ propriæ &longs;int aliarum &longs;cientiarum. Nos in hac methodo con&longs;tituimus illa di&longs;&longs;olue­re quæ vel ex no&longs;tris principiis malè deducta &longs;int, vel conclu&longs;a mediis per accidens, vel etiam in­uoluta &longs;ophi&longs;matis; illud in animo perpetuò fixum habentes, vt quæ ponuntur à nobis cum &longs;en­&longs;ilibus primum, tùm deinde cum Ari&longs;totelicis dogmatis congruant: &longs;iqua præter h&ecedil;c adhibean­tur, nihilominus &longs;tudebimus, vt ad ea ip&longs;a, quæ primi propo&longs;iti &longs;unt, aliquo pacto conducant. Nouerat enim Ari&longs;toteles Parmenidem & Meli&longs;&longs;um, tollere naturam principij, nedum natura­lis &longs;cientiæ fundamenta demoliri. uia verò præ&longs;eferret ea di&longs;putatio philo&longs;ophiam, ide&longs;t, pate­faceret aditum ad inueniendam veritatem (talis enim e&longs;t vis eius locutionis e)\xein filosofian, ide&longs;t, habere philo&longs;ophiam: ita vt etiam alibi Ari&longs;toteles ita &longs;criptum reliquerit aliquid e&longs;&longs;e à ciuili philo&longs;opho con&longs;iderandum, quòd haberet a)pozi\an ku\ filosofi\an pwlitikiw\, d ide&longs;t, dubitationem & philo&longs;ophiam ciuilem & alibi o(\sa me\n ou_n e)\xein filosofian pwlitikh\n, e ide&longs;t, “Quæcunque habent philo&longs;ophiam ciuilem”, &longs;ic quia contemplatio entis & vnius veritatem illu&longs;trat, & valet ad fundanda phy&longs;iologiæ principia, non detrectauit Philo&longs;ophus eiu&longs;modi con­gre&longs;&longs;um. Nanque et&longs;i non naturales quæ&longs;tiones ad di&longs;cutiendum proponebant, de natura &longs;e lo­qui profitebantur quæ, cùm principium foret, impellebat item ip&longs;os ad di&longs;ceptandum quodam­modo de principio. Itaque ob affinitatem quam habebat illa po&longs;itio cum phy&longs;iologiæ princi­piis, ab Ari&longs;totele con&longs;iderata e&longs;t. De natura autem &longs;e di&longs;&longs;erere autumabant, idcirco quod nulla alia &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;upra naturam ab illis per&longs;pecta fui&longs;&longs;et. Et Epicurus etiam omnia naturæ nomine appellauit qui ita diuidit. Omnium qu&ecedil; &longs;int, naturam e&longs;&longs;e corpora & inane, qu&ecedil;que his accidant. Nam quæcunque eluent aut his coniuncta duabus (corporibus & inani) rebus ea inuentes; aut horum euenta videbis. Ex hoc efficiebatur, vt apud illos ens & natura idem e&longs;&longs;et. Vnde Galenus rationem reddens in&longs;criptionis libri de natura humana, docuit omnes veteres in&longs;cribere con&longs;ue&longs;&longs;e &longs;uos libros de natura. Proinde naturalis erat prima philo&longs;ophia, ne dixerim quoque &longs;olam: quan­ mathematic&ecedil;, quia bonum con&longs;ectari non viderentur; è numero &longs;cientiarum expunctæ &longs;unt; &longs;ed po&longs;teà cognitis aliis &longs;ub&longs;tantiis materiæ immunibus ex &longs;upremo gradu deiecta fuit, & phi­lo&longs;ophiæ primæ proximos honores occupauit. Quamobrem latius patet naturæ &longs;ignificatum quàm id quod in no&longs;tra methodo concipitur & definitur, principium motus & quietis. dem enim valet atque ens. Quapropter qui naturam in eo &longs;ignificato &longs;pectat, multa quidem tractare cogitur qu&ecedil; cancellos methodi no&longs;tri tran&longs;iliunt, quod certè non ob&longs;eruans Themi&longs;tius, præ&longs;er­tim, cùm paullò antè affirma&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles, eos non agere de natura, quia motus initia &longs;u&longs;tuli&longs;­&longs;ent, locum ita legebat. De natura quidem non; naturales autem quæ&longs;tiones, & tamen illud om­nino fal&longs;um qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones ab illis inductas e&longs;&longs;e naturales. Id quod etiam videtur per&longs;pexi&longs;&longs;e Gale­nus a & legi&longs;&longs;e contextum, quemadmodum nos approbauimus. Ob id igitur de natura di&longs;&longs;ere­batur à cunctis; &longs;ed quæ&longs;tiones erant aliquando non naturales. Eiu&longs;modi fuerunt quas profe&longs;si &longs;unt Parmenides, & Meli&longs;&longs;us, & alij nonnulli eiu&longs;dem not&ecedil; philo&longs;ophi. Sed antequam &longs;ingulorum noto &longs;ententias, de philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ectis aliqua generatim dicere con&longs;titui. Quamuis autem hunc locum, vt c&ecedil;teros omnes Pererius docti&longs;simus vberrimè eruditi&longs;simèque. tractarit; nec qui&longs;quam illius indu&longs;triam diligentiamúe in hac tractatione con&longs;equi po&longs;sit; &longs;tudebimus tamen ea &longs;eligere qu&ecedil; ad Ari&longs;totelem magis attinere cen&longs;ebimus, & &longs;i qua &longs;uccurrent quæ no&longs;tro labore compara­uimus, ea quoque nos in medio ponemus. Ergo philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ectæ quæ tempore Ari&longs;totelis vel floruerant, vel florere inc&ecedil;perant, variæ fuerunt, atque illæ quidem varia nomina &longs;ortitæ, vel ab eo qui in&longs;tituerat, vt à Pythagora Pythagor&ecedil;i, vel à genere vitæ, vt Cynici, quòd vitam canis imitarentur; ab actione nonnulli, vt à deambulando Peripatetici. à patria quidem, vt Cyrenaici, & Megaren&longs;es, & à loco poti&longs;simum, velut Academici & Stoici à porticu. Sed ea princeps di&longs;tri­butio &longs;ectarum quæ à loco nomen obtinuit in Ionicam & Italicam huic nos Eleaticam &longs;ubiicimus. Nec defuerunt qui nomen ex profe&longs;sione ducerent, hinc quidam morales, alij dialectici dicti, nonnulli Theologi, & illi phy&longs;ici qui motum pro principio &longs;tatuerent. Atque vt ab Italica exor­diar quæ (ni&longs;i fallor) eadem e&longs;t cum Pythagorica, auctor eius fuit Pythagoras Samius Pherecy­dis Syri auditor qui cum He&longs;iodo numeratur in Theologis. uit autem primus qui animi immor­talitatem profe&longs;&longs;us fuerit, & cùm apud veteres my&longs;teria naturæ &longs;ub fabulis traderentur; grauiter & &longs;eriò philo&longs;ophari cœpit. Eius ergo auditor Pythagoras. Huius &longs;ectatores de quibus meminit Ari&longs;toteles, Empedocles, Epicharmus, Archytas Tarentinus, Alem&ecedil;o Crotoniates, &longs;ed hic floruit &longs;ub Pythagora iam &longs;eniore, Hippa&longs;us Metapontinus. Eleaticæ dicitur auctor fui&longs;&longs;e Thelauges Pythagoræ filius; eius patroni fuerunt Xenophanes, Parmenides, Meli&longs;&longs;us, Zeno Eleates; cum eis quoque Lycophronem numeremus; Leucippus, Democritus, & Heraclitus quorum ætate vixit Hippocrates. Ionicæ princeps fuit Thales Mile&longs;ius: hic omnium primus naturalem philo&longs;ophiam profe&longs;&longs;us e&longs;t; ip&longs;um &longs;equutus e&longs;t Anaximander; huic &longs;ucce&longs;sit Anaximenes; hic auditorem ha­buit Anaxagoram. s Archelaum docuit qui primus ex Ionia philo&longs;ophiam vexit Athenas, hunc po&longs;t audiuit Socrates. Sed ip&longs;e rerum naturalium &longs;crutatione po&longs;thabita, ac nonnullis de defini­tionis regulis explicatis &longs;e totum dedit officiis ciuilibus, & animos hominum bonis moribus infor­mare con&longs;tituit vtilia per&longs;equens; ea verò qu&ecedil; nullius v&longs;us e&longs;&longs;ent, àc &longs;i &longs;upra hominis captum fo­rent, omittens. A Socrate de&longs;cendit Plato auctor &longs;ectæ Academiæ, Anti&longs;thenes Cynicæ, Ari&longs;tip­pus Cyrenaicæ cum quo recen&longs;etur Eudoxus, à Platone fluxit Spere&longs;ippus qui &longs;e&longs;e tenuit in Aca­demia. Ari&longs;toteles, tamet&longs;i Platonis auditor, in&longs;tituit &longs;ectam Peripateticam valdè ab Academica differentem. Quia verò huius philo&longs;ophi in&longs;titutionem &longs;equimur, neque ab re nos facturos e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;emus, &longs;i de illius familia nonnulla &longs;ubiungamus. Fertur verò Ari&longs;totelem Theophra&longs;to &longs;cholam commi&longs;i&longs;&longs;e, hic verò eandem methodum &longs;eruans quam in&longs;tituit Ari&longs;toteles, &longs;crip&longs;it hi&longs;toriam plan­tarum. Po&longs;t Theophra&longs;tum Eudemus tenui&longs;&longs;e legitur. tque hactenus Ari&longs;totelis decreta retenta &longs;unt. Nam &longs;trato Lamp&longs;acenus, quanquam Theophra&longs;ti di&longs;cipulus, multa commutauit, vnde puri illi Peripati fontes conturbati fuerunt, pr&ecedil;tereo complures alios quorum nulla extat hodie nota apud no&longs;tros quorum audacia, &longs;eu negligentia veri&longs;imile e&longs;t, di&longs;ciplinam illam Ari&longs;totelicam fui&longs;&longs;e f&ecedil;datam. Mox graui&longs;simus ca&longs;us perculit non modo profe&longs;&longs;ores, verùm etiam libros occultauit, vt demum L. yllæ beneficio libri Ari&longs;totelici po&longs;t aliquot &longs;æcula qua&longs;i reuixerint; eos habuit M. arro; tractauit etiam M. ullius. Iterum afflicta e&longs;t illa philo&longs;ophandi ratio, donec à So&longs;igene Byzantij fuit propè à mortuis excitata. Sed eius extat &longs;ola memoria, ab Alexandro illius di&longs;cipulo propagata commentaria nulla. Hinc &longs;ucce&longs;sit Alexander, cuius iudicium ita pr&ecedil;&longs;tans habitum e&longs;t, vt nemo Ari&longs;totelicus exi&longs;timaretur, qui non e&longs;&longs;et Alexandr&ecedil;us. gnoratur autem hic'ne an pr&ecedil;ceptor eius So&longs;igenes u(pomnhmashsou_, ide&longs;t commentatoris nomine decoratus e&longs;&longs;et. Ab Alexandro The­mi&longs;tius emanauit, quem Metaphra&longs;ten maiores no&longs;tri vocarunt. Hinc Michaël Ephe&longs;ius v&longs;que ad Theodorum Metochyten, quos Atticos, generatim dictos fui&longs;&longs;e coniicimus ab interprete tertij de Anima, quem &longs;ub Ioannis Grammatici nomine tractamus, &longs;ed ob&longs;eruarunt nonnulli Stephanum e&longs;&longs;e & ip&longs;um Ari&longs;totelis interpretem, &longs;ed cuias ip&longs;e fuerit è quo ordine, qua ætate nil certi &longs;uccurrit quod affirmari valeat. Aliquanto ante hæc tempora di&longs;ciplinæ Alexandriæ excultæ &longs;unt earum profe&longs;&longs;ores Ammonij & Grammatici; atque illi quidem &longs;æpè doctori &longs;uo parùm amici. Ex interpretibus Ari­&longs;totelis illi etiam Platoni dediti; ne&longs;cio verò tenuerint'ne; cùm è Gr&ecedil;cia pul&longs;i fuerint, Simplicius, Pri&longs;cianus Lydus, & Olympiodorus; & hic etiam non valdè Ari&longs;toteli addictus. Inde ad Arabas di­&longs;ciplina Peripatetica permanauit; apud hos Auerroës & Auicenna floruerunt; quamquam in Hi­&longs;pania tenuere: pò&longs;t ad Britannos & Germanos; inter hos excelluit quamquam longo po&longs;t ten­pore Scotus. A Britannis & Germanis opera Karolimagni, qui Longobardis &longs;ubiugatis, & Italia ab eorum tyrannide liberata, Romæ, Bononiæ, Ticini gymna&longs;ia publica erexit; philo&longs;ophia longo temporis interuallo migrauit ad Italos: horum omnium Coryph&ecedil;us D. homas.

H

A

B

a 1. ad Eu. c. 3.

b 1. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 101.

C

c 13. Met. c. 1.

D

d 1. Polit. c. 9.

e 1. ad Eu. c. 1.

E

a 1. De E­lem

F

G

H

A

Explicatur generatim, quo pacto &longs;cientiarum principia tractentur, & quam viam tenuerit Ari&longs;toteles, dum veterum &longs;ententias de principijs conuellit. Cap. VII.

B

CAETERVM &longs;ententiæ de rerum &longs;umma exi&longs;tunt, quippe quòd initia phy&longs;iologiæ per­tentent, & ex his aliquæ &longs;ic labefactent, vt ip&longs;i nil planè relinquant, quo firmari po&longs;sit. Quare con&longs;tituendum quippiam fuit quo phy&longs;icè in&longs;i&longs;teret. d ab Ari&longs;totele confectum fui&longs;&longs;e &longs;cimus: &longs;ed qua ratione, qua via, & quatenus factitatum, non æquè con&longs;tat apud omnes. Igitur antequàm cominus accedamus ad ea perpendenda quæ veteres philo&longs;ophi decreuerint, breui­ter explicare præ&longs;tabit, quemadmodum &longs;cientiæ in &longs;uorum principiorum tractatione ver&longs;entur. Ab iis verò exordium di&longs;putationis no&longs;træ ducetur quæ monuit quondam nos Ari&longs;toteles in qua­que qu&ecedil;&longs;tione ve&longs;tiganda. a Ea verò et&longs;i ad Geometriam ab ip&longs;o accommodantur, nihilominus

ad phy&longs;icen facilè tran&longs;umuntur. ta enim illa pr&ecedil;cepta traduntur, vt ab vnius &longs;cientiæ progre&longs;&longs;u, de omnibus idem fiat iudicium. Quamobrem è di&longs;putationibus qua&longs;dam naturales e&longs;&longs;e pone­mus, alias autem non naturales, eas naturales appellamus quæ pendent ex principiis philo&longs;ophiæ naturalis. Non naturales autem, vel quòd phy&longs;iologiæ principia non a&longs;&longs;umant, vel quòd iis ab­utantur. Cùm tot modis tractentur qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones, illud ratum e&longs;&longs;e oportet, dum ver&longs;amur in &longs;cien­tia naturali, de non naturalibus ab&longs;olutè nihil e&longs;&longs;e dicendum. Proinde etiam Plato quendam de rebus ad Geometriam b pertinentibus &longs;ci&longs;citantem mi&longs;it ad Euclidem, licere autem verba facere naturali philo&longs;opho de qu&ecedil;&longs;tionibus illis qu&ecedil; &longs;unt non naturales aliqua ex parte. Quocirca &longs;i di­&longs;putationes naturales pendent è principiis &longs;cientiæ naturalis. ontrà, cùm qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones de principiis rerum naturalium non po&longs;sint e&longs;&longs;e ex hoc genere, neque ordine, & qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones igitur de principiis rerum naturalium, erunt omnino non naturales. portebit enim e&longs;&longs;e principiorum principia, quod &longs;cienti&ecedil; pror&longs;us aduer&longs;atur. Verùm fac incidere controuer&longs;iam de principiis huius methodi, cu­ius'nam officium erit illa tractare? Profectò principia cuiu&longs;dam &longs;cientiæ, aut in alia principia re­&longs;oluuntur, aut &longs;unt ab&longs;olutè prima. Rur&longs;us, &longs;i tractanda &longs;unt, aut ita illa tractare oportet, vt de­mon&longs;trentur, aut vt re&longs;pondeamus ad obiectiones. Ac &longs;i ea demon&longs;trari contingat; aut per cau&longs;&longs;as demon&longs;trantur, aut per nota nobis. In&longs;uper obiectiones ad quas re&longs;pondendum e&longs;t, aut pendent ex illius &longs;cienti&ecedil; principiis, aut illa euertunt. Si igitur illis alia principia pr&ecedil;cedant, eorum proba­tio pertinet ad eam &longs;cientiam quæ ver&longs;atur in notitia principiorum &longs;uperiorum, h&ecedil;c autem &longs;ub­alternans à dialecticis appellatur. Si verò principia prima fuerint ab&longs;olutè, aut hæc euidentia per &longs;e &longs;unt, ita vt &longs;olius &longs;en&longs;us auxilio note&longs;cant, aut &longs;i non adeò con&longs;picua fuerint, nec demon&longs;trantur item; &longs;ed admonitione quadam per&longs;uadentur, ea verò communis e&longs;&longs;e cuique &longs;cientiæ pote&longs;t, aut quanquam con&longs;picua, &longs;i negentur propter proteruientes vna redargutione confirmantur. d au­tem præ&longs;tat habitus dialecticus. Generatim verò in illa &longs;cientia in qua tanquàm principia &longs;umun­tur, ea &longs;upponi oportet, et &longs;i quo pacto tractentur, ita tractentur, vt aut declarentur per nota no­bis, aut vt tollantur obiectiones, non omnes &longs;anè, &longs;ed illæ quæ è principiis eius &longs;cientiæ ducuntur. Itaque aut vbi non &longs;upponantur phy&longs;iologi&ecedil; principia, aut afferantur rationes, qu&ecedil; ip&longs;a funditus è medio tollant, non abutentes neque detorquentes illa, non erit munus philo&longs;ophi naturalis ea tractare. Verùm &longs;i de principiis exi&longs;tant, aut erit &longs;ubalternantis officium, aut communis cuiu&longs;dam, &longs;iue ea fuerit prima philo&longs;ophia, &longs;iue dialectica. Sed cùm &longs;cientiæ principia varia &longs;int, variique. &longs;cientiarum ordines: age nunc particulatim &longs;ingula percurramus, & ius &longs;uum cuique &longs;cientiæ red­dere nitamur. Quid verò controuer&longs;i&ecedil; &longs;it adhibitis hi&longs;ce di&longs;tinctionibus facilè intelligetur. Nam ge­nera probationum tripliciter di&longs;tribuimus. ut enim &longs;unt ex cau&longs;sis, aut ex effectis, aut ex notis no­bis; quid autem differat nota nobis ab effectibus anteà dictum e&longs;t. Pr&ecedil;tereà principia &longs;unt illa ex quib. demon&longs;tramus, aut de quibus, i. p&longs;a &longs;ubiecta. &ecedil;c autem vel generalia &longs;unt cuiu&longs;dam &longs;cienti&ecedil; totius, vel propria cuiu&longs;dam partis, atque illa quidem quorum principia partes proprietatesque. ve&longs;tigantur. Atque iterum principia ex quibus demon&longs;tramus, aut cognitionis initia &longs;unt, aut rei. n principiis cognitionis &longs;unt axiomata communia, hypothe&longs;es, & quædam nota nobis quæ petuntur à &longs;en&longs;u. Principia rei &longs;unt definitiones & cau&longs;&longs;æ, vel totius &longs;ubiecti, vel partium eius. Ex his autem illa quæ &longs;unt nota nobis ad inuentionis potius quàm cognitionis initia referuntur. c &longs;i cognitionis initia libeat appellare, non idcirco debent in methodo tractari. a &longs;iquidem &longs;int vulgo noti&longs;sima; ars autem & &longs;cientia quæque ver&longs;etur in iis quæ vulgo latent, neque in euidentibus tractandis operam ludat. & Ari&longs;toteles hæc b eadem con&longs;tituit tanquam præcedentia cognitioni primorum principioru: quapropter re uera non &longs;unt &longs;cientiæ principia. uocirca à nob. ptimo iure omittentur. Ideoque. dum &longs;cruta­bimur po&longs;sint'ne &longs;cientiæ tractare &longs;ua principia, definitiones, & axiomata &longs;olum, & cau&longs;&longs;as; cùm &longs;ubiecti totius, tùm eius partium complectemur, eaque. cum triplici probationis genere conferemus. Po&longs;tremò cùm principia &longs;umi po&longs;sint, vt illa quibus accidit e&longs;&longs;e principia, aut etiam cum habi­tudine ad ea quorum principia &longs;unt, vtrunque caput in controuer&longs;iam reuocare volumus. Sed enim illud præc&ecedil;teris &longs;tatuendum e&longs;&longs;e videtur neminem v&longs;quam aggredi &longs;cientiam, quin iam animo præoccuparit aliquas e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;as & eorum principia quorum &longs;cientiam quærit. Nam qui &longs;cientiam per&longs;equitur, is certè in cau&longs;&longs;arum notitiam contendit. Nec etiam vulgò ignotum: c &longs;cire e&longs;&longs;e rem ex cau&longs;&longs;a cogno&longs;cere. roptereà dixit aliquando Ari&longs;toteles, d &longs;cientiæ & ratio­ cinationi cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;upponi quæ quæruntur. e idemque. inuectus e&longs;t in Parmenidem & Meli&longs;&longs;um, quia naturam principij tollerent. uòd hæc hypothe&longs;is mirum in modum &longs;cientiæ leges euertat. Idcirco vereor ne Theophra&longs;tus f parum aptè collegerit e&longs;&longs;e principia, &longs;imulque. hoc officium phy­&longs;ico delegarit, ita enim ratiocinatur. Compo&longs;ita &longs;unt. Compo&longs;ita con&longs;tant è principijs. Et prin­cipia &longs;unt igitur. Quis enim non per&longs;picit id concludi, quod accipitur? dum enim compo&longs;ita con­cipio, principia quoque componentia cogito. Nec cur id officium phy&longs;ici &longs;it. ror&longs;us &longs;cio. uip­pe quòd eadem ratione po&longs;&longs;et vti mathematicus. c primus philo&longs;ophus, & omnis artifex, dum ponit qui&longs;que &longs;ubiectum, cuius principia, partes, affectionesque. venetur. Itaque ratio communis e&longs;t, nec è principiis rei ducta, nec demon&longs;tratiua; nec phy&longs;ica igitur. Verùm quia po&longs;&longs;et qui&longs;piam repugnare dicens, quamuis id ad phy&longs;icum non pertineat; e&longs;&longs;e nihilominus habitum quendam qui tractet ita principia, vt doceat aliqua e&longs;&longs;e ex quibus con&longs;tent demon&longs;trationes. Monet Sim­plicius nullum habitum exi&longs;tere qui hoc munere fungatur. Neque verò nece&longs;&longs;arium e&longs;&longs;e, quòd &longs;ua cuique &longs;upponantur. Et illud per&longs;picuum e&longs;t in naturali philo&longs;ophia compo&longs;ita e&longs;&longs;e eorumque. e&longs;&longs;e principia, & philo&longs;ophiam naturalem habere principia. uocirca nec illius notitiam &longs;ine prin­cipiorum cognitione haberi po&longs;&longs;e. & &longs;tatim conuertere &longs;e &longs;cientiam ad exquirendum qualis &longs;it principiorum vis; vt quamuis quæ&longs;tio &longs;it'ne res, anteponenda &longs;it: nihilominus ea non requira­tur in omnibus, &longs;ed in iis quæ &longs;int, nec'ne ignoratur. Atqui principia no&longs;cuntur. Veruntamen finge tu nunc ignorari principia, neque itidem ad phy&longs;icam pertinebit eorum explicatio, &longs;ed ad aliam methodum. C&ecedil;terùm ni&longs;i h&ecedil;c in bonam partem accipiantur nec rectè contra Theophra­&longs;tum inferuntur, nec progre&longs;&longs;um Ari&longs;totelis admodum &longs;eruant. Hæc enim quæ a&longs;&longs;umit Simpli­cius, &longs;i transferantur ad &longs;ignificandum certa principia, v. . formam, aut finem; nihil id ad rem no&longs;tram, qui cum Theophra&longs;to de ratione principij di&longs;putamus: nec quærimus &longs;it ne forma, aut finis; &longs;ed vtrum principia &longs;int ab&longs;olutè nec'ne. uod nos in omni methodo, vt per&longs;picuum &longs;umi defendimus. Quòd &longs;i Simplicius principij rationem accipiat; etiam fallit quandò item ratio prin­cipij demon&longs;tretur; vt cùm prima contraria concluditur e&longs;&longs;e principia. Quocirca ratio principij, nec à phy&longs;ico, nec à primo philo&longs;opho, aut dialectico, nec demum in vlla methodo peragetur quæ &longs;implici quæ&longs;tione colligatur; &longs;iquidem natura per &longs;e, dum ingenuit &longs;ciendi cupidinem, excitat nos ad ob&longs;curarum rerum cau&longs;&longs;as indagandas, & ita notitiam cuiu&longs;dam principij quod inquirendum &longs;it, &longs;ubmini&longs;trat. Verùm principij rationem veluti complexum concludi nil pro­hibet. Nec quicquam vetat, quominus opiner eam tractationem à philo&longs;opho confici po&longs;&longs;e; & quamquam methodum ita &longs;uorum principiorum rationem habere, &longs;i oporteat. Mox ad ip&longs;a principia tran&longs;eamus. Quia verò tonus &longs;cientiæ &longs;ubiectum vt ba&longs;is e&longs;t eorum omnium quæ in &longs;cientia tractantur, & id quo vniuer&longs;a referuntur, & cuius gratia reliqua &longs;pectari debent, de illo primùm di&longs;&longs;eramus. In primis verò accipimus &longs;cientiam &longs;ubiecto definiri & ab ip&longs;o &longs;ic determi­nari, vt illius gratia cuncta di&longs;quirantur. uia primum pellit &longs;en&longs;um, & animo de&longs;iderium &longs;uæ cognitionIs incutit. Porrò dum quidpiam no&longs;cere volumus, con&longs;ectamur quid & cuiu&longs;modi &longs;it. illud definitione conficitur. oc ab&longs;oluit demon&longs;tratio. Quare definitiones & demon&longs;trationes illò tendunt, vt ip&longs;arum auxilio no&longs;catur &longs;ubiectum. &longs;que adeò, vt tamet&longs;i methodus rem quæ &longs;en&longs;ibus &longs;e&longs;e obtulerit, in &longs;ua principia re&longs;oluat & vbi re&longs;oluerit, ibi demum quie&longs;cat; at non ce&longs;­&longs;at mens, quin reditu quodam facto cau&longs;&longs;as re&longs;olutione inuentas applicet ad id quod anteà quæ rebatur. Hoc igitur non modò ignotum &longs;impliciter e&longs;&longs;e nequit, &longs;ed neque etiam omni ex parte notum. &longs;iquidem aliquod &longs;en&longs;ile, idque. noti&longs;simum nobis pro &longs;ubiecto &longs;umatur nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t, vt ad &longs;ui di&longs;qui&longs;itionem excitet mentem no&longs;tram, ac ni&longs;i tale fuerit, non rectè con&longs;tituetur &longs;ubiectum. Proinde ens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis & quantum, quia noti&longs;sima nobis vt &longs;ubiecta ponuntur, & eo­rum principia proprietatesque. ve&longs;tigantur. Nec vlla methodus e&longs;t, quæ non accipiat aut vnum ex his, aut eius aliquam partem, aut ip&longs;orum aliquid &longs;eu proprium, &longs;eu principium. Neque verò &longs;ic nota e&longs;&longs;e oportet ea, quæ &longs;cientiarum &longs;ubiecta facimus, vt &longs;ingulæ illorum partes nece&longs;&longs;ariò te­neantur: neque &longs;ic totius &longs;cientiæ &longs;ubiectum con&longs;tituitur: verùm &longs;at e&longs;t, &longs;i cogno&longs;catur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;im­pliciter, ita &longs;ub&longs;tantiam e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter nouimus, etiam &longs;i vna aut altera &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;catur à nobis quia demptis indiuidui conditionibus vniuer&longs;alibus &longs;ub&longs;tantia remanet. Itaque ex illo etiam quòd &longs;i non omnia; &longs;altem aliqua moueantur; motum quoque e&longs;&longs;e colligitur. tem a&longs;&longs;ecurandum e&longs;t de quanto, quod &longs;ine actu cognitione partium poni pote&longs;t, vt &longs;ubiectum. Ea po&longs;tmodo quæ ignota &longs;unt, &longs;iue partes, &longs;eu principia, &longs;iue proprietates in methodo &longs;uis viis & ingeniis exquirun­tur, de quibus mox agendum e&longs;t. Et de proprietatibus non e&longs;t dubitandum, quin ip&longs;arum demon­&longs;tratio &longs;it afferenda; quæ quidem fit vel propter quid &longs;olum, &longs;i &longs;en&longs;ui nota &longs;it, vel propter quid & quòd fit, &longs;i fugiat &longs;en&longs;um. au&longs;&longs;as enim habent, cur in&longs;int in &longs;ubiecto. Partes &longs;anè multis mo­dis accipiuntur in methodis. el vt &longs;ubiectum, &longs;icut animal &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis, vel vt pars eius quod e&longs;t ad vnum, velut accidens ad ens. & c&ecedil;lum ad reliqua corpora &longs;implicia, vel vt pars me­thodi, quia &longs;cilicet in aliqua eius parte proponatur ad examinandum, velut ortus qui duobus li­bris &longs;epararis explicatur, licet referatur ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quæ phy&longs;icæ totius e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum. uius generis e&longs;&longs;e queunt ea quæ non &longs;unt, vt inane, lineæ in &longs;ectiles, infinitum, & huiu&longs;modi. Sed quo­modocunque pars accipiatur de illa controuer&longs;ia na&longs;citur inter Auerrois interpretes propter re­pugnantiam quæ in eius philo&longs;ophi verbis deprehenditur. Nam quandoque. concedit Auerroës pattes &longs;ubiecti in eadem &longs;cientia po&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;trari. a Vnde etiam &longs;ummus philo&longs;ophus ignem e&longs;&longs;e aliquando concludebat. b Tamen alibi negat in &longs;cientia demon&longs;trati po&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum, eiusúe partes. c Priorem &longs;ententiam Zimara defendebat. eque ip&longs;i videbatur ab&longs;urdum, partes &longs;ubie­cti vbi fui&longs;&longs;ent ignot&ecedil;, cùm habeant aliquid &longs;eip&longs;is notius, aut proprium, aut cau&longs;&longs;am, vel ex cau&longs;&longs;a, vel ex effectu demon&longs;trari. Corroborarunt alij Zimaræ &longs;ententiam nonnullis argumentis. In­quiunt enim. Siquis &longs;it ad quem perrineat o&longs;tendere rem e&longs;&longs;e, ad eundem quoque &longs;pectare o&longs;ten­dere quid &longs;it. Sed ad geometram verbig. ertinet con&longs;iderare, &longs;it'ne triangulus qui pars e&longs;t, &longs;eu &longs;pecies &longs;ubiecti. Ergo etiam ip&longs;e docebit quid &longs;it. Si igitur illi &longs;ciendum e&longs;t, &longs;it'ne triangulus; idem quoque &longs;ciet quid &longs;it. Atqui hæc cognitio e&longs;t à priori & ex cau&longs;&longs;a. Prætereà definitio pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e nota aliqua ex parte, quamuis definitum &longs;it ignotum. Ergo definitum ex definitione demon&longs;tra­bitur. & ex cau&longs;&longs;a igitur. Quòd item ex effectu partem &longs;ubiecti demon&longs;trare liceat, Ari&longs;totelis au­ctoritate confirmatur qui docet nos po&longs;&longs;e no&longs;cere rem e&longs;&longs;e, vel per &longs;e, vel per accidens, ide&longs;t quan­do fuerint nota nobis euentu rei propo&longs;itæ. permulta verò huiu&longs;ce progre&longs;&longs;us exempla &longs;ubiicere po&longs;&longs;em. t cùm ignem e&longs;&longs;e probatur ex eo quòd terra &longs;it & e&longs;&longs;e mentem agentem, quia &longs;it pote­&longs;tate mens. Sed opponam ego huic &longs;ententiæ rationem Ari&longs;totelis ita concludentis. d Si demon­&longs;traretur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum; ergo & quid e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum demon&longs;trari po&longs;&longs;et. Sed quid e&longs;t demon&longs;tra­tioni non e&longs;t obnoxium. Nec quòd fit igitur. Quapropter, vt cum Ari&longs;totele con&longs;entiamus & Auerroëm purgare po&longs;simus; accipiemus primùm nullum e&longs;&longs;e genus demon&longs;trationis quo &longs;im­pliciter aliquid e&longs;&longs;e probari po&longs;sit. Et quamuis à definitione progrediamur ad definitum; nec id etiam vel auctore Auerroë genus e&longs;t argumentationis, &longs;ed numeratur in admonitionibus. &longs;iqui­dem in ip&longs;a definitione rei definiendæ natura &longs;tatim appareat: cùm idem &longs;int definitio & defini­tum, &longs;ed in definito natura ip&longs;ius confu&longs;a &longs;pectetur, in definitione verò di&longs;tincta & euoluta in &longs;uas partes. Ac &longs;iquis e&longs;t proce&longs;&longs;us rationis in definitione, is e&longs;t à parte definitionis ad partem, vt à ge­nere ad differentias & à partibus ad totam definitionem. & &longs;i rectè animaduertas, e&longs;t via &longs;eu me­thodus, non in&longs;trumentum cognitionis. Demum omni genere &longs;yllogi&longs;mi &longs;impliciter excluditur definitio, per &longs;e. Sed neque demon&longs;tratione ab effectu concludi pote&longs;t quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex. &longs;iquidem id quod demon&longs;tratione concluditur, vt in alio concluditur, & efficit quæ&longs;tionem complexam. Re&longs;tat igitur, vt quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex ab&longs;oluatur &longs;yllogi&longs;mo quem diximus hypotheticum per natu­ram. Quapropter ad ea quæ aduer&longs;arij dicebant, ita re&longs;pondemus. Primùm notantes accipi falsò vbi procedimus à definitione ad definitum, e&longs;&longs;e genus argumentandi; &longs;ed euolutionem &longs;olam & di&longs;tinctionem definiti in &longs;uas partes. e Similiter quòd à parte definitionis ad definitum &longs;yllogi­&longs;ticè progrediamur. d quoque nego. Et no&longs;cimus quidem e&longs;&longs;e rem, vel per &longs;e vel per accidens; nec tamen per &longs;yllogi&longs;mum &longs;impliciter. Quod verò ad repugnantiam pertinet quæ ex verbis Auerrois exoritur, eam facilè tollo; quoniam 4. de c&ecedil;lo probationem non &longs;impliciter accipit, &longs;ed quemcunque rationis progre&longs;&longs;um quem nos tum e&longs;&longs;e dicimus &longs;yllogi&longs;mum hypotheticum per naturam; 6. verò Met. icimus ip&longs;um &longs;yllogi&longs;mum &longs;impliciter ei denegare. Succedunt his principia cognitionis quæ dicimus axiomata. Hæc &longs;anè nullum genus demon&longs;trationis admit­tunt, quia nihil habent neque prius &longs;eip&longs;is, neque notius, neque natura, neque nobis Habent qui­dem axiomata principia qu&ecedil;dam inuentionis, ip&longs;a &longs;cilicet &longs;en&longs;ilia & &longs;ingularia è quibus colliguntur. Siquis tamen illa neget, proteruiens potius quàm quòd iis fidem non habeat; dicimus e&longs;&longs;e mu­nus artificis communis, &longs;eu dialecticus &longs;it, &longs;eu primus philo&longs;ophus; redarguere &longs;olùm ea negan­tem, neque vllo modo demon&longs;trare, quippe quòd omnino &longs;int indemon&longs;trabilia. Qua vérò id ra­tione efficiatur, hac facta partitione cogno&longs;cemus. Scire enim licet, inter axiomata vnum e&longs;&longs;e, quod e&longs;t omnium primum & principium c&ecedil;terorum pronuntiatorum, a nec quidem, vt cau&longs;&longs;am; &longs;ed vt per &longs;e noti&longs;simum. De quolibet verum e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;erere, aut negare. Ex hoc autem reliqua axio­mata fidem &longs;umere. Philo&longs;opho igitur nulla via &longs;uccurrit qua primum illud confirmet. Itaque &longs;ubuenit philo&longs;opho dialecticus, & ea ratione confirmat deducendo neganter in ab&longs;urda, repu­gnantia, nugas,s&scon&longs;imiles &longs;copos qui &longs;unt dialectici. Hoc principio &longs;tabilito c&ecedil;terorum proba­tionem &longs;u&longs;cipit. Primus philo&longs;ophus quæ &longs;ic confirmat, vt eò deducat aduer&longs;arium quod fieri nequit, id verò e&longs;t quod opponitur illi primo principio. Nam &longs;iquis &longs;iquis exemplig. eget. Quæ vni tertiò &longs;imilia &longs;unt, inter &longs;e quoque e&longs;&longs;e &longs;imilia. icet primus philo&longs;ophus. Si minus; ergo inter &longs;e &longs;imilia non e&longs;&longs;ent. uare nec illi eidem &longs;imilia erunt, &longs;ed di&longs;similia. Quapropter eadem eidem &longs;imilia erunt & non &longs;imilia. Sic de quolibet non erit verum a&longs;&longs;erere & negare, quod & euiden­ti&longs;simè fal&longs;um e&longs;t, & nullo modo fieri pote&longs;t. & hac ratione reliquarum &longs;cientiarum principia probantur. Nec ob id te &longs;u&longs;picari velim, primam philo&longs;ophiam c&ecedil;teras &longs;cientias &longs;ibi &longs;ubalternas ef­ficere, &longs;i illarum principia probet. Neque enim omne genus probationis con&longs;tituit gradum &longs;ubal­terni; &longs;ed vbi procedat ex cau&longs;sis, quod in no&longs;tra hypothe&longs;i non v&longs;uuenit. Deinde moneo prin­cipia noti&longs;sima non &longs;ic à philo&longs;opho tractari, quia contracta &longs;int ad cuiu&longs;piam cert&ecedil; &longs;cienti&ecedil; &longs;ub­iectum, vt in quaque &longs;cientia &longs;umi debent, accipiuntur enim &longs;ecundum analogiam, b vt no&longs;ti; &longs;ed quibus ine&longs;t per accidens, vt contracta ad certa &longs;ubiecta fiant principia c&ecedil;terarum &longs;cientiarum. Ex his &longs;oluere licet Eudemi dubitationem qui &longs;ic argumentabatur. Cùm probatio principiorum ad nullam &longs;cientiam &longs;pectet, &longs;ed aut ad &longs;uperiorem, aut ad communem quampiam. Si ponamus illa in &longs;uperiore aut communi nota non e&longs;&longs;e. Nec igitur hæ &longs;cientiæ &longs;ua principia confirmare po­terunt. uare ad aliam illas confugere oportebit. Aut igitur in infinitum hoc fiet; ideoque. efficie­tur, vt nullius rei &longs;cientia e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit, aut aliqua &longs;cientia poterit &longs;ua principia probare contrà quam con&longs;tituerit Ari&longs;toteles, inquiens. Nulli de principiis. d Nanque, vt etiam te&longs;tatur Simplicius re­&longs;pondens ad Eudemum, h&ecedil;c &longs;cientia perueniet ad ea quæ per &longs;e nota &longs;unt, quæ nemo fan&ecedil; mentis vnquàm negaret ni&longs;i proteruiens, in quem &longs;ic inuehetur, vt paullò antè docuimus. Secundum ab axiomate locum hypothe&longs;es obtinent, quas ab axiomate differre nouimus, quòd axioma de do­mo affertur, h&ecedil; tanti&longs;per illi cedentes præmon&longs;tratorem de&longs;iderant, &longs;ed tamen vt primùm decla­rantur, credit auditor eas aut communes e&longs;&longs;e accepimus in vniuer&longs;a &longs;cientia, cuiu&longs;modi illa e&longs;t. Statuatur omnia aut qu&ecedil;dam moueri; aut &longs;peciales, & ad probationem cuiu&longs;piam certæ conclu­&longs;ionis in ea facultate &longs;umi, attamen ip&longs;as per &longs;e demon&longs;trari po&longs;&longs;e; vt &longs;i infinitum non e&longs;&longs;e pona­mus cum Anaxagora di&longs;&longs;erentes de naturæ principiis, quod po&longs;teà pluribus tran&longs;igendum &longs;it. C&ecedil;terùm &longs;i communes fuerint, per &longs;en&longs;um note&longs;cunt, quemadmodum reliqua principia de qui­bus &longs;uprà dictum e&longs;t. e Quòd &longs;i non &longs;ufficiat &longs;en&longs;us, aut quoquo pacto negentur, earum proba­tio pertinet ad aliam methodum, &longs;iue ea communis &longs;it, &longs;iue habeat illam, &longs;ubalterna. tputa ma­thematicus accipit à phy&longs;ico in infinitum diuidi po&longs;&longs;e continuum. Si verò fuerint &longs;peciales & &longs;cientiæ partem re&longs;piciant; non video, cur in eadem &longs;cientia probari non po&longs;sint. Nam prius ali­quid habent in illa &longs;cientia ex quo demon&longs;trari queant. Itaque non de illis ad aliam facultatem quæ&longs;tio reuocari debet, &longs;ed de principiis illius primis, &longs;i fortè negentur, iis po&longs;itis reliqua ex illis nece&longs;&longs;ariò con&longs;equuntur. Ad hoc tamen dialecticen valere non nego. ullis enim cancellis coër­cetur; &longs;ed ex datis procedens, aditum habet ad quodlibet problema; atque ita latè patet, vt &longs;iquis principia primo philo&longs;opho negaret, facultas illa probandi &longs;uppeteret dialectico. Neque enim illos audiendos e&longs;&longs;e puto qui æqualem ambitum dialectico & primo philo&longs;opho concedunt, quòd vtrique de ente &longs;peculentur. &longs;iquidem non &longs;eruant eandem proportionem vtriu&longs;que me­thodi vires. ùm tamet&longs;i primus philo&longs;ophus de ente di&longs;&longs;erit, accipiat tamen ip&longs;um terminis qui­bu&longs;dam & certa con&longs;iderandi ratione definitum, itaque definitus habet quæ&longs;tiones. ontrà dia­lecticus omne ens peruagatur, nullis certis quæ&longs;tionibus ad&longs;tringitur. dcirco non minus di&longs;tat dialectica à prima philo&longs;ophia, quàm à reliquis &longs;cientiis. &longs;ed &longs;i id præ&longs;tare pote&longs;t eadem &longs;cientia, cur opem dialectici implorare debemus? Quod igitur ad cognitionis principia pertinet, ita con­&longs;titutum &longs;it. Reliquum modò e&longs;t, vt principia rei conficiamus. Porrò principia rei cau&longs;&longs;as defi­nitionesque. complectuntur. easque. cùm generales, tùm item &longs;peciales. De generalibus di&longs;&longs;erens Auerroës f eas di&longs;tribuit in primas, & pror&longs;us in demon&longs;trabiles, & illas quarum aliæ cau&longs;&longs;æ prio­res extent. Si primæ fuerint, putat eas ex effectibus o&longs;tendi po&longs;&longs;e; nos agamus communius, & dicamus ex notis nobis, quòd &longs;i in alias &longs;uperiores cau&longs;&longs;as re&longs;oluantur; propter quid ip&longs;æ &longs;int, explicare munus e&longs;&longs;e &longs;uperioris &longs;cientiæ. Veruntamen inuehebantur in Auerroëm viri graui&longs;si­mi ita opponentes. Primùm quòd non ex cau&longs;sis efficiatur &longs;cientia principiorum. Cùm enim &longs;cire quòd e&longs;t, & &longs;cire cur e&longs;t ita &longs;e habeant, at aliquando in eadem &longs;cientia vterque &longs;ciendi mo­dus habeatur, nonnunquàm verò &longs;cire quòd res e&longs;t, &longs;it inferioris &longs;cientiæ, cur autem &longs;uperioris. Si in eadem &longs;cientia &longs;int, quòd e&longs;t & cur e&longs;t, patet reditum fieri po&longs;&longs;e à demon&longs;tratione, quòd e&longs;t ad demon&longs;trationem cur &longs;it. Non igitur ex alia &longs;cientia demon&longs;trationem cur e&longs;t, petere cogemur: &longs;ed vna eademque. &longs;cientia vtraque hæc munera præ&longs;tabit. Quòd &longs;i &longs;inguli &longs;ciendi modi pertineant ad &longs;ingulas &longs;cientias, neque item cum vero con&longs;onabit id quod dicit Auerroës. Quoniam &longs;cire quòd res e&longs;t maximè pertinet ad eam &longs;cientiam in qua docetur cur e&longs;t. Cùm igitur accipiat Auer­roës ip&longs;um cur e&longs;t ad &longs;uperiorem &longs;cientiam pertinere; & ip&longs;um quòd e&longs;t, igitur ad eandem &longs;cien­tiam pertinebit. Neque item ex effectiş o&longs;tendi queunt principia &longs;ubiecti. Signo illud e&longs;to. &longs;iqui­dem o&longs;tendere quòd res &longs;it, &longs;it o&longs;tendere cau&longs;&longs;am quòd &longs;it. Verùm &longs;i &longs;cientia cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;e demon­&longs;traret, po&longs;&longs;et item retrocedendo cau&longs;&longs;am eiu&longs;dem o&longs;tendere. Itaque &longs;cientia &longs;ubalterna po&longs;&longs;et docere, cur e&longs;&longs;ent &longs;ua principia, oppo&longs;itum verò pronuntiabat Auerroës. Sed mirandum e&longs;t ho­mines bene doctos in re tam ludicra lap&longs;os e&longs;&longs;e, & &longs;ophi&longs;mate leui&longs;simo ita &longs;e&longs;e implica&longs;&longs;e. uan­doquidem et&longs;i in eadem &longs;cientia continetur vterque &longs;ciendi modus: at non idcirco pote&longs;t inferri etiam principia cogno&longs;ci cur &longs;int. Neque enim &longs;ic intelligitur vtrunque &longs;ciendi modum referri ad eandem rem, vt accipitur in obiectione: &longs;ed quòd vnius &longs;it &longs;cientia quòd e&longs;t, alterius autem cur. Quemadmodum &longs;e habent propè e&longs;&longs;e & non &longs;cintillare. uòd ex eo quòd non &longs;cintillent noui­mus e&longs;&longs;e propè: ex eo quòd &longs;int propè nouimus quamobrem non &longs;cintillant: non autem, quia no­uimus ab effectu quòd propè &longs;int, idcirco etiam nouimus cur propè &longs;int. Cùm &longs;ecundo loco affer­tur. Neque id euenire, vbi diuer&longs;a &longs;it &longs;cientia qua cogno&longs;cimus cur e&longs;t ab ea qua nouimus quòd e&longs;t. uoniam, dum cogno&longs;cimus cur e&longs;t, &longs;imul item nouimus e&longs;&longs;e rem. Dicimus ip&longs;um, quòd e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e duplex, aut quod e&longs;t notum nobis &longs;en&longs;u & per accidens, aut quod e&longs;t per &longs;e notum & per cau&longs;&longs;as. uod notum nobis e&longs;t, vt &longs;en&longs;u & experientia notuerit, in alia &longs;cientia & in arte plerun­que con&longs;picuum e&longs;t, quòd ars tractet &longs;en&longs;ilia; cau&longs;&longs;a ad &longs;uperiorem &longs;cientiam pertinet. & de hoc &longs;ciendi modo agebat Auerroës. Vbi tertiò dicitur o&longs;tendere quòd e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e o&longs;tendere cau&longs;&longs;am quòd &longs;it. Id non videtur perpetuò verum, &longs;ed valebit &longs;olùm in cau&longs;&longs;am habentibus. Nam &longs;iqua &longs;it pri­ma cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;impliciter, vbi ad illam re&longs;oluendo peruenero & nouero quòd &longs;it: at non idcirco illam &longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e nouero, quia nouerim eius aliquam e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am; &longs;ed quia per &longs;e nota &longs;it. Aut erit cogni­tio quòd cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;it, quæ &longs;it eadem cum eo cuius e&longs;&longs;e quæritur. Nam in &longs;implicibus quatenus &longs;im­plicia &longs;unt, idem e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e & e&longs;&longs;entia, cau&longs;&longs;æ verò &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi: Re&longs;tant modò principia rei &longs;pe­cialia, vt cau&longs;&longs;æ hominis & di&longs;ciplinæ compotis. Atque horum quidem notitia paratur ex notis nobis, & poti&longs;simè demon&longs;tratione quòd e&longs;t, &longs;i complexa fuerint. Ideoque. dictum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele accidentia magnam partem conferre ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t. &longs;i incomplexa, iis &longs;anè in&longs;tru­mentis de quibus antea dictum e&longs;t, cùm de incomplexorum probationibus ex 6. primæ philo&longs;o­phiæ diceremus. His ergo modis &longs;cientiarum principia tractantur. Verùm poterit nobis oppone­re qui&longs;piam. Cùm de principiis exi&longs;tere po&longs;sit quæ&longs;tio duplex, an &longs;int, vt an &longs;it materies, an &longs;it Deus; & an hæc principia &longs;int; cur po&longs;teriorem hanc quæ complexa e&longs;t, ab Ari&longs;totele tractatam comperimus; alteram &longs;implicem videmus fui&longs;&longs;e neglectam? præcipuè quòd non negatur &longs;cienti&ecedil; cuilibet ex notis nobis ad &longs;ua principia profici&longs;ci. Prætereà &longs;i quæ&longs;tionem &longs;implicem damus in partibus &longs;ubiecti cau&longs;sisque. &longs;pecialibus, ecquid e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;æ quominus etiam de illis excitari po&longs;sit quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex? An plures &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;æ propter quas omittitur &longs;implex quæ&longs;tio de cau&longs;sis pri­mis; cùm quòd propter ob&longs;curitatem vim methodi fugit; tùm etiam quòd quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex e&longs;t de eo quòd e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter; at quæ&longs;tio de eo, quòd res &longs;it &longs;impliciter, e&longs;t quæ&longs;tio metaphy&longs;ica: Sed valeat hoc ia &longs;cientiis particularibus; nanque opponet illico qui&longs;piam, cur non id pre&longs;tat pri­ma philo&longs;ophia? Quin etiam &longs;i quis in controuer&longs;iam reuocet principia communia; videtur in­currere in hoc periculum, ne de tota &longs;cientia dubitet; ergò eam profiteri nequit: at de cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;pe­ciali dubitans adhuc &longs;cientiam tueri pote&longs;t; & de cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;peciali qu&ecedil;&longs;tio &longs;pecialis e&longs;t à qua primus philo&longs;ophus abhorret perpetuò tractans vniuersè. Qui dixerit hanc quæ&longs;tionem fugere metho­dum, patronum habebit Auerroëm; is enim &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas per &longs;e ip&longs;as &longs;pectari po&longs;&longs;e tùm monet, cùm adepti &longs;umus alias &longs;cientias, &longs;unt verò principia entis, quare methodo excedunt. Ita ego de reliquis principiis primis &longs;imile iudicium faciam; præ&longs;ertim quòd &longs;cientiam & habitum demon&longs;tratiuum &longs;ic definiri per&longs;picio, quòd &longs;it vnius generis &longs;ubiecti eiusque. principia partes & proprietates doceat. ui periculum &longs;cientiæ proponet Græcos auctores &longs;ui con&longs;ilij proferet. Re­liquum e&longs;t nunc, vt explicemus, quemadmodum conflixerit cum veteribus Ari&longs;toteles. am enim patuit à phy&longs;ico negotium hoc peragi non po&longs;&longs;e. Nanque et&longs;i habet aliquid fortè quòd afferat contraponentes motum: at nihil &longs;upere&longs;t phy&longs;ico quo pugnet cum ijs qui negant motum. Video cen&longs;ere quo&longs;dam eo tempore phy&longs;icum primum philo&longs;ophi per&longs;onam &longs;u&longs;tinere, quod item­ confirmari audio, quia loquitur de ente Ari&longs;toteles. ns verò pertinet ad primum philo&longs;ophum. Terminos alij docent e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi, modum di&longs;&longs;erendi dialecticum. Mihi non placet Ari&longs;to­telem primi philo&longs;ophi per&longs;onam &longs;u&longs;cipere. Nam &longs;i ita dicamus, vercor ne habitum primi phi­lo&longs;ophi phy&longs;ico præponere cogamur; cùm tamen ea vox meta\ t\ fusi_ka\, ide&longs;t, po&longs;t naturalia, moneat habitum phy&longs;icum e&longs;&longs;e præponendum. Neque illud pror&longs;us verum, ens e&longs;&longs;e terminum primi philo&longs;ophi. a &longs;iquidem dialecticus, Sophi&longs;tes, & primus Philo&longs;ophus in entis con&longs;ideratio­ne ver&longs;entur. Proinde cùm dialecticus etiam de ente di&longs;&longs;erat, cum eiu&longs;dem quoque facultatis principia re&longs;piciat; illi probans de quolibet a&longs;&longs;erere, vel negare verum e&longs;&longs;e; cum item modus di&longs;­&longs;erendi &longs;it dialecticus; id quod &longs;copi &longs;ignificant quos in ea di&longs;putatione &longs;pectat Ari&longs;toteles; b non video cur congre&longs;&longs;us non &longs;it dialecticus. Etenim deducere in ab&longs;urda contradicentia quæ fieri nequeant, & &longs;olœci&longs;mos &longs;unt &longs;copi dialectici quos in tota illa di&longs;ceptatione con&longs;ectatur Ari&longs;tote­les. Atque hactenus de ratione qua principia &longs;cientiarum in &longs;cientiis generatim tractantur, & quemadmodum in methodo naturali Philo&longs;ophus in veteres inuehatur.

a 1. Post.

C

b Val. Max.

D

E

a Gal lib. de optima lecta.

b 2. Po&longs;t. T. 27.

c 1. Po&longs;t.

d 6. Met. T. 1.

e 1. Phy&longs;. T. 8.

F

f Simpl.

G

H

A

B

a 3. De c&ecedil;­lo T. . 32.

b 2. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 18.

c 2 de An. T. . 27. 6. Me. T. 1.

I.

II.

C

III.

d 6. Met. T. 1.

D

Ad I.

e 1. Phy&longs;. T. 5.

Ad II.

Ad III.

E

a 4. Met. T. 7. 8.

F

b 1 Post. ita tractantur à primo philo&longs;opho, quà communia &longs;unt. t tum principia &longs;unt entis, quatenus e&longs;t ens: c ideoque. non probantur, quà c&ecedil;terarum &longs;cientiarum principia &longs;unt, &longs;ed vt principia entis, c 11. Met. &longs;um. 2. c. 2.

d 1. Phy&longs;. T. 8.

G

e 1. Phy&longs;. T. 11.

H

f 2. Phy&longs;. T. . 22.

A

B

C

D

E

a 4. Met. T. 5.

b 1. Elen. c. 3.

Sit'ne &longs;ubalternationis affinitas inter phy&longs;icen & primam philo&longs;ophiam. Cap. VIII.

F

SI Phy&longs;icus per&longs;onam dialectici &longs;u&longs;tinet, dum inuehitur in eos qui tollunt motum & moueri, complura accipit à &longs;en&longs;u; facilè coniicere po&longs;&longs;umus inter phy&longs;icen & alias &longs;cientias, nullam affinitatem &longs;ubalternationis intercedere; &longs;iue ea &longs;ola conditio requiratur, vt nos opinamur, &longs;iue etiam aliæ nonnullæ quas alij philo&longs;ophi ponunt, quanquam Ari&longs;toteles omnem rem &longs;ub dubio reliquit, cùm indefinitè pronuntiauit, vbi principia negentur, officium ea probandi, aut e&longs;&longs;e alte­rius, hoc e&longs;t, &longs;ubalternantis, aut omnium communis: communis autem e&longs;&longs;e poterat tùm dialecti­ca, tum etiam prima philo&longs;ophia, quòd &longs;i dialecticen &longs;ignificare volui&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles, iam prima philo&longs;ophia quæ in principiorum probatione ver&longs;atur, ad alterum membrum reiicienda foret, & e&longs;&longs;et &longs;ubalternans. Nec minores difficultates affert natura &longs;ubalternantium quam in philo&longs;ophia Peripatetica non ni&longs;i coniectura a&longs;&longs;equi licet. Itaque non ab re mihi facturum videor, &longs;i rem hanc accuratius exquiram. Igitur de conditione &longs;ubalternarum tot propè &longs;ententias celebres ob&longs;eruo. vulgarem vnam quæ ab antiquis accepta fuit: iuniorum duas. Pa&longs;sim defendi &longs;olet hæc triam con­&longs;tituere &longs;ubalternam, &longs;i &longs;ubiectum inferioris in &longs;uperioris &longs;ubiecto contineatur. Cùm verò &longs;ub­iectum accipio, vel totum intelligo, quod ex duabus partibus con&longs;tat, altera, vt materia nimirum

re tractanda, altera, vt forma, nempè con&longs;iderandi ratione qu&ecedil; vtraque &longs;i in &longs;ubalternante & &longs;ub­alterna &longs;eruentur vt mihi in phy&longs;ica & medicína videtur, efficiunt &longs;ubalternationem numeris om­nibus ab&longs;olutam, vel alteram ex his partibus &longs;eor&longs;um, vt &longs;iqua res naturalis mathematicè &longs;pecte­tur, &longs;iue aliqua res mathematica naturaliter; c vnde inferior quidam gradus &longs;ubalternationis exo­ritur. Deinde vt inferioris &longs;ubiecto accidentaria quædam conditio &longs;uperueniat, vt lineæ videri po&longs;&longs;e. Po&longs;tremò vt inferioris principia petantur à &longs;uperiore. Sed reuoluenti complures facultates quæ &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia numerantur in &longs;ubalternis, aut non omnes his legibus ad&longs;tringi videntur, aut non ita &longs;impliciter acciprentiæ, aut non prime. Nanque opponam A&longs;trologiam quæ &longs;ubalter­na e&longs;t, A&longs;tronomiæ. Siquidem vbi vna accipiat quòd res e&longs;t, altera doceat cur ita &longs;it, iam ratio &longs;ub­alternationis intercedit. Atqui A&longs;trologia petit ab A&longs;tronomia rationes motuum; quapropter e&longs;t &longs;ubalterna. Neque tamen &longs;ubiectum e&longs;t pars. tenim in vtraque c&ecedil;lum ob&longs;eruatur, aut vniuer­&longs;um. Præterea quòd accidens alterius &longs;ubiecto accedat non licet ab&longs;olutè defendere: quandò ex &longs;ubiecto & eo quod adiicitur veluti forma, fit vnum per &longs;e, quod e&longs;t ab&longs;olutè &longs;ubiectum ex ge­mina parte con&longs;titutum ex materia nimirum, & ratione con&longs;iderandi. Sed &longs;ubiectum per &longs;e e&longs;t vnum, idem e&longs;t methodi finis, quippe cuius gratia c&ecedil;tera con&longs;iderantur, & ad quod referuntur, quod accidens e&longs;&longs;e non pote&longs;t. Tertiò non nece&longs;&longs;arium, quòd omnia principia &longs;ubalternæ re&longs;ol­uantur in alia &longs;uperiora principia. ropterea quòd &longs;unt ea principia, vel complexa, vel incom­plexa. tque incomplexa quidem à nullo demon&longs;trantur, & eadem &longs;unt in &longs;ubalterna & &longs;ubal­ternante, vt linea, quadratum & huiu&longs;modi. uòd &longs;i complexa fuerint, non videtur negare Ari­&longs;toteles d fieri po&longs;&longs;e, vt ex ei&longs;dem principi aliquid demon&longs;tretur in &longs;ubalterna quod demon&longs;tra­tum fuit in &longs;ubalternante. ita enim &longs;crip&longs;it Ari&longs;toteles, a)ll) e)c w(_h/ deiknut ai/ ti\ pe(zi w_n h/gewme­tzia e)/sin, h)/ a(\ e)k tw_n a)utw_n deknutai th_| gewmet zia, w/spe/z ta\ o)pka\. h&ecedil;c enim interrogatio geometrica e&longs;t, “quæ e&longs;t ex iis principiis ex quibus aliquid o&longs;tenditur, quod ad geometriam perti­net, aut illa quæ ex ei&longs;dem, ex quibus aliquid in geometria demon&longs;tratur. uiu&longs;modi &longs;unt optica qua&longs;i eadem accipiantur ad probandum geometrica & optica theoremata.” Quocirca viri præ­&longs;tanti&longs;simi veterum via relicta non multis, &longs;ed vna tantum lege contengi fueruut. x iis enim ali­qui ex &longs;olo tran&longs;itu de genere in genus & &longs;ubalternationem effici voluerunt. amet&longs;i iam tribus modis fieri cen&longs;uêre. Vel, quia demon&longs;tratio transferatur; ea verò transfertur, vel vbi maior vnius demon&longs;trationis propo&longs;itio &longs;umatur in duabus &longs;cientijs. el cum &longs;ubiectum vnius ab alia probetur. aut &longs;i adiiciatur aliqua conditio &longs;ubiecto &longs;uperioris. Ita vt non omnia hæc in &longs;ubalternatione requirantur, &longs;ed vbi vna ex his conditionibus ad&longs;it, continuò &longs;ubalterna exi&longs;tat. Illud optimè, &longs;i vna conditio &longs;it &longs;atis ne plures inculcentur. ru&longs;tra enim multa afferuntur, &longs;i vnum &longs;it &longs;atis. Nec improbandum e&longs;t, non omnes &longs;imul requiri, cùm difficile &longs;it in vniuer&longs;is quas &longs;ubalternas dici­mus, omnes has leges &longs;imul ob&longs;eruari. Cæterùm mihi videtur Ari&longs;toteles vnicam tantummodò formulam tran&longs;itus indica&longs;&longs;e, videlicet, vbi eiu&longs;dem effectus, aut principij altera tradat quòd e&longs;t, altera verò cur &longs;it. Adde quòd &longs;i phy&longs;icus o&longs;tendit e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias à materia liberas, &longs;iue &longs;int &longs;ub­iectum primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, &longs;iue etiam principia, nil enim refert, immò magis idem efficietur. &longs;i principia fuerint, quo principia &longs;ubiecto priora &longs;unt. rima philo&longs;ophia phy&longs;icæ &longs;ubalterna erit: quod nefas e&longs;t. & quanquàm &longs;uprà negatum e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum po&longs;&longs;e probari; at id ip&longs;i non viderant; nec probationum genera di&longs;tinguebant à viis in illa hypothe&longs;i. Quod &longs;i fortè probationem ex cau&longs;sis accipi velint, nulla ex iis tribus &longs;cientiis, prima, &longs;cilicet philo&longs;ophia, naturali & mathema­tica, &longs;ubalternæ locum occupabit, quod mihi &longs;at e&longs;t, illuc enim tendo, vt nullam ex his alteri &longs;ub­alternam e&longs;&longs;e doceam. uippe quòd &longs;ingulæ ex his &longs;cientiis &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as impetrarint. tque illas quidem ab&longs;olutè, vt nulla alterius auxilium imploret, quantum ad illud &longs;pectat, quòd rationem &longs;ui &longs;ubiecti reddere valeat. Si verò continuum opponas, quod cum mathematicò &longs;ubiiciatur, à phy&longs;ico tractatur accurati&longs;simè; re&longs;pondebo continuum vtriu&longs;que &longs;cientiæ proprium e&longs;&longs;e & ab vtroque vt &longs;ui ip&longs;ius proprium e&longs;t explicari, neque enim reddit rationem phy&longs;icus eius quanti: quod e&longs;t &longs;eparatum à materia &longs;en&longs;ili, cuiu&longs;modi accipitur à mathematico: &longs;ed reddit rationem phy&longs;icus eorum quæ in&longs;unt in corpore c&ecedil;le&longs;ti quod ab A&longs;tronomo &longs;pectatur, quia vtrobique c&ecedil;­lum cum accidentibus &longs;en&longs;ilibus accipitur, & eorum quæ con&longs;iderat medicus, quandò vtrique in &longs;en&longs;ilium tractatione occupantur. Con&longs;imilique. modo mathematicus eorum reddit cau&longs;&longs;am quæ docet opticus. &longs;iquidem vtrique lineam mathematicam explorant. Quòd &longs;i has tres principes. &longs;cientias exceperis, difficilè e&longs;t negare id e&longs;&longs;e commune omnibus &longs;ubalternis. mnes enim tractant res &longs;en&longs;iles, aut mathematicas, aut etiam primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, quarum principia &longs;impliciter à pri­mis illis &longs;cientiis exponuntur. Neque mihi &longs;ingulare videtur, immò commune, &longs;ubiecto &longs;ubalter­nantis addi aliquam conditionem in &longs;ubalterna; &longs;ed hoc nece&longs;&longs;arium e&longs;t, mea quidem &longs;ententia: &longs;iquidem res &longs;impliciter à tribus illis &longs;cientiis tractantur, à c&ecedil;teris cum aliqua conditione, &longs;iue ea &longs;it conditio contrahens &longs;ubiectum &longs;uperioris ad pauciora &longs;ubiecta, &longs;iue etiam &longs;it modus quo non res ip&longs;a, &longs;ed rei notio re&longs;tringitur. Attulerunt & vnicam alij conditionem, nimirum, &longs;i altera rem &longs;impliciter tractet, altera verò cum habitudine ad opus, aut actionem. t geometer lineam &longs;impli­citer: faber autem ferrarius lineam inferro cuiu&longs;dam v&longs;us gratia. a Nam cùm ille &longs;cientiæ quæ con&longs;iderant res &longs;impliciter, habeant cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ui &longs;ubiecti; reliquæ verò tractent &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;olum, & per ea cogno&longs;cant, &longs;uarumque. rationum principia ab illis accipiant; ex hoc efficitur, vt &longs;iquando cau&longs;&longs;as euentorum &longs;uorum perquirere velint, ad illas confugiant. Ideoque. artes & facultates om­nes erunt &longs;ubalternæ: tres verò &longs;cientiæ &longs;ubalternantes. Et planè nulla ex his tribus &longs;cientiis ad alteram confugit, vt cau&longs;&longs;as petat &longs;uorum theorematum, aut principiorum; &longs;ed omnes &ecedil;què pro­cedunt ex primis & maximè notis. Equidem ob&longs;truo id perpetuò apud Ari&longs;totelem, &longs;icuti men­tionem facit de &longs;ubalternis artis exempla in medio ponere, & ex ingenio &longs;ubalternarum conclu­di artes e&longs;&longs;e ex eo numero, quòd vbi vna doceat quòd e&longs;t altera cur &longs;it, ea qu&ecedil; docet e&longs;&longs;e rem, &longs;ub­alterna e&longs;t. Sed artes docent e&longs;&longs;e rem, cau&longs;&longs;as primas a&longs;signare non po&longs;&longs;unt. Ergo artes &longs;unt &longs;ub­alternæ. At verò illud dubito, &longs;it'ne hæc cau&longs;&longs;a proxima & vt dici con&longs;ueuit, ratio formalis &longs;ub­alternationis e&longs;&longs;e artem, &longs;eu &longs;pectare aliquid cum conditione, præ&longs;ertim quòd id nunquàm non modo expre&longs;&longs;um; &longs;ed ne indicatum quidem fuerit ab Ari&longs;totele. Quamobrem ego puto aliam primam &longs;ubalternationis cau&longs;&longs;am & rationem afferri po&longs;&longs;e, atque illam quidem à pr&ecedil;ceptore no­&longs;tro &longs;ignificatam. Siquando vna rem e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;en&longs;ilia doceret, altera verò cur e&longs;&longs;et. er&longs;uadeor au­tem ad id credendum hoc argumento. Nanque illa e&longs;t ratio rei cuiu&longs;piam quæ &longs;imiles differen­tias illi communicat: Sed differentias &longs;ubalternantibus & &longs;ubalternis communicant differentiæ eius, quòd e&longs;t & cur e&longs;t. Ergo ratio &longs;ubalternarum & &longs;ubalternantium e&longs;t, quòd &longs;it res & cur &longs;it. Propo&longs;itio fidem ex eo &longs;umit. uia &longs;imilis differentia in cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;imilem differentiam creat in effe­ctu. A&longs;&longs;umptio &longs;umitur ex Ari&longs;totele. ùm docet ex eo &longs;ubalternas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter, vel quodam­modo. uòd vna doceat cur hoc &longs;it &longs;impliciter, ide&longs;t reddat cau&longs;&longs;as maioris partis eorum quæ ac­cipiuntur in &longs;ubalterna, vt apparet in phy&longs;ica & medicina; altera doceat aliqua ex parte, vt geo­metria, quòd vulnera rotunda tardius curentur. Ex hoc ea nece&longs;&longs;ariò na&longs;cuntur. uòd &longs;ubalter­nans tradat cau&longs;&longs;as eorum quæ &longs;ubalternæ &longs;upponuntur. uòd fiat tran&longs;itus de genere in genus, dum ea quæ à &longs;ubalternante o&longs;ten&longs;a &longs;unt, ad illa probanda transferuntur quæ in &longs;ubalterna du­bitantur. Cætera quæ tribuuntur &longs;ubalternis, nil prohibet, opinor, e&longs;&longs;e per accidens, & aliun­de peti quàm à ratione &longs;ubalternationis. His ita con&longs;titutis ad propo&longs;itum de&longs;cendamus, & doceamus &longs;it'ne phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalterna primæ philo&longs;ophiæ. Qui conditionis à Latinis impo&longs;itas &longs;ubalternis accipiunt, facilè negare po&longs;&longs;ent omnes eas conditiones in phy&longs;ica reperiri. Con&longs;imili ratione qui defendunt rationem &longs;ubalternæ po&longs;itam e&longs;&longs;e in eo quòd vna rem &longs;impliciter tractet, altera cum habitudine ad opus & actionem; quia dicerent tres e&longs;&longs;e &longs;cientiasm contemplantes inter &longs;e di&longs;tinctas; quippe quæ proprium genus habeant & ex propriis &longs;uis ip&longs;arum principiis quoque procedant. Atqui non de&longs;unt rationes quæ affinitatem &longs;ubalternationis inter vtra&longs;que interce­dere per&longs;uadeant. Primum. Quoniam vbi fit tran&longs;itus de genere in genus ibi ade&longs;t &longs;ubalterna­tionis affinitas. Sed fit tran&longs;itus à prima philo&longs;ophia ad phy&longs;icen. Et gradus igitur &longs;ubalternatio­nis extat in phy&longs;ica & prima philo&longs;ophia. Nam tum fit tran&longs;itus, vbi propo&longs;itio &longs;uperioris &longs;cien­tiæ re &longs;umatur in inferiore. d verò in phy&longs;icis euenit. Siquidem Ari&longs;toteles primo de cœlo pro­baturus æternum fieri non po&longs;&longs;e quod caducum e&longs;t. ta con&longs;truit argumentationem. Non pote&longs;t idem &longs;imul e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e. Nullum igitur mortale perpetuum effici pote&longs;t. Attamen antecedens accipitur à primo philo&longs;opho. a Rur&longs;us docet Ari&longs;toteles nullam &longs;cientiam excepta prima phi­lo&longs;ophia, quærere po&longs;sit, &longs;it'ne &longs;uum &longs;ubiectum. uia non pote&longs;t mentionem facere &longs;impliciter de ip&longs;o quid e&longs;t. b Soli autem primo philo&longs;opho id præ&longs;tare licet. Et &longs;olus igitur &longs;uppeditabit principia reliquis, & &longs;ubiectum & quid e&longs;t ip&longs;ius. Vltimò Ari&longs;toteles o&longs;tendit primam philo&longs;o­phiam &longs;pectare &longs;umma principia & cau&longs;&longs;as poti&longs;simas. c Ergo etiam erit maximè &longs;cientia, & po­ terit reddere rationem principiorum quæ in aliis &longs;cientiis a&longs;&longs;umuntur. Quòd &longs;i ex his conuinci­tur gradus & affinitas &longs;ubalternationis, profectò prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;ubalternans erit, phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalterna. Verumenimuerò &longs;i no&longs;tra &longs;ententia defendi pote&longs;t, vt opinamur, eam &longs;cilicet e&longs;&longs;e ra­tionem &longs;ubalternationis, cum altera docet, cur &longs;it id quod altera e&longs;&longs;e nouit, prima illa ratio nihil officeret. Neque enim propo&longs;itiones i&longs;tæ communi&longs;simæ rationem cau&longs;&longs;æ continent, &longs;ed notifi­cationis duntaxat. Sed vt c&ecedil;teris qui de &longs;ubalternarum conditionibus aliter &longs;entiunt, opem fera­mus; nullam e&longs;&longs;e vim dicimus eius quod opponitur. Neque enim ille tran&longs;itus e&longs;&longs;et, &longs;ed a&longs;&longs;um­ptio principij communi&longs;simi &longs;ecundum analogiam, vt no&longs;ti ex Analyticis. oc enim commune. De quolibet verum e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;erere, aut negare, dum confertur in demon&longs;trationem, non accipitur vt &longs;eruat &longs;uam communitatem, &longs;ed quantum opus e&longs;t &longs;olùm, & pro ratione materiæ &longs;ubiectæ. Vt verò c&ecedil;tera tolli queant, monebimus antè geminum ordinem in &longs;cientiis ob&longs;eruari, alterum quidem naturæ, atque alterum mentis. Ordo quidem naturæ multiplex e&longs;t, de quo nos aliquid po&longs;tea. Sed intereà quantum &longs;pectat ad rem no&longs;tram, vbi de &longs;cientiarum gradibus agimus, qua­tenus mutuas &longs;ibi operas præ&longs;tant in fide facienda duplex e&longs;t, alter qui à finis natura deducitur, atque alter qui pendet ex ordine materiæ &longs;ubiectæ. à finis autem natura deducitur ordo earum quæ ita &longs;e habent, vt mini&longs;træ ad Architectonicas, vt vocat Ari&longs;toteles, &longs;int vt Plato h( gemonika\s, ide&longs;t, præcipuas & duces. b ordine &longs;ubiectæ materiæ &longs;umitur earum ordo quarum vna e&longs;t u(pa\llihlos, ide&longs;t &longs;ubalterna, altera &longs;ubalternans. Ordo mentis in eo po&longs;itus e&longs;t, vt vna quoddam &longs;implex con&longs;ideret, altera illi aliquid adiiciat. tputa mathematica &longs;pectat quantum &longs;impliciter, at phy&longs;ica quantum in materia. In hoc &longs;anè ordine d quicquid in &longs;impliciore ab&longs;urdum e&longs;t, & per naturalia pertinet: non autem contrà. Sed hoc ordine dimi&longs;&longs;o ad cuius plenam intelligentiam multa &longs;ubiicere oportebit, de ordine naturæ di&longs;&longs;eramus. Et &longs;anè magnum di&longs;crimen inter Archi­tectonicas & &longs;ubalternantes intercedit. Quandò &longs;ubalternans præbet cau&longs;&longs;as & principia. ec vn­quam in oculis e&longs;t &longs;ubalternæ, ni&longs;i aliquod è &longs;uis principiis ex ip&longs;ius manibus eripiatur. Archite­ctonicæ non e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;as afferre principiorum. Neque enim nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t mini&longs;tras ex iis procedere perpetuò, quæ demon&longs;trari po&longs;sint; &longs;ed pote&longs;t habere &longs;ua principia pror&longs;us prima. & h&ecedil;c &longs;impli­citer &longs;cire pote&longs;t, &longs;ubalterna non item. &longs;iquidem &longs;ciamus, cùm habemus demon&longs;trationem. æc verò ex primis e&longs;t. tqui rerum naturalium prima quædam principia &longs;unt quæ nouit phy&longs;icus, & mathematicus habet &longs;ua principia quæ in alia &longs;uperiora neutiquam re&longs;olui queunt. Rur&longs;us &longs;ub­alternans ea con&longs;iderat quæ &longs;unt natura priora; non item Architectonicus. Neque enim ens, quod à primo philo&longs;opho con&longs;ideratur, quem facimus Architectonicum, natura prius e&longs;t, quàm ens naturale, &longs;ed &longs;i prius, ratione &longs;ola prius e&longs;t. Docet Architectonicus quid tractandum & qua­tenus, quo ordine & via di&longs;ponendum: e nihil de his &longs;ubalternans. & &longs;emper in oculis geritur Architecton. Nam mini&longs;træ quicquid agunt, &longs;ic agunt, vt ad eum finem perueniant. Architecton autem quia con&longs;iderat finem (ab eius autem ingenio na&longs;citur, vt c&ecedil;teris &longs;ua cuiu&longs;que officia præ­&longs;cribantur) &longs;ingula pro &longs;ui finis adeptione di&longs;ponit. Subalternans mea quidem &longs;ententia, cùm doceat cur &longs;it & rem &longs;impliciter animaduertat, e&longs;t contemplator. Architecton item numeratur in artificibus. Nunc dicimus inter primam philo&longs;ophiam & reliquas &longs;cientias exi&longs;tere ordinem Architectonic&ecedil; & mini&longs;træ, non autem &longs;ubalternantis & &longs;ubalternæ. Cùm enim con&longs;ideret ens &longs;ub communi notione entis, &longs;it verò &longs;eparatum vel re ip&longs;a vt mentes beati&longs;simæ, vel &longs;ecundum rationem, quod dici &longs;olet per indifferentiam. inis verò intelligentiæ no&longs;træ &longs;int beati&longs;simæ men­tes, omnia docendo huc dirigere oportet, vt earum notitiam a&longs;&longs;equi po&longs;simus. Itaque mathema­tici nos a&longs;&longs;ue faciunt ab&longs;tractioni, cuius beneficio, iam aliquid de ingenio rerum verè &longs;eparatarum à materia cogitare incipimus. & phy&longs;icus auxilio motus, tanquam rei noti&longs;sim&ecedil;, nos eò perducit, vt tale entium genus e&longs;&longs;e no&longs;camus. Idcirco prima philo&longs;ophia meta\ ta\ fusika\, ide&longs;t, po&longs;t na­turalia nuncupatur. Cùm &longs;pectet item prima philo&longs;ophia communiter ens, & eius &longs;pecies, quatenus entia &longs;unt è quibus &longs;unt corpus mobile & quantum &longs;ingulis exhibet &longs;ua &longs;ubiecta. adem quoque propter vniuer&longs;alem illam con&longs;iderationem tractat &longs;impliciter ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t & id quod &longs;uiip&longs;ius e&longs;t, & id quod conuenit c&ecedil;teris, prout etiam nouit partes entis, quæ reliquis &longs;cientiis &longs;upponuntur. Quia nouit partes entis & quæ cuique definitio accommodetur, docet modum tractandi & definien­di, & quanquàm &longs;cientiam &longs;uis cancellis circun&longs;cribit. Cùm etiam proprium cuiusque. methodi &longs;it tractare certum &longs;ubiectum, partes eius, affectiones, & principia, ius habet in principia communi&longs;si­ma, & in ea quæ &longs;umuntur in reliquis methodis: attamen non &longs;ic illa exponit, vt eorum cau&longs;&longs;as red­dat. &longs;unt enim vbique prima, nec vllo modo obnoxia demon&longs;trationi: vt potius in prima philo­&longs;ophia prima &longs;ecundum rationem, quàm &longs;ecundum rem habenda &longs;int, nec ip&longs;a &longs;ub certa ratione con­cipit (&longs;ic enim cuiu&longs;que &longs;cienti&ecedil; propria forent) &longs;ed communiter tractat, vt principia entis. Proinde non verè &longs;ubalternans, &longs;ed Architecton optimo iure perhibetur. Sed cum tractet quid e&longs;t, & eiu&longs;dem cogitationis &longs;it no&longs;&longs;e quid e&longs;t & quòd &longs;it. idebitur alicui pr&ecedil;&longs;tare c&ecedil;teris quòd aliarum &longs;ubiecta de­mon&longs;trare po&longs;sit. At verò neque id efficere pote&longs;t (vt falsò quidam exi&longs;timarunt) &longs;iquidem definitio nullo pacto demon&longs;trationi &longs;ubiiciatur, &longs;ed alio modo planum fit e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum, in vnaquaque &longs;cien­tia, atque item in prima philo&longs;ophia. Quamobrem ex hoc apparet fallacia &longs;ecund&ecedil; rationis. Ad vlti­mam quoque &longs;ic re&longs;pondemus, eam non reddere cau&longs;&longs;as principiorum quæ in reliquis &longs;cientiis a&longs;&longs;umi &longs;olent, quod in &longs;ubalternante requiritur: &longs;ed per&longs;uadere principia entis communi&longs;simi qu&ecedil; &longs;i prin­cipia fuerint reliquarum methodorum, hoc e&longs;t per accidens. ùm c&ecedil;teroquin in &longs;ubalternante princi­pia &longs;ubaltern&ecedil; probentur. Neque Ari&longs;toteles aliquam &longs;cientiam e&longs;&longs;e voluit quæ c&ecedil;terarum principia confirmaret, qualem nonnulli primam philo&longs;ophiam e&longs;&longs;e autumant: a &longs;ed ex hypothe&longs;i loquitur, & indefinitè &longs;cientiam &longs;ummam accipit, qualis e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;et &longs;ubalternans: aut &longs;i &longs;umma principia perquirit, non ex hoc efficitur eam e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubalternantem, &longs;ed architectonicam. & hanc dicimus e&longs;&longs;e primam philo&longs;ophiam quæ ob tale &longs;ummum ius, non &longs;cientia propriè, &longs;ed &longs;apientia vocatur. Hoc loco memini mihi opponi. Principia entis per &longs;e &longs;unt, nulli accidunt; eius verò, quod non accidit, con&longs;ideratio per accidens e&longs;&longs;e non pote&longs;t. Itaque nec aliarum principia à primo philo&longs;opho per ac­cidens &longs;pectari poterunt. Re&longs;pon&longs;um e&longs;t in &longs;cientia quaque duo contineri, rem qu&ecedil; con&longs;ideratur & modum, &longs;eu rationem con&longs;iderandi: igitur, et&longs;i non accidunt, vt res illa principia reliquarum &longs;cien­tiarum principiis: at continent accidens propter rationem con&longs;iderandi; non enim o&longs;tenduntur vt principia corporis mobilis, &longs;ed vt entis quatenus ens. Porrò architectonicarum varij &longs;unt gradus & inter methodos quarum finis e&longs;t contemplari, & inter facultates quarum munus e&longs;t agere, & inter artes quarum officium e&longs;t efficere. rout mini&longs;trarum varia &longs;unt officia, vel enim materiam faciunt &longs;im­pliciter, b vel accommodatam ad opus inter artes. Inter eas verò quæ practicæ &longs;unt, & à fine politi­cæ nuncupantur, eas actiones præ&longs;tant, &longs;ine quibus cæteræ non con&longs;i&longs;tunt, vt &longs;ine pace con&longs;erua­tio legum. taque bellum gerimus, quia &longs;ine hoc pax non exi&longs;tit & pacem volumus, vt leges con&longs;er­uentur. on&longs;imili ratione inter contemplantes illæ &longs;unt mini&longs;træ quarum contemplationes alij &longs;unt v&longs;ui, vt &longs;ine his illa &longs;uas exhibere non po&longs;sit. Mini&longs;tra igitur phy&longs;ica & in ordine doctrin&ecedil; præponenda.

G

c 2. Phy&longs;.

H

d 1. Po&longs;t. T. 27.

A

B

C

a 1. Eth.

D

E

Ratio I.

II.

a. 4. Met.

b 5. 11. Me.

III.

c 1. Met.

F

Ad I.

G

d 3. De c&ecedil;­lo T. 6.

H

e 1. Eth.

A

B

Ad II.

Ad III.

a 1. Po&longs;t.

C

b 2. Phy&longs;. T. 24.

Animi habituum præ&longs;tantia generatim perpenditur, & contemplans actuo&longs;æ pr&ecedil;ponitur. Cap. IX.

HOC, quod à nobis in pr&ecedil;&longs;entia ve&longs;tigandum e&longs;t, altius aliquantò repetetur, propter frequen­tem eorum v&longs;um quæ ad explicationem propo&longs;iti &longs;olent a&longs;&longs;umi in vniuer&longs;a philo&longs;ophia Pe­ripatetica, horum verò aptum exordium fuerit, &longs;i res ip&longs;as in &longs;uas partes di&longs;tribuamus, quatenus mentem re&longs;piciunt. Verumenimuerò cum omnis perceptio fiat, propter conuenientiam quandam, &longs;imilitudinem & proportionem quæ inter res intelligendas & intelligentem facultatem intercedit (talis e&longs;t actus pote &longs;tatisque. conditio quorum alterum intelligenda imitantur, alterum verò mens, quæ intelligere pote&longs;t) ergo quot erunt differentiæ rerum intelligendarum, tot quoque intelligentium facultatum differenti&ecedil; &longs;int, nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. Et quanquàm res aut &longs;en&longs;u, aut mente cogno&longs;cuntur, omi&longs;sis &longs;en&longs;ilibus qu&ecedil; nullum me­thodi &longs;tudium po&longs;tulant, de intelligendis agamus. Hæc &longs;anè aut nece&longs;&longs;aria &longs;unt, & habent princi­pia quæ aliter &longs;e habere non contingit, aut variari po&longs;&longs;unt. x quo efficitur, vt etiam intelligentis animæ facultas &longs;it duplex, altera quæ in rerum nece&longs;&longs;ariarum intelligentia ver&longs;atur, atque altera qu&ecedil; mutabilia concipit. e po&longs;tremis hi&longs;ce exi&longs;tit opinio. C&ecedil;terùm ea quæ aliter eueniunt, aut con&longs;ide­rantur vt talem habent naturam, aut quo pacto pertinent ad nos & in no&longs;tra manu &longs;unt. rior il­la animaduer&longs;io &longs;oli opinioni relinquitur, deque. iis nulla, neque &longs;cientia, neque ars exi&longs;tit. c Po­&longs;teriorum aliquæ &longs;ub effectionem cadunt, ide&longs;t, relinquunt ex operatione opus aliquod perma­nens, vt ædificium & nauem quæ Græci poihta\ vocant, aliquæ actionem &longs;olam continent, nihil ex actione &longs;uper&longs;tes habent, hæc Græci paka\ dicunt. uorum item duo genera &longs;unt, vel enim à con&longs;ilio pendent, & attenditur poaiesi_s, vnde boni maliúe iudicamur, vel nulla con&longs;i­ lij ratio habetur, &longs;ed finis qui voluptas e&longs;t. n his, cùm agendi ratio &longs;olo opere excepto &longs;it eadem atque in aliis qu&ecedil; opus relinquunt, neque enim deliberant quid ex quo agendum, &longs;ed hoc ex hoc efficiunt nece&longs;&longs;ariò, &longs;i finem con&longs;equi volunt, & ab illis non con&longs;ilium &longs;olum, &longs;ed actio de&longs;idera­tur; ad eam mentis partem hæc relegantur quæ tractat illa quorum finis e&longs;t opus. liæ practicæ nuncupantur. Itaque tres habitus mentis exi&longs;tunt, vnus practicus, alter artificio&longs;us. o&longs;tremus contemplans qui &longs;i principiorum e&longs;t aut ea &longs;olum concipit & e&longs;t propriè mens, aut illa contem­platur & euoluit, & &longs;ic e&longs;t &longs;apientia. ut contemplatur conclu&longs;iones ex principiis, & e&longs;t &longs;cientia. Mens propriè vtriu&longs;que principium e&longs;t & pari cum illis gradu procedit, vt &longs;cientiæ principium ad &longs;cientiam referatur, & principium &longs;apientiæ ad &longs;aprentiam, quandò principiorum con&longs;ideratio ad eandem pertinet methodum cuius principia &longs;unt. uare etiam dimi&longs;&longs;amente quæ e&longs;t comprehen­&longs;io pura principiorum, de &longs;apientia &longs;cientiaque. di&longs;putemus quas item, quòd in con&longs;titutione me­thodi &longs;imiles &longs;unt, vtra&longs;que communibus regulis metiemur. Porrò contemplari nil aliud e&longs;t quàm rerum e&longs;&longs;entias explorare, cau&longs;&longs;as perquirere & veritatem propter &longs;e expetendam, per &longs;e & liberè, non ad alterius v&longs;um inuenire. Tamet&longs;i genus hoc cognitionis omnes omnium rerum naturas per­uagatur. &longs;iquidem omnia per &longs;eip&longs;a, aut quàm ad v&longs;um aliquem applicentur, contemplationi &longs;ubii­ciantur. & prius hoc in contemplationem cecidi&longs;&longs;e oportet, quàm nos moueat ad agendum. a Sic & caduca & contingentia &longs;ubiacent contemplationi, deque. illis philo&longs;ophia exi&longs;tet, quia &longs;ic etiam nece&longs;sitatem quandam præ&longs;eferunt. b tamen cùm ea qu&ecedil; contemplati &longs;umus, ad v&longs;um traducenda &longs;unt, philo&longs;ophia &longs;e&longs;e tenet in ijs quæ agi po&longs;&longs;unt facienda tanquam vilia re&longs;puit, nec libero homine digna. Quocirca animi perfectio, non &longs;ine optima cau&longs;&longs;a philo&longs;ophia perhibetur. Nam tùm res perfecta exi&longs;timatur, vbi &longs;it idonea fungi munerib. llis ad quæ in&longs;tituta e&longs;t à natura velut equus, cum à domitore factus idoneus e&longs;t ad vehendum placidè &longs;e&longs;&longs;orem, & ad currendum, aut certan­dum & domus, &longs;i commodè inhabitari queat. uius enim rei gratia exædificata e&longs;t. &longs;ic homo per­fectus e&longs;t, po&longs;tquàm ea præ&longs;tare pote&longs;t quæ hominis propria &longs;unt & quorum gratia producitur à natura. Atqui duo &longs;unt in homine principia, mens & appetitus. tque hic quidem homini datus e&longs;t, vt bona per&longs;equatur, mala declinet: illa verò vt rerum naturas percipiat, & agenda fugiendaúe præ&longs;cribat. Hominis ergo perfectio po&longs;ita erit in eo, vt bona per&longs;equi, mala autem vitare con&longs;ue­&longs;cat, & rerum naturas optimè &longs;crutetur. primum agendo comparatur, quòd Græci dixerunt pzai\thein, alterum contemplando, quod ijdem appellarunt qewzei)/n. Hæc officia &longs;ola homine libero digna reputarunt, & ad ea prærogatiuam philo&longs;ophia pertinere voluerunt. &longs;iquidem ab hi&longs;ce duobus officiis extitit duplex philo&longs;ophandi genus, alterum quod appellatur practicum, atque alterum, quod dicitur contemplans, quod per habitus illos pertinet qui &longs;cientiæ vocantur. Cum igitur hoc philo&longs;ophandi genus, in rerum naturis & e&longs;&longs;entiis explorandis po&longs;itum &longs;it, planum e&longs;t, quòd quot erunt e&longs;&longs;entiarum genera, totidem quoque habitus contemplantes, &longs;iue &longs;cientias e&longs;&longs;e oportet. uandò habitus ex fine & obiecta &longs;pecie di&longs;tinguuntur. At verò rerum definiendarum & quarum definitio & quid e&longs;t a&longs;signatur, aliæ ita cum corpore & materia &longs;en&longs;ili coniunctæ &longs;unt, vt &longs;ine illis neque con­&longs;i&longs;tere, neque concipi queant, vt &longs;imum & ambulare, quorum in altero nares, in altero crura conti­nentur. Ali&ecedil; &longs;unt in materia, vt &longs;ine ip&longs;a quidem non con&longs;eruentur, veruntamen &longs;ine ip&longs;a intelligan­tur, veluti rectum & curuum, quæ &longs;unt &longs;emper in ligno & lapide, nihilominus, non &longs;emper lapidi lignoúe affiguntur; &longs;ed cum corpore cogitantur à qualitatibus &longs;en&longs;ilibus ab&longs;oluto & citra motum .i. non includunt aliquam rationem agendi & patiendi, &longs;oloque. interuallo contenta &longs;unt; cum c&ecedil;teræ form&ecedil; &longs;int, aut in certa materia, aut præ&longs;eferant rationem agendi & patiendi, vt prim&ecedil; qualitates, aut certè ratio agendi patiendique. ip&longs;is &longs;upponatur, vt reliquis quæ ex primis qualitatib. riuntur. Aliæ &longs;unt, quæ e&longs;&longs;entiam obtinent ab oim materia liberam. vt D. . M. Cum igitur aliqua &longs;int quæ principia motus in &longs;e contineant, motus verò principium &longs;it natura. x hoc &longs;cientia quæ in eorum contemplatione poni­tur, appellatur naturalis, quæ verò tractat res quæ &longs;ine motu concipi po&longs;&longs;unt, dicitur à certitudine mathematica, &longs;iquidem ea quæ &longs;ine motu concipiuntur in abaco de&longs;cribi & oculis &longs;ubijci po&longs;sint, maqei_n enim idem valet àc videre; qu&ecedil; con&longs;iderat ea quorum e&longs;&longs;entia vel ratione, vel reip&longs;a &longs;epara­tur à materia &longs;en&longs;ili, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;unt vniuer&longs;alia qu&ecedil;dam & natura diuina à rerum gradu prima phi­lo&longs;ophia, &longs;eu theologia; ab ordine doctrinæ po&longs;t naturalia vocatur. Eius methodi partes du&ecedil; sunt, quemadmodum item ea quæ à materia &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;eparantur, vel vniuer&longs;alia &longs;unt quæ idcirco indiffe­rentia dicuntur, vel ab omni concretione materiæ &longs;ecreta, vt Deus. uius &longs;peculationem per&longs;equens humana mens, & huc omnia dirigens ex illius intelligentiæ præ&longs;cripto cuncta di&longs;ponit. taque duas partes &longs;u&ecedil; methodi facit, alteram quæ e&longs;t pazaskh\ & apparatus qua exponitur, quid ip&longs;i conue­niat, quatenus eorum beneficio qu&ecedil; tractantur, habet imperium in c&ecedil;teras, atque alteram qua res ip&longs;i iam explicantur. Mathematicæ multæ &longs;unt partes. Nam &longs;icut duplex e&longs;t genus quantitatis, continuum, &longs;. & di&longs;cretum, & vtrunque vel per &longs;e con&longs;ideratur, vel vt re&longs;picit aliud, &longs;ic per &longs;e geometria de conti­nuo di&longs;&longs;erit, arithmetica de di&longs;creto. In &longs;en&longs;ilibus quantitas di&longs;creta ab harmonico &longs;pectatur, con­tinua ab A&longs;trologo & optico, multas alias eius partes con&longs;ultò dimitto, contentus pr&ecedil;cipuis, quandò reliquæ nihil ad Ari&longs;totelem. Practicarum finis e&longs;t generatim bonum humanum cuius habitus prudentia nominatur. ius verò tria &longs;unt membra &longs;icut etiam bonum humanum tres continet ha­bitudines, aut enim habenti ip&longs;i bonum e&longs;t, quod cùm ex a&longs;&longs;uetudine partum &longs;it quam Gr&ecedil;ci vocant e)/qos, h)qiko\n appellatur, aut e&longs;t bonum familiæ & tw_| o_ikw|. cuius gubernatio dicitur œconomia, à qua prudentia œconomica denominatur aut e&longs;t bonum reip. uius gubernatio cùm politia dica­tur à Gr&ecedil;cis etiam facultati & prudenti&ecedil; politic&ecedil; nomen dedit. H&ecedil;c ergo philo&longs;ophia &longs;pectat, qu&ecedil; in &longs;e&longs;e rationem continet boni, quod agendo comparatur, & pulchri quòd contemplando accedit, nihil infra ip&longs;a re&longs;piciens, qua&longs;i quicquid infra e&longs;t, &longs;eruile habendum &longs;it. Cùm tamen & &longs;&ecedil;pe de artibus incidat &longs;ermo, in methodis Ari&longs;toteleis, aliqua de ip&longs;is vniuersè &longs;cribere placet qu&ecedil; valeant &longs;cilicet ad pr&ecedil;ceptoris no&longs;tri &longs;ententias illu&longs;trandas. Iam docuimus, vt in artibus illæ quoque re­ponantur qu&ecedil; nullum opus ex operatione relinquunt, quòd non ex con&longs;ilio & electione profici&longs;can­tur, vt illæ quas practicas propriè dicimus. & quòd imitantur. rtes operando, non con&longs;ultantes quid ex quo agendum &longs;it, & &longs;i nihil ex operatione relinquunt, non ex eo na&longs;citur, quia &longs;int actio­nes animi, ex eorum genere quas immanentes vocant; &longs;ed quòd in ea materia &longs;e exercent qu&ecedil; non retinet &longs;peciem impre&longs;&longs;am ab artifice, vt lignum retinet &longs;camni formam, exemplig. &longs;oni &longs;ubiectum e&longs;t aër, &longs;ed eius &longs;pecies ex ab&longs;entia &longs;onantis euane&longs;cit. ta & motionis &longs;pecies quæ oritur ex arte &longs;altandi, manet in ip&longs;a motione, & cum ip&longs;a tantum propagatur. taque & mens qu&ecedil; in eiu&longs;modi ver&longs;atur operationibus effectricis non autem practic&ecedil; nomine digna e&longs;t habita. Nunc eas multi­fariam partiri philo&longs;ophi videntur. Primùm quidem ex modo quo finem &longs;uum con&longs;equi po&longs;&longs;unt, aut enim earum finis e&longs;t in facientis pote&longs;tate po&longs;itus, ita vt nunquàm artifex &longs;uo fine fru&longs;tretur, &longs;i omnia aptè & appo&longs;itè fecerit, vt finem con&longs;equatur. Sunt & artes quarum finis non ab artifice, &longs;ed ab alio pendet, in quibus etiam magnam partem &longs;olet habere fortuna, has facultatis nomine notare voluerunt, quia facultas incertum euentum præ&longs;eferat, & infinitatem. & cùm incertos &longs;uc­ce&longs;&longs;us habeant, locum dare con&longs;ultationi videntur, qua vel &longs;ic vel aliter faciendum e&longs;&longs;e iudicetur, vt propo&longs;ito fine potiantur, (&longs;emper enim re&longs;piciunt finem, licet ip&longs;um non &longs;emper a&longs;&longs;equi po&longs;sint) à coniectura coniectrices dictæ &longs;unt. ales &longs;unt Dialectica, Oratoria, Medicina, Nautica, Militaris. Proinde cùm finis in earum pote&longs;tate non &longs;it, ab iis non &longs;olet finis, &longs;ed officium de&longs;iderati duntaxat. Secundò di&longs;tribuuntur artes ex modo faciendi. t quamuis & marmorarius & lutarius & fu&longs;or &longs;tatuam faciant, quia non &longs;it idem omnium faciendi modus, artifices ijdem non &longs;unt. Non &longs;anè dico eo&longs;dem non e&longs;&longs;e artifices, quòd eandem materiam non tractent: &longs;ed non eodem modo. Nanque etiam idem artifex e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t, qui fundendo &longs;tatuam facit ex auro & plumbo. Itaque notabat Galenus a &ecedil;tatis &longs;u&ecedil; medicos qui medicinam &longs;ecarent in totidem partes, quot &longs;unt corporis humani & quidam Rom&ecedil; e&longs;&longs;ent ocularij medici, nonnulli auricularij, neque enim id ex artis natura cùm vna &longs;it partium omnium medicina: &longs;ed ex commoditate na&longs;cebatur. &longs;iquidem eam artis portionem profiterentur è qua victum &longs;ibi parare po&longs;&longs;e &longs;perarent, c&ecedil;teras negligebant. uòd &longs;i victui nece&longs;&longs;aria non &longs;uppedita&longs;&longs;et ea portio medicin&ecedil;, quemadmodum euenire &longs;olebat in Gr&ecedil;cia, aut &longs;olum vertere cogebantur, aut alias artis medic&ecedil; partes exercere. Tertiò vel artes materiam faciunt, vel parant, vel perficiunt id quod natura non potuit ab&longs;oluere, vel etiam mini&longs;tr&ecedil; &longs;unt ad quas etiam referri dicimus organicas. faciunt materiam figuli, dum lateres &ecedil;dificatori efficiunt, materiam parant fabri qui ferrum repurgant. ab&longs;oluunt ea qu&ecedil; natura pr&ecedil;&longs;tare non pote&longs;t, vt lanifices; mini&longs;trant, vel qu&ecedil; faciunt in&longs;trumenta. vt frenorum fabricatrix eque&longs;tri, vel qu&ecedil; impedimenta remouent, & applicant agentia principia ad patientia. Quamobrem Medici clamant, Naturas e&longs;&longs;e morborum curatrices, modicos autem mini­&longs;tros. Po&longs;tremò ex fine di&longs;tinguuntur. uòd variis modis ad humanos v&longs;us accommodentur. etenim aut nece&longs;sitatis ergò operantur, aut commodi, aut voluptatis. x hoc ordine &longs;unt kos mhtikai\ dictæ, ide&longs;t ornatrices & fortè memhtikai\, i. mitatrices, vt poëtica. æ qu&ecedil; in &longs;olam voluptatem collimant, mea quidem &longs;ententia &longs;unt omnium abiecti&longs;sim&ecedil;; quippe qu&ecedil; &longs;olum illam animi no&longs;tri partem re&longs;piciant, qu&ecedil; bruta e&longs;t. u&ecedil; commodum &longs;olum intendunt, c&ecedil;teris pr&ecedil;ferendæ, &longs;unt enim vt bene ho­mini &longs;it: atqui multò pr&ecedil;&longs;tantius e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e bene, quàm e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter. b Omnes tamen vniuersè lon­gi&longs;simo tractu practicis & contemplantibus cedunt, & ip&longs;is origine & natura po&longs;teriores, &longs;unt: etenim politicæ &longs;eruiunt cuius vniuer&longs;a officia po&longs;ita &longs;unt in eo quòd ociosè contemplari valea­mus, ill&ecedil; omnium infimæ qu&ecedil; reponuntur in mini&longs;tris, quòd natura cedant, cum in aliarum gratiam in­uentæ fuerint, & origine po&longs;teriores &longs;int. Nam veri&longs;imile e&longs;t, ni&longs;i vtens e&longs;&longs;et, nullum fore officium in&longs;tru­menti, c vt ni&longs;i fuerit qui colat domum, fru&longs;tra futura &longs;it domus. Omnibus his analytica vilior & origine po&longs;terior. qnm oens &longs;cientiæ & artes recta ratione vtuntur, illæ quidem contemplantes, hæ verò efficientes, & practicæ recta ratione agentes, quæ prudentia nominatur. Porrò rectæ rationis regu­las analytica docet: itaque omnibus ancillatur. & prius generatim bon&ecedil; artificum operationes exti­terunt quàm regul&ecedil; traditæ, vt prius aliquis verum contemplando conclu&longs;it, ex hoc regul&ecedil; ob&longs;eruat&ecedil; quibus verum concludi po&longs;&longs;et. d Igitur analytica omnibus his & origine & natura po&longs;terior. Sed his omi&longs;sis in quæ nulla dubitatio cadit, ad practicas accedamus & eas cum &longs;peculantibus comparemus. Profectò &longs;i præ&longs;tantius e&longs;t imperare, quàm &longs;eruire a & imperat ciuilis artes in ciuitate con&longs;tituens, & &longs;ingulis ciuibus &longs;ua munera præ&longs;cribens, nec non illa curans quæ pertinent ad philo&longs;ophiam, in­&longs;tituens quas &longs;cientias in ciuitate, & quou&longs;que ciues eas recepturi &longs;int. prudentisque. officium e&longs;t &longs;ancire & decernere b qua&longs;cunque &longs;cientias vir ciuilis admittit in Repub. anife&longs;tum e&longs;t ciuilem omnibus aliis facultatibus & &longs;cientiis e&longs;&longs;e præponendam. Attamen, &longs;i vera &longs;unt Ari&longs;totelis docu­menta, vt de facultatibus ex functione &longs;it iudicandum, & de functione ex rebus obiectis, aliter &longs;en­tire oportet. Nam contemplatio rerum æternarum e&longs;t, formarum & mentium, quæ ab omni materiæ concretione liberæ &longs;unt, vnde omnis imperfectio deriuatur, omnia verò per &longs;eip&longs;a pul­cherrima & hone&longs;ti&longs;sima habentur. Et contemplatio ip&longs;a per &longs;e&longs;e munus e&longs;t præ&longs;tanti&longs;simum, cùm &longs;it bonum continuum. eque enim requirit in&longs;trumenta corporea, aut parum admodum, ex quorum v&longs;u defatigatio na&longs;citur, eadem quoque æterna e&longs;t, cùm re&longs;piciat obiecta, nulla habi­ta ratione materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis, vnde omnis mutatio na&longs;ci &longs;olet. & cùm res nece&longs;&longs;arias contemplatio tractet, miras affert voluptates, nanque in eo po&longs;ita e&longs;t voluptas, vt expleatur de&longs;iderium, & ita &longs;edetur, vbi fine potitum fuerit, at tùm maximè no&longs;tra mens &longs;edatur, vbi rem &longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e nouit, vt ali­ter &longs;e habere non po&longs;sit; id quod &longs;ola contemplatio præ&longs;tat, officia verò ciuilis &longs;emper laborio&longs;a &longs;unt, de fine &longs;emper anxia, quia facilè mutatur; itaque &longs;emper cogitant, & quid agendum &longs;it a&longs;si­duè con&longs;ultant. Contemplatio in &longs;eip&longs;a &longs;pem omnem &longs;ui repo&longs;itam habet, auxilia re&longs;puit, in &longs;o­litudine exerceri pote&longs;t. Proinde Scipio nunquam &longs;e minus &longs;olum quàm cùm &longs;olus e&longs;&longs;et, e&longs;&longs;e di­cebat. Tùm etiam propter &longs;e expetitur & libera e&longs;t. &ecedil;terarum functionum alius e&longs;t finis. Demum nulla actio &longs;iue effectio pote&longs;t exhiberi, ni&longs;i contemplatio præcedat, qu&ecedil; quid agendum, quomo­doúe agendum &longs;it, dictatur. Conuerte te nunc, quæ&longs;o ad actionem. æc, vt dictum e&longs;t, auxilium contemplationis implorat, aliud ex &longs;eip&longs;a producit, vt ex fortitudine pacem, virtus indiget exter­nis. am liberati ad largiendum pecuniis opus e&longs;t. u&longs;to ad pr&ecedil;&longs;tandam iu&longs;titiam &longs;atellitibus forti viribus & armis. adem &longs;edat animi perturbationes; tranquilla autem mens optimè &longs;peculatur. Actio re&longs;picit hominem quatenus humana con&longs;tat natura: contemplatio beatarum mentium munus e&longs;t & hominis, quà partem propè diuinam in &longs;eip&longs;o continet. Quanto igitur Deus homi­ni præ&longs;tat; tanto quoque actioni contemplationem pr&ecedil;&longs;tare putandum e&longs;t. Etenim actio e&longs;t fun­ctio &longs;ecundum virtutem moralem; atqui functio quæ &longs;ecundum mores e&longs;t, ad res pertinet huma­nas. am functio &longs;ecundum fortitudinem & iu&longs;titiam, c&ecedil;terasque. virtutes atque omnino quæ na­&longs;cuntur ex prudentia &longs;pectant affectus internos, vel actus externos, quæ &longs;unt res humanæ. Nam cum virtutibus prudentia coniuncta e&longs;t, cùm eius principia quæ &longs;unt fines humani boni con&longs;e­quendi profici&longs;cantur à virtutibus. Eæ verò ab ip&longs;a prudentia ad bonum finem dirigantur: quan­dò virtus efficit rectum propo&longs;itum: prudentia verò vniuer&longs;a regit quæ ad ip&longs;um producunt, vt qua&longs;i clauum tenens virtutum moralium, &longs;ecundum dirigat cur&longs;um, quo in optimum finem tan­quam in portum &longs;ecuri&longs;simum ferantur. Itaque tanta e&longs;t cognatio prudentiæ cum virtutibus, vt à &longs;e inuicem diuelli nequeant: proinde prudentia virtus e&longs;t hominis propria. Huc accedit quòd virtutes & prudentia &longs;unt compo&longs;iti, quia pertinent ad illam animi facultatem, quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in &longs;en&longs;ibus, Deos autem quos deridenda vetu&longs;tas approbauit, ocio&longs;os quidem e&longs;&longs;e velle inepti&longs;simum &longs;ed multò quoque ab&longs;urdius illis attribuere prudentiam quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in delectu bonorum & malorum; quibus mali nihil e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t. uid item illis opus e&longs;t ratiocinatione qua vtimur ad eam rem, vt apertis ob&longs;cura a&longs;&longs;equamur. ut enim Deo nihil ob&longs;curum e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t, aut id ip&longs;um non curat. Quid iu&longs;titia, qu&ecedil; &longs;uum cuique tribuit, pertinet ad Deos? hominum enim &longs;ocietas & com­munitas iu&longs;titiam procreauit. Quo etiam pacto fortis Deus intelligetur? in dolore, an in labore, an in periculo? quorum Deum nihil attingit. Quis erit locus in c&ecedil;lo temperantiæ, fine que etiam voluptatibus ob&longs;cœnis ibi e&longs;t locus? ni&longs;i ea dicamus & &longs;tulti&longs;simè credamus qu&ecedil; plena &longs;unt futili­tatis &longs;umm&ecedil;que. leuitatis, ætates, ve&longs;titus, ornatus, coniugia, cognationes, cupiditates, ægritudines, iracundias, bella, prælia, vel quòd duos exercitus contrarios, vt apud Homerum, alij dij ex alia parte defenderent, vel quòd cum Titanis aut gigantibus propria bella ge&longs;&longs;erunt. Quid illud quòd

D

c 6. Met. T. 4. Met. &longs;um. 3. c. 2.

E

a 3. de An. lib. e mo­tu an.

F

b 10. Met. T. lt.

G

H

A

B

C

a Gal. ib. de part. r. med.

D

b 3. Top.

c 4. de par. an. . 10.

d 1. Rhet.

a 1. Eth. . 2. 6. Eth. .

E

b 1. Pol.

F

G

H

Sæpe etiam Iuno maxima c&ecedil;licolûm.

Coniugis in culpa flagrauit quotidiana

No&longs;cens omniuoli plurima furta Iouis?

Et Mercurius, cuius ob&longs;cœnius excitata natura traditur, quòd a&longs;pectu Pro&longs;erpinæ commotus &longs;it. & ea quæ de Vulcano Vergilius

Optatos amplexus, placidumque. petiuit

Coniugis infu&longs;us. remio per membra &longs;oporem.

Iam verò dij ab&longs;ci&longs;si, exoleti, ver&longs;ipelles, fures, in vinculis habiti, fulminibus appetiti, vulnera­ti, qui dies &longs;upremos obierint, terrenasque, &longs;epulturas meruerint, omnes &longs;tultiti&ecedil; terminos &longs;uperat. Saturnus item cum obunca falce cu&longs;tos ruris, vt aliquis ramorum lux uriantium ton&longs;or; cum peta&longs;o­gnatus Mai&ecedil;, tanquam vias aggredi pr&ecedil;paret; & &longs;olem puluerenque. declinet, idem priuatus a)zgeifo/nths. Deum mater cum tympano, cum tibijs & p&longs;alterijs mu&longs;æ. Meminit Plutarchus in eo libro, quo di&longs;putat, &longs;it'ne &longs;eni admini&longs;tranda Re&longs;p. &longs;eniores Mercurios à veteribus, ita fingi &longs;olitos &longs;ine ma­nibus & pedibus membris virilibus arrectis: quanquàm &longs;ignificare voluerunt &longs;enes à c&ecedil;teris mu­neribus quæ corpore obeuntur, immunes; oratione, & con&longs;ilio remp. diuuare, & publicorum commodorum e&longs;&longs;e fœcundos: non erat nihil ominus quòd &longs;ymbolum tam ob&longs;cœnum excogita­rent. Plena erant non modo poëtarum volumina con&longs;imilibus figmentis, &longs;ed ædes & templa. Quanto &longs;tultius illi qui brutorum formas attribuebant dijs immortalibus; qui error etiam per­man&longs;it v&longs;que ad tempora Num&ecedil;. Quamobrem illi eo nomine gratia e&longs;t habenda, quòd primus vetuerit Romanos (vt Plutarchi verbis vtar) anqzwpoeidh_ kai\ zwomo\zfon qeou_ di)kona nomi/zein, ide&longs;t imaginem Dei &longs;peciem præ&longs;eferre hominis aut bellu&ecedil; putare. Verùm h&ecedil;c mi&longs;&longs;a faciamus, & redeamus ad Deos, quos neque otio contabe&longs;cere natura rerum patitur, neque ratione vti, aut manere in officio, quemadmodum imbecillitas humana requireret. Siqua igitur functio propriaque. voluptas e&longs;t, eam omnem in contemplatione meritò collocabimus. Itaque c&ecedil;teris hominum fun­ctionibus contemplatio præ&longs;tabit, & quamuis prudentia politicaque. facultas de &longs;cientiis & con­templandi ratione multa con&longs;tituat, vt ip&longs;i &longs;apienti&ecedil; quodammodo imperare videatur; &longs;cire licet permagni intere&longs;&longs;e imperare de aliquo, & illi imperare. Nanque imperare de aliquo &longs;ignificat imperare gratia illius, alicui verò imperare idem e&longs;t atque illo vti tanquam mini&longs;tro. oc &longs;upe­rioris officium e&longs;t, illud arguit &longs;eruitutem. Porrò in ædibus atrien&longs;is omnibus præe&longs;t, omniaque di&longs;pen&longs;at; &longs;ed nondum idem imperat omnibus; verùm domino otium parat, ne is præpeditus rerum nece&longs;sitate di&longs;&longs;oluatur, quominus hone&longs;tè quippiam & officio&longs;i agat. Sed dominus atrien&longs;i imperat. Eadem ratione prudentia tanquam &longs;apientiæ quidam atrien&longs;is illi otium parat, vt &longs;uo fungatur officio cohibendo affectus, eosque. non tollendo pror&longs;us, hoc enim neque fieri pote&longs;t, nec humanum ingenium tolerat; &longs;ed temperando &longs;olùm. Non ergo præcipit politica &longs;apientiæ, &longs;ed ip&longs;ius gratia tantum. Quare tantum abe&longs;t vt hic imperandi modus indicet politicæ nobilitatem, vt potius conuincat oppo&longs;itum; &longs;icut etiam quòd Deos curet non &longs;ignificat ip&longs;am dijs e&longs;&longs;e præ­&longs;tantiorem. ec quòd medicina magis eligenda potiorque. &longs;it quàm bona valetudo, quamuis pa­ret valetudinem & imperet ægro; quia imperat propter illam. Hactenus igitur o&longs;ten&longs;um e&longs;t con­templationem actioni præ&longs;tare & idcirco &longs;cientias facultati ciuili anteponendas e&longs;&longs;e.

A

B

Comparatur &longs;cientia naturalis cum cæteris &longs;cientijs. Cap. X.

C

PRAESTAT &longs;anè &longs;cientia duobus nobilitate rei, quæ tractatur & a)kzibei/a. Sed huius vocis a)kzibei/a notio multiplex e&longs;t. tenim latinè diligentia dici po&longs;&longs;e videtur. Quam­obrem iubet Ari&longs;toteles, non in omnibus eandem diligentiam e&longs;&longs;e requirendam. a Et

admone­bat M. ullius in epilogis nihil nimis enucleandum; minutam e&longs;&longs;e enim omnem diligentiam, eum verò locum grandia requirere: hoc verò e&longs;t cùm &longs;ingula ponuntur ob oculos & ad tenue eliman­tur. Proximè puto ego illa voce &longs;ignificari certitudinem quam item per&longs;picuitati maximè affinem e&longs;&longs;e credo: &longs;iquis hæc idem valere non recipiat. anc verò non in eo ponerem tantùm quòd &longs;in­gula exponantur: &longs;ed quòd res in ea principia di&longs;&longs;oluatur quæ per &longs;eip&longs;a con&longs;picua &longs;unt & pro­bè intelliguntur, & maxima illis fides habetur. Prior illa a\kzibei/a potius in docente quàm in rei natura po&longs;ita e&longs;&longs;e videtur. nde in &longs;cientias nihil nobilitatis, pr&ecedil;&longs;tantiæúe redundare facilè opina­bor. ltera naturam methodi videtur attingere. H&ecedil;c verò à duobus fontibus peti &longs;olet, ab ingenio demon&longs;trationis & rei &longs;ubiectæ. b Atqui demon&longs;trationis certitudo, &longs;eu per&longs;picuitatis non e&longs;t vniu&longs;modi. &longs;iquidem certior ea demon&longs;tratio perhibeatur quæ fidem facit ex cau&longs;sis quàm illa quæ rem e&longs;&longs;e tantummodò o&longs;tendit. ut &longs;i vtraque ducatur ex cau&longs;sis, erit illa certior quæ ex cau&longs;sis certioribus pendebit, hoc e&longs;t ex cau&longs;sis natura prioribus & notioribus. At verò &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;æ potiores vim finis obtineant, inde colligetur ea præ&longs;tantia quam in architectonicis anteà colloca­uimus. Certior item demon&longs;tratio dicetur quæ con&longs;tabit ex cau&longs;sis quæ non modo natura; ve­rumetiam nobis notiores &longs;int. Hæc po&longs;trema certitudo conuenit quoque &longs;ubiecto. c illud enim &longs;ubiectum certius dicitur quod nobis notius e&longs;t, cuiu&longs;modi e&longs;t animal in methodo naturali. Pro­ptereà docebat Ari&longs;toteles &longs;cientiam de animantibus e&longs;&longs;e præ&longs;tantem, quòd à nobis plenius co­gno&longs;ci po&longs;&longs;unt: quandò &longs;tirpes & animantis &longs;ocias & familiareis habemus, quapropter eas vbe­rius no&longs;&longs;e valemus: quippe cùm multa ine&longs;&longs;e in quoque genere po&longs;sit ille ob&longs;eruare, qui laborem non recu&longs;at. uòd igitur propiora &longs;unt nobis & cognationem habent cum humana natura, aliquid cum rerum diuinarum &longs;tudio rependunt. Sed enim alia certitudo, &longs;eu per&longs;picuitas accipitur à &longs;ubiecto. uoniam certior e&longs;t ea methodus qu&ecedil; non de &longs;ubiecto, quàm ea qu&ecedil; de &longs;ubiecto, ide&longs;t illa certior qu&ecedil; de &longs;ola forma quàm ea qu&ecedil; formam &longs;pectat in materia &longs;en&longs;ili. Sic arithmetica cer­tior e&longs;t quàm harmonica; quòd illa numerum ab omni qualitate &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;egregatum examinat, hæc illum cum &longs;ono &longs;pectat. His ita con&longs;titutis &longs;atis apparet omnium pr&ecedil;&longs;tanti&longs;simam e&longs;&longs;e philo­ &longs;ophiam diuinam, & &longs;apientiam. Nam quid ad per&longs;picuitatem &longs;ubiecti pertinet, noti&longs;simum e&longs;t, quippe ens quod ab omnibus no&longs;citur, nihil &longs;eip&longs;o notius habet. Idem quoque &longs;implicius quàm &longs;ubiecta c&ecedil;terarum facultatum; cum &longs;it ens vniuersè ad nullam certam rem applicatum &longs;ine ap­po&longs;itione aliqua: quod verò &longs;ubiicitur cæteris &longs;it aut ens mobile, aut quantum. Prætereà diuina philo&longs;ophia cau&longs;sis vtitur, atque illis omnium primis, vnde cætera omnia impetrarunt quòd &longs;int; itaque &longs;unt omnium maximè. eæque &longs;icut omnium primæ natura, &longs;ic etiam natura no­ti&longs;simæ: idcirco e&longs;t maximè &longs;cientia & ob id maximè docere pote&longs;t. adem quoque, cùm &longs;um­mum finem &longs;pectet c&ecedil;teris præferenda, quòd ad eas &longs;e habet vt Architecton, reliquas vt mini­&longs;tras re&longs;piciens, quod olim à nobis expo&longs;itum e&longs;t. ec parcat dicto; &longs;ed omnibus pr&ecedil;cipiat, & c&ecedil;teras regat, quo facilius perducantur in contemplationem primi entis, vnde etiam prima phi­lo&longs;ophia nominatur. Siquo ip&longs;i dee&longs;t conditio per&longs;picuitatis, illa e&longs;t, quia non accipit nota no­bis &longs;ed natura nota. Quapropter et&longs;i ordine naturæ &longs;uperat reliquas &longs;cientias ordine tamen do­ctrinæ po&longs;tponenda e&longs;t. Phy&longs;ic&ecedil; proxima &longs;en&longs;ui per&longs;equitur & familiaria nobis, &longs;ed illa po&longs;te­riora natura &longs;unt: neque enim de primo fine &longs;ermonem facere pote&longs;t, &longs;olumque illi ip&longs;um at­tingere &longs;ufficit, nihil habens quod de eo diligenter tractare po&longs;sit. Itaque non prima philo&longs;o­phia; &longs;ed &longs;ecunda iure optimo cen&longs;etur. At verò proximè pendet à prima, vt ni&longs;i h&ecedil;c &longs;it, naturalis prima & &longs;ola reputari deberet, quemadmodum eam illi perhibebant, qui vltra ens &longs;en&longs;ile nullum aliud no&longs;&longs;ent, & mathematicen &longs;cientiæ nomine non dignarentur. a Nos quid de mathematicis decernendum &longs;it po&longs;teà videbimus. Interim illud &longs;ilentio non videtur inuoluendum, vtpotè, non alienum à con&longs;ilio no&longs;tro, Sit'ne futura prima phy&longs;ice, &longs;i diuina tollatur. d a&longs;&longs;erit Ari&longs;tote­les. Scoti&longs;t&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;am afferunt; quia &longs;ola philo&longs;ophia naturalis de &longs;ub&longs;tantia differeret, qu&ecedil; prima e&longs;t omnium entium. &longs;iquidem &longs;ublata &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ &longs;ecreta e&longs;t à materia, ab&longs;tractionis ratio de medio tolleretur in qua po&longs;ita e&longs;t prima philo&longs;ophia: &longs;uper&longs;tes enim foret &longs;ola &longs;ub&longs;tantia na­turalis quæ ab&longs;trahi non pote&longs;t. Alij contrà et&longs;i phy&longs;icen primam e&longs;&longs;e fatentur, diuina &longs;ublata philo&longs;ophia, rationem tamen Scoti&longs;tarum non recipiunt & primam non origene phy&longs;icen e&longs;&longs;e futuram defendunt, &longs;ed dignitate &longs;olùm atque præ&longs;tantia. Nam contra id quod accipiunt Sco­ti&longs;tæ, nullam rationem ab&longs;tractionis &longs;upere&longs;&longs;e, opponunt multa. Tùm quia &longs;uper&longs;tes e&longs;&longs;et aliqua vis ab&longs;tractionis quæ ad res naturales & mathematicas generatim pertineret, cuius explicatio fo­ret muneris primi philo&longs;ophi. Tùm etiam quia multa &longs;uper&longs;unt à primo philo&longs;opho con&longs;ide­randa quæ ab&longs;tractione illa non continentur quam Deo mentibusque &longs;epararis attribuimus. Non igitur erit origine prior &longs;cientia naturalis; &longs;ed &longs;i fortè, præ&longs;tantior. & certè ita erit, inquiunt, quia &longs;ola &longs;pectabit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;impliciter: cùm c&ecedil;teroqui mathematicæ quantum con&longs;iderent. Quòd &longs;ivideatur item requiri tractatio communium illorum attributorum & vt &longs;olet dici, tran&longs;cenden­tium, adhuc philo&longs;ophia naturalis erit natura præponenda, quia cùm pauca admodum ea &longs;int quæ ab&longs;trahi queant, &longs;cientiam &longs;eparatam non efficient, &longs;ed vt partes vni ex his &longs;cientiis adiun­gentur. & &longs;icut in mathematicis aliqua, tamet&longs;i magnitudini numeroque. conuenientia communi­ter, non idcirco &longs;eor&longs;um tractantur, &longs;ed vel in geometria, vel in arithmetica traduntur, idem quo­que iudicium de naturali &longs;cientia fiet. Quantum &longs;anè attinet ad Scoti&longs;tas, hæc aduer&longs;us illos for­ta&longs;&longs;e plurimum valent, contra nos non item qui ens non vniuocum ponimus, quique numerum & magnitudinem vniuocè volumus e&longs;&longs;e quantitates & planè nouimus Euclideum progre&longs;&longs;um ab Ari&longs;totele notatum, qui non vniuersè concluderet, b cùm tamen ratio vniuersè concludendi &longs;uppeteret; & ab Alexandro de&longs;ignationes illas p&longs;eudographos habitas. c Nec id prohiberet, quominus e&longs;&longs;et alia &longs;cientia ad quam earum rerum tractatio pertineret, tamet&longs;i paucæ forent, quia &longs;cientiæ non ex rerum magnitudine, &longs;ed fine, v&longs;u, & modo di&longs;tinguuntur: nec tollit quomi­nus &longs;it ars ludendi &longs;cacchis à c&ecedil;teris &longs;eparata, quamuis paucis admodum verbis comprehendatur. Sed hoc mi&longs;&longs;o &longs;pectemus argumenta oppo&longs;ita. Profectò ni&longs;i &longs;it aliqua &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparata, ne&longs;cio futura'ne &longs;it aliqua &longs;cientia de communibus rei naturali & mathematicæ, quia reip&longs;a eadem e&longs;t magnitudo naturalis: nec vlla communis &longs;cientia nece&longs;&longs;aria foret. Ac &longs;i rectè rem animaduertas, omnis tran&longs;cendentia (&longs;ic enim notionem nouam nouo nomine appellare mihi liceat) na&longs;citur ex affinitate & pendentia quæ inter &longs;ub&longs;tantias naturales & &longs;eparatas intercedit. is ergo &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiis de medio &longs;ublatis pendentia, & &longs;ubinde tran&longs;cendentis ratio tolleretur. Adde quòd &longs;iqua fo­ret &longs;cientia de tra&longs;cendentibus illis e&longs;&longs;et natura po&longs;terior, vt o&longs;tendemus qua de illorum vi di&longs;&longs;e­retur, aut ad &longs;ummum prior &longs;ecundum rationem. taque adhuc phy&longs;ica & origine & natura an­teiret. Ergo &longs;i &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ non e&longs;&longs;ent; nec philo&longs;ophia diuina; prima omnium foret na­turalis. Mathematicæ cùm ex notis nobis, & natura &longs;imul efficiant id quod cupiunt, &longs;ic c&ecedil;teris demon&longs;trationis per&longs;picuitate præponentur, nam vis rerum quas ip&longs;æ tractant, non e&longs;t admodum nobilis; quippe quòd &longs;int accidentia, ide&longs;t habeat rationem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quatenus &longs;ubiicitur, & de­terminatur quanto; eaque. con&longs;iderentur longè &longs;ecus atque in natura exi&longs;tant; v&longs;que adeò vt non­nullis non naturæ, &longs;ed mentis opera e&longs;&longs;e credatur. Attamen nonnullarum rerum ingenium tale TRANSCRIPTION and IMAGE missing TRANSCRIPTION and IMAGE missing Tùm etiam eius forma non e&longs;t, quoniam eius e&longs;&longs;et definitio: huius enim munus e&longs;t explicare for­mam. Sed eius e&longs;t non definitio, verùm de&longs;criptio, nec forma igitur. Nec non ea quæ probantur, externa &longs;unt, nec intrin&longs;ecus à rei &longs;ub&longs;tantia pendent. Et ad idem confirmandum valet auctoritas Ari&longs;totelis aientis, principia mathematices e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;imilitudinem, neque propria. a Idemque. non &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a ab Ari&longs;totele acceptum; proptereà quòd omnes cau&longs;&longs;æ definiuntur per motum: effi­ciens enim e&longs;t principium motus, finis cuius gratia motus e&longs;t, forma & materia &longs;unt naturæ; & mo­tus igitur principia &longs;int nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. At verò mathematica &longs;unt immobilia. Et nullum igitur ibi cau&longs;&longs;æ genus exi&longs;tit. Tùm etiam nulla affertur poti&longs;sima demon&longs;tratio. Siquidem definitio non a&longs;&longs;umitur: & e&longs;to quòd a&longs;&longs;umatur, ea non interna e&longs;t, &longs;ed externa. Quin etiam vna e&longs;t cuiu&longs;que rei demon&longs;tratio. Sed in his plures exhibentur; & recta, & quæ deducat ad id quod fieri nequit; & mediis adeò diuer&longs;is eadem conclu&longs;io comprehenditur. Mathematicæ quoque rationibus vtun­tur quæ deducunt ad id quod fieri nequit: eæ verò non &longs;unt ex primis, &longs;ed à &longs;igno. Po&longs;tremò ve­rè &longs;cientia tractat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. roptereà tot philo&longs;ophiæ partes quot &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. b Atqui mathe­matice relinquit eam naturali. C&ecedil;terùm toto c&ecedil;lo veteres aberrant, nec de bono di&longs;tinguere &longs;ciunt. quandoquidem bonum duplex e&longs;t hone&longs;tum & honore dignum to\kalo/n Græci vocant, atque alterum, cui conuenit laus; Græcè dicitur a)gaqo/n hone&longs;tum quidem propter &longs;e expetitur; lau­dandum propter aliud expeti pote&longs;t. one&longs;tum e&longs;t in immobilibus alterum motu & actione con­paratur. Nunc contemplatio ex hone&longs;tis e&longs;t; quippe quæ aliena e&longs;t à motu. Quapropter h)h/mh, &longs;cientia vocata e&longs;t à &longs;tatu, c quòd &longs;edatis humoribus ætatis autem proce&longs;&longs;u id fit; & perturbationi­bus id quod præ&longs;tat virtus, nobis accedat, & id ita proprium &longs;apienti&ecedil; habitum e&longs;t, vt M. arro in &longs;eriis quoque di&longs;ceptationibus imperet quietem. Romanus, inquiens, &longs;edendo &longs;apit. Hoc genere boni præditæ &longs;unt mathematicæ; & verum continent, quòd per &longs;e expetendum e&longs;t; & ex hi&longs;ce principiis originem duxi&longs;&longs;e mon&longs;trat id quòd otij vitandi gratia &longs;acerdotes apud Aegyptios in­cubuerint mathematicis. Itaque ad illud. Omne bonum finis e&longs;t, concedo. inis cuiu&longs;dam actus e&longs;t finis; & id quoque do. Omnis actus cum motu: hoc verò nego. Sed actio vel imperfecta e&longs;t, vel perfecta. tque imperfecta quidem e&longs;t cum motu; perfectam &longs;ine motu con&longs;i&longs;tere po&longs;&longs;e pla­num e&longs;t. Et contemplatio e&longs;t bonum hone&longs;tum & actus, &longs;ed &longs;ine motu. Nunc contra iuniores &longs;eor­&longs;um o&longs;tendamus mathematicas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;cientias. Atque iam patet ex fine eas in &longs;cientiis e&longs;&longs;e nume­randas. &longs;iquidem contemplatio, & veritas &longs;int &longs;cientiæ finis, aliquam verò partem contemplatio­nis, & veritatis mathematicæ præ&longs;eferant. Per&longs;uadet nos ordo rationum quibus ip&longs;e vtuntur. Nam cùm ad tot capita vniuer&longs;æ referantur, Rhetoricæ enim &longs;unt, aut Dialecticæ, aut demon&longs;tra­tiuæ. Sed non Rhetoricæ, non Dialecticæ, demon&longs;tratiu&ecedil; igitur: itaque &longs;cientiam faciunt. Pr&ecedil;tereà quinque &longs;unt habitus, quibus verum dicere contingit, mens, &longs;apientia, prudentia, ars, & &longs;cientia. Sed mathematicæ non mens, non &longs;apientia, non prudentia, non ars. gitur &longs;cientia. Quin etiam efficiuntur ex nobis & natura notis. a verò &longs;unt natura priora & cau&longs;&longs;a. x cau&longs;sis autem, &longs;i con­templatio veritatis proponatur; efficitur &longs;cientia. Accedunt & Ari&longs;totelis, & Ptolomæi &longs;ententi&ecedil;; Quoniam ille primam figuram &longs;cientiæ faciend&ecedil; maximè accommodatam e&longs;&longs;e te&longs;tatur, d & &longs;&ecedil;pe auctoritate mathematicorum conditiones ver&ecedil; demon&longs;trationis explicat. Ptolom&ecedil;us item cæte­ris &longs;cientiis tribuit logon, probabile &longs;cilicet & veri&longs;imile; certum & nece&longs;&longs;arium mathematicis. Quòd &longs;i nece&longs;&longs;arium; & per &longs;e igitur; idque. in primo, vel in &longs;ecundo modo; proptereà continent quid e&longs;t; quod e&longs;t principium demon&longs;trationis. Et cùm mathematica &longs;int entia; vel &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;æ vel ex cau&longs;sis: tale enim e&longs;t rerum genus in natura, quod nullum certum materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis genus &longs;ibi vendicat: ergo &longs;unt obnoxia demon&longs;trationi. At verò vt rationes oppo&longs;itæ diluantur, aduer­tere oportet con&longs;ilium Philo&longs;ophi 4. Met. nde &longs;caturit omnis fallacia propemodum. Non te la­tet ex his, quæ nos anteà &longs;crip&longs;imus, ab eis qui præce&longs;&longs;erunt Ari&longs;toteli, mathematicen è &longs;cientiarum numero eiectam fui&longs;&longs;e, & habitam veluti philo&longs;ophiæ in&longs;trumentum, quod item re&longs;pexi&longs;&longs;e vide­tur præceptorum præceptor, dum 3. Met. robabiliter argumentatur in eis non e&longs;&longs;e bonum. Au­di&longs;ti quoque ante Ari&longs;totelem fui&longs;&longs;e ignotum genus illud &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quod ab omni materiæ &longs;e­cretum foret, & apodictice &longs;olùm ab Ari&longs;totele confectum. roinde non extiti&longs;&longs;e locum primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, &longs;ed primas &longs;ibi vendica&longs;&longs;e naturalem: ex quo effectum e&longs;t, vt eo &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum ge­nere comperto naturalis qu&ecedil; tunc erat prima, locum cederet alteri philo&longs;ophiæ, eaque. iure optimo prima haberetur, quòd de primis &longs;ub&longs;tantiis ageret; naturalis autem &longs;ecunda, quia de &longs;ecundo &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum ordine di&longs;putaret. Hæc quoniam confecta in phy&longs;icis vt per&longs;picua &longs;tatuuntur: de mathematicis erat di&longs;&longs;erendum, quod in eius philo&longs;ophiæ calce peractum e&longs;t. Ergo cùm de ma­thematicis eo tempore nil decretum fui&longs;&longs;et; ex iis quæ tum con&longs;tituta erant, accipit Ari&longs;toteles tot e&longs;&longs;e &longs;cientias quot &longs;unt genera &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum, qua&longs;i certum & confectum ex vi apodixeos, & communiter approbatum, & &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia receptum, duo &longs;cilicet e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum gene­ra, nec non totidem &longs;cientias. uod fortè non dixi&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles, po&longs;tquàm (id quod in extre­mo illo volumine fecit) docui&longs;&longs;et quemadmodum item bonum ad mathematica pertineret. Verùm fac illud fui&longs;&longs;e decretum Philo&longs;ophi ex numero &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum colligi &longs;cientiarum mul­titudinem: culpandi &longs;unt mathematici qui quantum ab omni &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genere &longs;eparatum con­mini&longs;cuntur, idque mathematico &longs;ub&longs;ternunt, neque ius &longs;uum retinent. Vt enim ante &longs;ignificaui­mus, accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia neque e&longs;&longs;e, neque cogitari pote&longs;t, & in mathematica &longs;ic &longs;ubit ab&longs;tra­ctionem, vt primùm fit in ab&longs;tractione aliorum accidentium, determinando notionem &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiæ tali forma accidentis, vt con&longs;iderando &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quatenus e&longs;t quanta, non vt &longs;ubiectum quanti, deinde liberatur quantum conditionibus materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis, hoc e&longs;t, alteratricibus calore & frigore, & quæ na&longs;cuntur ex illis, &longs;ibi relinquens extentionem &longs;olam dia\shma, &longs;iue dia\sasi+n, au­xilio no&longs;træ mentis: e&longs;t autem di&longs;tantia infinitum quid, & intrin&longs;ecus inhæret in materia, immò e&longs;t ip&longs;a materies, vt &longs;uo loco demon&longs;trabitur. & quamuis non &longs;it &longs;en&longs;ilis, e&longs;t nohth/, & intelligen­da: infinita verò non quòd omni termino excedat, &longs;ed quia mens in ea terminum vbicunque fi­gere queat, & quadrans & rotundans. am termini naturales &longs;unt in materia iam qualitatibus alteratricibus & &longs;en&longs;ilibus affecta. Accedit eodem quòd nomen &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; multiplex e&longs;t, & inter c&ecedil;tera comprehendit to\ ti/e)si\, quod quid e&longs;t, atque hoc e&longs;t &longs;cientiæ caput, vt dixi. Proinde tria &longs;unt genera ip&longs;ius quid e&longs;t, vnum formarum ab omni materiæ &longs;ecretarum, quod e&longs;t primi philo­&longs;ophi, alterum quod e&longs;t in materia &longs;en&longs;ili & naturale, & tertium quod &longs;ecernitur à materia &longs;en&longs;i­li, & e&longs;t mathematicum. Quòd &longs;i accidens &longs;pectare dicuntur; ita accipito, quia non re&longs;oluunt &longs;uas demon&longs;trationes in principia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, quemadmodum aliæ &longs;cientiæ, &longs;ed in principia quanti tantummodò; nihilominus & ip&longs;a rei principia perhibentur ab Ari&longs;totele; a vt quid tetragoni&longs;mus? inuentio mediæ. Quanquam illud &longs;atis e&longs;&longs;e poterat ad per&longs;uadendum in mathematicis e&longs;&longs;e rei cau&longs;&longs;am & &longs;i illis concedebatur quid e&longs;t. Hæc enim &longs;unt Ari&longs;totelis verba 5. primæ phil. . de termino. to\ ti/e)si\ pe/zws gnw/seas, kai\ tou_ pzagma/tos. Ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e terminum cognitionis, &longs;i verò cognitionis & rei. Et planè &longs;i ita res e&longs;t veram habeat cau&longs;&longs;am tetragoni&longs;mus; propter quam &longs;it oportet, aut &longs;it a)nai/tios & &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a, quod e&longs;t principium. Quapropter et&longs;i non &longs;unt ver&ecedil; cau&longs;­&longs;æ, ide&longs;t, præcipu&ecedil;, &longs;unt tamen primæ, &longs;i referantur ad &longs;uos effectus, id quod demon&longs;trationi &longs;at e&longs;t. Memento verò ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e duplex vel propriè, quod rei formam continet, vel logicè, quod per omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera &longs;eor&longs;um tradi pote&longs;t. Atqui ea definitio, quæ continet formam, &longs;u­mitur à Mathematicis, nec à phy&longs;ica definitione differt: quandò non aliter definiret phy&longs;icus re­ctum, aut curuum, vel Sexagonum, cum docet curiris lapis &longs;it Hexagonus; itaque etiam nos do­cuit Ari&longs;toteles b ip&longs;um cur in ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t re&longs;olui, vt in definitionem recti, & eius, cuius po­te&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e commen&longs;io. Vtitur etiam materia Mathematicus, vt cùm totum rectum ex duobus &longs;e­mirectis concludit. & cùm in omni prædicamento contineatur ratio pote&longs;tatis & actus, & quod e&longs;t in&longs;tar materiæ ac formæ, vtrunque principiorum genus v&longs;urpat; & quamuis non &longs;int ab&longs;olu­tè prima, &longs;at e&longs;t &longs;i in &longs;uo genere &longs;int huiu&longs;modi. Neque tibi negotium face&longs;&longs;at, &longs;iquando ex nobis audies dimidia, aut aliud &longs;imile partium genus e&longs;&longs;e toto po&longs;teriora; proptereà non po&longs;&longs;e ex illis demon&longs;trationem confici; aut &longs;i conficit demon&longs;tratio; ex his tanquàm prioribus verearis ne falsò pronunciatum &longs;it ab Ari&longs;totele, eas partes e&longs;&longs;e toto po&longs;teriores. Etenim alia ratio e&longs;t eiu&longs;modi partium apud mathematicum & c&ecedil;teros philo&longs;ophos: apud hos enim &longs;unt accidentia e&longs;&longs;entiæ; proptereà toto po&longs;teriores habentur; at apud mathematicum qui di&longs;tantiam per &longs;e con&longs;iderat quæ per &longs;e con&longs;tat ex iis partibus iure principia reputantur. In&longs;uper &longs;cire licet certitudinem &longs;eu per&longs;picuitatem e&longs;&longs;e vel per demon&longs;trationem, vel etiam multò maiorem, qualis e&longs;t principiorum, qu&ecedil; &longs;anè per&longs;picuitas &longs;cientiam non oppugnat. oc autem modo multa note&longs;cunt in mathema­ticis, quæ tanquàm &longs;en&longs;u de&longs;criptionibus exponuntur. Necnon affectiones e&longs;&longs;e proprias, vel &longs;pe­ciei, vel generis, neque omnes vno &longs;ubiecto fundari. Specta primùm tu ea qu&ecedil; &longs;unt ad aliquid, h&ecedil;c profectò &longs;altem duobus innituntur, con&longs;imilique. ratione &ecedil;quale, & in&ecedil;quale quæ &longs;unt propria quanti, & &longs;imile & di&longs;simile qu&ecedil; &longs;unt propria qualis. Et multa &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi apud mathema­ticos qu&ecedil; in relatione po&longs;ita &longs;unt, vt anguli & latera oppo&longs;ita. Po&longs;tremò memini&longs;&longs;e oportet, vnam vnius rei definitionem e&longs;&longs;e, cau&longs;&longs;amque propinquam quæ ab&longs;olutè demon&longs;trationem efficit, vel rectam, vel eiu&longs;modi qu&ecedil; terminetur eo quod fieri nequit, vt po&longs;teà longo &longs;ermone declarabimus. ea verò, &longs;i ex multis cau&longs;sis ordinem inter &longs;e habentibus componatur; nil refert. Sed cur non e&longs;t &longs;&ecedil;pè culpa mathematicorum, qui vera effectuum cau&longs;&longs;a neglecta propter difficultatem, alia pro­pria quæ &longs;int annexa, con&longs;ectantur? vt &longs;i in phy&longs;icis cùm ri&longs;us & habilitas ad di&longs;ciplinam &longs;e con­&longs;equi per&longs;picuum &longs;it ex inductione, tamet&longs;i illa habilitas habet cau&longs;&longs;am, ob facilitatem per ri&longs;um demon&longs;tretur. His ergo &longs;ic po&longs;itis facilè e&longs;t diluere rationes oppo&longs;itas. Nanque negatur a&longs;&longs;umptio &longs;ecund&ecedil; rationis. Eam confirmant opponendo demon&longs;trationem 32. primi Elem. uæ accipiat aliquid extrin&longs;ecus. Equidem, vt hoc gratis dabo, quòd mathematici &longs;&ecedil;pè principiis ijs videntur e&longs;&longs;e contenti qu&ecedil; &longs;int euidentia: &longs;ic confidenti&longs;simè a&longs;&longs;euerabo re&longs;olui talia principia quæ &longs;unt euidenti&longs;sima, in cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ui generis; vt in re no&longs;tra ex&longs;uperantia duorum angulorum ad quenque tertium, qu&ecedil; per externum angulum declaratur: e&longs;t enim &ecedil;qualis duobus oppo&longs;itis. Quod deinde afferunt mathematica theoremata ex communibus effici; negatur. &longs;iquidem ad rem propo&longs;itam ex analytico præcepto contrahantur. Et illud etiam quòd medium non &longs;it ratio formalis conclu­&longs;ionis; & quòd vna eademque. cau&longs;&longs;a plurium effectuum e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t. An id &longs;ufficit, vt talis &longs;it cau&longs;&longs;a qua po&longs;ita ponatur effectus, quæcunque illa cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;it, aut in eam re&longs;oluatur: & &longs;i plura &longs;int me­dia, vt ex ijs vna cau&longs;&longs;a fiat, aut ni&longs;i res ita &longs;e habeat, vitium in ratione latebit; & erit p&longs;eudogra­phema, neque mathematicæ conditio; &longs;ed demon&longs;trantis error erit culpandus. Quòd forma ca­reant mathematicæ, aut materia: tùm patebit, cum docebimus terminos e&longs;&longs;e formam interualli quod mathematico &longs;ubijcitur. & in rebus mathematicis e&longs;t materia, &longs;i non &longs;en&longs;ilis; at quæ men­te comprehendi queat; & partes quæ materiæ vim obtinent: carent planè fine & efficiente, quo­niam cau&longs;&longs;æ i&longs;tæ &longs;unt principia motus; mathematica verò &longs;unt immobilia: &longs;ed materia quæ &longs;ub mentem cadit & forma quæ re&longs;pondeat illi, nequaquàm. & id fal&longs;um e&longs;t, quòd talium quantorum non &longs;it definitio. Ea, quæ probantur externa e&longs;&longs;e; &longs;i extrà idem &longs;ubiectum, fateor. &longs;i verò extra genus; id verò pernego. Addis auctoritatem Ari&longs;totelis negantis principia propria mathemati­cis, te deludit ambiguum, quod culpa interpretis in codicem latinum irrep&longs;it. anque duæ &longs;unt voces apud Græcos, quas vnico nomine proprij Latini verterunt. ku/zion & o/ikei_on. Porrò oi)kei_arequiruntur in &longs;cientiis; a ku/zia non in omni &longs;cientia, &longs;unt verò ku/zia præcipua & poti&longs;sima cau&longs;&longs;arum genera nimirum finis & efficiens, & ku/zion e&longs;t auctor & caput. b hæc ergo negantur ab Ari&longs;totele mathematicis. Dices hæc e&longs;&longs;e principia metaphoricè. An &longs;unt principia metapho­ricè mutationis, non principia &longs;impliciter accepta, quòd aliquid de illorum ratione minuatur. immò &longs;unt principia maximè; vnde aliquid pendeat; cuius &longs;ignum quòd illo immutato, aliquid etiam &longs;ecum immutetur, quæ nonnulli è Latinis &longs;ic explicant, quòd &longs;int efficientia formaliter, non effectiuè. quemadmodum forma & priuatio dicuntur agere, non quia moueant; &longs;ed quòd &longs;ui pr&ecedil;­&longs;entia faciant aliud. & ratio peccat à coniunctis ad diui&longs;a. De his ergo, quæ ku/zia &longs;unt; agebat Ari&longs;toteles, non de propriis, quæ quatenus ip&longs;um in&longs;unt. Neque verò rationem &longs;cientiæ tollit, quòd principia &longs;int metaphoricè; &longs;iquidem etiam inibi conce&longs;&longs;erit Philo&longs;ophus idem principiorum genus primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, quæ e&longs;t omnium maximè &longs;cientia. Quanquàm non erat etiam, vt ve­reremur a&longs;signare principia propria mathematicis, qui ob&longs;erua&longs;&longs;emus notari Bry&longs;&longs;onem c quòd in orbe quadrando communibus vteretur, ideoque. repudiari rationem eius à Mathematicis; necnon audi&longs;&longs;emus Ari&longs;totelem nos admonentem, quemadmodum principia mathematicæ, quæ c&ecedil;tero­qui communia numero & magnitudini videbantur; propria redderentur, nimirum quòd non &longs;im­pliciter, &longs;ed ex analogia &longs;umerentur. Quamuis autem cau&longs;&longs;æ omnes definiantur per motum; &longs;ube&longs;t in dicto fallacia con&longs;equentis. &longs;iquidem et&longs;i omnes definiuntur per motum, non idcirco omnis earum con&longs;ideratio comprehendit motum: id quod v&longs;ueuenire dicimus in mathematicis. & e&longs;t verè dictum &longs;yncategorematicè, quia &longs;ingulæ efficiunt motum, non tamen categorematicè, quia non omnibus modis acceptæ. Non licet etiam negare, quin externæ cau&longs;&longs;æ & externa quid e&longs;t, in demon&longs;trationibus a&longs;&longs;umantur. Nanque demon&longs;trationes ab&longs;olui po&longs;&longs;unt etiam ip&longs;is quid e&longs;t lo­gicè acceptis. d Quòd autem varia media &longs;umi queant, &longs;i inter illa &longs;it ordo, concedimus: &longs;i minus, & hic demon&longs;tratorem arguemus. Porrò quòd idem valeant demon&longs;tratio recta, & ea quæ termi­natur eo quod fieri nequit; &longs;uo loco declarabitur. taque ex hoc etiam tollitur ratio &longs;eptima. Tollitur autem po&longs;trema ratio &longs;ignificata fallacia con&longs;equentis. &longs;iquidem cùm &longs;atis &longs;it ad &longs;cientiam vt &longs;it de &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;iue &longs;en&longs;ili, &longs;eu intelligenda, traducunt &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; nomen ad &longs;ignificandam tan­tummodo &longs;en&longs;ilem. Nos autem defendimus etiam mathematicen comprehendere alterum illud &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genus. Quare non e&longs;t dubitandum, quin mathematicæ &longs;int in &longs;cientiis collocandæ, quod multi, ijdemque. philo&longs;ophi nobili&longs;simi hoc tempore negant.

a 2. Met. 1. Eth.

b 1. Po&longs;t. T. 42. 1. de An.

D

c 1. de par. an. . 5.

E

F

a 3. Met. T. 7.

G

b 1. Po&longs;t.

c Elen.

H

A

IIII.

V.

a 1. Eu. . 7.

VI.

VII.

VIII.

b 4. Met. T. 4.

B

c 7. Phy&longs;. 1. de An.

Ad I.

Ratio I.

II.

C

III.

d 1. Po&longs;t. T. 31.

Hypoth. 1.

D

E

F

a 2. de An. T. 12.

b 2. Phy&longs;. T. 68.

G

II.

III.

H

IIII.

Ad II.

A

Ad III.

Ad IIII.

Ad V.

a 1. Po&longs;t.

B

b 2. de An. T. 46.

c 1. Po&longs;t. 1. Phy&longs;. 1. Elen.

C

Ad VI.

d 7. Met. T. 59.

Ad VII.

Ad VIII.

D

Accipiat'ne primus Philo&longs;ophus à naturali &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas e&longs;&longs;e. Cap. XII.

NEQVE ab in&longs;tituto no&longs;tro videtur abhorrere, &longs;it'ne quæ&longs;tio naturalis, an diuina de eo quòd &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ pror&longs;us à materia liberæ. Cùm enim ex eo po&longs;t naturalia vocemus philo&longs;ophiam diuinam, quòd naturalia theoremata ordine doctrinæ præponantur; & illud præ­cipuè, quòd o&longs;ten&longs;um e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e primum mouens omnibus modis immobile, & ob id à materia &longs;e­paratum; cen&longs;ebit aliquis eam quæ&longs;tionem e&longs;&longs;e naturalem. Et tamen profitetur Ari&longs;toteles &longs;e in methodo naturali di&longs;&longs;erturum de formis quæ re&longs;piciunt materiam, diligentiorem verò tractatio­nem de forma aliò reiecturum, idque. non &longs;ine valida ratione pronuntiatum, quòd cùm &longs;int etiam formæ quædam &longs;ine materia; de his agere non erat munus philo&longs;ophi naturalis. Idemque. alibi con­firmatum. Quæcunque mouent immobilia permanentia, e non e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;icæ con&longs;iderationis. Neque de&longs;unt argumenta quibus hæc pars problematis approbari po&longs;sit. Siquidem eiu&longs;dem men­tis &longs;it no&longs;&longs;e, &longs;it'ne res, & quid &longs;it. Verùm &longs;olus primus philo&longs;ophus nouit quid &longs;it primus motor. ergo is &longs;olus no&longs;cet etiam quòd &longs;it. &longs;t enim forma illius motoris penitus à materia &longs;eiuncta, & ita decreuit Auicenna. In hanc &longs;ententiam Auerroës Auicennæ infen&longs;i&longs;simus inuehitur pluribus locis, a & tribus poti&longs;simè nititur argumentis. Primum. Nulla, inquit, &longs;cientia probat e&longs;&longs;e &longs;uum &longs;ubiectum, &longs;ed ip&longs;um accipit, vt noti&longs;simum. Cùm ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quæ &longs;unt extra materiam, &longs;int primæ philo&longs;ophiæ &longs;ubiectum, nequit prima philo&longs;ophia illas e&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;trare. Deinde demon­&longs;tratio rei cuiu&longs;piam ad eam &longs;cientiam pertinet, vnde promitur medium. Sed demon&longs;tratio, quòd &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, vtitur medio naturali, nempe motu. Ergo & ea demon&longs;tratio naturalis habebitur. Tertiò demon&longs;trat Ari&longs;toteles &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas e&longs;&longs;e 8. Phy&longs;. quinimo ea&longs;dem argu­mentationes ad verbum re&longs;umit 12. po&longs;t natural. Illa igitur di&longs;putatio naturalis erit, non autem diuina. Nam quòd 8. Phy&longs;. &longs;it pars methodi naturalis, non e&longs;t quòd ambigamus, cum 1. de ortu citetur cum libris de motu. Quapropter Auerroës &longs;ic omnem controuer&longs;iam tollere putauit. Cùm enim de &longs;ub&longs;tantiis quæ &longs;unt extra materiam, quæ&longs;tio duplex excitari po&longs;sit, an'ne &longs;int, & quid &longs;int, priorem quæ&longs;tionem à naturali di&longs;&longs;oluendam e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;uit, po&longs;teriorem verò à primo philo&longs;opho. Cæterùm, &longs;i eiu&longs;dem mentis e&longs;t no&longs;&longs;e, &longs;it'ne res & quid &longs;it. ùm philo&longs;ophus natu­ralis norit e&longs;&longs;e tale genus &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, profectò etiam no&longs;cet quid ip&longs;um &longs;it. Et contrà quia primus philo&longs;ophus nouit quid ip&longs;um &longs;it, illud item e&longs;&longs;e cogno&longs;cet. Itaque inanis erit illa di&longs;tinctio de quæ&longs;tionibus, quæ pertinent ad &longs;ub&longs;tantias ab omni materiæ concretione &longs;ecretas. Pr&ecedil;tereà con­tingeret, inquit Scotus, b philo&longs;ophiam naturalem priorem e&longs;&longs;e diuina; quod quidem haberi de­bet ab&longs;urdum. Sed h&ecedil;c forta&longs;&longs;e leuia. Nam quantum &longs;pectat ad primum, no&longs;&longs;e licet rem e&longs;&longs;e bi­fariam, vel per &longs;e, hoc e&longs;t, per &longs;ua principia, vel per accidens, ide&longs;t, per euenta quædam. Verùm non nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t, vbi &longs;ciamus rem e&longs;&longs;e per accidens, vt ibidem quoque &longs;ciamus quid e&longs;t. quemadmodum euenire dicebat Ari&longs;toteles in &longs;ubalternis qu&ecedil; &longs;olum norunt rem e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;en&longs;ilia qu&ecedil; &longs;uperiores, per &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as cogno&longs;cunt. Ex quo item efficitur, vt argumentum Scoti nullius &longs;it roboris; pro­ptereà quòd vbi &longs;cientia quædam no&longs;cat aliquid per accidens quod no&longs;citur ab alia per &longs;e; nihil forta&longs;&longs;e prohibet, quominus ordine doctrinæ antecedat; at ordine naturæ nequaquam; &longs;icuti ne­que etiam &longs;ubalterna præcedit &longs;ubalternanti natura: &longs;ed &longs;iquo modo pr&ecedil;cedit, id &longs;olum e&longs;t ordi­ne doctrinæ. quo pacto etiam naturalem diuinæ philo&longs;ophiæ præcedere non negamus. Illa &longs;ine dubio grauiora quæ te&longs;tatur ip&longs;emet Ari&longs;toteles. c Ip&longs;e enim nos admonet e&longs;&longs;e con&longs;iderationem alte­rius &longs;cientiæ, & quidem prioris quam &longs;it naturalis no&longs;&longs;e quòd &longs;int entia nonnulla ingenita & omnino immobilia. rætereà docet officium e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi di&longs;&longs;erere vtrum è &longs;ub&longs;tantiis &longs;olæ &longs;en&longs;i­les, an aliæ præter has exi&longs;tant. Prætereà quærendum, inquit, an præter materiam &longs;it aliqua cau&longs;&longs;a per &longs;e, atque illa quidem &longs;eparabilis. Clarius item 6. Met. d docet ad primum philo&longs;ophum pertinere vtrunque problema, an &longs;int & quid &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;uprà naturam. 7. e quoque libro idem a&longs;&longs;erit. Necnon lib. 11. f eandem confirmat &longs;ententiam. Sed quid apertius afferri pote&longs;t quàm ea quæ pronuntiat in eodem libro? g Non'ne etiam 12. Met. h has &longs;ub&longs;tantias e&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;trat? Demum eodem libro perorans, i inquit &longs;e o&longs;tendi&longs;&longs;e repetiri tale genus &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum. Quin & ip&longs;e Auer­roës. 1. Met. 2. Met. 4. Met. 7. & 12. Met. k quæ&longs;tionem de eo, quòd &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ &longs;int, ad di­uinum philo&longs;ophum pertinere te&longs;tatur. Quare non ad phy&longs;icum, vt ip&longs;e in calce primi phy&longs;ici profe&longs;&longs;us e&longs;t. Non po&longs;&longs;unt &longs;anè qui cum aliqua diligentia legunt Ari&longs;totelem, id negare: &longs;ed tamen eò confugiunt, quòd et&longs;i eiu&longs;modi contemplatio diuina e&longs;t; nihilominus non e&longs;t &longs;impliciter; &longs;ed conclu&longs;io duntaxat: nam concluditur medio naturali, &longs;cilicet motu. Indignaretur profectò hæc audiens Auerroës qui theorema ad eam &longs;cientiam referri voluerit, vnde promitur medium. ua­re apud ip&longs;um, &longs;i medium e&longs;t phy&longs;icum, efficitur etiam phy&longs;icam fore conclu&longs;ionem. Sed enim hoc mi&longs;&longs;o manife&longs;ti&longs;simè per&longs;piciemus, notitiam motus diuino a habitu non abhorrere. In primis enim 4. Met. l docet Ari&longs;toteles, primi philo&longs;ophi munus e&longs;&longs;e contemplari omnes &longs;pecies entis. atqui motus e&longs;t &longs;pecies entis. m & motum igitur primus philo&longs;ophus contemplabitur. Prætereà cùm prima philo&longs;ophia non habeat &longs;ubalternam, ad hanc alia tran&longs;itus fieri nequit. Ne igitur fiat tran&longs;itus, oportet in eadem &longs;cientia con&longs;iderari definitum in qua partes definitionis habentur. At verò partes definitionis ip&longs;ius motus &longs;unt de prima philo&longs;ophia. & motus igitur. Motus etenim definitur. Actus eius quod e&longs;t in potentia, quatenus in potentia. mnes autem norunt, actum & pote&longs;tatem ad diuinam methodum pertinere. n In&longs;uper potentia definitur per motum. Omitto etiam &longs;tudio breuitatis multa loca Alexandri & Auerrois o qui huic &longs;ententiæ &longs;ub&longs;crip&longs;erunt. Accedit eodem, quòd termini communes qui ab Ari&longs;totele 5. primæ philo&longs;ophiæ de&longs;cribuntur, ex omnium philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ententia &longs;unt eius methodi. rgo & cau&longs;&longs;æ. quare etiam cau&longs;&longs;a effi­ciens. Atqui genus hoc cau&longs;&longs;æ per motum definitur. & eius igitur definitio partesque. definitionis. quamobrem & motus per quem cau&longs;&longs;a efficiens definitur. Po&longs;tremò &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ aliquid efficiunt in entibus & rebus naturalibus per motum. taque etiam phy&longs;ice mouent. p Sed à pri­mo philo&longs;opho cogno&longs;cendæ &longs;unt, vt efficiunt: ergo & per motum cogno&longs;cantur oportet. Motus igitur ad primum philo&longs;ophum pertinebit. rgo & demon&longs;tratio quæ vtitur motu, non erit ab ip&longs;o aliena. Sed hæc &longs;atis hactenus dubitata &longs;int. unc docebo quid &longs;entiam. d verò duorum capitum explicatione continetur. Primo quidem. Philo&longs;ophum naturalem no&longs;&longs;e &longs;olum quòd &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ materiæ immunes exi&longs;tant. Altero verò Philo&longs;ophum diuinum no&longs;&longs;e it ab quòd &longs;unt & quid &longs;int. Ve­runtamen admodum di&longs;parem e&longs;&longs;e rationem qua illas e&longs;&longs;e vtrique cogno&longs;cunt. quandò naturalis illas e&longs;&longs;e cogno&longs;cit per accidens potius quam per &longs;e, nimirum ex &longs;olo motu. C&ecedil;terùm non id dico, phy&longs;icum in earum notitiam ex &longs;olo motu peruenire, tanquam medio, cùm & id etiam in diuina methodo contingat: &longs;ed quòd notio quam habet de &longs;ub&longs;tantia illa philo&longs;ophus naturalis, &longs;emper includit mo­tum, vel quòd efficiat motum, mouet enim phy&longs;icè; vel quia notatur per priuationem motus. Nam quia e&longs;t nobis ignota, &longs;ic de&longs;cribatur oportet per ea qu&ecedil; &longs;unt nota nobis. b eanque. cau&longs;&longs;am octauus phy­&longs;icorum pars erit methodi naturalis, tamet&longs;i explicat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam à materia &longs;eparatam. Qmm verò tale &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; genus non modò mouet materiam, &longs;ed habet functiones proprias citrà omnem materi&ecedil; co­gnationem; neque &longs;unt &longs;olum principia &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; mobilis, verumetiam &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;impliciter & &longs;unt entia beati&longs;sima; nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t item &longs;it alia &longs;cientia qu&ecedil; in earum &longs;peculatione ver&longs;etur qu&ecedil; non re&longs;piciat motum, licet auxilio motus eius cognitionem adipi&longs;catur. Itaque vt hanc rationem pr&ecedil;&longs;eferunt, &longs;pectat ad diuinum philo&longs;ophum no&longs;&longs;e, quòd e&longs;t hoc &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genus. Ita fit, vt eius explicationem ab&longs;oluere nequeat philo&longs;ophus naturalis, quòd habeat item alias functiones qu&ecedil; lateant ip&longs;um, quia non in­cludant motum. cùm verò primus philo&longs;ophus con&longs;ideret ens quod e&longs;t, vel &longs;en&longs;ile, vel &longs;eparatum, & cau&longs;&longs;as eius, liceat illi eius e&longs;&longs;entiam ab&longs;olutè tractare. & quà principium e&longs;t rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium, & qua e&longs;t res qu&ecedil;dam à materia &longs;ecreta. Quantum verò e&longs;t de qu&ecedil;&longs;tione quid e&longs;t, a&longs;&longs;ero eam nullo modo ad phy&longs;i­cum pertinere. nam ver&longs;atur in eius cognitione per accidens, & eam tantum cogno&longs;cit, quà re&longs;picit motum. Sed primus philo&longs;ophus illius vniuer&longs;as functiones intelligens attingit e&longs;&longs;entiam. (&longs;iquidem in his operari & e&longs;&longs;e idem &longs;int, & idem quoque e&longs;&longs;e & e&longs;&longs;entia.) & ita per &longs;eip&longs;am cogno&longs;cit & quid &longs;it, & quòd &longs;it. uanquàm habitus huiu&longs;ce notiti&ecedil; nulla methodo explicatur; a &longs;ed eò nos deducit me­thodus, vt po&longs;tquam notuerit, maximè intelligatur, & per &longs;eip&longs;am. Ergo, inquies tu, cogno&longs;cetur à nobis e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, quod tnm à probatioribus philo&longs;ophis non conceditur. Pr&ecedil;tereà &longs;i idem e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e, & e&longs;&longs;entia in hoc genere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Si igitur nouit phy&longs;icus <09> &longs;unt; idem quoque e&longs;­&longs;entiam no&longs;cat oportet. Velim equidem h&ecedil;c dicta accipi in bonam partem. <09>.&longs;. illam attingimus, quia &longs;e&longs;e nobis maximè prodit: attamen quia mens tantum lumen &longs;u&longs;tinere nequit; ideo negant philo&longs;ophi comprehendi &longs;eparatorum e&longs;&longs;entias. Et planè quemadmodum oculus noctu&ecedil; fontem lucis attingit, non tnm ip&longs;um ferre pote&longs;t ob nimium &longs;plendorem; &longs;ic menti no&longs;træ dicimus euenire. Iam verò quòd phy­&longs;icus no&longs;&longs;e nequeat e&longs;&longs;entiam &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;eparat&ecedil;, id omne na&longs;citur ex notione quam habet de illa, cogno&longs;cit enim ip&longs;am cum habitudine ad materiam, at qui illa habitudo facit, quominus idem &longs;int e&longs;&longs;e & e&longs;&longs;entia in &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparata. &longs;iue vt rectius dicam, quòd nos h&ecedil;c, veluti diuer&longs;a concipimus qu&ecedil; tnm idem reip&longs;a &longs;unt; & quod per &longs;eip&longs;um indiuiduum e&longs;t, diuiduè comprehendatur; neque tamen ea &longs;it complexa notitia, & in quam cadere valeat error: &longs;ed per integumenta cogno&longs;citur, vt &longs;i &longs;olem per nubem ad&longs;pexeris, totus quidem cernitur, &longs;ed non dilucidè: ac veluti notitia &longs;implici no&longs;cuntur homo & animal rationis compos, & ex toto, &longs;ed homo confusè, & imperfectè, animal vtens ronne di&longs;tinctè & perfectè; &longs;ic mentes diuin&ecedil; tot&ecedil;, &longs;ed confusè no&longs;cuntur à phy&longs;ico, à primo verò philo­&longs;opho di&longs;tinctè. Itaque accurata explicatio &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;eparat&ecedil; non e&longs;t muneris naturalis, &longs;ed diuini: & id &longs;ibi voluit Ari&longs;toteles, vbi con&longs;iderationem illam philo&longs;opho naturali denegauit. Ex his conuerto me ad rationes in fronte capitis allatas. Et quidem eiu&longs;dem mentis dicimus e&longs;&longs;e no&longs;&longs;e &longs;it'ne res, & quid e&longs;t, vbi ip&longs;am per &longs;e cogno&longs;camus; &longs;ecus &longs;i no&longs;catur per accidens; quanquam eiu&longs;modi verborum verus e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;us, &longs;icuti quòd e&longs;t, cum &longs;it qu&ecedil;&longs;tio &longs;implex, &longs;yllogi&longs;mo non o&longs;tenditur; &longs;ic neque ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t: ideò nihil ad nos: &longs;ed detur hoc. Ergo quia primus philo&longs;ophus nouit &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;epa­ratas per &longs;e, &longs;imul explicat vtranque qu&ecedil;&longs;tionem. on &longs;ic philo&longs;ophus naturalis. ùm ens ex acci­dente cogno&longs;cat. Diluuntur item rationes Auerrois. Nanque vbi probat primum philo&longs;ophum non probare quòd &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, quia &longs;uum &longs;ubiectum e&longs;&longs;e probaret. Falsò dicimus &longs;umi &longs;ub­&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum prim&ecedil; philo&longs;ophiæ. &longs;iquidem &longs;it ens, quod complectitur decem pr&ecedil;­dicamenta, eius autem principia &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, quæ per nota nobis per&longs;picuæ fiunt. Et &longs;i­quis eas &longs;ubiecti partem e&longs;&longs;e defendere velit, &longs;i &longs;ectator fuerit Auerrois, eum monebo non e&longs;&longs;e ab­&longs;urdum apud illum in eadem &longs;cientia po&longs;&longs;e probari; &longs;unt enim pars &longs;ubiecti totius. Et quamuis ex motu ratio procedat, dicam ego motum, quia notus nobis ab omni methodo v&longs;urpari, tamet&longs;i nihil ab&longs;ur­di con&longs;equetur, &longs;i etiam accipiamus ip&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e medium, quod pertineat ad philo&longs;ophiam diuinam. Quod obiicitur eius &longs;cientiæ demon&longs;trationem e&longs;&longs;e, vnde &longs;umitur medium dabo &longs;i medium fuerit prius. &longs;i po&longs;terius &longs;it facilè negabo, vt patet, &longs;i &longs;ubalternans accipiat quòd e&longs;t à &longs;ubalterna. Ad vltimum ne­gamus cognitionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ ab&longs;olui 8. Phy&longs;. cùm ibi &longs;olùm explicetur quoad re&longs;picit motum: ip&longs;a verò alias habeat functiones à motu di&longs;iunctas quæ &longs;unt officij &longs;uperioris. Video te his non acquie&longs;cere, &longs;ed nouis telis adhuc contrà nos in&longs;urgere, quippe <09> motus non po&longs;sit e&longs;&longs;e medium de prima philo&longs;ophia. Nam motus quo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ demon&longs;trant æternus e&longs;t. tqui motum &ecedil;ternum e&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t theorema phy&longs;icum, nec vllo mom primi philo&longs;ophi: proinde Ari&longs;t. tit hoc medio, tanquam in TRANSCRIPTION MISSING PAGE 62 do comparatur, quod e&longs;t corpus humanum. anque illud e&longs;t, quod affici oportet vt bene valeat: hoc &longs;ecatur, vritur, purgatur, inediam patitur, in hoc e&longs;t bona valetudo, vt in &longs;ubiecto. Sed in me­thodo non erit finis opus, vt bona valetudo; nihil enim docendo efficitur; &longs;ed explicari volunt cau&longs;&longs;æ, proprietates, & partes eius &longs;ubiecti quod pote&longs;t obtinere bonam valetudinem, quatenus huiu&longs;modi. anque horum no&longs;cendorum gratia laboramus, eisque. cognitis acquie&longs;cimus, cumque. talem reddiderit medicus auditorem, vt hæc optimè teneat, finem &longs;e docendo feci&longs;&longs;e putat. & hoc e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum, quia &longs;ubiectum e&longs;t id cuius principia, partes, & affectiones exponuntur. Itaque idem e&longs;t in methodo finis & &longs;ubiectum. In &longs;cientiis igitur, in quibus nulla ratio operis habetur, idem erit &longs;ubiectum, idemque finis habitus & methodi. uapropter etiam sxopo\s &longs;eu propo&longs;itum vocatur à Gr&ecedil;cis. Quanquàm ego latius patere puto vim &longs;copi, quàm &longs;ubiecti. Quandò &longs;ubiectum &longs;cientiæ totius appello, ad quod omnia referuntur in illa &longs;cientia, & quod per &longs;e expetitur & ex­plicatur, sxapo\n verò, quod etiam alterius gratia tractatur. Sic ortum & interitum, non &longs;ubie­ctum, &longs;ed &longs;copum con&longs;tituam, quia propter aliud tractatur, illud &longs;ubiectum perhibebo propter quod con&longs;ideratur ortus. Itaque faciam, vt &longs;ubiectum per omnes partes alicuius &longs;cientiæ perti­neat, vt id ad quod &longs;emper ea referantur quæ in &longs;ingulis &longs;cientiæ partibus exponuntur non ali­quod generale quod partes & proprietates contineat, motus auctoritate. Ari&longs;totelis 1. Po&longs;t. analyt. & 4. primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, vbi ens ip&longs;e con&longs;tituit &longs;ubiectum, non quod omnia generatim complectitur, &longs;ed cuius principia, partes, & propria ve&longs;tigantur. Hoc verò vnum e&longs;&longs;e debet, vel vniuocè, vel vt ad vnum quod &longs;anè latius accipiendum e&longs;&longs;e duco, vt non modò illud, cuius id quod primum e&longs;t in notione formali reliquorum includatur, velut &longs;ub&longs;tantia in notione acciden­tis, verùm etiam quomodocunque in alio includatur, vt cau&longs;&longs;a, per quam explicatur quid e&longs;t lo­gicè. Genus igitur, quod res materiatas & &longs;en&longs;iles complecteretur, variis modis con&longs;tituêre, qui Ari&longs;totelis ve&longs;tigia &longs;ecuti &longs;unt. Cùm enim ens &longs;impliciter à primo philo&longs;opho tractaretur, a reli­quæ &longs;cientiæ portionem entis acciperent, eam entis portionem vel generis &longs;ubalterni nomine ex­pre&longs;&longs;ere, vtputa, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ corporis, vel aliquam conditionem ad ens, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, corpusúe ad­iecere, velut quòd &longs;it mobile, aut naturale. Sic cùm corpus e&longs;&longs;et per &longs;e quantum quod mathema­ticæ con&longs;iderationis e&longs;&longs;e videbatur, vt ip&longs;um à mathematico &longs;eiungerent, adiunxere quoque con­&longs;imiles differentias quæ ip&longs;um limitarent. Videamus nunc, quid mouerit illos, vt hoc potius, quam illud approbarent. D. uidem Thomas accepit ens ea ratione per&longs;ua&longs;us, nimirum. Illud e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub­iectum, cui primo & per &longs;e prima affectio conueniret, atqui prima affectio motus e&longs;t: is autem conuenit ènti primò; &longs;iquidem illi primò conuenire putandum e&longs;t, per quod definitur. Sed mo­tus definitur per ens: ita enim definitur. Actus eius quod e&longs;t in potentia, quatenus in potentia. Subiectum igitur e&longs;t ens. Quia verò credendum e&longs;t D. homam non accepi&longs;&longs;e ens vniuersè: quia non omnia &longs;unt capacia motus, Deus enim pror&longs;us immobilis e&longs;t veritati con&longs;entaneum e&longs;&longs;e vi­detur, etiam ens conditione mobilitatis e&longs;&longs;e re&longs;trictum & illud ens pro &longs;ubiecto fui&longs;&longs;e receptum quod haberet in &longs;eip&longs;o principia motus. At qui &longs;i ita e&longs;t, cur mobile magis appellatur, quàm na­turale? qu&ecedil; ratio mutandi conditionem & formulam &longs;ubiecti? Rur&longs;us cur ens potius quàm &longs;ub­&longs;tantia? quandò &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis e&longs;t, vbi in &longs;eip&longs;a principia motus habeat. & mutatio in &longs;ub­iecto videatur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantia, cùm anima &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia, ad quam mutatio quoque pertinere pote&longs;t, vt ip&longs;e D. homas a&longs;&longs;euerat, nec repugnat Ari&longs;toteles, qui dum motum manife&longs;ti&longs;simum e&longs;&longs;e o&longs;ten­dit, etiam motum phanta&longs;iæ complexus e&longs;t. Pr&ecedil;tereà, &longs;i re&longs;tringitur ens nouam notionem facit, vt cum animali rationis compos accedit. taque non amplius ens &longs;impliciter: aut &longs;i ens &longs;implici­ter, affectio illius propria non erit: quippe quòd latius pateat &longs;ubiectum, quàm appo&longs;ita conditio. Mitto quòd &longs;ubiectum debet e&longs;&longs;e ab&longs;olutè primum, ita vt in ea facultate cui &longs;ubiicitur, demon&longs;trari, non po&longs;sit. At mobile per naturale de &longs;ubiecto demon&longs;tratur. b Mitto etiam illa qu&ecedil; obiecit Aegi­dius, vt puta, quòd phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalterna foret primæ philo&longs;ophiæ. Tùm etiam quòd ens mobile &longs;it diuin&ecedil; con&longs;iderationis. uorum alterum ita probabat. uòd cùm ens mobile &longs;it pars entis, & acci­piat conditionem qu&ecedil; non fluit ab eius principiis, illi ine&longs;t per accidens. t vbi condition per acci­dens alicui parti &longs;uperueniat, ibi intercedit affinitas &longs;ubalternationis. Itaque phy&longs;ica erit &longs;ubal­terna, id verò vt ab&longs;urdum reputari debet. Alterum verò quòd illa con&longs;ideratio phy&longs;ica non e&longs;&longs;et: &longs;iquidem prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;pectat ens, eiusque. partes, & modos, ac differentias per quæ illud cone proximè diuiditur. Ergo cùm per mobile & immobile diuidatur ens, efficitur, vt ens mobile non &longs;anè phy&longs;ic&ecedil; &longs;it contemplationis, &longs;ed prim&ecedil; philo&longs;ophi&ecedil;. Mitto hæc, inquàm, vel quia controuer&longs;a &longs;unt cùm apud nos, tùm apud alios; & quia, vel non con&longs;entiunt cum iis qu&ecedil; anteà con&longs;tituimus, vel quòd fal&longs;a videntur, nullam vim afferunt. Nam quod ad primum illud &longs;pectatur. & primum & &longs;ecundum continent propo&longs;itiones repugnantes. tenim mobile, vt conditio qu&ecedil; per accidens enti in&longs;it, accipitur. o&longs;t verò, vt pars, modus, &longs;eu differentia entis. eclaret nobis animi &longs;ui &longs;ententiam Aegidius. Nam &longs;i conditio per accidens e&longs;t; ergo fal&longs;um e&longs;t &longs;ecundum argumentum: nempe quòd con&longs;ide­rare ens mobile &longs;it munus primi philo&longs;ophi. ulla enim &longs;cientia &longs;pectat illa qu&ecedil; in&longs;unt per accidens. Quòd &longs;i ine&longs;t per &longs;e, vt modus, vel pars, vel differentia, iam non erit phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalterna; quandò &longs;ubalternatio po&longs;tulat conditionem accidentariam. Sic nos deludit Ægidius. Sed eò minus h&ecedil;c valent apud nos, qui de &longs;ubalternæ conditionibus di&longs;&longs;entimus. & quod attinet ad &longs;ecundum vi­demus primùm ob eam rationem quàm proponit Aegidius &longs;ic euerti omne &longs;ubiectum phy&longs;ic&ecedil;, immò &longs;cientiarum omnium: quia nulla res e&longs;&longs;et quæ non e&longs;&longs;et pars, aut modus, aut differentia entis. Adde & illud, quòd non differt primus philo&longs;ophus à c&ecedil;teris in rebus tractandis, &longs;ed in ratione tractandi. uippe quòd vniuersè contempletur ea quæ reliqui &longs;cientes particulatim &longs;pe­ctant. His igitur po&longs;terioribus repudiatis primis illis in&longs;i&longs;tamus. Eadem quoque per&longs;uadent phy­&longs;icæ &longs;ubiectum non e&longs;&longs;e ens naturale; licet hoc facilius defendi queat: cùm naturale prius e&longs;&longs;e quàm mobile videatur: &longs;ed quatenus ponitur ens, ei&longs;dem difficultatibus implicatur. Spectemus nunc, &longs;it'ne corpus mobile aut naturale &longs;ubiectum. & planè tale &longs;ubiectum accipiendum e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;ebimus, &longs;i conditiones intueamur quibus ad&longs;tringitur. Etenim phy&longs;iologiæ &longs;ubiectum mo­tu definitur. t motus e&longs;t affectio corporis. & corporis igitur erit &longs;ubiectum. Præterquàm quòd te&longs;tatur non &longs;emel Ari&longs;toteles &longs;cientiam de natura plurimum impendi in explicatione corporum & magnitudinum. Tùm prætereà: quia &longs;ubiectum illud e&longs;t, cuius principia partes & proprieta­tes in illa methodo &longs;pectantur cui &longs;ubiicitur. Sed &longs;iquis vniuer&longs;am phy&longs;iologiam animo lu&longs;tret, nihil aliud ab ea tractari cogno&longs;cet. Et hoc igitur erit &longs;ubiectum. Veruntamen id D. homæ non placuit. ùm quia motus qui tractatur à phy&longs;ico per ea quoque pertinet quæ corpora non &longs;unt vt motus cogitationis: tùm etiam quòd &longs;ubiectum neque &longs;eor&longs;um, &longs;iue &longs;ecundum materiam, &longs;i­ue &longs;ecundum formam, neque complexum o&longs;tenditur, at mobile de corpore demon&longs;tratur, a & corpus item de mobili, illud quidem ex eo quòd e&longs;t naturale: alterum verò ex illo quòd omne id quod mouetur, e&longs;t partim in termino à quo, partim in termino ad quem, & partibile igitur. Neque minus partes & proprietates & principia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis, aut mobilis explicantur à phy&longs;ico quàm partes & proprietates, ac principia corporis mobilis, &longs;eu naturalis. Accedit & auctoritas Ari&longs;totelis, qui &longs;ubiectum phy&longs;icæ con&longs;tituit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, b in qua &longs;unt principia motus & quietis. Itaque alij, quibu&longs;cum ego &longs;entio, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam mobilem, &longs;eu naturalem phy­&longs;icæ po&longs;uere &longs;ubiectum. Quod item confirmare libet auctoritate Ari&longs;totelis qui, dum principia talis &longs;ubiecti &longs;e tradere profitetur, id verò e&longs;t, quod habet naturam, dicit e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, eo quòd è &longs;ub&longs;tantiis con&longs;tat. c Similique. modo nos ea mouent quæ &longs;crip&longs;it Ari&longs;toteles. d “Scientia de natura ferè plurima videtur circum corpora & magnitudines & horum pa&longs;siones atque mo­tus; adhuc autem circum principia quæ talis &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt.” & cùm ignotum &longs;it, &longs;it'ne corpus hoc & probandum: &longs;ubiectum verò noti&longs;simum e&longs;&longs;e velit, mihi &longs;it veri&longs;imile illud &longs;tatui po&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam naturalem, &longs;eu &longs;ub&longs;tantiam mobilem. Cæterùm dicet qui&longs;piam, veluti ens repu­diatum e&longs;t, quia non e&longs;t proprium mobilitaris &longs;ubiectum, nec bene congruit, cùm ratione forma­li; &longs;ic neque &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quiddam enim amplius e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quàm mobilitas, &longs;iquidem aliquæ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;int ad quas nullo modo pertineat motus, vt illæ &longs;unt quæ ab omni materiæ concre­tione vindicantur. udiet is, quantum hoc valeat, &longs;i antè con&longs;tituatur, quemadmodum &longs;ub&longs;tan­tia naturalis, &longs;eu mobilis &longs;it &longs;ubiectum. Nam tres leges adhibendas e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eo, &longs;i defendere velimus tale &longs;ubiectum. Primùm quidem, vt totum hoc coniunctum quod dicimus &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiam mobilem, pro &longs;ubiecto ponatur. Neque enim &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eor&longs;um, neque &longs;eor&longs;um mobile &longs;unt &longs;ubiectum; &longs;ed totum hoc quod e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis; atque adeò, vt æquiualeat hoc ter­mino cuidam &longs;implici, itaque neque mobile de &longs;ub&longs;tantia, neque &longs;ub&longs;tantia de mobili probari po&longs;&longs;unt; id autem notum nobis e&longs;t notitia confu&longs;a qua ope &longs;en&longs;us accedit, dum cogno&longs;cimus omnia, aut quædam moueri, vel dum nouimus e&longs;&longs;e motum, nam &longs;imul nouimus hoc aut illud moueri. Ex quo efficitur, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia non &longs;impliciter & vniuersè ponatur &longs;ubiectum, &longs;ed &longs;ub­&longs;tantia in qua motus ine&longs;t qu&ecedil; e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis, &longs;eu &longs;implex, &longs;eu compo&longs;ita, & primò &longs;ub&longs;tan­tia, &longs;i non &longs;ecundum naturam, at nobis vndè ordine quodam c&ecedil;ter&ecedil; &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quæ &longs;en&longs;um fu­giunt & exortes materiæ &longs;unt, nuncupantur. Itaque Platonici Deum non &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed u)po| ou_sion, ide&longs;t, &longs;upra &longs;ub&longs;tantiam vocant naturam proprietatem attendentes & vt e&longs;t à no&longs;trate &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparantes. Proinde vt in communibus ad vnum (id verò infrà docebimus) notio &longs;implex ad primum in illo ordine coarctatur, &longs;ic euenit in notione &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, hæc enim quæ &longs;en­&longs;ilis e&longs;t, primò concipitur, & hæc pro &longs;ubiecto con&longs;tituitur. Neque ob&longs;tat, &longs;i nos armis no&longs;tris op­pugnare coneris; quia &longs;i &longs;uppo&longs;itum ex adiectione conditionis arctatur; erit item confu&longs;io in par­tibus methodi naturalis; quandò generalior erit animi commentatio, in qua res con&longs;iderantur, vt &longs;en&longs;iles, quàm libri de elementis: oportet enim rationem formalem vniuer&longs;a complecti. ecnon aliquid per accidens &longs;cientiæ &longs;upponetur: nam &longs;ub&longs;tantia per accidens e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;ilis: euitamus enim hæc omnia &longs;umentes &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem &longs;ecundum materiam: cùm in his obiectionibus accipia­tur &longs;en&longs;ile &longs;ecundum formam. Tertiò mobilitas in hac &longs;ub&longs;tantia, ide&longs;t habilitas ad motum nota­tur, non actus ip&longs;e mouendi. uapropter idem e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e mobile, ac naturale; hoc e&longs;t, quod habet in &longs;eip&longs;o principia motus. & cùm motus &longs;it duplex, verus & metaphoricus, vt verus e&longs;t notior nobis ita mobilitas habilitatem indicabit ad verum motum primò & præcipuè, non autem ad non autem ad metaphoricum. æc &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis nece&longs;&longs;ariò corpus e&longs;t, &longs;olùm ab eo differt, modo concipiendi, &longs;iquidem, vniuer&longs;alior e&longs;t notio &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;, quàm corporis, atque vniuer&longs;alior quidem, non vniuer&longs;itate pr&ecedil;dicationis; totidem enim &longs;ubiecta comprehendit &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis, quot corpus de prædicamento &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, &longs;ed vniuer&longs;itate modi, quia &longs;ine limitatione, &longs;cilicet ea­dem &longs;ub&longs;tantia comprehenditur quæ &longs;ub nomine corporis quantitare quodammodo limitatur. Et cùm ens etiam in prima notione &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;ignificet, atque illam quidem &longs;en&longs;ilem, efficitur item, vt ens ad eandem &longs;ub&longs;tantiam contrahatur. Ergo re uera idem &longs;unt ens mobile &longs;eu natura­le. &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis, &longs;eu naturalis: & corpus mobile, &longs;eu naturale. Nec vllum argumentum po­te&longs;t opponi, quin his &longs;tantibus euerti po&longs;sit. Ac primùm, quod extremo loco oppo&longs;itum e&longs;t, quòd &longs;ub&longs;tantia non e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum congruens cum mobilitate. Iam enim patuit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam accipi, vt in prima &longs;ui notione & vt id ad quod c&ecedil;teræ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ referuntur. a verò e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;ilis &longs;ub&longs;tantia cum qua motus conuertitur: nulla enim talis &longs;ub&longs;tantia e&longs;t quæ non &longs;it mobilis, nec vllum mo­bile, quin &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis. Sic contra nos argumentum D. homæ non valet, vbi probat ens e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum, non &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, aut corpus, quia &longs;it ens proprium motus &longs;ubiectum, vt ex definitione apparet. uandò ens, quod in illa definitione &longs;umitur, aut adæquat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en­&longs;ilem, aut vt rectius dixerim, e&longs;&longs;e ibi e&longs;t non res, &longs;ed apprædicatum, ide&longs;t, non &longs;ignificat vt termi­nus, &longs;ed vt copula: &longs;ed cùm dicitur eius, quod e&longs;t, & re&longs;oluitur copula in terminum & copulam, & hoc quid communius e&longs;&longs;e videtur, quàm corpus & &longs;ub&longs;tantia. ico ip&longs;um non vniuer&longs;itate prædicationis e&longs;&longs;e communius, &longs;ed vniuer&longs;itate modi. Sic quoque defendetur D. homas qui ens pro &longs;ubiecto &longs;ump&longs;it: neque enim ens vniuersè accepit, &longs;ed quod æquipollet &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;en&longs;ili. Iam verò quòd accipitur corpus, etiam facilè re&longs;pondere licet; &longs;i &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem idem e&longs;&longs;e re cum corpore cogitemus. Itaque dum corpus efficitur &longs;ubiectum motus, dum principia, partes, & proprietates afferuntur, etiam talis &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ubiectum motus efficitur; & eius principia, par­tes, & proprietates explicantur. Nec ea nos perturbant, quæ D. homas oppo&longs;uit qui in prima notione mobilitatem re&longs;picere volumus, motum verum qui corporis e&longs;t, non metaphoricum qui e&longs;t animi. Atque vbi opponitur demon&longs;trari id quod mouetur e&longs;&longs;e corpus, multos exitus habet oppo&longs;itio: tùm quia probatur de corpore motus qui e&longs;t actus, in ratione verò &longs;ubiecti accipitur mobilitas quæ e&longs;t habilitas. Prætereà non idem probatur & con&longs;tituitur. on&longs;tituitur &longs;anè in cor­pore mobilitas, at corpus de mobili probatur. Ne verò mirum videatur, vt vnum &longs;it per&longs;picuum, & reciprocum &longs;it ob&longs;curum, cùm &longs;&ecedil;pe in mathematicis v&longs;ueueniat probari reciprocum, quod optimi mathematici docent ad 6. primi, quanquam id quod pro &longs;ubiecto accipitur, vnum e&longs;t vt totum hoc corpus, &longs;eu &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis, & e&longs;t veluti terminus &longs;implex. deo nullo pacto demon­&longs;trationi &longs;ubiicitur. De ratione autem quæ affertur è 1. de c&ecedil;lo rur&longs;us &longs;e&longs;e offeret occa&longs;io di&longs;pu­tandi. Veruntamen & iterum repugnet qui&longs;piam. o quòd omnes affectiones ine&longs;&longs;e videntur in &longs;ubiecto per rationem quam formalem vocant. t non per mobilitatem ine&longs;t corpori e&longs;&longs;e in loco, &longs;ed per &longs;uperficiem. Prætereà &longs;ubiectum vult e&longs;&longs;e vniuocum, aut ad vnum. Sed hoc quod nos &longs;ubiectum facimus, nihil ex his e&longs;t. Nanque &longs;ub&longs;tantia naturalis e&longs;t, vel elementum, vel ex ele­mentis, & corpus c&ecedil;le&longs;te quæ nihil habent vniuocum. uandò differunt vt caduca & æterna. Nec &longs;unt ad vnum. &longs;iquidem ea quæ &longs;unt ad vnum, &longs;ic &longs;e habeant, & vnum &longs;it, à quo c&ecedil;tera mu­tuant e&longs;&longs;entiam; Sed non ita &longs;e habent inferiora ad cœlum. uius rei &longs;ignum: quia non vtuntur illò in &longs;uis definitionibus. Adde etiam quòd de &longs;ubiecto præno&longs;&longs;e oportet, quòd &longs;it, & quid &longs;it. At vbi'nam habetur definitio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis? Dicimus &longs;anè ad primam etiam locum e&longs;&longs;e proprietatem quæ pullulat à rei natura, vt po&longs;ita res in &longs;ua natura &longs;it etiam in &longs;uo loco. nde etiam dici &longs;olet. Dans formam, quæ e&longs;t natura; dare etiam con&longs;equentia formam, in quibus numeratur locus. &longs;t etiam locus naturalis terminus motus naturalis. Ad &longs;ecundam &longs;ic re&longs;pondemus ad con­&longs;eruandam rationem eorum quæ &longs;unt ad vnum, &longs;atis e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;i prius accipiatur in quid e&longs;t po&longs;te­riorum logicè, hoc e&longs;t, in quocunque genere cau&longs;&longs;æ. Cùm igitur c&ecedil;lum habeat vim efficientis ad ea qu&ecedil; intra orbem Lunæ continentur, ita etiam in illorum definitione comprehendetur. &ecedil;c nos docuit Auerroës. a Tertia &longs;ic tolli poterit. Subiectum generale cuiu&longs;que facultatis ita &longs;e habere, vt genus generali&longs;simum. uare non re&longs;oluitur in alia principia &longs;uperiora. uocirca neque defi­nitione &longs;ubiicitur. Verùm &longs;ufficit inchoata quædam notitia rei illius quæ per nomen &longs;ignificatur quam vnu&longs;qui&longs;que etiam &longs;ine præmon&longs;tratore pote&longs;t habere. n methodo po&longs;teà principia ex­quiruntur, ex quibus con&longs;tat. anc re&longs;olutionem &longs;iquis ad definitionem dirigi putet haud repu­gnabo (e&longs;t enim propriè de&longs;criptio) atque illam colligi autumabo non Primo de c&ecedil;lo, vt Auer­roës opinatus e&longs;t, quoniam ibi ita definiri puto corpus naturale, quatenus continet interuallum & pendet à quanto; &longs;ed initio &longs;ecundi. Phy&longs;. b po&longs;tquàm explicatum e&longs;t, quid &longs;it natura, & vbi o&longs;tenditur quid &longs;it habens naturam. Sic igitur &longs;ub&longs;tantia naturalis ponetur phy&longs;iologiæ &longs;ubiectum.

e 2. Phy&longs;.

Ratio I.

E

a 1. Met. c. 1. 1. Phy&longs;. T. c. 83.

II.

2. Phy&longs;. T. c. 26.

III.

F

b 6. Met. que 4.

c 3. de c&ecedil;­lo T. 2. 3. Me. T. 7. T. 18.

G

d T. 2.

e T. 5.

f c. 1. 2.

g c. 8.

h T. 29.

i T. 30. T. 41.

k T. . 8, 15 T. . 6. T. . 1. T. . 5.

l T. 2.

H

m 7. Met. T. 8.

n 1. Phy&longs;. T. 78.

o 5. Met. T. 6. 21. 22 23.

p 2. Phy&longs;.

A

B

a Auer. 3. de An. T. c. 39.

C

D

Ad I.

Ad II.

Ad III.

Ad IIII.

A

B

a 6. Met.

Ratio I.

C

D

b 1. de c&ecedil;­lo T. 5.

E

F

a 1. de c&ecedil;­lo T. 5. 6. Phy&longs;. T. 32.

b 6. Met. T. 1.

c 2. Phy&longs;. T. 4.

d 1. de c&ecedil;­lo T. 1.

G

H

A

B

C

Dubitat. I.

II.

III.

Ad I.

D

Ad II.

Ad III.

a Epit. Me. T. 4.

b 2. Phy&longs;. T. 4.

Quo cau&longs;&longs;arum genere, & quatenus vtatur Philo&longs;ophus naturalis. Cap. XIIII.

E

METHODVS naturalis ad contemplationem dirigitur, & numeratur in &longs;cientiis. Scire autem e&longs;t no&longs;ce quid, & quale &longs;it genus &longs;ubiectum per proprias cau&longs;&longs;as, principia & ele­menta quæ &longs;cilicet in &longs;ubiecto, per &longs;e & quatenus ip&longs;um in&longs;int, quod cùm certum genus præfini­tumque &longs;it, accerta ratione informatum, certas quoque proprietates certasque. cau&longs;&longs;as admittit. Porrò cau&longs;&longs;arum genera multa &longs;unt, multæque, eiu&longs;dem generis cau&longs;&longs;æ quarum varietate contingit, vt variis modis afficiantur ad &longs;cientias: neque omnes pariter, aut omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera per­quirant, aut eiu&longs;dem generis omnibus vtantur. Itaque ad con&longs;tituenda phy&longs;iologiæ fundamen­ta de hac re nobis item in hac methodo tractandum e&longs;t. Quia verò ab eiu&longs;dem generis &longs;ubiecti principiis cùm demon&longs;tratio, tùm definitio ducuntur, ad omnem quoque notitiam quouis in&longs;tru­mento comparetur, in&longs;tituta quæ&longs;tio pertinebit, & principia non cognitionis, vt aliquibus place­re video; &longs;ed rei ip&longs;ius attinget quæ idem valent àc cau&longs;&longs;æ quarum quatuor &longs;pecies &longs;unt omni­bus con&longs;picuæ, ex quo vt materia, per quod vt forma, à quo vt efficiens, cuius gratia vt finis, ta­met&longs;i veteres, cùm materiam &longs;olam, vt cau&longs;&longs;am agno&longs;cerent, aut &longs;i prætereà cau&longs;&longs;am mouentem ob&longs;eruarent, velut Empedocles & Anaxagoras; quia tamen vel eam non v&longs;urparent in reddenda

ratione problematum naturalium, ni&longs;i fortè cur ita fieret à materia non &longs;uppeteret, a vel vt fieri &longs;olet in iis quæ &longs;unt ad vnum, vt res à notiore nuncupetur; quia materia quam elementum pro­priè vocant, notior e&longs;&longs;et, eodem quoque nomine reliquas cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ignificari voluerint. Itaque etiam di&longs;cordia illa Empedoclea quam &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia cau&longs;&longs;am efficientem ponimus ab Ari&longs;totele ip&longs;o elementi nomine vocata e&longs;t; de elemento, quòd primo &longs;ignificat materiam, non principio, aut cau&longs;&longs;a mentionem facerent. Quicquid igitur &longs;it & quomodocunque vocetur, &longs;eu principium, &longs;iue cau&longs;&longs;a, &longs;iue elementum, cùm &longs;cientia quæque ex notitia principiorum, &longs;eu cau&longs;&longs;arum, &longs;iue ele­mentorum oriatur; à nobis di&longs;&longs;erendum e&longs;t, an omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera phy&longs;icus a&longs;&longs;umat, & omnes cau&longs;&longs;as ex omni genere accipiat à prima v&longs;que ad vltimam. Neque enim &longs;olùm cau&longs;&longs;æ genere di&longs;crepant, &longs;ed in eodem genere aliqua propinquior e&longs;t, alia remotior, vt animalis mate­ria proxima &longs;unt partes difformes, remotior vniformes, remoti&longs;sima quatuor elementa, & ratio forma hominis proxima, remotior anima: per omnes verò re&longs;pondere liceat interrogatis cur & quid aliquid &longs;it, vt &longs;igillatim vnaquæque cau&longs;&longs;a docet, cur & quid &longs;it: ita dubitari pote&longs;t, an ad ab&longs;olutam rei cuiu&longs;que &longs;cientiam omnes &longs;imul a&longs;&longs;umere oporteat, &longs;iue genere, &longs;iue etiam ordine di&longs;tinguantur. Et omnes &longs;imul accipiendas e&longs;&longs;e monet Ari&longs;toteles, dum inuehitur in Anaxagoram, & Democritum, qui principia rerum naturalium infinita po&longs;uerunt; quòd ex omnibus cau&longs;sis &longs;cientia con&longs;tat, ex quibus res &longs;cienda con&longs;tituta e&longs;t, quæ &longs;i infinitæ forent, nullo modo concipi po&longs;&longs;ent. Si igitur non ex omnibus cau&longs;sis ex quibus res &longs;cienda conflatur, &longs;cientia fieret; etiam &longs;i principia forent infinita, contingeret vt haberemus &longs;cientiam; nanque aliqua &longs;olùm ex infinitis &longs;ufficerent ex quibus efficeretur &longs;cientia. Prætereà docuit Ari&longs;toteles ab exemplo finis à prima v&longs;que ad &longs;upremam cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;e procedendum; e&longs;t verò illa &longs;uprema qua allata nihil amplius inquiritur, vt cur indutus e&longs;t pallio? vt prodeat in forum. ur hoc? vt offendat amicum. ur item i&longs;tud? vt &longs;oluat debitum. Contrà verò neque omnia quæ &longs;ciri po&longs;&longs;unt, omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera flagitant: neque item omnes à prima v&longs;que ad vltimam accipi queunt. tenim &longs;i ex eodem gene­re omnes a&longs;&longs;umendæ &longs;int, in infinitum progredi cogemur, quod plurimum abhorret à &longs;cientia: &longs;iquidem vt &longs;it Franci&longs;cus infinita præcedant indiuidua quæ ni&longs;i extiti&longs;&longs;ent, neque hoc exi&longs;tere po&longs;&longs;et. Et cùm res quæ &longs;ub &longs;cientiam cadunt, &longs;int æternæ, vel mortales, & ex his quædam &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiæ, nonnullæ accidentia: planum &longs;it æterna carere efficiente naturali, quia non e&longs;t ibi principium motus quo definitur efficiens: accidentia verò forma: quandò nulla e&longs;t qualitatis qualitas, b & ex accidentibus complura fine vacare, quippe quæ ex materiæ nece&longs;sitate &longs;uboriantur. eaque. liben­ter, &longs;i po&longs;&longs;et, natura re&longs;pueret; ex hoc genere mors e&longs;t in brutis, & ærugo in ære; &longs;ed tantum bo­num non &longs;ine i&longs;to paruo malo habendum e&longs;t. Itaque cùm varia rerum genera &longs;int, nec omnia cau&longs;&longs;as omnes admittant, &longs;uarumque. rerum ex propriis ip&longs;arum principiis &longs;ingulæ &longs;cientiæ &longs;int &longs;pectatrices; profectò neque omnes &longs;cientiæ per omnes cau&longs;&longs;as vnamquanque rem edocebunt, neque poterunt, etiam &longs;i contendant: multoque minus id præ&longs;tabunt &longs;ingulæ demon&longs;trationes, aut definitiones. Verumenimuerò cùm id in non omnes cau&longs;&longs;as accipientibus, nullam habeat con­trouer&longs;iam, neque in &longs;cientiis illis quæ non omnes cau&longs;&longs;as ob&longs;eruant, quales mathematicas e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;uimus in quibus nulla neque efficientis, neque boni ratio &longs;olet haberi. At &longs;tatuatur aliquid omnes cau&longs;&longs;as habens ex omni &longs;cilicet genere ab imis v&longs;que ad &longs;ummas, an'ne demon&longs;trationes eiu&longs;modi con&longs;trui poterunt qu&ecedil; omnes illas cau&longs;&longs;as complectantur, & erit'ne aliqua &longs;cientia qu&ecedil; tale demon&longs;trationum genus v&longs;urpare queat? Hìc dici con&longs;ueuit. Scire &longs;impliciter accipi tribus modis. tenim dicitur vbi quæque res per omnem rationem note&longs;cit, & &longs;ub omni notione expli­catur, qua concipi pote&longs;t, vt homo quà ens, quà &longs;ub&longs;tantia naturalis, quà magnitudine preditus, quà &longs;tudio&longs;us. Secundò quà &longs;ub certa ratione con&longs;ideratur, & in certum genus refertur, velut &longs;i &longs;pectetur, quòd &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia in qua fons in&longs;it & origo motus. Tertiò quoque &longs;impliciter &longs;ci­tur, vbi in eo genere &longs;ub propria ratione &longs;pectetur, vt quatenus homo. Quantum certè attinet ad primum illum modum &longs;ciendi &longs;impliciter, vel id omnes &longs;cientiæ præ&longs;tant vnà, & omnes artes & facultates, aut vna erit &longs;cientia quæ omnem con&longs;iderandi rationem complectetur, qualem non­nulli ponunt, qui vniuer&longs;am contemplationem in tres partes di&longs;tributam e&longs;&longs;e volunt, non ex re­rum natura, &longs;ed ex v&longs;u no&longs;tro, & ob doctrinæ commoditatem, ob quam &longs;anè cau&longs;&longs;am &longs;æpe fit, vt id quod vnius e&longs;t methodi & loci, in aliam methodum locumúe transferatur, aut aliunde tracta­tum petatur. ta dicunt primum philo&longs;ophum tran&longs;ump&longs;i&longs;&longs;e rationes ex 8. Phy&longs;. & vocis tracta­tionem quæ loci illius propria e&longs;t in qua &longs;en&longs;ilium natura declaratur, accipi è 2. de Anim. ecnon vim ridiculorum quæ ip&longs;ius e&longs;t oratoris, à poëtarum arte de&longs;umptam. Nec ratio dee&longs;t qua con­firment illud admirabile. Quandò &longs;cientiæ &longs;e habent veluti res. Sed vnum e&longs;t omnium genus &longs;i­ne vniuocum, &longs;iue ad vnum, nihil refert ad &longs;tatuendum &longs;cientiæ &longs;ubiectum, nimirum ens. Ergo & vna &longs;cientia, cuius reliquæ &longs;int partes, quemadmodum reliqua entia &longs;unt partes entis. Sed quam &longs;it hoc fal&longs;um, rerum obiectarum varietas mon&longs;trat, difformitas principiorum & di&longs;similis de­mon&longs;trandi modus, vnde &longs;cienti&ecedil; di&longs;tinguuntur, vt anteà vi&longs;um e&longs;t. uid enim cum rebus diuinis habet affinitatis, quòd æqualibus demptis ab aliis æqualibus re&longs;idua &longs;int æqualia? & accuratio re­quiritur in mathematicis, quæ negligitur in prima philo&longs;ophia propter illiberalitatem. aturalis flagitat demon&longs;trationes quæ cum &longs;en&longs;u conueniant, Naturalis & mathematica res &longs;peciatim tractant; vniuersè prima philo&longs;ophia. & omnes tractare &longs;cientias, vt aliqua res reneatur, præter­quàm quòd erit Stoicorum dogmate in&longs;i&longs;tere, quòd idem quem &longs;apientem e&longs;&longs;e volunt, & rex erit bonus, & &longs;utor bonus, quod ri&longs;u explodendum e&longs;t; etiam cogetur primus philo&longs;ophus de&longs;cende­re ad particularem cuiu&longs;que rei con&longs;iderationem, vt cum &longs;pectabit hominem quatenus e&longs;t ens, quod nos nulla ratione approbamus, tùm etiam &longs;cientiæ non habebunt præfinitas interrogatio­nes, &longs;ed &longs;ciens de omni quæ&longs;tione di&longs;&longs;erere valebit. Quòd &longs;i id ab Ari&longs;totele perpetuò negatum. atque id ip&longs;um acceptum de &longs;ecundo genere &longs;ciendi &longs;impliciter; planum e&longs;t Ari&longs;totelem non no­ui&longs;&longs;e primum &longs;ciendi modum; &longs;ed planè &longs;ecundum accepi&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub quo tertius item continetur: nam &longs;upponitur in quaque demon&longs;tratione ratio generalis eius generis quod in ea &longs;cientia tractatur, eaque. propriis ve&longs;titur attributis. Nam quòd vna &longs;it &longs;cientia, quia &longs;it vnum rerum omnium genus; nihil officit planè, etenim &longs;pectare licet res, vel vt habent inter &longs;e ordinem prædicationis, vel vt habent in &longs;eip&longs;is rationem &longs;cibilis. t &longs;cibiles autem habent certos terminos quibus continentur, & certos tractandi modos. At ens c&ecedil;tera complectitur vt prædicabile, vnde &longs;cientiarum partitio non accipitur. Non &longs;equitur igitur, vt etiam &longs;i ens de omnibus prædicetur; &longs;it vna &longs;cientia com­munis. Igitur accipiamus &longs;ecundum genus &longs;ciendi &longs;impliciter quod ab Ari&longs;totele definitum fui&longs;­&longs;e credimus: & cùm duo &longs;int cau&longs;&longs;arum ordines, primus qui po&longs;itus e&longs;t in quatuor diuer&longs;is gene­ribus, alter qui gradibus cau&longs;&longs;arum generis eiu&longs;dem con&longs;i&longs;tit; &longs;i primum ordinem &longs;pectemus, ita decernetur. Effectum, &longs;eu quæ&longs;tionem non e&longs;&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;ariò re&longs;oluendam in &longs;ingula genera cau&longs;&longs;a­rum, &longs;ed in ea duntaxat à quibus pendet. Cauendum verò e&longs;&longs;e, vt omnia &longs;ub illa ratione ponan­tur quæ illius &longs;cientiæ propria e&longs;t in qua ver&longs;amur. t &longs;i de re naturali, quatenus e&longs;t huiu&longs;modi, quæramus; eius &longs;cientiam con&longs;equemur ex iis ip&longs;is cau&longs;sis quæ pertinent ad rem illam con&longs;tituen­dam, quatenus hæc omnia continent rationem motus quo naturalis &longs;cientia determinatur. Ita fiet vt mathematicus tractans quantum, etiam &longs;i quantum ab efficiente producatur; & &longs;it form&ecedil; in&longs;trumentum, idemque. materiæ extentæ terminus, nihil horum attinget; quia repudiant h&ecedil;c ab­&longs;tractionem & immobilitatem quam con&longs;ectatur mathematicus. Verùm quod &longs;pectat ad cau&longs;&longs;a­rum gradus, res ip&longs;a re&longs;oluenda e&longs;t in cau&longs;&longs;as v&longs;que &longs;ummas; modo tamen cau&longs;&longs;æ per &longs;e ad effe­ctum dirigantur. &longs;i minus; quantumuis &longs;e con&longs;equantur, non omnes accipiendæ &longs;unt. t puta, inuentio the&longs;auri, cau&longs;&longs;am habet proximam nimirum effo&longs;sionem, effo&longs;sio quoque certam habet cau&longs;&longs;am, nempe ru&longs;ticum effodientem. Inuentio tamen the&longs;auri per &longs;e à ru&longs;tico effodiente non pendet, &longs;iquidem the&longs;aurus præter &longs;pem con&longs;iliumque. effodientis inuentus fuerit. Quamuis ergo &longs;it alia prima cau&longs;&longs;a effo&longs;sionis, non nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t ab ea per &longs;e pendere effo&longs;sionis effectum, quando­quidem prima illa cau&longs;&longs;a non huc per &longs;e contendit, &longs;ed per accidens &longs;olùm, effodiebat enim ru&longs;ti­cus terram, vt &longs;ereret arbores, arborum &longs;atio per &longs;e optabatur; &longs;ed dum &longs;ationis gratia foderet, euenit fortuito, vt the&longs;aurum inueniret. Atque ita etiam &longs;i in infinitum indiuidua &longs;ibi &longs;uccedant, po&longs;teriora tamen exi&longs;tunt, & cogno&longs;ci po&longs;&longs;unt; proptereà quòd et&longs;i alterum ex altero na&longs;citur in infinitum: vt à Saturno Iuppiter, à Ioue Tantalus, non tamen Saturnus e&longs;t per &longs;e cau&longs;&longs;a Tantali, &longs;ed per accidens. Quocirca non cogimur di&longs;&longs;oluere po&longs;terius hoc indiuiduum in reliqua omnia præcedentia, nec in immen&longs;um, &longs;ed in illis cau&longs;sis acquie&longs;cimus quas per &longs;e nouimus ad eius in­diuidui propagationem concurrere. Proinde etiam &longs;i Ari&longs;toteles omnes cau&longs;&longs;as in demon&longs;tratione definitioneúe &longs;umendas &longs;ignificauerit, eius &longs;ententiam vt collectim, non di&longs;tributiuè pronuntiatam accipiemus, quòd hæc &longs;cientia fiat ex his cau&longs;sis, ex aliis alia, vt quamuis phy&longs;ica demon&longs;tret per omnia genera cau&longs;&longs;arum, non tamen per illa omnia vnum quodque demon&longs;trare cogatur. Nunc ad illa veniamus quorum cau&longs;&longs;a hæc præfati &longs;umus, ac doceamus quibus cau&longs;sis, & quatenus phy&longs;icus vtatur. Profectò &longs;i phy&longs;icus &longs;pectat &longs;ub&longs;tantias quà mobiles &longs;unt, mathematicus autem res immobiles, con&longs;imilique. modo primus philo&longs;ophus: phy&longs;icus &longs;anè cau&longs;&longs;as illas accipere debe­bit à quibus pendet motus, eas negligent primus philo&longs;ophus & mathematicus, illasque. &longs;olas reci­pient, quæ &longs;ine motu &longs;uos præ&longs;tabunt affectus. oc quidem prima fronte &longs;ic decernendum vide­bitur: attamen non &longs;ine diligenti inqui&longs;itione approbandum; &longs;iquidem oporteat de cau&longs;&longs;arum &longs;peculatione di&longs;tinguere. Nanque pluribus modis cau&longs;&longs;æ principiaque, tractari po&longs;&longs;unt, vel vt res quædam & entia ab&longs;oluta veluti Deus, quà Deus e&longs;t; vel etiam vt cau&longs;&longs;æ, eademque tractantur, quòd illarum natura & e&longs;&longs;entia cum diligentia ve&longs;tigetur, &longs;iue quod ad cognitionem incomplexam pertinet, &longs;iue quod ad complexam, aut in demon&longs;trationibus &longs;olùm a&longs;&longs;umuntur. Rur&longs;us &longs;pecu­latio principiorum aut e&longs;t habitus, aut methodi. Permagni verò intere&longs;t &longs;it'ne &longs;peculatio metho­di an habitus. Nam methodi e&longs;&longs;e dicitur, quia doceri po&longs;sit; habitus autem, quia cognitio quidem pendeat ex alicuius &longs;cientiæ fundamentis, attamen explicari aut non nece&longs;&longs;e &longs;it, aut nequeat. Et planè principiorum cognitio, quà &longs;unt entia & incomplexa & ab ea con&longs;ideratione ab&longs;trahuntur quæ principij, hoc e&longs;t, relatiui cuiu&longs;dam rationem præ&longs;efert nullius e&longs;&longs;e methodi iure optimo iu­dicabitur, quemadmodum de mente actu cen&longs;etur ab Auerroë. a quandò explicatio methodica procedendo à nobis notis ea &longs;olum indicat, e&longs;&longs;entiam per &longs;e menti con&longs;iderandam relinquit, hæc autem habitu &longs;apientiæ pollens alla contemplatur. Itaque cùm methodum in præ&longs;entia con&longs;ecte­mur, de illis di&longs;&longs;eramus, quà methodo &longs;ubiiciuntur. Ea primum quà principia, ide&longs;t, cum relatio­ne & habitudine concipiuntur: deinde vt complexa tractantur, hoc e&longs;t, vt doceatur, hæc e&longs;&longs;e prin­cipia, neque id qui&longs;quam negare audebit, opinor, qui primum phy&longs;icum &longs;edulò ob&longs;eruabit, vbi contraria prima & &longs;ubiectum e&longs;&longs;e principia concluditur. non e&longs;&longs;e, inquàm, hæc principia qu&ecedil; &longs;unt, forma, priuatio, & &longs;ubiectum; &longs;ed formam, priuationem & materiam e&longs;&longs;e principia. erùm quòd &longs;int, præterquàm quòd demon&longs;trationi non e&longs;t obnoxium, &longs;icuti docuimus antè, methodi mune­ra tran&longs;ilit, mentique, &longs;oli committitur. Illud video non &longs;atis ab Ari&longs;totelis interpretibus animad­uer&longs;um, ne dixerim, confu&longs;um; quod e&longs;t, cau&longs;&longs;am tractare & illam v&longs;urpare in demon&longs;trationibus. Etenim vt facile me o&longs;ten&longs;urum confido phy&longs;icum omni cau&longs;&longs;arum genere demon&longs;trando vti, sic omne cau&longs;&longs;arum genus cum diligentia ab ip&longs;o tractari confurabo. Quòd enim per omne cau&longs;­&longs;æ genus demon&longs;tret, præter Ari&longs;totelis te&longs;timonia, b ratio confirmat quæ e&longs;t huiu&longs;modi. Ad na­ turalem philo&longs;ophiam pertinet illas cau&longs;&longs;as in demon&longs;trationibus a&longs;&longs;umere ex quibus pendent &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturales, quà naturales &longs;unt. Sed &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturales, quatenus huiu&longs;modi, pendent: ex omni genere cau&longs;&longs;arum. Et omne igitur cau&longs;&longs;arum genus, ad naturalem philo&longs;ophiam perti­nebit. Iam enim con&longs;titit &longs;cientiam, quanquam in proprio quodam genere ver&longs;ari, & omneis cau&longs;­&longs;as in demon&longs;tratione e&longs;&longs;e v&longs;urpandas ex quibus res ip&longs;a con&longs;tat, quatenus in ea &longs;cientia tractari pote&longs;t. At verò in rebus naturalibus quà &longs;unt naturales, e&longs;t forma, vt quod quid erat e&longs;&longs;e homi­nis; materia men&longs;trua, mouens pater, finis cuius gratia vel qui cum forma conuenit, vel eius ope­ratio perfecta. Et profectò cum rerum naturalium ingenio congruit omnis cau&longs;&longs;arum generis a&longs;&longs;umptio. uippe quòd &longs;int &longs;uoptè nixu mobiles. Atqui in motu &longs;ubiectum requiritur quod e&longs;t materia; de&longs;ideratur efficiens, vnde principium motus exi&longs;tat. xoptatur finis quo efficientis ope­ra terminantur, flagitatur forma per quam &longs;it id quod natura per motum con&longs;equi voluit; neque enim mouet, in immen&longs;um, &longs;ed aliquid permanens mouendo cupit adipi&longs;ci, eoque. comparato quie­&longs;cere, id autem e&longs;t forma. C&ecedil;terùm hoc facilè dabitur: illud non approbabitur à pleri&longs;que philo­&longs;ophum naturalem demon&longs;trando accipere primam formam & primum finem, & ad id confir­mandum multa loca & rationes adducentur. Quoniam ea quæ con&longs;iderat phy&longs;icus, re&longs;piciunt motum. At primus finis & prima forma &longs;ine motu con&longs;i&longs;tunt & concipiuntur. Igitur à phy&longs;ico non a&longs;&longs;umuntur. Prætereà cùm res naturales &longs;ine motu, &longs;eu materia non definiantur, illæ cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;unt à phy&longs;ico a&longs;&longs;umendæ quæ cum motu operantur. Cùm ergo primus finis & prima forma &longs;e­parentur à motu; dicemus item ha&longs;ce cau&longs;&longs;as cum &longs;cientia naturali non congruere. Tum etiam ip&longs;emet Ari&longs;toteles affirmat phy&longs;icum &longs;pectare quæcunque mouendo mouentur, c quæcunque verò manent immobilia non e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;icæ con&longs;iderationis, idemque. a&longs;&longs;erit. De principio &longs;ecundum formam d vtrum vnum, an plura exqui&longs;itè decernere alterius e&longs;&longs;e officij, non naturalis. Et multo clarius adhuc 1. e de ortu. &longs;&longs;euerat, de immobili principio di&longs;tinguere prioris e&longs;&longs;e philo&longs;ophi. Quamobrem naturalis à c&ecedil;teris philo&longs;ophijs &longs;eparatur, quòd motum & materiam perpetuò &longs;u­mit. Sed prima forma primusque. finis motum non re&longs;piciunt. Non ergo v&longs;urpantur à phy&longs;ico. Sed enim, &longs;i philo&longs;ophus naturalis a&longs;&longs;umere debet omneis cau&longs;&longs;as corporis naturalis, quatenus e&longs;t huiu&longs;modi, in eius verò cau&longs;sis prima forma primusque. finis numerantur. (e&longs;t enim primus fi­nis primum quid e&longs;t) f Ergo & prima forma primusque. finis a&longs;&longs;umentur à philo&longs;opho naturali. &longs;iquidem pluribus locis cau&longs;&longs;am perpetuæ &longs;ucce&longs;sionis in rebus caducis o&longs;tendat e&longs;&longs;e primum fi­nem, cui omnia parent, & quod imitari cupiunt. Proptereà, vt omnes cau&longs;&longs;as ab imis v&longs;que ad &longs;ummas adhiberi à phy&longs;ico iuis demon&longs;trationibus affirmo: &longs;ic omnes cum diligentia ab eodem tractari po&longs;&longs;e nego; &longs;ed eas tantùm cum diligentia in hac methodo explicandas e&longs;&longs;e quæ non &longs;e­parantur à motu, reliquarum explicatio diligens &longs;uperiori officio delegabitur. & cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t, quia cùm includant rationem & notionem motus, quia motus à phy&longs;ico diligenti&longs;simè exponitur; er­go, & illa, in quorum notione ine&longs;t motus optimè à naturali cogno&longs;centur. Nam veri&longs;imile e&longs;t ibi aliquid maximè cogno&longs;ci, vbi illud maximè cogno&longs;citur per quod explicatur. Itaque omnia illa loca quæ nuper allata contrà fuerunt, o&longs;tendent quidem naturalem philo&longs;ophum cau&longs;&longs;as illas non exponere & pro merito tractare: nihil ob&longs;tabunt, quominus eas in demon&longs;trationibus v&longs;ur­pari po&longs;&longs;e credamus. llud &longs;olum per&longs;uadebunt: demon&longs;trationem qu&ecedil; in cau&longs;&longs;as illas re&longs;oluitur, vt e&longs;t ex maximè primis in hac philo&longs;ophia, ita non e&longs;&longs;e ex nobis noti&longs;simis, quòd illò phy&longs;icæ methodi vis non tuebatur. Re&longs;tat igitur, vt efficiens & materia cum omni diligentia tractentur à philo&longs;opho naturali & demon&longs;trationes quæ è tali cau&longs;&longs;arum genere conflantur in methodo na­turali, &longs;int &longs;uis numeris partibusque. ab&longs;olutæ. & omnibus modis; cùm è c&ecedil;teris ab&longs;olutæ quidem &longs;int, &longs;ed in proprio genere; quia &longs;cilicet illis &longs;it contentus, quatenus referuntur ad motum. Nam quicquid vlterius cogno&longs;citur, &longs;i facit ad rei notitiam pleniorem; non tamen facit ad notitiam rei, quatenus e&longs;t naturalis, &longs;ed vt cadit in aliam rationem, vt puta, entis. Neque ob&longs;tat quòd operen­tur prima forma primusque. finis &longs;ine motu: quare non re&longs;piciant &longs;ub&longs;tantiam naturalem; quia non id &longs;ibi vult illud dictum, quòd omnis earum ratio notioque &longs;eparentur à motu: &longs;ed quòd inter re­liquas cau&longs;&longs;as hæ quoque &longs;ine motu con&longs;iderari queunt, cùm functiones habeant qu&ecedil; &longs;ine corpo­re obiri po&longs;sint. Ideo quatenus re&longs;piciunt motum, pertinent ad methodum naturalem: &longs;ed cùm habeant item alia officia qu&ecedil; &longs;egregantur à motu, illa res natura plenè cogno&longs;ci nequit à phy&longs;ico qui non excedit limitibus motus, &longs;ed ab eo philo&longs;opho cogno&longs;cetur qui con&longs;iderat entia quæ &longs;unt immobilia; hic verò e&longs;t primus philo&longs;ophus. Quanquam de iis quæ nuper con&longs;tituta &longs;unt, non leues exi&longs;tunt dubitationes: &longs;iquidem &longs;ubiectum philo&longs;ophi&ecedil; naturalis perfectius in alia &longs;cien­tia, quàm in naturali no&longs;ceretur; ibi enim perfectius no&longs;citur, vbi ip&longs;ius principia no&longs;cuntur. Quia verò facilè hoc dabis obiiciens locum Ari&longs;totelis, a vbi te&longs;tatur primi philo&longs;ophi munus e&longs;&longs;e præbere &longs;ubiecta c&ecedil;teris &longs;cientiis; qua&longs;i no&longs;cat ip&longs;e &longs;olus illa e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter: animaduerte ob­&longs;ecro Ari&longs;totelem agere de eo quòd &longs;int; itaque verè dicere: quandò vnus primus philo&longs;ophus tenet rem e&longs;&longs;e, quatenus e&longs;t: &longs;ed nos hîc &longs;ub&longs;tantiam naturalem &longs;ub ratione naturæ concipimus; eam verò nulli notiorem fore quàm philo&longs;opho naturali prædicamus. Tùm etiam &longs;citu dignum e&longs;t an'ne materia plenè cogno&longs;catur à philo&longs;opho naturali; ecquid'nam amplius afferat ad hanc cognitionem primus philo&longs;ophus. At verò quantum e&longs;t de primo: cùm &longs;it hoc in no&longs;tris placitis con&longs;titutum principia &longs;pectari in methodis cum habitudine ad ea quorum principia &longs;unt, etiam &longs;equenti auctoritatem Ari&longs;totelis &longs;crupulum iniiciet ea &longs;ententia. b Siquis vnum è relatiuis di­&longs;tinctè no&longs;&longs;e velit, alterum quoque di&longs;tinctè no&longs;cat nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: neque enim &longs;atis e&longs;t percunctanti cuius ego &longs;im filius, &longs;i parentis filium me e&longs;&longs;e audiuerit: &longs;ed tùm acquie&longs;cet, &longs;i me Nicolai filium e&longs;&longs;e doceatur, qui nobiles cau&longs;&longs;as aliquando perorarit: aliter non plus certior abierit, quàm curio­&longs;ior ille qui quærens ex quodam &longs;eruo, quò iret, & cuius e&longs;&longs;et; re&longs;pon&longs;um tulerit. Huc eo, heri &longs;um &longs;eruos; nunquid nunc es certior? Hîc ego te con&longs;iderare velim, longè aliud e&longs;&longs;e rei merita tractare, & methodi in qua ver&longs;amur, etenim methodus procedit ex propriis, & certis quibu&longs;dam terminis cohibetur: itaque &longs;atis e&longs;t illi ea continere quæ ip&longs;ius propria &longs;unt, reliqua negligit; neo idcirco quicquàm de iure &longs;uo deminuit rei notitia latius patet, & quandoque, multarum methodo­rum opem flagitat: itaque c&ecedil;lum & à naturali & ab A&longs;tronomo con&longs;ideratur; quia &longs;ubit diuer&longs;as rationes; cùm c&ecedil;teroquin vna &longs;it cuiu&longs;que methodi ratio qua determinatur: quamobrem ea prin­cipiorum notitia contenta e&longs;&longs;e debet, qua &longs;ubiectum &longs;ub propria ratione tractatur, vlteriorem non requirit; & quicquid vlterius adhibetur, alienum e&longs;t, & ad rei quidem notitiam faciens, &longs;ed nihil adiuuans illam methodum. Neque no&longs;&longs;e oportet, vt aliquem certò patrem alterius e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ciamus, &longs;it'ne animal rationis compos an brutum; neque po&longs;tulat ea notitia certam atque accuratam fun­damenti, vt ita dicam, explicationem: itaque di&longs;tincta alterius relatiui cognitio v&longs;que ad quendam terminum peruenit, & cum di&longs;tinctione illa adhuc connexam habet aliquam confu&longs;ionem: aliter immineret periculum, ne &longs;ciremus bis duo facere quatuor, ni&longs;i perfectè &longs;ciremus quid e&longs;&longs;et nume­rus, quid quantitas, & an &longs;it materi&ecedil; proprietas, an form&ecedil;. neque no&longs;&longs;et expugnare oppidum Im­perator, ni&longs;i cogno&longs;ceret quid &longs;it victoria, quid beatitudo, & cuncta politic&ecedil; principia teneret, qu&ecedil; &longs;anè res e&longs;t venia potius, quàm admiratione digna. Hoc iudicio commotus Antonius apud M. ul­lium c oratoriam facultatem modicis regionibus circun&longs;cribit; & infinitatem illam quæ&longs;tionum de quacunque re &longs;ubtiliter di&longs;ceptandi negat oratori. Sed Ari&longs;totelis ip&longs;ius iudicium, & aliorum philo&longs;ophorum per&longs;equamur. uotasqui&longs;que e&longs;t ex A&longs;tronomis, qui de eclyp&longs;i ita di&longs;putet, vt quærat, vnde opacitas Lunæ na&longs;catur, & qu&ecedil;'nam &longs;it corporis illius natura, è quo'nam materiæ genere con&longs;tet, quæ &longs;it eius forma; vtrum'ne caducum &longs;it corpus, an mortale? eo contentus erit, quòd Luna à Sole lumen accipiat, eùm &longs;it corpus opacum, & eiu&longs;modi, vt ip&longs;um ad nos reflectat; atque vbi ex interuentu terræ lumen Solis amittat, tùm fieri eclyp&longs;in: itaque ve&longs;tigabit quo tem­pore terra &longs;ic inter vtraque lumina interponatur, vt Luna in eius vmbram incurrat, & eclyp&longs;in ita de&longs;ignabit. & illa di&longs;cens nihilo plus erit bonus mathematicus. Et medicus v&longs;que ad quendam terminum materiam nerui no&longs;cere volet; accuratam eius perqui&longs;itionem phy&longs;ico relinquet; ni­hilominus Alexandro dignus e&longs;&longs;e poterit. Etiam logicus illa breui in&longs;tructione prædicamentorum contentus erit, certam doctrinam primo philo&longs;opho delegabit. Ergo fines &longs;uos aliquando tuebi­tur methodus, dum rem pro &longs;uo munere explanabit; etiam &longs;i principia non pro rei dignitate, &longs;ed pro &longs;uo ip&longs;ius merito tractet. & tamen tanta lux erit principiorum, vt quamuis non ab&longs;olutè co­gno&longs;cantur; ea tamen illu&longs;trare queant quæ &longs;unt ex ip&longs;is; & &longs;i non quatenus ea res pateretur, at &longs;altem quoad ab eius methodi profe&longs;&longs;ore de&longs;ideratur. Proinde Phy&longs;ico &longs;at e&longs;&longs;e dicemus, &longs;i pri­mum motorem &longs;ic tractet, vt re&longs;picit materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem; eiusque. attributa doceat, quatenus erum­punt ex illa habitudine; nec aliter explicatur ab ip&longs;o, quòd e&longs;t indiuiduus & æternus, & extra omnem materiæ contagionem: quapropter omnibus modis immobilis; ni&longs;i quòd eius aliquod munus redundat in materiam: quod fine illa habitudine concipi pote&longs;t, id alterius officium e&longs;&longs;e dicimus. & hoc modo 3. Phy&longs;. pars erit no&longs;træ methodi; & in illo regre&longs;&longs;us phy&longs;icus; &longs;i methodum re&longs;picias, ab&longs;olutus; &longs;i rem perpendas, aliqua ex parte deficiens. At verò tibi fortè negotium fa­ce&longs;&longs;et, quòd &longs;i ita nouit phy&longs;icus primum motorem, & eius accurata notitia pertinet ad alterum philo&longs;ophum; videbitur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubalternus, quod tamen anteà confutatum e&longs;t: etenim non poterit explicare quid &longs;it illud principium, nec afferre propter quid &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed o&longs;tendet tantum quòd &longs;it; cur ita &longs;it, ab altero arce&longs;&longs;et, atqui vbi hic gradus intercedebat; &longs;ubalternationis ratio poneba­tur. Ad hoc dicam primum motorem quoque primum, quà primus e&longs;t motor, à phy&longs;ico no&longs;ci quid &longs;it, quantum fert eius ingenium, quod propter &longs;implicitatem definitioni non e&longs;t obnoxium: deinde tum re&longs;pondebo affinitatem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubalternationis, vbi in genere conueniant &longs;ubalterna & &longs;ubalternans: at cùm &longs;ublimior &longs;peculatio primi motoris &longs;it alterius generis; cùm hæc &longs;pectet &longs;ub­&longs;tantiam naturalem; illa verò &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;impliciter (etenim genus in &longs;cientiis à ratione formali ducitur qu&ecedil; omnino diuer&longs;a e&longs;t in phy&longs;ica & prima philo&longs;ophia) non igitur erit phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalter­na. Tertiò defendimus primum motorem &longs;e habere vt finem; at qu&ecedil; con&longs;iderat finem, non habet rationem &longs;ubalternantis, &longs;ed architectonicæ. Quapropter e&longs;t gemina facultas, quæ in motoris pri­mi notitia vertitur; & &longs;ingulæ in &longs;uo genere perfectæ. Tran&longs;eo nunc ad alterum caput, quo de no­titia materiæ di&longs;ceptandum e&longs;t, quo phy&longs;icæ conceditur: nam multa contrà &longs;uccurrunt; &longs;iquidem plena cuiu&longs;que rei cognitio tunc habetur; cùm omnes cau&longs;&longs;æ no&longs;cuntur ex quibus res illa pendet. Sed materia cau&longs;&longs;as omnes infert; ab omnibus pendet. Igitur materia cau&longs;&longs;arum omnium notitiam flagitat. Atqui non omnes cau&longs;&longs;æ cogno&longs;cuntur à phy&longs;ico. Neque igitur phy&longs;icus plenè cogno­&longs;cet materiam. Nanque materia formæ gratia e&longs;t & finis; eademq: finem: &longs;ine efficientis opera non con&longs;equitur. Præterea materia, vt nobis placet, e&longs;t pote&longs;tas. a verò &longs;ine actu cogno&longs;ci non pote&longs;t. Cæterùm neque actus neque pote&longs;tas à phy&longs;ico, vel auctore Ari&longs;totele ab&longs;olutè cogno&longs;cuntur. a Ergo neque materia. Confirmo etiam, quia formæ &longs;ciri debet magis quàm materia. Sed forma non cogno&longs;citur à phy&longs;ico perfectè; multò minus igitur materia: Vrgebit nos item Auicenna te­&longs;te Auerroë. b Quando cognitio cuiu&longs;que rei tùm exi&longs;tit, cum eius cau&longs;&longs;æ cogno&longs;cuntur à primis v&longs;que ad vltimas. At materia prima non pote&longs;t à phy&longs;ico no&longs;ci. Neque item vltima & proxima. quia omnes artifices mentionem faciunt de materia proxima, non de remota & prima, vt medi­cus de materia proxima nerui, quæ fortè &longs;unt elementa. Verùm phy&longs;icus e&longs;t artifex particularis: neque enim &longs;pectat ens &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed aliqua conditione re&longs;trictum, vt puta mobilitate. Neque igitur phy&longs;icus &longs;pectabit materiam primam. Tùm etiam; quòd &longs;i eam tractaret phy&longs;icus, & demon­&longs;trare po&longs;&longs;et. on demon&longs;trat autem, quia principium e&longs;t. Nos item in confirmationem adimus. Prima philo&longs;ophia materiam cogno&longs;cit. Sed prima philo&longs;ophia e&longs;t maximè &longs;cientia, quippe quæ &longs;ciat ex maximè primis. Ergo & ip&longs;a magis &longs;cit quàm phy&longs;ica. Sic materiæ tractatio non erit pr&ecedil;­cipua philo&longs;ophi naturalis. Sed quantum &longs;pectat ad Auicennæ decretum; fal&longs;um pror&longs;us exi&longs;ti­mo phy&longs;icum materiæ primæ cognitionem detrectare. Tùm quòd artifex, et&longs;i materiam commu­ni&longs;simam non &longs;pectat; quia certas formas &longs;ibi propo&longs;itas habet, vt &longs;tatuarum &longs;tatuarius; at nihilo­minus con&longs;iderat materiam communem omnibus &longs;uis formis, vt marmor, aut æs. Itaque cùm phi­lo&longs;ophus naturalis con&longs;ideret omnes formas naturales, etiam con&longs;iderare cogetur materiam con­munem omnibus illis formis, hæc verò e&longs;t materia prima; quandoquidem etiam ip&longs;a primas ele­mentorum formas accipiat. Accedit eodem, quòd &longs;i phy&longs;icus de motu differit, etiam principia motus omnia ve&longs;tigare debet in quibus cum materia prima reponatur, efficit item, vt materia pri­ma &longs;it à phy&longs;ico no&longs;cenda. Quamobrem non id puto nunc in controuer&longs;iam e&longs;&longs;e reuocandum; tractet'ne phy&longs;icus &longs;impliciter materiam primam, quia certè tractat: &longs;ed an'ne phy&longs;icus magis no&longs;cat materiam primam quàm primus philo&longs;ophus. Rationes autem Auicennæ cum reliquis po&longs;teà diluentur. am vi&longs;um e&longs;t prius di&longs;ceptare de cau&longs;sis, quas tractant primus philo&longs;ophus & mathematicus.

F

a 14. Met. c. 4.

G

b 1. Po&longs;t.

H

A

B

C

D

E

F

a 3. de An. T. . 36.

b 2. Phy&longs;. T. 70. 8. Met. T. 12.

G

H

c 2. Phy&longs;. T. 71.

d 1. Phy&longs;. T. 83.

e T. 14.

f 12. Met. T. 48.

A

B

a 6. Met.

C

b Prædit.

D

c Orator.

E

F

G

II.

III.

a 1. Phy&longs;. T. 78. Auicennæ ratio I.

b 2. Phy&longs;. T. . 22.

H

II.

III.

A

Vt &longs;e habeant cau&longs;&longs;æ in prima philo&longs;ophia & mathematicis. Cap. XV.

EADEM quoque di&longs;tinctio propemodum quadrabit in primam philo&longs;ophiam. icemus enim genus omne cau&longs;&longs;arum v&longs;urpari ab illo philo&longs;opho demon&longs;trando: accuratam verò expli­cationem primi finis, primæque. formæ &longs;olius e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi. Nanque & id quod aiebat Ari­&longs;toteles, principio &longs;ecundum &longs;peciem determinare alterius quàm phy&longs;icæ methodi munus e&longs;&longs;e, & omnino de immobili principio &longs;atis per&longs;uadent, eas cau&longs;&longs;as ab ip&longs;o &longs;olo cum diligentia tractari; reliquas autem cau&longs;&longs;as, materiam nimirum & efficiens monet Ari&longs;toteles in illa methodo propo­ni ad explicandum, a vbi docet quatuor entium cau&longs;&longs;as ibi e&longs;&longs;e tractandas. Omne item cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; ge­nus accipiet in demon&longs;trando primus philo&longs;ophus: &longs;iquidem contempletur ens, quatenus ens: itaque contemplatur omneis cau&longs;&longs;as entis, quatenus ens. Sed omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; entis. Igitur & per omne cau&longs;&longs;arum genus demon&longs;trabit. Et cùm entium quædam &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;int, alia &longs;en&longs;um fugiant, & immunia &longs;int à materia: &longs;en&longs;ilium verò principia &longs;int materia & efficiens. Ergo materia & efficiens non modò à primo philo&longs;opho tractabuntur, &longs;ed demon&longs;trando item accipientur. Itaque omne cau&longs;&longs;æ genus ab vtroque philo&longs;opho a&longs;&longs;umetur. &longs;ed ea quæ re&longs;piciunt motum, vt ab illo &longs;eparari non po&longs;sint, diligenter à phy&longs;ico tractabuntur: illa verò qu&ecedil; ab&longs;oluun­tur à motu, diligenter ve&longs;tigabit primus philo&longs;ophus, vt &longs;olum &longs;pectandi ratio differens intercedat: quia &longs;cilicet phy&longs;icus ea cau&longs;&longs;arum genera tractabit, quà &longs;unt principia corporis naturalis; pri­mus autem philo&longs;ophus quatenus &longs;unt principia entis. uod item docuit nonnunquàm Auerroës. b & te&longs;tatus e&longs;t contemplationem primi philo&longs;ophi, c licet eadem tractet àc phy&longs;icus e&longs;&longs;e commu­ niorem, quippe qui etiam con&longs;iderando &longs;en&longs;ilia ad particularia non de&longs;cendat. At verò cùm è cau&longs;­&longs;is quædam proximæ &longs;int, aliæ remotæ, &longs;eu quædam vniuer&longs;ales, aliæ &longs;peciales, haud facilè dede­rim omnes æquè accipi aut &longs;pectari à primo philo&longs;opho, &longs;icut à naturali. uandò primus philo&longs;o­phus e&longs;t vniuer&longs;alis admodum, nec particularia contemplatur quæ &longs;pectantur à phy&longs;ico: aliter cæteræ &longs;cientiæ redundarent. Proinde cau&longs;&longs;arum proximarum tractationem pror&longs;us denegarem primo philo&longs;opho. & naturali committerem. Neque ob&longs;tant illa quæ opponi &longs;olent. t primum philo&longs;ophum non concipere motum; naturalem nihil &longs;ine motu comprehendere. Aut etiam quòd hæ methodi &longs;ecum differunt, quòd prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;ine motu con&longs;iderat illa quæ naturalis non diuellit à motu. Neque enim hæc nos ita credere cogunt, vt quæ &longs;ine motu exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ic à pri­mo philo&longs;opho tractentur, aut accipiantur, quin & illa &longs;pectet, aut a&longs;&longs;umat, quæ motum re&longs;piciunt: aut quòd phy&longs;icus ita illa a&longs;&longs;umat quæ motum re&longs;piciunt, vt cætera negligat. Sed illud notant, quo vtræque methodi &longs;eparantur. x hoc enim di&longs;tinguuntur quòd prima philo&longs;ophia cum dili­gentia tractat immobilia principia, phy&longs;ica verò mobilia, neque tamen ob id ab oppo&longs;itorum no­titia excluduntur. &longs;olumque. &longs;ufficit phy&longs;ico, &longs;i principia quæ &longs;unt immobilia con&longs;ideret, aut &longs;u­mat, quatenus re&longs;piciunt motum. Quapropter non erit &longs;impliciter verum primum philo&longs;ophum &longs;ine motu & materia contemplari. Sed verum erit ea quæ tractat phy&longs;icus, à materia motuque. non ab&longs;olui. Idcirco neque dici poterit. mnem con&longs;iderationem quæ materiam motumque. includit, e&longs;&longs;e naturalem. Sed illud verè a&longs;&longs;euerabitur, omnem con&longs;iderationem qu&ecedil; re&longs;puit motum & ma­teriam e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi, &longs;eu rectius, non naturalem, quia mathematicæ quoque repudiant motum. Ad quas nunc accedentes, ijs con&longs;titutis quæ de illarum ingenio pluribus anteà di&longs;putata fuerunt: nimirum quòd cau&longs;&longs;as habent, & quòd cùm immobilia &longs;tatuant, fine & efficiente carent, addemus. Si mathematicorum morem Euclidis, Archimedis, & Ptolem&ecedil;i con&longs;ulamus, nullam de vllo cau&longs;&longs;arum genere mentionem fieri intelligemus. Etenim &longs;crip&longs;ere per lemmata; rem &longs;cilicet ip&longs;am nudam qua &longs;cientia continetur, expre&longs;&longs;erunt, alteram, atque illam quidem nece&longs;&longs;ariam par­tem omi&longs;ere, quæ pertinet ad modum &longs;ciendi, & ad informandos animos auditorum, qua gene­ralia quædam capita exponuntur quibus illa &longs;cientia gubernatur: rerum &longs;cilicet conditio mate­riæque. &longs;ubiectæ edi&longs;&longs;eritur, enarratur quod demon&longs;trationum genus admittat, & denique illa pr&ecedil;­cepta, quæ generaliter à primo philo&longs;opho & analytico tradita &longs;unt, ad materiam &longs;ubiectam ac­commodantur. Hæc &longs;anè omnia ab auctoribus mathematicæ neglecta, aut &longs;iquid ad hoc pertinet, vnus Ptolemæus id præ&longs;titit. Sed veri&longs;imile e&longs;t, &longs;icut Ari&longs;toteles in cæteris &longs;cientiis atque faculta­tibus con&longs;cribendis perpetuò fecit; &longs;ic & in ijs edocendis fui&longs;&longs;e facturum: & &longs;icuti aliorum erro­res detexit, dum ea neglexere, quæ quatenus ip&longs;um in&longs;unt & aliena per&longs;ecuti &longs;unt; dum rationes &longs;ophi&longs;ticas, & p&longs;eudographos adnotauit, dum rerum mathematicarum & quantitatis vim &longs;igni­ficauit, dum docuit quo'nam cau&longs;&longs;arum genere definiendo demon&longs;trandoque. vterentur, ita quoque in proœmijs eadem moniturum fui&longs;&longs;e lectores. Fac igitur mathematicorum commentarios ea methodi parte, quæ modus &longs;ciendi vocatur, fui&longs;&longs;e &longs;uppletos. ùm immobilia tractent; planum e&longs;t, neque de fine, neque de efficiente &longs;ermonem ab iis fui&longs;&longs;e faciendum. Cæterùm neque de materia &longs;en&longs;ili, quandò &longs;ubiicitur mutationibus. Itaque re&longs;tat, vt de forma & ad &longs;ummum de altero ma­teriæ genere quod intelligendum vocatur, &longs;ermonem facturi fuerint. uod autem &longs;it id materi&ecedil; genus po&longs;thàc docebimus. At cùm mathematica &longs;int formæ naturales, in eo &longs;olum differentia, quòd vt &longs;unt in materia &longs;en&longs;ili, citra notionem illius concipiuntur, ex hoc efficitur, vt iis re uera materia &longs;upponatur, atque illa quidem &longs;en&longs;ilis. &longs;ed id non e&longs;t methodi mathematicæ. Verum­enimuerò, quia quantum accipitur idque in infinitum &longs;ectile, infinitas autem e&longs;t à materia, quà e&longs;t interuallum: etiam quod attinet ad hanc methodum, tale materiæ genus e&longs;t mathematici mune­ris. Nunc videndum, quo cau&longs;&longs;æ genere demon&longs;trando vtatur. c de forma dubium non e&longs;t apud Ari&longs;totelem, aut aliquem ex eius interpretibus de genere formæ dubium e&longs;t, & vtrum materiam adhibeat demon&longs;trando, nec'ne, vulgò dicitur formam propriè non &longs;umi ab ip&longs;o, &longs;ed formam quam appellant declarantem, hoc e&longs;t medium, in cuius virtute conclu&longs;io no&longs;citur. Sed nos olim docui­mus, ea&longs;dem eiu&longs;dem e&longs;&longs;e definitiones naturales & mathematicas, & rei principia &longs;umi; ac &longs;i quan­do media declarantia &longs;olùm accipiuntur, illa in propria quid e&longs;t adhuc re&longs;oluenda e&longs;&longs;e profite­mur, quæ tamen à mathematicis aut neglecta fuerint, quia &longs;atis foret illis ad v&longs;um properantibus veritatem a&longs;&longs;equi theorematum, aut forta&longs;&longs;e ignorata, quia proprias affectiones quanti &longs;igillatim con&longs;ectati fuerint, non eius naturam & quod per &longs;e ine&longs;t in quanto. ut etiam non omnia quæ ignorantur, e&longs;&longs;e obnoxia demon&longs;trationi, &longs;icut in cæteris &longs;cientiis, &longs;ed aliqua à &longs;igno declarari, non­nulla &longs;en&longs;u ip&longs;o patefieri, & qua&longs;i digito indicari, quæ &longs;cilicet per &longs;e ignota non &longs;unt, &longs;ed medio quodammodo &longs;e habentia, vt neque per&longs;picua &longs;int. anque h&ecedil;c principia &longs;unt, neque per &longs;e igno­ta, quòd horum &longs;it demon&longs;tratio, &longs;ed ignota quodammodo. uapropter admonitione &longs;ola, aut aliquo &longs;igno confirmantur. Materiam multi negant accipere demon&longs;trando mathematicum. Et certè &longs;i (vt aiunt) mathematici non con&longs;iderant &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, materia verò e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia, non po­terunt illam a&longs;&longs;umere. Veruntamen ab Ari&longs;totele notatur illa demon&longs;tratio a qua probatur an­gulum in &longs;emicirculo e&longs;&longs;e rectum, quòd accipiat materiam. Nanque accipit partes. tqui partes quanti ad totum &longs;unt vt materia. Et quod a&longs;&longs;umitur Mathematicum non con&longs;iderare &longs;ub&longs;tantiam; &longs;i id &longs;it non con&longs;iderare &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, quod e&longs;t rationem &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; non habere in &longs;uis contempla­tionibus, & ego quoque con&longs;entiam: &longs;ed &longs;i id &longs;ibi velit, quia cum quanto &longs;ub&longs;tantiam non con­cipiat, omnino negabo ob eas &longs;cilicet rationes quibus docuimus accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia, neque re, neque cogitatione po&longs;&longs;e &longs;eparari. & quas &longs;uperius attulimus, dum de eius &longs;cienti&ecedil; meritis agere­mus, admonebo &longs;olùm &longs;ub&longs;tantiam illam actu non e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;iquidem inter mathematicos A&longs;trologus vnus, b tale genus &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ contempletur. &longs;ed eam quæ potentia e&longs;t, & interuallum nomine proprio nuncupatur, quod etiam cùm Simplicio &longs;ub&longs;tantiam e&longs;&longs;e defendemus, & à quanto diuer­&longs;am, c atque illam dicimus, vbi &longs;ine iis affectionibus cogitetur quæ per motum accedunt, e&longs;&longs;e materiam intelligendam quæ mathematicis &longs;upponitur. Itaque a&longs;trologus non purè mathemati­cus; &longs;ed inter mathematicos naturalis con&longs;tituitur. Non ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;impliciter, vt cen&longs;uit Albertus, &longs;ed pote&longs;tate &longs;ub&longs;tantia: non ip&longs;um quantum, vt ij qui &longs;ectantur Auerroëm, licet ratio­nibus quibu&longs;dam confirmare nitantur eiu&longs;modi &longs;ententia. Tùm quòd in definitionibus quæ in geometria & arithmetica ponuntur nulla materiæ notitia per&longs;piciatur. Tùm etiam, quia doceat Ari&longs;toteles mathematicum relinquere &longs;olum quantum, & continuum. d Atque item auctoritas accedat Alexandri & aliorum Græcorum e qui materiam illam intelligendam; autument e&longs;&longs;e quantum: qua&longs;i verò ip&longs;e Euclides, f dum definit vnitatem, non definiat per &longs;ubiectum, inquiens, vnitatem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ecundum quam vnum quodque eorum quæ &longs;unt, vnum dicitur, & ip&longs;e Auerroës in definitione quanti & continui non moneat &longs;ubintelligendam e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. g Et &longs;iquando dixerint Græci quantum e&longs;&longs;e materiam, &longs;ic costueamur: quia pote&longs;tate quantum acceperint, quod Auerroës interminatum vocauit; &longs;i minus explodendi &longs;int. uòd &longs;i accipiant, vti debent, quantum non id quod e&longs;t actu, &longs;ed pote&longs;tate, pari quoque ratione Auerroës defendi poterit. Neque me ad­huc de &longs;ententia deducere pote&longs;t eruditi&longs;simus ille Pererius, dum conatur o&longs;tendere mathemati­cas e&longs;&longs;entias & affectiones quæ de quantitate demon&longs;trantur, nullo modo illi conuenire in ordine ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed per &longs;e, vt e&longs;&longs;e diuiduum, inter &longs;e commetiri, admittere &ecedil;qualitatem, proportio­nem & c&ecedil;tera id genus: triangulum habere treis angulos æqualeis duobus rectis: lineam rectam in puncto circulum tangere, aliaque. multa quæ pa&longs;sim in ea di&longs;ciplina occurrunt: cuncta enim &longs;ine vllius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ re&longs;pectu, inquit, in&longs;unt in quantitate. Neque enim hæc ita &longs;e habent &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ beneficio, &longs;ed quantitatis vnius, vnde exi&longs;tit extentio, terminatio, omnisque. ratio deriuatur æquali­tatis & inæqualitatis, in quibus definiendis tota geometria planè occupatur. Con&longs;imilique. ratione cubum tantum &longs;patij pote&longs;t occupare, non propter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed per &longs;eip&longs;um, vt &longs;i qua vis tantum valeret, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantiam à quantitate &longs;eiungeret, quantitas ip&longs;a tantundem &longs;patij &longs;emper obtineret; quemadmodum etiam &longs;i quantitati &longs;ub&longs;tantia rur&longs;us accederet; nihilo plus &longs;patij po&longs;­&longs;et implere. Siquidem hæc omnia con&longs;iderentur in potentia quanto quod e&longs;t materia, &longs;ed non ex­plorata natura materi&ecedil;. docueritque. philo&longs;ophus rationem diui&longs;ionis ex potentia quanto a quod e&longs;t materia, tanquam ex fundamento deriuari, cui terminos, quibus po&longs;itis verè quantum e&longs;t, vt doce­bimus aliàs, qui à forma imponuntur in natura, mens ip&longs;a con&longs;tituit in mathematicis. taque verè pote&longs;tate quantum e&longs;t; actu &longs;olùm e&longs;t quantum per de&longs;ignationem. Quapropter, non potentia quan­tum e&longs;t mentis opus, &longs;ed naturæ, ac &longs;iquo pacto mens in quanto po&longs;sit, illud &longs;it actu quantum, quod ip&longs;a in potentia quanto de&longs;ignauit. Neque refert quòd eidem termini ab Ari&longs;totele ponantur na­turales & mathematici. Nanque & ij qui de&longs;ignantur, &longs;unt eorum &longs;imulachta qui &longs;unt in natura, vt quadratum quod ego de&longs;igno in charta, præ&longs;entat quadratum quod ine&longs;t aut ine&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t in corpore naturali. Quamobrem neque accedam ad eorum &longs;ententiam qui defen&longs;uri mathematicum omne &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; genus pr&ecedil;termittere; ad id quod à nobis opponi &longs;olet. Po&longs;terius à priore non po&longs;­&longs;e di&longs;iungi, re&longs;pondent id verum e&longs;&longs;e, quandocunque prius in po&longs;terioris definitione &longs;umatur, & cum &longs;ine ip&longs;o po&longs;terius intelligi nequit: neque enim id ita euenire puto in &longs;ub&longs;tantiam ad accidens; cùm placeat & &longs;ub&longs;tantiam in accidentis definitione comprehendi, & accidens non po&longs;&longs;e concipi &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia.

a 1. & 2. Met.

B

b 12. Met. T. . 5.

c 2. Met.

C

D

E

F

a 2. Po&longs;t.

G

b 12. Met. T. 44.

c 4. Phy&longs;.

d 11. Met. T. 3.

e 7. Met. T. 35. 39.

f 7. Elen.

H

g 1. de c&ecedil;­lo T. . 2.

A

a 3. Phy&longs;.

B

Auicennærationes diluuntur quibus probat materiæ primæ con&longs;iderationem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olius primi philo&longs;ophi. Cap. XVI.

REDEO nunc ad rationes illas quibus probari videbatur materiam primam nihil attinere ad philo&longs;ophiam naturalem, &longs;ed materiam proximam primæque. contemplationem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olius primi philo&longs;ophi. Rationes autem complures ad idem allatæ fuerunt quibus &longs;igillatim re&longs;pondere oportet: &longs;ed prius aliqua veluti fundamenta &longs;ubiicienda &longs;unt. Horum primo &longs;tatuetur quot modis aliquid magis &longs;cire contingat, altero verò quid &longs;ibi velit id quo plurimum nititur Auicenna, nimi­rum primum philo&longs;ophum e&longs;&longs;e artificem conem, phy&longs;icum verò particularem. In primis igitur &longs;cire magis e&longs;t tum, cùm &longs;citur per cau&longs;&longs;as id quod per effectum, & &longs;igna no&longs;cebatur, &longs;iue id in eadem &longs;cientia contingat, &longs;iue &longs;ciatur per &longs;igna in &longs;ubalterna, & in &longs;ubalternante per cau&longs;&longs;as. Pr&ecedil;tereà &longs;i­quid per priores cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ciatur, magis &longs;citur. riores autem cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;unt, vel ex eodem genere à qui­bus &longs;cilicet effectus pendet principalius. el è generibus diuer&longs;is: qu&ecedil; &longs;eries ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;ignifica­tur 2. Po&longs;t. bi materies omnium infima, finis autem omnium primus e&longs;&longs;e perhibetur. uod item & ad eandem &longs;cientiam & ad diuer&longs;as pertinere pote&longs;t. Et &longs;cire magis ille dicitur qui nobiliore modo nouit quàm qui modo ignobiliore, vt Rex magis &longs;cit, quàm centurio, quia quod centurio &longs;igillatim nouit, ip&longs;e rex vniuersè cogno&longs;cit. Necnon magis ille &longs;cit, qui plura de aliqua re nouit, quàm qui pauciora. Et ille quoque magis &longs;cit qui rei ip&longs;ius e&longs;&longs;entia & quid e&longs;t, maximè nouit. Cum verò quid e&longs;t & e&longs;&longs;entia logicè &longs;umi po&longs;sit & phy&longs;icè: ac logicè quidem omne cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; genus &longs;it quid e&longs;t: phy­&longs;icè vero &longs;ola forma aut ad &longs;ummum quod definitione &longs;ignificatur, nos hic e&longs;&longs;entiam non logicè, &longs;ed phy&longs;icè accipimus, & magis illum &longs;cire dicimus qui per formam nouit, & denique per intrin­&longs;eca principia. Et ille planè optimè &longs;cire videtur qui per formam nouit. Signo illud e&longs;t. uòd de­finitio poti&longs;simè nobis euoluit illa principia quæ rem con&longs;tituunt, vt patet in iis de finitionibus qu&ecedil; omnium perfecti&longs;sim&ecedil; &longs;unt; &longs;unt verò &longs;peciei &longs;peciali&longs;sim&ecedil; de prædicamento &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, nam con­&longs;tant è genere & differentiis quibus primum forma exprimitur, deinde materia, ex quibus res ip&longs;a con&longs;tituta e&longs;t: aliæ cau&longs;&longs;æ omittuntur, ni&longs;i fortè cùm forma conueniant, vt in pleri&longs;que rebus natu­ralibus euenit. &longs;ed pror&longs;us attenditur forma quam &longs;icuti res obtinendo perfectionem con&longs;ecuta e&longs;t, ita mens contemplando fine &longs;uo potitur: materia vt form&ecedil; pars e&longs;t, &longs;iquidem in forma contineatur. Sed de his aliàs. Vltimò &longs;cire dicitur hic magis, quàm alter, quòd alterius cognitio illi &longs;uppona­tur. t &longs;ubalternans &longs;cit magis, quàm &longs;ubalterna, quia pr&ecedil;ter id quod rem e&longs;&longs;e nouit vt &longs;ubalterna, nouit pr&ecedil;tereà cur ita &longs;it. Quantum verò e&longs;t de &longs;ecundo fundamento; multis item modis aliquis &longs;ciens vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;&longs;e fertur. Etenim ille vniuer&longs;alis qui &longs;pectat genus, &longs;i cum altero conferatur qui &longs;olam &longs;peciem tractat; veluti phy&longs;icus vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;t, medicus particularis, quòd ille omnium rerum naturalium vires explorat. ic in homine con&longs;iderando &longs;uam operam impendit. Proinde vniuer­&longs;ales artifices appellare &longs;olet Ari&longs;t. rimum philo&longs;ophum, dialecticum, & &longs;ophi&longs;ten, addere quoque licet oratorem. Nanque orator de ei&longs;dem rebus di&longs;&longs;erere pote&longs;t, de quibus dialecticus, & &longs;ophi&longs;tes; Ni&longs;i quod hi vniuersè tractant, vt quid hominem deceat; ille quid deceat Socratem & &longs;igillatim con&longs;iderat. ui omnes &longs;ic appellati fui&longs;&longs;e videntur, quòd ens vniuersè propo&longs;itum habeant, non hanc aut illam portionem entis. t mathematicus habet quantum. Secundo loco vniuer&longs;alis artifex ille dici pote&longs;t qui efficit id quod vult ex communibus & per accidens nec accipit propria, & per fo &longs;ic dialecticus, &longs;ophi&longs;tes, & orator vniuer&longs;ales &longs;unt: primus philo&longs;ophus non e&longs;t vniuer&longs;alis, quoniam, et&longs;i de omni ente di&longs;&longs;erit, at illa quæ &longs;unt entis propria ve&longs;tigat, & qu&ecedil; per &longs;e in&longs;unt, communia for­tuitaque. reijcit. Tertiò vniuer&longs;alis ille dici pote&longs;t qui rem vniuersè con&longs;iderat: idque. tribus modis, (ni&longs;i fallor) intelligi pote&longs;t, vel quia nullis legibus obligetur, &longs;ed euagetur quà velit, & talem vi­detur po&longs;ui&longs;&longs;e Philoponus b dialecticum eiusque. affines, quippe qui de rebus naturalibus mathema­ ticis, medicis & ad alios artifices attinentibus promi&longs;cuè di&longs;putare valeant: itaque ei&longs;dem auctor ille propria principia denegauit, attribuit aliena. Vel etiam vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;t, quia con&longs;ideret aliquid nulla differentia contractum, vt &longs;iquis hominem con&longs;ideraret &longs;impliciter quem medicus ob&longs;eruaret quà bonam valetudinem ip&longs;i re&longs;tituere po&longs;&longs;et, aut alius, quatenus e&longs;&longs;et compos ri&longs;us. bi &longs;anè nulla ambitus ratio habetur, &longs;ed notionis. dem enim homo e&longs;t qui con&longs;ideratur &longs;impliciter & per eadem indiuidua funditur, atque is in quo ri&longs;us capacitas aduertitur, aut recuperatio &longs;alutis, &longs;ed eiu&longs;dem rei notio re&longs;tringitur acce&longs;&longs;u nouæ conditionis. Tertio dici pote&longs;t artifex vniuer&longs;alis qui rem ge­neratim con&longs;iderat, nec ad eius &longs;pecies de&longs;cendit, vt &longs;iquis animal con&longs;ideraret, hominis, aut equi con&longs;iderationem prætermitteret. His ita po&longs;itis facile e&longs;t di&longs;&longs;oluere problema & diluere rationes quibus auferebatur facultas naturali philo&longs;opho di&longs;&longs;erendi de materia prima, & illam plenè co­gno&longs;cendi. quandoquidem eam &longs;ic cogno&longs;cit, vt nulla methodus plura de materia di&longs;quirere po&longs;­&longs;it, nec eius internas affectiones explicare, & &longs;iqua &longs;unt quæ intrin&longs;ecus ad eius con&longs;titutionem per­tineant, vt relatio & habitudo ad formam & compo&longs;itum & omnino facultas, vberrime tractare valeat. tque adeò vt ad hanc tractationem nihil adiungere liceat primo philo&longs;opho. Idem quoque philo&longs;ophus naturalis v&longs;um & mini&longs;terium materiæ nouit & optimè tenet cuius gratia &longs;it in&longs;tituta materia, & quemadmodum beneficio cau&longs;&longs;æ mouentes ad actum qui &longs;uus e&longs;t finis, materia proue­hatur, & per formam euadat in naturam. Proinde etiam phy&longs;icus materiæ notionem re&longs;oluit in cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;uperiores v&longs;que ad &longs;ummam atque omnium perfecti&longs;simam quæ primus e&longs;t finis. Non &longs;ic pri­mus philo&longs;ophus. uippe qui per externa principia melius quidem norit; &longs;ed interna, vt dictum e&longs;t, implent cognitionem quibus nihil addit præter illa quæ naturalis philo&longs;ophus indicauit, & cùm vniuersè cogno&longs;cat, magis quidem cogno&longs;cit, quia nobiliore quodam modo, & veluti architecton, non quia tractet accuratius. ccurati&longs;simè autem tractare materiam phy&longs;ici &longs;olius e&longs;t. &longs;que ad ali­quid planè phy&longs;icus explanat formam; quòd forma &longs;impliciter accepta aliud e&longs;&longs;e habet, quàm vt re&longs;piciat materiam, idque. à philo&longs;opho naturali non &longs;atis explicari pote&longs;t, &longs;ed e&longs;&longs;e omnis materi&ecedil; po­&longs;itum e&longs;t in habitudine ad formam illam quæ probè cogno&longs;citur à philo&longs;opho naturali. Sed iam pondus &longs;ingularum rationum exploremus. Obijcitur primùm omnem &longs;cientiam ex omnium cau&longs;&longs;arum cognitione pendere; non omnes autem à phy&longs;ico no&longs;ci. Propo&longs;itio fallaciam pre&longs;efert. uippe quòd &longs;cientia &longs;it ab&longs;oluta, vbi cau&longs;&longs;æ internæ & con&longs;tituentes &longs;olum habeantur, & e&longs;to quòd velis etiam rei propo&longs;it&ecedil; notitiam in omne genus cau&longs;&longs;arum di&longs;&longs;oluere, id quoque pr&ecedil;&longs;tat phy&longs;icus. At non nouit planè vim externarum cau&longs;&longs;arum, vt primus philo&longs;ophus: fateor. Sed quis e&longs;t auctor, vt ad cu­iusque rei cognitionem in genere exacta cau&longs;&longs;arum omnium cognitio requiratur? &longs;at e&longs;t, &longs;i optimè te­neat cau&longs;&longs;as illas, quà re&longs;piciunt rem propo&longs;itam; vt cum phy&longs;ica nouit finem, non in &longs;e &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed quatenus efficit motum in materia. uicquid nouit vlterius, iam non e&longs;t officium naturalis. Atque h&ecedil;c quidem verè pronunciantur. ihi tnm magis arridet, quòd plena cuiusque rei &longs;cientia ex internarum proprietatum notitia ducatur. Quod dicitur. Materiam quia &longs;it pote&longs;tas, à phy&longs;ico non po&longs;&longs;e cogno&longs;ci: &longs;ic diluitur. uoniam actus & pote&longs;tas &longs;unt nomina ad vnum, & per alias res per­tinent quam naturales, itaque ad communiorem di&longs;ciplinam &longs;pectant, quàm &longs;it naturalis. Sed cùm a&longs;&longs;umuntur in certa methodo, propria fiunt eius methodi, vt de circulo dictum e&longs;t apud grammati­cos 1. Po&longs;t. deò quantum e&longs;t de illorum notione quæ accommodatur ad phy&longs;icen, actus & pote&longs;tas ibi optimè cogno&longs;cuntur, & plus &longs;ine dubio, quàm prima philo&longs;ophia. Confirmas etiam. uia for­ma cogno&longs;citur magis quàm materia. Sed forma non plenè cogno&longs;citur à naturali. Re&longs;pondeo, &longs;i forma cum materia conferatur, maiorem haberi cognitionem formæ quàm materiæ. Cæterùm non id inquiritur nunc: &longs;ed propo&longs;ita cognitione materiæ quæritur an'ne eius cognitionem, qua­li&longs;cunque &longs;it, plenè phy&longs;icus a&longs;&longs;equatur, an primus philo&longs;ophus. & obiectio fallaciam continet elenchi. pr&ecedil;terquam <09> materia cogno&longs;citur per formam qu&ecedil; po&longs;ita e&longs;t in materia: h&ecedil;c verò optimè co­gno&longs;citur à phy&longs;ico. uapropter nihil ob&longs;tabit, quominus phy&longs;icus, etiam &longs;i non &longs;impliciter cogno­&longs;cat formam, po&longs;sit tnm aptè cogno&longs;cere materiam, & quatenus eius ingenium patitur. A&longs;&longs;umit Auicenna phy&longs;icum e&longs;&longs;e artificem particularem; proinde non no&longs;&longs;e materiam primam. certè &longs;i minoris ambitus e&longs;&longs;e vo­luit Auicenna phy&longs;icum, quam primum philo&longs;ophum, mea quidem &longs;ententia, decipitur. terque enim con&longs;ide­rat idem ens quod in decem pr&ecedil;dicamenta &longs;ecatur. terque primò &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem &longs;peculatur, cuius accidentia cau&longs;&longs;asque. vult indagare. Nec quicquam aliud exprimit ens q<26> vel à primo philo&longs;opho, vel à dialectico tractatur, quam id quod aliqua pr&ecedil;dicamenti formula &longs;ignificatur, cum qua (vt anteà dictum e&longs;t) &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notio &longs;emper exi&longs;tit. Nec <09> quacunque euagetur. quanquam nullus e&longs;t artifex hmoni; neque etiam dialecticus. oens enim qua&longs;i cancellis quibu&longs;dam coërcentur, quos egredi non licet. c qu&ecedil;uis methodus habet &longs;uam propriam ronnem qua munus &longs;uum pr&ecedil;&longs;tet. & dialecticus illud habet, vt ex conibus progrediatur: ac ni&longs;i ita fecerit, &longs;uum munus tran&longs;iliat, & vt inquit Ari&longs;t. a lateat alteram &longs;cien­tiam faciens. Itaque non po&longs;&longs;um non accu&longs;are Philoponum qui crediderit ob id ab Ari&longs;t. pronunciatum. b omnes methodos quarum &longs;unt principia, cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil;, & elementa, propter dialecticen, eo quòd cau&longs;sis, principiisque. careret, & di&longs;&longs;erens de mathematicis a&longs;&longs;umeret principia mathematica. ùm &longs;ic de­ generaret in mathematicum. & illud ab Ari&longs;totele pr&ecedil;ceptum &longs;it dialecticum efficere quod vult ex principiis communibus & per accidens. a Quin eius methodi & artis &longs;unt principia <04>pria qu&ecedil; non &longs;unt alterius. t finis eius facultatis & loca quibus vtitur di&longs;&longs;erendo. Proinde &longs;i methodi li­mites &longs;pectetur, omnes habent quod &longs;uum e&longs;t cuiu&longs;que <04>prium, communitas in dialectico &longs;ophi­&longs;ta, & rhetore comperitur, quoad omnia, &longs;ed tamen certo quodammodò &longs;ibi vendicant. Re&longs;tat igitur vt primus philo&longs;ophus &longs;it vniuer&longs;alis, quia &longs;impliciter id &longs;pectet quod aliæ &longs;cienti&ecedil; cum ali­qua conditione con&longs;iderant, vt ens, cùm phy&longs;ica tractet idem ens, &longs;ed quatenus e&longs;t naturale, aut vltimò, quia rerum genera notionesque. communes inquirat. & hi&longs;ce modis primus philo&longs;ophus e&longs;t artifex vniuer&longs;alis. Sed quia nil vetat, quominus eiu&longs;dem ambitus &longs;it philo&longs;ophus naturalis: non tollit etiam id, quin <04>pter ambitum &longs;uum po&longs;sit tractare materiam primam; pr&ecedil;&longs;ertim cum ali­qu&ecedil; res naturales ex materia prima con&longs;tent, & forma. Verùm quidem e&longs;&longs;et id quod a&longs;&longs;ump&longs;it Auicenna, &longs;i ita &longs;e haberet phy&longs;icus ad primum philo&longs;ophum vt &longs;pecies ad genus, &longs;ed non e&longs;t ita. Incidit quinta rom in errorem conem, quòd id quod in aliqua &longs;cientia tractatur, præ&longs;ertim &longs;i fuerit &longs;implex, obnoxium &longs;it demon&longs;trationi, cùm ad &longs;ummum &longs;it obnoxium illi progre&longs;&longs;ui, cum quo &longs;ola nece&longs;sitas iuncta e&longs;t, qu&ecedil; plus patet, quae &longs;yllogi&longs;mus. b Nam frequentius ex re&longs;olutione note&longs;cunt, aut admonitione per&longs;uadentur. Prima verò philo&longs;ophiam maximè cogno&longs;cere dicimus, quia no­biliore modo cogno&longs;cat, non quia rem accuratius inquirat: hoc aunt modo non negamus ab ip&longs;a ma­teriam cogno&longs;ci magis quae à phy&longs;ica, &longs;ed per interna in quibus exqui&longs;ita &longs;cientia con&longs;i&longs;tit, multò magis ipsam à phy&longs;ico quae à primo philo&longs;opho no&longs;ci putamus & multò plura de illa in methodo naturali tractata fui&longs;&longs;e dicimus, quae in prima philo&longs;ophia. Ni&longs;i fortè, quia primo philo&longs;opho &longs;upponitur cognitio naturalis; ip&longs;um aliquid vlterius quae naturalem cogno&longs;cere fateamur. ttamen neque id prehibebit, quo minus &longs;i vtriu&longs;que munera &longs;eparentur plus magisque. no&longs;cat de materia naturalis quae primus philo&longs;ophus. Nam totum id quod &longs;upponit primo philo&longs;opho, proprium e&longs;t naturalis.

C

D

b 1. Phy&longs;. T. 1.

E

F

Ad I.

G

Ad II.

Ad III.

H

Ad IIII.

a 1. Rhet.

b 1. Phy&longs;. T. 1.

A

a 1. Elen. c. 8.

Ad V.

b 1. Prior.

Ad VI.

B

Vtrùm form&ecedil; naturales, &longs;i non re, at cogitatione &longs;eparentur à materia, nec'ne. Cap. XVII.

ACCEPIMVS antè ea quæ mouendo mouentur, e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;ic&ecedil; contemplationis. æc verò &longs;ic in materia &longs;unt, vt quem admodum vulgò dici &longs;olet, con&longs;tituant materiam, & ip&longs;i referant acceptum quòd &longs;int. Itaque tale formarum genus à materia nunquam diuellitur, atque illa quidem &longs;en&longs;ili. Videbatur etiam monere nos Ari&longs;toteles, nec mentem quidem habere vim eas à materia &longs;e­parandi. Verumenimuerò Philoponus, vt perpetuus ho&longs;tis Ari&longs;totelis, etiam rationibus & repu­gnantiis oppugnare conatur hoc decretum. Nequid igitur pr&ecedil;termittamus, quantum in nobis e&longs;t quod valeat ad purgandum Ari&longs;totelem; libet item in hoc primo aditu methodi naturalis, huiu&longs;­modi placitum perpendere diligenter. H&ecedil;c opponit Philoponus quibus conuellat &longs;ententiam Ari&longs;t. Primùm quidem quia mens aliam materi&ecedil; notionem habet, aliam form&ecedil;: atque aliud e&longs;&longs;e materiam nouit à forma. Quinetiam di&longs;tinguitur ab Ari&longs;t. &longs;ub&longs;tantia in tria membra qu&ecedil; nonmodò viribus &longs;ed natura & e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;unt, materiam nimirùm, formam, & compo&longs;itum. Quòd &longs;i tria &longs;ecum differentia &longs;unt: profectò forma citra materiam concipi valebit. Adde etiam quòd ea nomi­num pote&longs;tas e&longs;t, vt primum &longs;ignificent formam, mox compo&longs;itum; po&longs;tremò materiam. in primo igitur temporis puncto, quo mens audit & concipit ex nomine formam, non compo&longs;itum, aut ma­teriam, haud negari pont, quin &longs;ola forma comprehendatur à mente, & igitur vt à materia &longs;eiuncta. Rur&longs;us re&longs;tatur Ari&longs;t. è formis naturalib. qua&longs;dam &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;e. c Sed quid eas cogitatione &longs;ola &longs;eparari profitebimur, cùm etiam reip&longs;a &longs;eparari queant? Nanque materia manens eadem, modò has, modò illas formas accipit. Rur&longs;us facit Ari&longs;t. oinum formarum &longs;ubiectum materiam, &longs;iue inter­uallum expers oinum qualitatum, &longs;iue ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;iue ad accidentia referantur. Verùm quid nos certius optamus quàm quòd prius à po&longs;teriore nonmodò cogitatione, &longs;ed etiam re &longs;eparari pont. Cùm igitur forma prior &longs;it quàm materia, ab ip&longs;a quoque &longs;eparabitur. Quapropter docet Ari&longs;t. rationem d qua form&ecedil; naturales &longs;ine materia concipiuntur; ea&longs;que. verè formas e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;euerat qu&ecedil; à materia &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;euocantur. e At verò &longs;ic di&longs;tinguitur &longs;cientia naturalis à c&ecedil;teris, quòd &longs;e&longs;e appli­cat ad motum, & principia con&longs;iderat eius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ in qua motus initia continentur, & quod­cunque ip&longs;a concipit, re&longs;picit materiam, &longs;eu po&longs;itiuè, quia &longs;cilicet ortum ex materia ducat, &longs;eu priuatiuè, quia per priuationem motus à nobis concipiatur, vel quòd habeant omnino quandam affiinatem cum motu, vt &longs;i efficiant motum. Itaque definitiones naturales &longs;ine motu & materia non a&longs;signantur; ac &longs;iquando materiam non comprehendant &longs;iue ob&longs;curè, &longs;eu per&longs;picuè; vanæ perhibentur & imperfectæ. Sed &longs;it hoc huius methodi officium, quia determinetur eo, quòd id quod ab ip&longs;a con&longs;ideratur, &longs;emper a&longs;piciat motum: de mentis vi di&longs;&longs;eramus: nonnunquamenim mens id &longs;egregat à materia, quod tnm natura po&longs;uit in materia, quemadmodum apparet in mathematicis. Nam magnitudo e&longs;t in materia, &longs;ine ip&longs;a tamen cogitatur. Iam illud nobis placere audi&longs;ti mentem non immutare rerum e&longs;&longs;entias: pendet enim à rebus obiectis, & prout ip&longs;&ecedil; &longs;unt, ita concipiantur quoque nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. Si igitur aliquorum e&longs;&longs;entia continet materiam; neque mens illam à materia &longs;e­parabit: aliter id quod non e&longs;t, conciperetur, & fal&longs;itas in termino &longs;implici extaret: e&longs;t enim e&longs;&longs;entia materi&ecedil; adnexa, ea tamen no&longs;citur, vt extra materiam. Et quanuis ad terminos &longs;implices ignoratio pertineat, a quia cum &longs;int indiuidui, vel pror&longs;us attinguntur, vel penitus ignorantur; in hac notione fal&longs;itas inerit, quòd partim res ip&longs;a attingetur, partim ignorabitur: attingetur &longs;anè, dum e&longs;sentia comprehenditur, ignorabitur aunt, quòd e&longs;&longs;entia concipietur aliter àc &longs;it. Sed eius ignoratio quod ab&longs;trahere vocatur, in cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t oins erroris: neque enim ille qui ab&longs;trahit, ita &longs;eparat, quia cogitet rem aliter atque ip&longs;a &longs;it; &longs;ed con&longs;eruat e&longs;&longs;entiam & rei naturam vt &longs;e habet, non cogitat de oppo&longs;i­to; non accipit ac &longs;i hoc &longs;ine illo &longs;it, &longs;ed quod e&longs;t in illo, accipiens con&longs;iderat id quod ine&longs;t; alterum, in quo ine&longs;t, omittit; non enunciat hoc non e&longs;&longs;e in hoc: nam &longs;ic &longs;implex comprehen&longs;io non e&longs;&longs;et, & includeret fal&longs;itatem: verùm videt hoc in illo e&longs;&longs;e, & totum concipit primùm; partes facit qu&ecedil; ne­ce&longs;&longs;ariò vinculo iunct&ecedil; &longs;unt, & eas ita iunctas intelligit, &longs;ed alteram partem &longs;e conuertit, quam & &longs;i &longs;ine materiaa con&longs;iderat; non idcirco &longs;ine materiaa concipit. Con&longs;iderare enim e&longs;t contemplari naturam, & <04>cedere à confu&longs;o ad di&longs;tinctum; concipere e&longs;t &longs;olummodò informari, &longs;iue in prima & confu&longs;a notitia, &longs;eu cùm iam di&longs;tinctè nouimus, & notionibus di&longs;tinctis informamur. Ecce nunc tibi domi­num; quis eum concipiet &longs;ine &longs;eruo? vna e&longs;t vtriu&longs;que comprehen&longs;io; dominum tamen con&longs;idero non con­&longs;iderato &longs;eruo, ide&longs;t naturam domini exploro, non &longs;erui, quem tamen &longs;ine &longs;eruo non concipio <04>pter nece&longs;&longs;ariam habitudinem quæ inter illos intercedit. lia e&longs;t vtriu&longs;que e&longs;sentia & ratio, &longs;ed ade&longs;t penden­tia mutua; atque illa quidem quæ re&longs;piciat e&longs;&longs;entiam; <04>pter hanc vnum &longs;ine materiao neutiquam concipi pont; &longs;ed <04>pter variam vtriu&longs;que rationem vnum &longs;ine materiao con&longs;iderare licet; hoc non illud con­templor, & &longs;i non &longs;ine illo cogno&longs;co. &longs;ic ab&longs;trahendo non dico mendacium, quia &longs;implex appre­hendo (huius enim notio &longs;implex e&longs;t, cùm de huius domino cogito) vniuer&longs;am rei naturam concipio; quod ad hoc pertinet, &longs;eor&longs;um contemplor, quod &longs;cilicet illius e&longs;t <04>prium, & in hoc munere &longs;ic affectus &longs;um, vt neque etiam ignorantiæ redargui po&longs;sim, quòd rem aliter intelligam, àc &longs;it. uin &longs;i illorum e&longs;&longs;entias &longs;eor&longs;um &longs;umà. non quòd exi&longs;tant, &longs;ed ratione &longs;olas animaduertam, quod vulgò dici &longs;olet formaliter; &longs;ic ob&longs;eruabo &longs;eparatas; vt altera, tamet&longs;i manet &longs;imul & indi&longs;&longs;olubiliter; nihilominus de altera negari po&longs;sit: hac enim ratione licet dicere hominem non e&longs;&longs;e animal, quod hu­ius ratio non e&longs;t ratio alterius; quanuis huius ratio &longs;ine materiaius ratione non con&longs;i&longs;tat, & ita licet dicere accidens non e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, & dominum non e&longs;&longs;e &longs;eruum, quanquae accidens e&longs;t aliquid &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & dominus &longs;erui dominus, quod genus ab&longs;tractionis, quia negatione exprimi pote&longs;t, non &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a complexum vocabimus. Itaque communius e&longs;t concipere quae ab&longs;trahere & con&longs;ide­rate, &longs;iquidem concipere &longs;it rerum formas accipere, vel vt re ip&longs;a per &longs;en&longs;us offeruntur, vel vt e&longs;­&longs;entiæ à materia &longs;egregatæ & e&longs;t officium mentis patibilis; con&longs;iderare & ab&longs;trahere e&longs;t &longs;epara­te conceptas, & pertinet ad eam mentem qu&ecedil; vocatur agens. ut e&longs;t &longs;altem in actu, neque conceptæ omnes formæ &longs;eparantur, vt &longs;imitas, &longs;ed planè &longs;eparatas anteà conceptas fui&longs;&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: conci­pere etiam mentis e&longs;t rudis, ab&longs;trahere fœcund&ecedil;: concipere pendet ex obiectis; ab&longs;trahere de&longs;cen­dit à mente; tamet&longs;i <09> ab&longs;trahi queat, inh&ecedil;ret in rei natura. &longs;t enim res mathematica talis, vt ad cer­tam materiam &longs;e non applicet & form&ecedil; ex &longs;eip&longs;is habent, vt & inter &longs;e & ab altis rebus &longs;eiugentur, &longs;ed ab&longs;trahendi actus e&longs;t ex mente & ad obiecta ip&longs;a procedit. concipitur totum, re&longs;oluitur in par­tes ab&longs;trahendo: conceptui confu&longs;o &longs;uccedit ab&longs;tractio, eadem conceptui di&longs;tinctio præcedit. Quoniam verò triplex e&longs;t ab&longs;tractio, quemadmodum docuimus olim, & ea cuius ope concipitur vniuer&longs;ale confu&longs;um, & vbi conceptum cùm &longs;en&longs;ilis materiæ &longs;imulachtis ab ip&longs;is ab&longs;oluitur, vel vt &longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t, vt mathematici faciunt, vel &longs;impliciter, quod præ&longs;tat primus philo&longs;ophus: de po­&longs;tremis agitur in pr&ecedil;&longs;entia, quæ &longs;unt <04>pria mentis cum alioquin illa &longs;it naturæ: etenim ex vi for­marum e&longs;t, vt hoc modo moueant &longs;en&longs;us, illo verò mentem, ad obeundas c&ecedil;teras ab&longs;tractiones opera mentis requiritur: quanquae nec mens per &longs;eip&longs;am &longs;ufficit: nam flagitat mini&longs;terium naturæ: vt mox indicabimus: proinde efficitur, vt quot modis res ip&longs;&ecedil; di&longs;tinguantur, totidem ab&longs;tractio fiat. & prima di&longs;tinctio in eo quòd &longs;unt: E&longs;&longs;e verò duplex e&longs;t, vel exi&longs;tere, vel id quod indicat e&longs;&longs;entiam. quod ad primum pertinet, ea &longs;eor&longs;um con&longs;iderantur quæ &longs;ubiecto di&longs;cernuntur, tum item quæ re, vt quorum diuer&longs;a &longs;unt genera, veluti quantum & quale. E&longs;&longs;entia quorum rom explicans quid e&longs;t, non e&longs;t eadem, vel &longs;impliciter, vt eorum qu&ecedil; dialectici di&longs;perata vocant, vel formaliter, vt totum e&longs;&longs;e vnius non &longs;it totum e&longs;&longs;e alterius, vel ent ronne, quia &longs;int indifferentia, vt communia ad vnum. Ex his illa qu&ecedil; sunt natura priora, & ab&longs;trahuntur, & concipiuntur &longs;ine po&longs;terioribus: qu&ecedil; vero po&longs;teriora ab&longs;trahuntur &longs;anè, &longs;ed concipi nequeunt &longs;ine illis. Ergo elementa extra mixturam cogitantur, & &longs;ine po&longs;te &longs;ub&longs;tantia, & album &longs;ine mu&longs;ico & cygno, & cygnus &longs;ine albedine, vt vbi cum oppo&longs;ita nigredine con­cipitur, etenim nihil prohibet illi concedi quodcunque cum eo non implicet repugnantiam, veritatem logicam vocant. Ita Deus &longs;ine c&ecedil;teris à mente quæ &longs;u&longs;tineat illum &longs;plendorem & concipi, & con&longs;iderari pont, non &longs;ic homo &longs;ine animali. Nam Deus nulli refert acceptum, <09> &longs;it rationis compos, continet ani­mal e&longs;sentiæ partem: huic &longs;imilis e&longs;t materiæ form&ecedil;que. rom, vt mox docebimus. Quibus &longs;ic &longs;tantibus hoc etiam maneat firmum. Cùm aliud &longs;it concipi ab eo quod e&longs;t con&longs;iderari; vt negamus po&longs;terius &longs;ine po&longs; concipi, &longs;ic damus &longs;ine po&longs; con&longs;iderari. Nec me latet à nonnullis concedi po&longs;terius &longs;ine po&longs; concipi po&longs;&longs;e, in notitia confu&longs;a. oui enim hominem, ignoro tamen &longs;it'ne animal rationis compos. Cæterùm quia &longs;unt idem homo & animal rationis compos; mihi videtur is qui hominem confusè nouit, etiam confusè no&longs;&longs;e animal rationis compos. uius rei &longs;ignum, quòd ille qui nouit ho­minem confusè, non audebit negare ip&longs;um animal e&longs;&longs;e: neque in ea notitia quamuis rudi, concipiet aut enuntiabit hominem non e&longs;&longs;e animal, quod &longs;anè facere po&longs;&longs;et, &longs;i in ea notitia hominis notio ab animalis notione non penderet: idem enim foret àc &longs;i per accidens coniuncta e&longs;&longs;ent in quibus non repugnat oppo&longs;itum, veluti de cygno & nigro dictum fuit. uòd &longs;i nouit mens inferri repugnan­tiam, vbi animal hominem non e&longs;&longs;e cogiter, iam hominem &longs;ub animalis notione comprehendit. Ex his Philoponi rationes facilè diluuntur. Nam tres illæ primæ confundunt id quod e&longs;t conci­pere, cum eo quod e&longs;t ab&longs;trahere. Tùm deinde ab&longs;tractio illa eorum e&longs;t, vt formaliter accipiun­tur, in iis verò nihil ob&longs;tat, quominus alterum &longs;ine materiao concipi nequeat. At verò locus 2. Phy&longs;. non magis &longs;tat à Philopono quàm à nobis, nam variis legitur modis & diuer&longs;as interpretationes admittit. Docet enim ibi Ari&longs;toteles phy&longs;ici munus e&longs;&longs;e &longs;pectare formam non &longs;impliciter; &longs;ed quatenus refertur ad materiam. taque formæ quæ ad materiam &longs;e&longs;e applicarunt, vt in illa &longs;int immer&longs;æ, &longs;unt phy&longs;icæ con&longs;iderationis. & addit & illæ quæ &longs;unt xwz/is a\ me\n ei)/dei, e)n u/lhde\, quæ verba &longs;unt valde ambigua. &longs;iquidem &longs;u&longs;picio &longs;ub&longs;it de lectione, an'ne e)i\dei, quod e&longs;t &longs;pecie & forma, ide&longs;t ratione legendum &longs;it quibus &longs;ignificatur modus &longs;epararionis. n ei)/dh ide&longs;t &longs;pecies & formæ quibus &longs;ignificantur formæ, quæ &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;unt, ac &longs;i priorem lectionem recipiamus, duplex interpretatio &longs;uccurrat. rima quidem, quòd hæc &longs;it ratio generalis con&longs;iderandi formas apud philo&longs;ophum naturalem. uòd illæ &longs;pectentur quæ ratione quidem &longs;eparantur; reap&longs;e ve­rò re&longs;ident in materia. Sed tunc exoritur difficultas, quid intelligendum &longs;it, cùm dicitur &longs;eparari ratione. o&longs;sint'ne formæ naturales &longs;ine materia cogitari: quod tamen &longs;uperius confutatum fue­rat. a An potius dictum id &longs;it, proptereà quòd priore lib. Phy&longs;. o&longs;ten&longs;um fuerit materiam & formam ratione differre. Tùm verò nil vetat, quin forma &longs;ine materia concipi non po&longs;sit: quandò e&longs;t ea notio formalis qua natura quidem alia &longs;ignificatur, non tollitur verò pendentia. & ita nihil face­ret locus ille contra nos. An hoc animaduer&longs;um fuerit propter Pythagoram & alios qui rerum naturalium principia fecerint numeros & magnitudines quæ omnia ab illis extra materiam po­&longs;ita fuerunt. Itaque moneat Ari&longs;toteles Phy&longs;icen illas formas tractare quæ ratione quidem &longs;ola &longs;eparantur à materia, re verò re&longs;ident in ip&longs;a, non illas quæ &longs;unt extra materiam. Aut etiam hæc verba ab Ari&longs;totele ad&longs;cripta fuerint, vt doceat item formas mathematicas à naturali perquiri, non &longs;anè vt ratione &longs;eparantur, &longs;ed quatenus inh&ecedil;rent in materia. Po&longs;&longs;umus & ei)/dh, ide&longs;t, formas ac­cipere. & ita videbitur Ari&longs;toteles deducere phy&longs;icam methodum ad &longs;ub&longs;tantias verè &longs;eparabiles quas explorat primus philo&longs;ophus, & adnotare quatenus ad phy&longs;icum pertineant, quatenus &longs;ci­licet &longs;unt in materia: non idcirco, quia &longs;int formæ materiat&ecedil;; &longs;ed quòd exercent &longs;ua munera in materia: atque adeò, vt in materia &longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e dicantur, &longs;icut dictum e&longs;t de Dei O. . &longs;ede b quam con­&longs;tituit illi Ari&longs;toteles in dextris c&ecedil;li, quòd ibi maximè vigeant eius vites. odem modo dicantur illæ formæ in materia, quòd earum vires &longs;e&longs;e prodant in materia, qua&longs;i dicat Ari&longs;toteles etiam &longs;e­parata pertinere ad phy&longs;icum, quatenus tamen materiam re&longs;piciunt, & i&longs;ta interpr&ecedil;tatio mihi magis arridet: quoniam &longs;ubiicit Ari&longs;toteles exemplum formæ cuiu&longs;dam quæ &longs;eparata e&longs;t à ma­teria quam afficit & immutat, &longs;olis nimirum quo &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparata notatur. Neque enim immo­bilis illa & indiuidua tum notuerat. Nam quamuis Deus omnium auctor ab Empedocle prædi­caretur illis carminibus quibus ex ip&longs;o omnia deriuari te&longs;tatur.

C

Ratio I.

II.

III.

IIII.

c 2. Phy&longs;. T. 26.

V.

VI.

D

d 3. De An.

e 7. Met.

E

a 9. Met.

F

G

H

A

B

a 2. Phy&longs;. T. 18.

C

b 8. Phy&longs;. T. 81.

*ga/nq) o(sa teh)_n, o(sa te e)si\n, h)d) o(sage e)sai o)pisw

*de/ndza/te, bebla/shke kai\ a)ne/zes, h)de/ gunai/kes

*qh_zes t) o)iwnoi\te kou\ u)daztor ze mmones i)xqu)s.

D

Ari&longs;toteles ip&longs;e (vt videbimus) ex eo tanquam fine h&ecedil;c omnia deriuari putat c&ecedil;lum; aut &longs;olem, horum omnium reputat auctorem velut efficiens. Sed quocunque modo hunc locum interpre­temur, nihil officit nobis ita credentibus, form&ecedil; notionem à materiæ notione non &longs;eiungi. Ea verò quæ quinto loco &longs;ubiiciuntur; &longs;olùm per&longs;uadent rationis &longs;eparationem quæ non detrahit de no­tione materi&ecedil;. & materiam potius, quàm formam &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;e conuincunt. Ad illud autem quod vltimò opponitur. ormam naturalem à &longs;en&longs;ili materia &longs;egregari, dum pul&longs;at mentem, eamque. verè & propriè formam e&longs;&longs;e, vbi di&longs;iuncta &longs;it à materia &longs;en&longs;ili. Primùm re&longs;pondemus materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem e&longs;&longs;e vniuer&longs;alem & &longs;ingularem. Porrò &longs;ingularem e&longs;&longs;e forma po&longs;teriorem non modò natura, &longs;ed origine, &longs;impliciter enim forma prior e&longs;t, quàm materia, vniuer&longs;alem verò priorem; quip­pe partem e&longs;&longs;entiæ. Ac verè tùm formam e&longs;&longs;e dicimus, vbi &longs;ecreta fuerit à materia &longs;ingulari; ab altera verò neque re, neque cogitatione &longs;eiungi, & tùm intelligi po&longs;&longs;e, cùm &longs;eparata fuerit à &longs;ingulari: ac tùm verè formam e&longs;&longs;e, quòd in &longs;ingulari non &longs;it forma, &longs;ed compo&longs;itum. quanquàm reip&longs;a forma &longs;emper exi&longs;tit in materia &longs;ingulari: &longs;ed hoc mentis officium e&longs;t, ip&longs;am

à &longs;ingulari ab&longs;trahere, hoc e&longs;t, &longs;ine &longs;ingulari materia con&longs;iderare. roptereà talis forma in mente ponitur ab Ari&longs;totele. Dico verò &longs;ic con&longs;iderari formam naturalem; atque moneo, talem con&longs;ide­rationem adhuc e&longs;&longs;e naturalem, quòd includat materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem, non ignarus etiam &longs;ine mate­ria &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;pectari po&longs;&longs;e formas naturales aliis duobus modis, qui non &longs;unt naturales, altero qui­dem vniuer&longs;ali quo forma naturalis generatim con&longs;ideratur, & vt principium &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis vni­uersè non huius aut illius, in quo item &longs;en&longs;ilis materia, &longs;ed vniuersè continetur, non vniuersè tan­quam genus; &longs;ed vt commune per indifferentiam, & &longs;ub hac notione materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis, non huius aut illius, vt o&longs;sis & carnis etiam vniuersè &longs;umptorum: & a&longs;&longs;ero con&longs;iderationem hanc e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi. ltero verò modo con&longs;ideratur forma naturalis &longs;ine materia &longs;en&longs;ili, quia &longs;it quoddam genus formæ, quod interuallum comitatur & materiam pote&longs;tate quantam, quæ cùm &longs;it prior motu, ab omni motu &longs;eparari pote&longs;t, & hanc ad mathematicum pertinere profiteor. Itaque mo­dus ab&longs;trahendi de quo &longs;uprà di&longs;putatum e&longs;t, proprius e&longs;t omnis &longs;cientiæ: quia &longs;ic oportet pro­gredi, &longs;i &longs;cientia paranda &longs;it, ab&longs;tractiones i&longs;tæ, de quibus nuper expo&longs;itum e&longs;t, &longs;unt primi philo­&longs;ophi & mathematici, quæ tibi diligenter ob&longs;eruandæ &longs;unt. Sed dicet qui&longs;piam, &longs;atis dictum e&longs;&longs;e de &longs;epararione formæ, verùm quid dicendum e&longs;t de &longs;epararione materiæ? Dicimus ad hoc mate­riam ita &longs;eparari à forma, non quia in eius e&longs;&longs;entia forma non concipiatur, &longs;ed cùm materia &longs;it vel &longs;ingularis, vel infinita. &longs;ingularem à forma &longs;eparari, quoniam prior e&longs;t origine forma &longs;ingulari, & ab illa &longs;eparari & re & ratione, quia forma illa &longs;ingularis e&longs;t, quod verò e&longs;t &longs;ingulare non po­te&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e alicuius e&longs;&longs;entia. nanque e&longs;&longs;entia per definitionem euoluitur, hæc verò non e&longs;t &longs;ingularis. remaneret autem &longs;i non proxima (hæc enim cum forma corrumpitur) at alterius formæ &longs;ubie­ctum. &longs;impliciter autem materia non &longs;eparatur à forma, quòd &longs;impliciter forma prior e&longs;t quàm materia, & actus &longs;impliciter prior e&longs;t quàm pote&longs;tas, & forma & actus in materiæ pote&longs;tatisque definitione &longs;umuntur.

E

F

1. Po&longs;t.

9. Met.

Quid &longs;it materia &longs;en&longs;ilis, & quemadmodum in naturali methodo accipienda. Cap. XVIII.

ACCEPIMVS antè &longs;ic &longs;e habere formam naturalem, vt nulla ratione neque reip&longs;a, neque vi mentis &longs;ine materia &longs;en&longs;ili concipi queat. Attamen, vt opinor, à no&longs;tra methodo non abhorrebit, &longs;i hoc loco &longs;ermonem no&longs;trum conuertamus ad explicandum vnde no&longs;catur, quid ip&longs;a &longs;it, & doceamus etiam qua ratione tractetur: confert enim ad cogno&longs;cendam rationem & viam qua res naturales &longs;unt definitione euoluendæ. Primùm igitur eam nemo ignorat e&longs;&longs;e mate­riam &longs;en&longs;ilem quæ iam à qualitatibus cum actuo&longs;is, tum patibilibus occupatur, & motui tran&longs;­mutationique. &longs;ubiicitur. am &longs;ine his nulla vera mutatio videtur effici po&longs;&longs;e. deò materia &longs;en&longs;i­lis ab eiu&longs;modi qualitatib. & affectionib. on &longs;egregatur: reip&longs;a quidem per&longs;picuum e&longs;t, cogita­tione verò dubium, &longs;iquidem materia principium eiu&longs;modi affectionum optimo iure ponatur: quia verò natura prius a po&longs;teriore &longs;euocari queat, non erit culpæ alicuius affinis qui materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem per qualitates &longs;en&longs;iles, non &longs;anè definiri, tanquam hæc eius principia &longs;int, &longs;ed vt per effe­cta de&longs;cribi putabit. Præ&longs;ertim quòd &longs;i definiretur per accidentia, non po&longs;&longs;emus euitare quin ac­cidens in &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ definitione &longs;umi po&longs;&longs;et; id verò oppugnat vniuer&longs;a præcepta analytica. Ete­nim pp illum canonem. Quando alterum de altero prædicatur, vt de &longs;ubiecto; quæcunque de illo prædicantur, etiam de &longs;ubiecto prædicentur oportebit. At verò materia &longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t pars &longs;ub­&longs;tantiæ naturalis; ergo in eius definitione &longs;umenda e&longs;t: pone tu nunc accidens principium mate­riæ &longs;en&longs;ilis. Et principium igitur &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis. ùm cæteroqui de &longs;ubiecto debeat demon­&longs;trari per &longs;ubiecti principia, & per &longs;ubiectum eiusque. principia definiatur. Neque hic tu elaberis inquiens, eam regulam complecti principia e&longs;&longs;entiæ: materiam verò negans e&longs;&longs;e principium e&longs;­&longs;entiæ, &longs;ed exi&longs;tentiæ tantum quæ po&longs;terior e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entia: proinde nil vetare, quominus accidens in explicatione &longs;en&longs;ilis materiæ ponatur: qnm nihilominus efficeretur, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia fieret ex non &longs;ub&longs;tantia: fieret enim indiuiduum ex materia &longs;en&longs;ili quæ componeretur ex accidentibus. Sed enim &longs;i po&longs;teriora &longs;unt accidentia, &longs;eparari queunt a materia, vt &longs;ine ip&longs;is exi&longs;tat. Vel igitur erit mate­ria &longs;en&longs;ilis &longs;ine po&longs;tib. & &longs;ic indiuiduum &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ nudum quod nos non approbamus, vel non erit amplius &longs;en&longs;ilis; verùm degenerabit in aliud materiæ genus. Idcirco &longs;ic de &longs;en&longs;ili materia &longs;tatuendum puto. Aut enim &longs;pectatur, quatenus habet vnde pellat &longs;en&longs;us. ut vt res huic facultati &longs;ubiecta, vel &longs;ub ratione principij. abet autem, vnde moueat &longs;en&longs;us, initium duplex; alterum re­motum, atque alterum proximum: ac remotum quidem e&longs;t ip&longs;a forma & actus; ex hoc enim ac­cidentia pendent, quibus ine&longs;t proxima facultas excitandi &longs;en&longs;um. Quatenus igitur materia &longs;en­&longs;ilis, non dubium e&longs;t, quin accidens in eius definitione comprehendatur, non &longs;ecus àc albedo in definitione hominis albi. a Vt enim te&longs;tatur Ari&longs;toteles partes cuiu&longs;que coniuncti in eius defini­tione ponendæ &longs;unt. Ex hoc effectum e&longs;&longs;e putant quidam, vt tale materiæ genus motu de&longs;ignetur; a ea verò cùm in rerum naturalium definitione requiratur; &longs;&ecedil;pius item ab Ari&longs;t. ronuntiatum &longs;it, definitiones naturales &longs;ine motu non e&longs;&longs;e tradendas: &longs;iquidem materia &longs;en&longs;ilis ex motu, eanquae priore &longs;en&longs;ili con&longs;taret. Veruntamen, vt placet hoc, <09> materia &longs;en&longs;ilis hmoni &longs;it accidentium bene­ficio; pp allatas rationes haud a&longs;&longs;entiar motum vt primum quid in rerum naturalium definitio­nibus e&longs;&longs;e ponendum; &longs;ed vt notam duntaxat eius principij ex quo proximè fluit. Concedam quoque &longs;icuti natura per motum veluti principium definitur, &longs;ic & materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem, vt principium per motum probè definiri; &longs;unt enim relatiua principium, & id cuius e&longs;t principium. &longs;i ea &longs;ecundùm formam con&longs;ideres; non &longs;ecundùm materiam: tnm in definitione &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; non id quod rei prin­cipioque. comitatur accipiendum e&longs;t; &longs;ed rem cui hæc comitatur, per eam habitudinem menti &longs;e­&longs;e offerre quidem fatebor, &longs;ed cùm tali habitudine &longs;ub&longs;tantiam complere negabo, & a&longs;&longs;euerabo Phi­lo&longs;ophum accepi&longs;&longs;e motum quo materiam per &longs;e alioquin ignotam illu&longs;traret, vnde initium &longs;pe­culationum &longs;uarum de&longs;umeret; notis enim in&longs;i&longs;tant oportet. Proinde materiam illam puto &longs;umi in definitione rerum natura con&longs;tantium, cui hæc accidunt, ide&longs;t, illam facultatem, vnde proximò exi&longs;tunt accidentia quæ pellunt &longs;en&longs;us. Ideòque. non con&longs;tituitur per accidentia; neque per ip&longs;a defi­nitur, neque item &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis; &longs;ed ex accidente note&longs;cit, & ex ip&longs;o prius quid accidente &longs;i­gnificatur. Quare monebat nos Alexander; b vbi Ari&longs;t. &longs;&longs;umeret motum, interpretandum e&longs;&longs;e ma­ teriam &longs;en&longs;ilem, qua&longs;i ex con&longs;equente &longs;ignificetur materia &longs;en&longs;ilis quæ nos alioqui latet eo planè modo quo &longs;ub&longs;tantia ip&longs;a naturalis nomine corporis exprimitur, quod e&longs;t primum genus quan­titatis, <09> ab hoc con&longs;equente nunquam de&longs;eratur, mente no&longs;tra aut non, aut ægrè admodum ea &longs;eparante c quæ in&longs;unt perpetuò, ab illis quib. n&longs;unt, vt hominis formam à carnib. & o&longs;sib. <09> in iis &longs;emper apparet; idemque. efficeret mens in circulo, quæ forma nulli cert&ecedil; materiæ per &longs;e ad­dicta e&longs;t, &longs;i qui&longs;que in ære extaret, neque enim &longs;ine &ecedil;re concipi po&longs;&longs;et. Ac &longs;i rem interius &longs;crutari veli­mus; non &longs;ine certa ratione v&longs;urpatur in de&longs;ignanda materia, quippe <09> accidens non &longs;it ens &longs;im­pliciter, & ab omni &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;uaptè natura &longs;egregatum, &longs;ed &longs;it propriè &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ic affecta. ius affectio cùm moueat &longs;en&longs;um; efficitur, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ingularis, aut materia &longs;en&longs;ilis quæ alio­qui &longs;entiri per &longs;e non po&longs;&longs;et, per accidens &longs;entiatur, à quo &longs;i cogitatione &longs;epararetur, iam non am­plius &longs;en&longs;ilis & &longs;ingularis e&longs;&longs;et, &longs;ed intelligenda, & vniuer&longs;alis, quia tnm neque per &longs;e mouet mentem, cùm &longs;it pura pote&longs;tas, cogimur item materiam intelligendam notare aliquo accidente quod ip&longs;i in&longs;ideat immobiliter, vt motus. Itaque ent motus quà de&longs;ignat materiam generatim &longs;umptus ingre­ditur definitiones naturales methodo non tam euolutioni rei con&longs;ulente quàm captui no&longs;tro. Quoniam verò accidens ita &longs;e habet ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, vt & contraria quandoque. in eadem &longs;pecie reperiantur, d vt album, & nigrum in homine, & in eodem indiuiduo nonnunquàm; & mas & f&ecedil;­mina in pleri&longs;que partibus animalis, alia non item, vt æternum, atque caducum; & hæc quidem per &longs;e, illa per accidens: quæ per accidens in&longs;unt, materiæ &longs;en&longs;ili atque illi quidem &longs;ingulari ad&longs;cribun­tur, neque enim po&longs;ita, vel ablata rerum naturas immutant, &longs;icuti neque &longs;en&longs;ilis illa materia; quapro­pter nec e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entiæ pars, &longs;ed exi&longs;tentiæ &longs;olùm, quod e&longs;t aliquid e&longs;&longs;entiæ &longs;uperueniens, vt &longs;uo lo­co demon&longs;trabitur. Ex hoc efficitur, vt in indiuiduo &longs;int accidentia &longs;ua ip&longs;ius propria, tamen non idcirco &longs;ub&longs;tantiam indiuiduam con&longs;tituant, &longs;ed &longs;ingularis eiu&longs;dem principij, materiæ nimirum &longs;igna &longs;int, quib. tem &longs;ublatis, verùm vt po&longs;terioribus, materia quoque tollatur; velut etiam motu &longs;ublato natura, quanquàm vt po&longs;teriore, de mundo, aut &longs;altem è con&longs;pectu tolleretur. Atque ha­ctenus de modo quo nobis materia note&longs;cit, vt autem &longs;it, ita cogitare oportet omnem &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; mutationem e&longs;&longs;e circa &longs;ingulare, quod &longs;anè con&longs;tat ex materia & forma, in materia verò propter formam etiam in&longs;unt accidentia certa; cùmque. mutationi &longs;ubiiciatur id quod e&longs;t potentia tale per &longs;e, per accidens autem id quod e&longs;t actu, efficitur, vt aut ei quod factum e&longs;t, accedant quæ &longs;unt propria form&ecedil; genit&ecedil;, & &longs;i qu&ecedil; etiam qu&ecedil; non repugnantia retinentur ex quorum cumulo fit in­diuiduum. itaque e&longs;t cum accidentibus quæ pendent ex forma, vel coni genit&ecedil; & corruptæ, vel ex pr&ecedil;&longs;ente pro potentia materi&ecedil; pr&ecedil;cedentis, &longs;unt & alia quibus &longs;upponitur quidem forma &longs;ub&longs;tan­tiæ, non &longs;unt tamen ex forma, verùm exi&longs;tunt ex infinitate materiæ, nec amplectuntur vniuer&longs;am &longs;peciem, quare dicuntur indiuidui veluti gignitur aër ex aqua quæ e&longs;t aër pote&longs;tate, remanet in aëre pelluciditas, accedit raritas, leuitas, calor, qu&ecedil; potentia latebant in ea materia: e&longs;t etiam ver­big. uòd extra &longs;uum locum detineatur, quod e&longs;t accidens. x his omnibus fit non modò aër, &longs;ed hic aër. H&ecedil;c igitur materia &longs;en&longs;ilis & indiuidua principium e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;ingularis, eaque cùm habeat adnexa illa accidentia perpetuò cum illis aufertur: & cùm ab&longs;tractio fiat ab hoc & illo albo & à c&ecedil;teris con&longs;imiliter, &longs;equitur vt etiam fiat ab&longs;tractio à materia &longs;en&longs;ili: itaque &longs;icuti ab­&longs;trahendo &longs;ingulare degenerat in vniuer&longs;um, & ab&longs;tractione facta non remanet h&ecedil;c &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ingularis, vt aliqui opinantur, &longs;ed vniuer&longs;alis duntaxat, & &longs;pecies aut genus: &longs;ic non remanet materia &longs;ingularis, & &longs;en&longs;ilis, &longs;ed efficitur vniuer&longs;alis & intelligenda. Cùmque. & h&ecedil;c accidentia, & materia &longs;en&longs;ilis vnum reap&longs;e exi&longs;tant, factum e&longs;t, vt Ari&longs;toteles in rerum naturalium definitio­nibus accidens po&longs;ui&longs;&longs;e videatur: c&ecedil;terùm iis &longs;ignificatur materia &longs;en&longs;ilis: nam &longs;icut &longs;e habent accidentia &longs;ingularia ad materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem indiuiduam; &longs;ic & facta per ab&longs;tractionem vniuer&longs;a­lia materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem vniuersè &longs;ignificant, quam mox e&longs;&longs;entiæ partem e&longs;&longs;e o&longs;tendemus; & pro­pter modum e&longs;&longs;endi quem ab&longs;trahendo mutat; ex eo <09> e&longs;t exi&longs;tentiæ principium, in principium e&longs;&longs;entiæ transformari. Hoc ip&longs;um o&longs;ten&longs;uri nunc exordiamur ab ea materia quæ tran&longs;mutatio­ni &longs;ubiicitur, & illam inueniamus quæ con&longs;tituit methodum naturalem. Neque verò dubitatur ma­teriam &longs;en&longs;ilem quæ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ formam excipit, e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ingularem: quod enim fit e&longs;t &longs;ingulare; & ge­neratur non homo, &longs;ed Callias & Plato. Veruntamen &longs;icuti mutationes &longs;unt &longs;ingularium; &longs;ic de iis nulla methodus e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t; quando e&longs;&longs;ent incerta & infinita. Quocirca vt &longs;cientiam genera­re po&longs;sint; &longs;ingularia ad vniuer&longs;ale quoddam referenda &longs;unt. At verò &longs;i vniuer&longs;ale colligitur ex &longs;ingularibus, imminebit periculum; ne &longs;eparatum à formis &longs;en&longs;ilibus generationi repugnet, & aliud repræ&longs;entet, atque ea &longs;ingularia quæ &longs;unt obnoxia mutationi: nanque homo &longs;eparatur ab indiuidui conditionibus. d autem quod e&longs;t huiu&longs;modi æternum e&longs;t, & cùm &longs;ignificet naturam communem, &longs;iquid illi tribuatur, conueniet communiter. Attamen generari proprium e&longs;t &longs;ingu­larium, quatenus &longs;ingularia &longs;unt. Verumenimuerò philo&longs;ophi nos per&longs;uadent vniuer&longs;ale duplex e&longs;&longs;e: alterum quidem quod repræ&longs;entat ip&longs;a &longs;ingularia, ita vt cum illud concipio, &longs;imul etiam men­te comprehendam &longs;ingula in illa natura communi conuenientia, quod &longs;anè ab&longs;trahitur ab indi­uidui conditionibus, ita tamen, vt etiam referat conditiones &longs;en&longs;iles: verùm quia non magis huius quàm illius indiuidui proprietates refert; proptereà dicatur vniuer&longs;ale. Alterum vniuer&longs;ale e&longs;t quod &longs;ignificat naturam ab indiuidui conditionibus omnino &longs;eparatam, vt &longs;i hominem ip&longs;um nul­la ratione materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis habita &longs;pectem. Illud primum compo&longs;itum e&longs;t ex forma & materia &longs;en­&longs;ili: quapropter in eo aliud e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e ab e&longs;&longs;entia, & hoc in multis e&longs;t, atque adeò in vniuer&longs;is &longs;ingula­ribus & quia non &longs;eparatur à materia &longs;en&longs;ili vniuer&longs;ale, phy&longs;icum non iniuria vocabitur: idque definitioni &longs;ubiicitur. Alterum e&longs;t in mente &longs;ola, idemque. cum e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ua, cuius cùm duæ &longs;int par­tes, forma nimirum & materia quæ mente concipitur, ita etiam è binis partibus, quæ binis illis re&longs;pondeant, proportione conflatur, genere videlicet vt materia, differentia verò vt forma. Neque enim fieri pote&longs;t, vt forma naturalis à materia, &longs;eu re &longs;eu cogitatione &longs;eiungatur. Quocirca reip&longs;a re&longs;idet in materia &longs;en&longs;ili, in mente verò alteram materiam a&longs;&longs;ecuta e&longs;t quæ pertinet ad mentem. po&longs;terius hoc genus vniuer&longs;alis, &longs;i logicum dicamus, non erimus forta&longs;&longs;e reprehendendi: quia lo/gos e&longs;&longs;entiam definitionemque. &longs;ignificat, & rationem quæ iam e&longs;t hoc vniuer&longs;ale à &longs;en&longs;ili mate­ria &longs;ecretum, & mentis officium per quod vniuer&longs;ale hoc &longs;eparatur à materia &longs;en&longs;ili indiuidua. æternum hoc, quippe extra omnem aleam temporis illud in &longs;eip&longs;o perpetuum, quia &longs;emper e&longs;t; &longs;impliciter verò nequaquam, quia con&longs;i&longs;tit partibus quæ mutantur a&longs;siduè, & partes offert quæ continuè variantur. Vtranque genus vniuer&longs;alis ab Ari&longs;totele mon&longs;tratum e&longs;t. Nam de primo illo quod phy&longs;icum dicimus. liquando verba faciens hæc &longs;cripta reliquit. a Homo & equus, & illiu&longs;modi c&ecedil;tera in ip&longs;is &longs;unt &longs;ingulis & docuit eius non e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed e&longs;&longs;e totum quod­dam quod ex vniuer&longs;ali materia formaque. con&longs;tet, &longs;icuti &longs;ingulare con&longs;tat ex materia formaque. &longs;in­gulari. Rur&longs;us de altero vniuer&longs;ali meminit quod rationem vocat, b vt circulus. roinde inquit, e&longs;&longs;e circuli & circulus, & e&longs;&longs;e animæ atque anima idem e&longs;t: atque iterum te&longs;tatus e&longs;t hominem dici bifariam, velut compo&longs;itum, quare non e&longs;t idem hominis e&longs;&longs;e, & hominem e&longs;&longs;e, vel vt ani­mam; itaque idem &longs;unt e&longs;&longs;e hominis atque hominem. Vbi igitur in methodo naturali ver&longs;emur, cùm vniuer&longs;alia non &longs;eparentur à materia &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed à &longs;ingulari tantùm, & &longs;upponant pro &longs;ingularibus: ideò fit, vt non &longs;it &longs;cientia &longs;ingularium: nec ob id quæ de vniuer&longs;ali pronuntian­tur, abhorreant à &longs;ingularibus. Nec quatenus naturæ quædam communes &longs;int; illis generari tri­buatur, &longs;ed vt referunt &longs;ingularia generatim, de quibus &longs;igillatim ea pr&ecedil;dicari po&longs;&longs;unt. Nec ea materia quæ &longs;ubiicitur methodo naturali, quia &longs;en&longs;ilis, &longs;it &longs;ingularis. Etenim &longs;icut e&longs;t &longs;ingularis homo, & communis: ita quoque e&longs;t materia &longs;en&longs;ilis &longs;ingularis, & materia communis quæ eadem quoque &longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t, h&ecedil;c methodi, illa mutationis. Neque &longs;anè &longs;en&longs;ilis, quia materia communis &longs;entia­tur, &longs;ed quia proximè referat eam quæ pellit &longs;en&longs;um, & vt &longs;&ecedil;pe diximus, quia pro illa &longs;upponit. qua ratione quoque res &longs;en&longs;iles &longs;cientiæ naturali &longs;ubiiciuntur, quas propter vim methodi nihilo­minus vniuer&longs;ales e&longs;&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: &longs;unt enim potentia &longs;en&longs;iles, quia cùm applicantur ad conditiones &longs;en&longs;iles & hæc accidentia, fiunt &longs;en&longs;iles, & &longs;unt in habitu, non actu &longs;en&longs;iles.

G

H

a 1 Phy&longs;. T. 29. 7. Met. T. 6.

A

a Land.

b 6. Met. T. 2.

B

c 7. Met.

C

d 10. Met. T. lt.

D

E

F

G

a 7. Met. T. 30. apud Alexand.

b 8. Met. T. 5.

H

Quod'nam genus materiæ &longs;umatur in definitionibus naturalibus. Cap. XIX.

MATERIAM &longs;en&longs;ilem, atque illam quidem &longs;ingularem didicimus e&longs;&longs;e &longs;tratum muta­tionis naturalis, vniuer&longs;alem verò in methodo naturali &longs;pectari. &longs;ed vtrum'ne omnis ma­teria &longs;en&longs;ilis, quam quam vniuer&longs;alis, in naturali methodo accipitur, & vtrum pars e&longs;t definitionis naturalis, an aliquam aliam vicem in naturali definitione gerit, & vtrùm aliud vltra &longs;en&longs;ilis ma­teriæ genus in naturali definitione accipiendum e&longs;t? Porrò materiam geminam ob&longs;eruamus apud Ari&longs;totelem qu&ecedil; quoquo pacto licet di&longs;similiter, definitionem re&longs;piciat: alteram quidem &longs;en&longs;ilem, atque alteram mente comprehendendam, & eiu&longs;modi, vt &longs;en&longs;um pro &longs;e non excitet. Hæc quidem quæ mente comprehendi pote&longs;t, variis modis accipitur. &longs;iquidem & materia illa quæ &longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t, vbi &longs;euocetur à qualitatibus quæ &longs;en&longs;um mouent, non amplius &longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t, &longs;ed mente duntaxat concipitur. a etiam continuum quod e&longs;t materia mathematicorum, vi no&longs;træ mentis à &longs;en&longs;ilibus affectionibus &longs;egregatum e&longs;t materia quæ cadit in mentem non &longs;en&longs;ilis. Ita & genus in definitione e&longs;t materia quam mens &longs;ola attingit. Conuincunt &longs;anè rationes, & loca Ari&longs;totelis materiam &longs;en&longs;i­lem complere definitiones naturales. uandò res &longs;en&longs;iles à naturali philo&longs;opho tractantur: hæ verò tali materia con&longs;i&longs;tunt, nec ab ea, quà &longs;en&longs;iles & naturales, ne cogitatione quidem, ne dum re diuelli queunt: aliter in aliud genus tran&longs;irent, vt mathematicum, aut diuinum; eam nos docui­mus e&longs;&longs;e vniuer&longs;alem. Nunc etiam materia &longs;en&longs;ilis qu&ecedil; vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;t, ita di&longs;tribuitur ab Ari&longs;to­tele, b in eam quæ toto po&longs;terior e&longs;t, atque illam quæ toto prior. am &longs;anè vocante toto po&longs;te­riorem quæ à toto &longs;ecreta non &longs;eruatur, &longs;ed &longs;ine ip&longs;a compo&longs;itum exi&longs;tere pote&longs;t, vt digitus, aut manus, c quæ tum verè &longs;unt, cum in compo&longs;ito &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tunt, ab eo remota &longs;olùm nomen ad &longs;um­mum &longs;eruant, naturam ami&longs;erunt. d At cor, &longs;eu cerebrum contrà &longs;e habent. tenim ip&longs;a, vt in pri­ma fœtus conformatione con&longs;tat, &longs;ine reliquis partibus viuunt; at reliqua &longs;ine talium partium ge­nere nequaquam. dcirco toto hæc priora non &longs;ine optima ronne cen&longs;entur. Ita in naui &longs;unt qu&ecedil;dam partes &longs;en&longs;iles, vt a&longs;&longs;eres, & tigna: &longs;unt ent prora, puppis, & carina. &longs;ine illis totum con&longs;i&longs;tit, vt quan­uis etiam iugiter commutentur, permaneat tamen nauis, at &longs;i proram puppim carinamúe, aut au­feras, aut immutes, &longs;eu nauem è medio &longs;u&longs;tuleris, &longs;eu &longs;peciem euariaueris. Cùm hæc ita &longs;int, cer­tè partes illæ quas toto po&longs;teriores e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;uimus, à definitione arcebuntur. xplicat enim rei principia definitio, po&longs;teriora relinquit ponens illa &longs;olùm ob oculos ea ratione, quia po&longs;terio­rum cau&longs;&longs;as euoluit. Re&longs;tat igitur, vt &longs;i &longs;en&longs;ilis materia collocanda &longs;it in definitione, ea &longs;it toto prior, & ab hac, dum &longs;ingularis e&longs;t, totum &longs;i fuerit &longs;ingulare, nullo pacto &longs;eparatur, & paritatione, &longs;i fuerit vniuer&longs;ale, non di&longs;iungitur ab ea, quatenus vniuersè comprehenditur. Et quoniam communis e&longs;t, & vniuer&longs;alis optimè cum definitione congruit. tenim materia per &longs;e ignota e&longs;t, cùm &longs;en&longs;ilis exi&longs;tit. ta enim incerta & infinita e&longs;t, & obnoxia mutationi; at cùm &longs;it intelligenda per &longs;e note­&longs;cit, definitio verò ex per &longs;e notis con&longs;tituatur oportet; cùm verò vniuersè accipitur, intelligi pont, vt enim verbis Ari&longs;totelis vtar. e Si ab actu rece&longs;&longs;erint (&longs;unt enim actu in &longs;ingularibus) non &longs;anè patet (&longs;en&longs;ui) &longs;int nec'ne. Sed vniuer&longs;ali ratione &longs;emper dicuntur, ac cogno&longs;cuntur. Qua­propter etiam &longs;iquis ad materias intelligendas hoc materi&ecedil; genus adiiciat, non abutetur aucto­ritate Ari&longs;totelis. Quod verò pertinet ad eam quæ mente comprehendi pote&longs;t, mente quidem ma­teria prima concipitur, cùm &longs;en&longs;us à &longs;ingulari pul&longs;etur, & ab ea quæ à qualitate &longs;en&longs;ili occupatur, à qua materia prima &longs;i non re, &longs;altem cogitatione di&longs;iungitur. Verùm quia &longs;ola ip&longs;a non planè &longs;e­cundùm rem, &longs;ed &longs;ecundùm ronnem prior e&longs;t, & in &longs;ingularibus quæ iam certis potentiis præfinita &longs;unt, pror&longs;us exi&longs;tit. &longs;t enim per &longs;e extenta nec vniuer&longs;itatis capax, cùm &longs;it hoc formæ &longs;olius, quòd in definitione contineatur, vt rei principium non opinor, &longs;ed vt ratione prius, & ita no­tius, quia per analogiam in aliis eodem modo &longs;e habere notuerit. Secunda illa Mathematicorum <04>pria e&longs;t, ideò nihil ad methodum &longs;eu definitionem naturalem. Tertia quæ per genus expri­mitur, nonmodò naturalis e&longs;t <04>pria, &longs;ed generatim pertinet ad omneis methodos atque &longs;cientias quæ definitione vtuntur. Nam quæcunque definitio propriè &longs;tatuitur, ea planè con&longs;tat ex gene­re & differentiis: genus in definitione materiæ locum &longs;ibi vendicat; differentia formæ. Verum­eninuerò genus materiæ locum in definitione obtinere non vno modo verum e&longs;&longs;e arbitror. Etenim video genus appellari materiam non &longs;emper ex eo, quòd denotet id quod e&longs;t in natura, &longs;icut materia, &longs;ed notionem communem, &longs;eu formam vniuer&longs;alem, quæ alia notione, &longs;eu forma mi­nus communi determinari pote&longs;t, vt cùm dicimus animal bipes. îc enim notio animalis quæ communis e&longs;t, à bipedis notione coërcetur, & tamen animalis nomine forma &longs;ignificatur, animus nimirùm, à bipede verò materia &longs;en&longs;ilis. Quocirca materiam non re, &longs;ed cogitatione duntaxat ge­nus habendum e&longs;&longs;e puto. Sed enim materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem, quam vniuer&longs;alem accepimus, & toto priorem, genere explicari po&longs;&longs;e credo, vt cùm corpus in definitione pro genere &longs;umitur. Itaque ma­teria &longs;en&longs;ilis illa quam in naturali definitione &longs;umendam e&longs;&longs;e monui, modò genere. liàs diffe­rentia poterit explicari; ex hoc ordine &longs;unt illa bipes, aquatile, volatile & huiu&longs;modi. Proinde &longs;peciatim Philo&longs;ophus 1. de partib. nimal: nec non 4. c. 12. 13. volatile dixit e&longs;&longs;e de e&longs;sentia auis, & to\ ns iko\n kata\ to\n th_s ou)si/as lo/gon, quæ tamet&longs;i in metaphy&longs;ica definitione collocantur (&longs;iquidem genus & differentia diffinitionem compleant in oim philo&longs;ophia) tamen in naturali me­thodo cum habitudine ad materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem concipiuntur; in c&ecedil;teris verò ab eiu&longs;modi materiæ notione &longs;egregantur. Etenim veri&longs;imile e&longs;t, vt quemadmodum homo non con&longs;ideratur à naturali philo&longs;opho &longs;ine materia &longs;en&longs;ili, quia &longs;upponitur pro &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ili, &longs;iue, vt rectius loquar, cir­culus, quia &longs;upponitur pro figura qu&ecedil; &longs;it in materia &longs;en&longs;ili, à Mathematico verò, vt &longs;ine ip&longs;a: &longs;ic ea quæ continentur in definitione circuli qui à naturali philo&longs;opho &longs;pectatur, cum habitudine ad &longs;en&longs;ilem materiam &longs;umuntur, & contrà quæ in circuli mathematici definitione collocantur, à ma­teria &longs;en&longs;ili mentis ope &longs;educuntur. Peto verò exempla libenter à mathematico, cùm verear rerum ip&longs;arum definitiones ad&longs;cribere &longs;peciatim primo philo&longs;opho; quippe qui putem eum e&longs;&longs;e philo&longs;o­phum quendam vniuer&longs;alem, neque formarum particularium notitiam, ni&longs;i generatim aggrredi; quoad doceat ex quib. xi&longs;tit definitio, quorum &longs;it, & cùm varia &longs;int rerum genera, qui definitionis modus cuique competat. &longs;eor&longs;um verò &longs;pectare res à materia &longs;uaptè natura &longs;ecretas, &longs;eu ex priuatione di&longs;criminis, &longs;iue ex e&longs;sentia tales fuerint quæ definitione non euoluuntur, cùm &longs;int &longs;implices & actus. Proinde non verè &longs;cientia, &longs;ed &longs;apientia perhibetur. Etenim &longs;i id verè pronunciatur prìmum philo­&longs;ophum &longs;eparate formas à materia, non pote&longs;t ip&longs;e formas naturales &longs;pectare: &longs;unt enim pror&longs;us in­&longs;eparabiles à materia; ab&longs;urda verò e&longs;t illa mens quæ &longs;eparare conatur ea quæ &longs;eparari non po&longs;­&longs;unt, & ni&longs;i &longs;epararet, efficeretur protinus &longs;pecialis, quippe Phy&longs;ica. Sic fit vt ei&longs;dem generib. c differentiis vtrunque diffinitionis genus ab&longs;oluatur, nec quicquae pr&ecedil;ter genus ac differentias in quaque perfecta definitione flagitetur: quia &longs;cilicet materia &longs;en&longs;ilis ex genere, aut differentia non vtentib. ab&longs;tractione per&longs;picua fiat, & ab&longs;tractione facta im definitione mathematica mentis ope relinquatur.

A

a 7. Met. T. 5.

c 7. Met.

c 7. Met. T. 30.

d 1. de ort.

B

e 7. Met.

C

D

E

F

Compleat'ne materia &longs;en&longs;ilis definitionem naturalem, vt pars e&longs;&longs;entiæ, an non. Cap. XX.

CVM demon&longs;tratum &longs;it quid & quotuplex &longs;it materia &longs;en&longs;ilis, & explicatum quod'nam eius materiæ genus accipiatur in methodo & definitione naturali, &longs;equitur vt in&longs;tituto no­&longs;tro in&longs;i&longs;tentes, doceamus etiam, an'ne id materiæ genus &longs;it pars e&longs;&longs;entiæ naturalis. Nam magna e&longs;t lis inter Latin&ecedil; philo&longs;ophi&ecedil; patronos, & veteres, & recentes, & vndique &longs;uccurrit quod in vtranque partem problematis afferri po&longs;sit. Nam tamet&longs;i oens habent pro comperto materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem à philo&longs;opho naturali definiente non e&longs;&longs;e omittendam, di&longs;&longs;erunt tamen, an vt formæ vehiculum ac­cipiatur in definitionibus, an vt e&longs;&longs;entiæ pars. Quæ&longs;tio non facilè extricari pote&longs;t, nec &longs;ubuenit, quod demon&longs;tratiuè ad alterutram partem problematis decernatur, & vtriu&longs;que patronorum eorun­demque, auctorittias maxim&ecedil; copia &longs;uppeditat. Quamobrem nos quid probabilius nobis vi&longs;urum &longs;it defendemus, & in aliis illa notabimus quæ quoquomodo à decretis no&longs;tris abhorrentia cen­&longs;eri po&longs;sint. Con&longs;tans atque perpetuum Ari&longs;totelis te&longs;timonium nobis occurrit. Naturales defini­tiones non e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ine motu tradendas, a hoc e&longs;t, &longs;ine materia &longs;en&longs;ili. Tùm etiam formas naturaleis à tali materia nunquàm po&longs;&longs;e diuelli, b atque illi grauiter accu&longs;ati qui formas naturaleis à materia &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;egregare &longs;tuderent. Necnon definitiones naturales, vbi &longs;ine materia tradantur e&longs;&longs;e diale­cticas, & vanas, &longs;eu communes ob eam cau&longs;&longs;am quæ inferius exponetur. Et certè &longs;i rerum natura definitione e&longs;t exponenda, ea verò e&longs;t in materia, materia quoque in illarum definitione &longs;umenda e&longs; &longs;e videbitur. Et quod diceret aduer&longs;arius, dans quidem eam nece&longs;&longs;ariò &longs;umendam e&longs;&longs;e in definitione naturali, non tamen vt e&longs;sentiæ partem & eius ronnis qua quid e&longs;t explicatur, &longs;ed quia non &longs;ine ip&longs;a forma exi&longs;tit. rgumentabor ego eo con&longs;tituto. Quicquid non e&longs;t de ratione formali rei cuiu&longs;piam ab ea po&longs;&longs;e abrahi, vel re, vel cogitatione: e&longs;t enim ratio formalis prima rei notio: quicquid extra hanc e&longs;t iam non primum, &longs;ed po&longs;terius & qua&longs;i externum e&longs;t. Ergo ab illo pont ab&longs;tractio fieri. t pri­uatio luminis in Luna e&longs;t rom formalis eclyp&longs;eos: ideò cùm primò concipitur eclyp&longs;is. a priuatio concipitur, ita vt etiam &longs;i &longs;it ex interuentu terræ, nec &longs;ine ip&longs;o exi&longs;tat, nihilominus ab eo &longs;eparari po&longs;­&longs;it: ei rei &longs;ignum quia varij varias eius euenti cau&longs;&longs;as afferebant. Ergo ab oppo&longs;ito. Quod neque re, neque cogitatione &longs;eparatur, ide&longs;t de illius ronne formali. Sed talis e&longs;t materia &longs;en&longs;ilis ex eo genere ad formam naturalem. Ergo talis materies e&longs;t de ronne formali, & prima notione form&ecedil; naturalis. A&longs;sumptio con&longs;tat ex multis locis in vtraque philo&longs;ophia: etenim inter &longs;e re&longs;piciunt, & ab&longs;urda mens quæ diuellere conatur à materia formam. E&longs;t igitur materia de ronne formali naturalium formarum. Quapropter ex regula Pr&ecedil;d. Quicquid pr&ecedil;dicatur de pr&ecedil;dicato in quid e&longs;t, ent pr&ecedil;dicatur in quid e&longs;t de &longs;ubiecto. Sed materia pr&ecedil;dicatur in quid e&longs;t de forma; forma aunt de compo&longs;ito. ergo & ma­teria de compo&longs;ito. Deinde materia a&longs;signatur phy&longs;icè ad explicationem ip&longs;ius quid e&longs;t, veluti cùm veteres philo&longs;ophi definiebant per materiam &longs;olam. Accedit eòdem <09> tum &longs;cire vnum quodque arbitramur, quando nouimus ex quibus & quot principiis con&longs;tat, &longs;ed con&longs;tat ex materia & for­ma: ergo debemus &longs;cire per materiam & formam. At verò cùm duplex cognitio &longs;it quid e&longs;t, & quale e&longs;t; quæro quæ'nam erit cognitio per materiam, neque &longs;anè quale e&longs;t, e&longs;t enim maximè &longs;ub&longs;tantia & quid igitur. Extatent dictum Philo&longs;ophi, c rationem .&longs;. compo&longs;iti di&longs;&longs;olui in ronnes componen­tium. rom aunt e&longs;t oratio explicans quid e&longs;t. Etiam multò planius elocutus e&longs;t Ari&longs;t. n calce 4. Meteor. dum &longs;ic inquit. “Sic enim &longs;cimus vnumquodque cur, & quid e&longs;t, &longs;i materiam, vel ronnem habeamus: maximè verò cum ambo [vtra&longs;q. au&longs;&longs;as] ortus & interitus, & vnde principium mot^{9}. Demum definitio p for­mam &longs;olam in phy&longs;icis e&longs;t vana & imperfecta.” Nunc &longs;i in definitione qu&ecedil;ritur e&longs;sentia &longs;ola, & h&ecedil;c pendet ex &longs;ola forma. ur ergo vana definitio per &longs;olam formam? Fortè dices eam e&longs;&longs;e definitionem logicam, non naturalem; meo quidem iudicio non potes, quòd ea complet definitionem naturalem, & fa­cit vt quæ c&ecedil;teroqui dialectica fuerat, euadat naturalis. Itaque &longs;i propter quod vnumquodque. ta­le e&longs;t, & illud magis tale, cùm definitio per formam fiat naturalis acce&longs;sione materiæ, ergo & de­finitio per materiam magis erit naturalis. Neque id ob&longs;tat quòd forma &longs;it magis natura quàm materia: e&longs;t enim magis natura, quoad pertinet ad e&longs;&longs;entiam, non autem cau&longs;&longs;a methodi; defini­tio per materiam contrà methodi magis e&longs;t, licet &longs;it e&longs;&longs;entiæ minus. Dices'ne di&longs;&longs;olui compo&longs;itum in rationem materiæ, non quia &longs;it pars e&longs;&longs;entiæ, &longs;ed quia vehiculum &longs;it, & ad id nece&longs;&longs;arium, vt forma exi&longs;tat? Non licet, opinor; neque enim notat antiquos Ari&longs;toteles, quòd per materiam de­finirent, quia pars e&longs;&longs;entiæ non e&longs;&longs;et, &longs;ed vehiculum; verùm quòd in illa &longs;ola conquie&longs;cerent. Ne­que item verò a&longs;&longs;eritur materiam adiuuare notitiam formæ, quia per ip&longs;am &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tit: Nanque omnino &longs;equeretur prius in notitia di&longs;tincta ex po&longs;teriore pendere; proptereà quòd pertinet hoc ad u(\pazcin, non ad ou)sian & to) ti\ e)si\, &longs;ed u(\pazcis e&longs;t &longs;ingularis caduca, & po&longs;terior; e&longs;&longs;entia vniuer&longs;alis æterna & prior. Itaque potius u(\pazcis ex e&longs;&longs;entia cogno&longs;cetur, quàm e&longs;&longs;entia ex u(\pazcew)s. Nam c&ecedil;teroquin quæ D. homas, & &longs;ectatores Scoti in medium attulerunt licet apud ip&longs;os valeant admodum, apud nos locum habere non po&longs;&longs;unt. Nimirum, &longs;i materia &longs;o­lùm vehiculi vicem in definitione &longs;ubiret, etiam &longs;ub&longs;tantiam iri definitum ex additamento quen­admodum accidens. Etenim &longs;icuti &longs;ubiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis, velut eius vehicu­lum; non quia &longs;it pars quiditatis accidentis, vt in &longs;imitate na&longs;us; &longs;ed quia &longs;it naturale vehiculum &longs;imitatis (e&longs;t enim &longs;imitas accidens, ideoque. &longs;implex quædam natura) &longs;ic de &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ definitione dicendum foret. Deinde quia &longs;equeretur, vt &longs;ola forma e&longs;&longs;et tota, & completa quiditas, & &longs;pecies: ex quo efficeretur vt anima hominis &longs;eparata e&longs;&longs;et totus homo. Nec forma cùm materia faceret vnum per &longs;e, quia fit vnum per &longs;e ex imperfectis &longs;olum, non autem ex aliquo perfecto, nunc for­ma perfectum quid e&longs;&longs;et. Quin etiam nullum foret di&longs;crimen inter res materia concretas, & à materia &longs;eparatas: in vtri&longs;que enim &longs;ola forma e&longs;&longs;et vniuer&longs;a quiditas. Nanque etiam &longs;ubiectum. complet quid e&longs;t accidentis. Quamobrem &longs;i ita &longs;e haberet materia ad formam, vt &longs;ubiectum ad accidens; iam per&longs;picuum foret, quid de hoc problemate decernendum e&longs;&longs;et; cuius oppo&longs;itum cùm &longs;umat D. homas, id apud nos verum e&longs;&longs;e nullo modo pote&longs;t. Neque item concedimus ac­cidens e&longs;&longs;e naturam &longs;implicem, quippe qu&ecedil; &longs;it in alio, à quo item pendet in eo, quòd &longs;it. Quocirca etiam ab Ari&longs;totele exclu&longs;um e&longs;t accidens ab aliis, a quorum e&longs;&longs;e & e&longs;&longs;entia idem &longs;unt, id quod &longs;implicibus euenire &longs;olet. Neque item valet apud nos. Si forma e&longs;&longs;et tota rei quiditas, animam hominis &longs;eparatam fore vniuer&longs;um hominem: quandoquidem non pugnant hæc &longs;ecum: formam, e&longs;&longs;e totam hominis quiditatem, & eam non e&longs;&longs;e hominem totum, quia totus homo vltra quidita­tem habet quoque materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem, & toto po&longs;teriorem. Proptereà dictum &longs;&ecedil;pè e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;to­tele rationem e&longs;&longs;e explicationem formæ non compo&longs;iti: b nec compo&longs;ita definitione explicari propter acce&longs;sionem materiæ: & id nece&longs;&longs;ariò con&longs;equi, &longs;i definitione explicaretur compo&longs;itum, vt bis idem repeteretur, non &longs;ecus atque &longs;iquis na&longs;um &longs;imum definite vellet; etenim &longs;imum per na&longs;um definiendum e&longs;t, quare &longs;i na&longs;um &longs;imum definire velis, & na&longs;um in eius definitione &longs;ume­re cogeris. Neque verò ego id dico, quin compo&longs;itum &longs;it id cuius definitio quæritur & quid e&longs;t: &longs;ed quòd non e&longs;t id quod definitione exponitur; illius quidem e&longs;t quid e&longs;t & definitio; &longs;ed ip&longs;um non e&longs;t: itaque definitur quòd eius e&longs;&longs;entia quæritur; non definitur autem, quia partes eius non omnes explicantur definitione. Adde etiam; quia non videtur item ab&longs;urdum Ari&longs;toteli totam quiditatem e&longs;&longs;e totum hominem qui mente comprehendendus e&longs;t: idem quoque te&longs;tabatur Auer­roës. Neque enim quiditas e&longs;t &longs;ine mente: ideò & id explicat primò quod e&longs;t in mente; & quoniam homo ille qui e&longs;t in mente, compo&longs;itus e&longs;t ex materia & forma: non verebor etiam dicere totam formam ex ei&longs;dem partibus e&longs;&longs;e compo&longs;itam: nam materia qu&ecedil; mente concipitur & e&longs;t toto prior, e&longs;t pars formæ; & vt Ari&longs;totelico verbo vtar; eius formæ, quæ e&longs;t quiditas. me/ zws me/n o(_un e)/si\, xai\ tou_ ei_dous. “Pars igitur e&longs;t formæ; nempe ea materia &longs;ine qua forma cogitari non pote&longs;t”, & cùm q_dos & forma &longs;it vox ambigua qua notatur &longs;pecies, & qualitas, vnde e&longs;&longs;entia deriuatur; ne labamur in hoc; & &longs;peciei partem &longs;u&longs;picemur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olum materiam; &longs;eip&longs;um explicat Ari&longs;toteles dicens, “q)_do/s de\ le\go to\ ti/ lw(_ q(_nal”. ide&longs;t formam c dico quod quid erat e&longs;&longs;e. Nam quamuis po&longs;tea T. 37. videatur monui&longs;&longs;e carnes & o&longs;&longs;a non e&longs;&longs;e formæ partes, &longs;ed materiam; tamet&longs;i men­te &longs;euocari nequeat ab illis forma, quòd &longs;ine illis non exi&longs;tit; memineris iam Ari&longs;totelem di&longs;tin­xi&longs;&longs;e partes in eas quæ &longs;unt priores & po&longs;teriores toto, atque a&longs;&longs;euera&longs;&longs;e eas quæ &longs;unt toto prio­res, e&longs;&longs;e partem definitionis, form&ecedil; ac quiditatis; &longs;ed enim carnes & o&longs;&longs;a huiu&longs;modi non e&longs;&longs;e, & ita &longs;e habere ad formam vt æs ad circulum, vt &longs;i omnes circuli ænei forent: nihilo enim magis e&longs;­&longs;et e&longs;&longs;entiæ pars: at non ita de corde iudicandum e&longs;t. Verùm quòd vtraque &longs;unt in mente, mate­ria, non quidem &longs;en&longs;ilis, &longs;ed mente comprehendenda e&longs;t in eo quod definitur, & definitione. Qua­propter neque etiam id verendum e&longs;t, ne quamuis vniuer&longs;a quiditas totam rei e&longs;&longs;entiam explicet; totum definitum exponat: e&longs;t enim vt totum exponit, quippe, id quod &longs;ola mente comprehenditur, & e&longs;t vt partem &longs;olam exprimit, vtpotè, &longs;i referatur ad id quod ex materia &longs;en&longs;ili con&longs;tituitur. nam de hoc materiæ genere verba facere Ari&longs;totelem id &longs;ignificat, quòd illud arcet, vt indefinitum, &longs;ed illa materia, quæ facta e&longs;t intelligenda, & prior e&longs;t toto, certa e&longs;t & præfinita, perpetuoque. per­manet in re. Et id etiam confirmant verba Philo&longs;ophi T. 39. o&longs;tendentis aliqua in &longs;ua quiditate continere materiam. Neque verò intelligendam &longs;olam, quæ genere exprimi &longs;olet; quandò non aliqua definitio talem materiam contineret, &longs;ed omnes æqualiter; nec magis eiu&longs;modi definitio naturalis e&longs;&longs;et quàm mathematica, vel metaphy&longs;ica, cùm omnes in &longs;uis definitionibus tale mate­riæ genus v&longs;urpent. Con&longs;imilique. modo cùm opponitur, formam non coituram cum materia pro­pter ab&longs;olutam formæ perfectionem, non me valde mouet; quia &longs;ua perfectione contenta e&longs;t for­ma quæ in coniunctione materiæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t, aliter forma non e&longs;&longs;et: at illa perfectio repugnat con­iunctioni quæ collocatur in ea &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ &longs;eparari pote&longs;t, & con&longs;i&longs;tere per &longs;eip&longs;a, vt compo­&longs;itum, atque illud quidem quod e&longs;t &longs;pecies extrema, & atomos, & ea quæ pror&longs;us ab omni mate­riæ genere &longs;ecernuntur, & e&longs;t, vt vno verbo dicam, eius perfectio vt vniuer&longs;itatis non exten&longs;iua. hæc e&longs;t in compo&longs;ito, & repudiat coniunctionem, illa non item. Et fal&longs;um illud; nullum fore di­&longs;crimen inter formas quæ abhorrent à materia, ac materia concretas; cùm materia concretæ &longs;olum à materia &longs;en&longs;ili mente &longs;eparentur, non à materia &longs;impliciter, & &longs;uaptè natura materiam perpetuò re&longs;piciant; quæ verò &longs;unt à materia di&longs;iunctæ nullam habent affinitatem cum materia. Idcircò in eorum &longs;ententiam venio qui &longs;tatuunt materiam in definitione naturali, velut e&longs;&longs;entiæ partem fore &longs;umendam. Quanquàm non ita arbitror omne materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis vniuer&longs;alis genus in defini­tione v&longs;urpandum, vt credidit D. homas; a &longs;ed eius tantùm materi&ecedil; &longs;en&longs;ilis, quæ compo&longs;ito prior e&longs;&longs;et. bi relinquatur hoc materiæ genus in methodo naturali, definitionem e&longs;&longs;e imperfectam, aut non naturalem; quia totum nobis non referat quod e&longs;t definitione euoluendum; & nece&longs;&longs;ariam partem rei relinquat; e&longs;t enim tale formæ genus quod addicitur certæ materiæ, non vt mathema­tica. Quamobrem huc ego rem vniuer&longs;am deducerem. Definitionem &longs;impliciter e&longs;&longs;e explicatio­nem formæ, & e&longs;&longs;entiam &longs;impliciter à forma deriuari. Quia verò duplex e&longs;t ratio &longs;pectandi e&longs;&longs;en­tias; & e&longs;&longs;entiæ rerum non vniu&longs;modi; cùm aliæ pendeant ex materia &longs;en&longs;ili, nonnullæ &longs;int illius expertes, an re, an cogitatione &longs;ola; earum qu&ecedil; pendent ex materia, nec ab ip&longs;a ne cogitatione qui­dem auelluntur; &longs;icuti pendent in eo quòd &longs;unt à materia, explicationem quoque &longs;ine materia tradi non po&longs;&longs;e, & eam non e&longs;&longs;e definitionem &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed definitionem naturalem rei quate­nus e&longs;t naturalis, eamque. in genere vel differentia contineri: & quidem in methodo naturali, tan­quam partem e&longs;&longs;entiæ naturalis; in c&ecedil;teris methodis quæ materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem non &longs;pectant; ex ne­ce&longs;sitate con&longs;ecutionis &longs;olum: c&ecedil;terùm &longs;ine materia &longs;en&longs;ili definitionem quidem e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;e, atque illam in &longs;uo genere ab&longs;olutam, vt in prima philo&longs;ophia, & mathematicis; veruntamen non natu­ralem: nam con&longs;ideratio materiæ naturalis e&longs;t propria: & hoc nomine philo&longs;ophus naturalis à c&ecedil;teris &longs;eparatur; ex eo enim quòd applicat c&ecedil;teras cau&longs;&longs;as ad materiam, naturalis appellatur: nec &longs;anè quòd &longs;olam materiam con&longs;ideret; quòd e&longs;&longs;et hæc imperfecta con&longs;ideratio; &longs;ed quia cum reli­quis cau&longs;sis &longs;peculetur materiam. Ari&longs;totelem verò puto in libris prim&ecedil; philo&longs;ophiæ &longs;æpè formam & e&longs;&longs;entiam accepi&longs;&longs;e pro eodem, & formæ &longs;olius in hoc officio memini&longs;&longs;e, neglexi&longs;&longs;e materiam non vna de cau&longs;&longs;a. Cùm enim &longs;it &longs;peculator communis & vniuer&longs;alis & generalem per&longs;onam &longs;u­&longs;tineat, neque addictam cuipiam con&longs;iderationi &longs;peciali, cuiu&longs;modi in phy&longs;icis, aut mathematicis habetur, ea debet tradere qu&ecedil; generalia &longs;unt: generale verò cuique &longs;peculatori e&longs;t definire per for­mam: materiam nonnulli negligunt; idcirco definitiones & quid e&longs;t ex &longs;ola forma a&longs;signat. Aut &longs;i tibi &longs;u&longs;pecta e&longs;t hæc &longs;olutio, quia nimirum logicus, etiam &longs;it artifex, eodem planè modo commu­nis, & tamen dicitur per omne cau&longs;&longs;arum genus definire; accipito ip&longs;um con&longs;iderare e&longs;&longs;entiam vt totum &longs;ecundum formam, non &longs;ecundum materiam & extentum in &longs;uis partibus: e&longs;t enim non in ip&longs;is partibus po&longs;ita e&longs;&longs;entiæ ratio, &longs;ed in ip&longs;a vniuer&longs;itate. & ita planè &longs;e habet in e&longs;&longs;entia, velut in numeris; etenim &longs;i octo &longs;ump&longs;eris & cùm quatuor contuleris exi&longs;tit ratio dupli; atque ita hæc ratio in octo con&longs;i&longs;tit, vt &longs;i vnum demas; continuò ratio commutetur, & vbi erat dupli efficiatur &longs;uperpartiens quartas: proinde e&longs;&longs;entiæ po&longs;itæ &longs;unt in certa ratione. Aut etiam quòd non omittat materiam, &longs;ed tribuat formæ quid e&longs;t, cùm forma ab&longs;oluat quiditatem, & &longs;it poti&longs;sima pars per quam res e&longs;t, & ibi &longs;pectans proprietates entis, quatenus e&longs;t, tribuat vniuer&longs;am e&longs;&longs;entiam formæ. & fortè ob omnes ha&longs;ce cau&longs;&longs;as ita factitarit. Nec quamuis aliæ methodi materiam omittant; id­circo degenerant in dialecticen; nec earum definitiones communes van&ecedil;que. &longs;unt, quemadmodum &longs;i in methodo naturali traderentur: optimè enim explent &longs;uum munus, quòd materiæ non egeant; &longs;ed in naturali planè non præ&longs;tarent id quod ip&longs;a de&longs;iderat. Proinde quamuis ad rem ip&longs;am qu&ecedil; &longs;æpè e&longs;t in materia, forta&longs;&longs;e parum; at &longs;atis certè ad methodum. & hoc videtur fui&longs;&longs;e indicium. Philo&longs;ophi 1. de Anim. Quanquàm alicui mirabile videri potuit: cur eam definitionem quæ ma­teria &longs;ola con&longs;i&longs;teret; naturalem &longs;anè &longs;tatueret; &longs;ed imperfectam; & quæ per formam dialecti­cam; quandò & naturalis &longs;pectat formam; multoque magis habet eius rationem, quàm materiæ. Potuit ergo dici eam quidem e&longs;&longs;e naturalem, &longs;ed imperfectam, &longs;icuti dictum e&longs;t de ea quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in &longs;ola materia. & dialecticus oem cau&longs;&longs;æ genus tractare pont: nihil enim e&longs;t q<26> ip&longs;e non attingere queat; & apud illum non minus ritè di&longs;putatum fuerit de definitione, &longs;i interroget, aut re&longs;pondeat an accen&longs;io &longs;an­guinis &longs;it ir&ecedil; definitio, qu&ecedil; continet materiam; quam &longs;i qu&ecedil;ratur &longs;it'ne eius definitio appetitus vltionis qu&ecedil; con&longs;tat ex forma. Addo etiam, cum dialecticus accipiat oens cau&longs;&longs;as; cur ent ea qu&ecedil; con&longs;tat ex forma & mate­ria, ponitur phy&longs;ica, non dialectica? nam qu&ecedil; con&longs;iderat vtra&longs;que cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;eor&longs;um; quid ab&longs;urdi e&longs;t, &longs;i &longs;pe­ctet item vtra&longs;que coniunctim? Quantum pertinet ad primas illas obiectiones, fortè dici po&longs;&longs;et, Ari&longs;t. bi non di&longs;tinguere definitiones ex ronne formali &longs;cientiarum, &longs;ed è &longs;copo, hoc e&longs;t ex eo q<26> poti&longs;simè re­&longs;picitur in methodo. Quòd igitur in dialectica illa definitio qu&ecedil; per formam traditur, e&longs;t perfecta; in phy&longs;icis imperfecta, & a&longs;&longs;umptione materi&ecedil; &longs;upplenda; &longs;ic definitio per formam dialectico tribuit, ne­que tollit hoc, quin ent dialecticus in &longs;uis di&longs;putationib. oem aliud cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; genus v&longs;urpet: neque item ex hoc vetabitur, quominus philo&longs;ophus naturalis ent definiat per formam, &longs;ed illud tantummodo con&longs;tituetur eam definitionem e&longs;&longs;e imperfectam. e&longs;t verò perfecta definitio per &longs;olam formam in dialectica, <09> abundè pn&longs;tat idq<26> à dialectico de&longs;ideratur: vult enim no&longs;&longs;e quid e&longs;t, q<26> ip&longs;e ab omni cau&longs;&longs;arum genere &longs;eor&longs;um ducit. C&ecedil;terum opponam & eodem modo definitionem ex materia apud dialecticum e&longs;&longs;e perfectam; ergo & h&ecedil;c erat dialectico tribuenda, velut ea qu&ecedil; ex forma; tantoque. magis, quantò ent forma &longs;pectatur magis à natu­rali. Po&longs;&longs;es ad h&ecedil;c dicere non &longs;equi id q<26> opponitur, cum materia &longs;ola determinetur phy&longs;ica methodus: itaque & &longs;i quoad cognitionem forma flagitatur, at hoc noine quo naturalis methodus con&longs;tituitur, maius, e&longs;t officium materi&ecedil; quam formæ; quapropter definitio ex materia naturali committitur, non dialectico. &longs;ic efficietur, vt ab vtroque tractetur, & dicatur e&longs;&longs;e propria naturalis. Si igitur tibi placet Ari&longs;t. rius ob&longs;erua&longs;&longs;e illa quæ &longs;unt &longs;copi; pò&longs;t ea quae &longs;unt ex ronne formali methodi, neque tibi incon&longs;tantia videatur, vt mihi, potes hoc modo defendere Ari&longs;t. Illud vnum re&longs;tabit explicandum, cur definitio per formam conis & vana reputetur. Re&longs;pondebat Zimara a quia con&longs;iderarentur cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; rerum ab&longs;tractè; neque applicarentur ad effectus. At mihi qu&ecedil;rendum &longs;uccurrit, cur dialectic&ecedil; vocentur; qua&longs;i verò dialecticus & de cau&longs;&longs;a & de­finitione, & &longs;ecundum formam, & &longs;ecundum materiam di&longs;&longs;erere nequeat; neque &longs;pectet vtrum hoc huius &longs;it cau&longs;&longs;a & definitio; nec'ne. Dicunt alij formam &longs;pectari ronne vniuer&longs;ali. C&ecedil;terum admodum ambigua rnn&longs;io: &longs;iquidem &longs;i tanquam à materia &longs;eparata; non modo dialectica; verum ent mathematica & eius philo&longs;ophiæ quae &longs;equitur naturalem: &longs;i conis, quia forma non accipiatur quæ &longs;it propria rei, vt &longs;ub attributis conibus & ea quoque phy&longs;ici e&longs;&longs;e pont, quippe qui formas per&longs;equatur ab vltimis v&longs;que ad primas; & de proxima item adhuc dubitari queat, an à materia &longs;eparata &longs;it phy&longs;ici, an dialectici. Hic ego primum ne difficul­tatem &longs;ubterfugere videar; his obiectionibus re&longs;i&longs;tere conabor: deinde de auctoritate Ari&longs;t. icam q<26>&longs;entio. No&longs;ti in primis dialecticen accipi multis modis: nanque dialectica apud Platonem idem valebat àc prima philo&longs;ophia; deinde dialectica ab analytica di&longs;tincta, & à c&ecedil;teris facultatibus & &longs;cientiis, quippe <09> illæ ex propriis concludant, quanquam propria &longs;unt quae non modo in&longs;unt, quatenus ip&longs;um, &longs;ed in alia re&longs;olui nequeunt, veluti principia naturalis, aut diuin&ecedil;: h&ecedil;c verò ex conibus & quae videntur e&longs;&longs;e ve­ra; non nece&longs;&longs;ariò tnm eiu&longs;modi &longs;unt. Tertiò dialectica comprehendit analyticen, cui &longs;ubiecta &longs;unt in&longs;tru­menta &longs;cientiarum b quæ eadem &longs;olet appellari logicè. Sed cum analyticè &longs;it methodus quae ita &longs;e habet ad res, quenadmodum vas, vt &longs;extarius ad triticum, fruges, & legumina; conis e&longs;t, & tradit regulas quae per vni­uer&longs;os habitus pertineant quib. verum dicere contingit, c & oens cau&longs;&longs;as complectitur quas cum in &longs;uis in­&longs;trumentis referat ad pr&ecedil;dicationem quae conuenit formæ, & qua terminatur interrogatio quid e&longs;t; ita ex oimbus cau&longs;sis exi&longs;timatur petere quid e&longs;t. ideoque. cau&longs;&longs;æ oens logicè dicuntur explicare quid e&longs;t, q<26> tnm pn­&longs;tatur in &longs;cientiis: nihil enim habet analyticè proprij, ni&longs;i q<26> attinet ad fabricam in&longs;trumentorum cognitio­nis. Quia verò &longs;ingul&ecedil; vniuer&longs;am rei naturam non exponunt, cones appellantur, & forma pncipuè &longs;ine ma­teria, <09> &longs;it pntereà ronne prior. Ergo dialectic&ecedil; & cones, i.logic&ecedil; dicuntur definitiones à materia formam &longs;eparantes, eam .&longs;. quæ e&longs;t materiata, & con&longs;ideratur in rebus &longs;en&longs;ilib. t &longs;iquis ambulationem &longs;ine pedib. definiret: de talib. . formis fit &longs;ermo: verum &longs;i po&longs;teà coniungantur cum materia fiunt ab&longs;olutè naturales, & eius &longs;cientiæ propriæ. Quòd &longs;i dialectica propriè &longs;umatur qui e&longs;t habitus, &longs;eu facultas di&longs;&longs;erendi de quocunque propo&longs;ito problemate probabiliter, & &longs;eorsum ex quaque cau&longs;&longs;a definitio perfecta foret, atque coniunctim: nanque et&longs;i coniunctim fit propria methodi naturalis; at modus quo tractatur à dialecti­co definitio, redderet eam non naturalem: &longs;iquidem ab ip&longs;o <04>blematicè exquiratur. Vtrum animal ronnis compos­&longs;it hoim definitio, nec'ne. Vnde item tollitur po&longs;trema illa obiectio, &longs;i dialectica diffinit per oina genera cau&longs;&longs;arum &longs;epararim, cur non & coniunctim? Atque h&ecedil;c ad difficultates propo&longs;itas, ac &longs;iquis &longs;en&longs;um vul­gatum & cum a&longs;&longs;ertione exprimat ex illo contextu. Quanquam mihi nil videtur in eo loco a&longs;&longs;erere Ari&longs;t. que vt id per&longs;picuum fiat, libet proponere verba Philo&longs;ophi, quae &longs;unt hmoni. *diafezo/ntws d) a(/n o(zisaiz o( fusiko/s te kai\ o( dialekiko/s e(\kason au)tw_n. Differenter autem diffiniuerit .i. iffinire po&longs;&longs;et & phy&longs;i­cus & dialecticus vnunquodque ip&longs;orum. & ira&longs;ci & amare q<26> vides planè cum dubitatione prolatum, quen­admodum & alia multa quae ad inue&longs;tigandam animi e&longs;&longs;entiam ante propo&longs;ita fuerant. Dubitatio verò talis e&longs;t. Cum &longs;int diuer&longs;a definitionum genera per materiam, per formam, per vtrunque, e&longs;t'ne definitio per for­mam dialectici: per materiam verò phy&longs;ici? & hoc exemplis illu&longs;trat. Vt ira quid e&longs;t, hic .n .&longs;. dialecticus vl­tionis appetitum, aut aliquid hmoni; ille verò, qui e&longs;t phy&longs;icus feruorem &longs;anguinis circum cor, aut calidi: horum verò hic quidem a&longs;signat materiam ille verò formam & rationem. &longs;unt enim idem lo/gos & ei_dos. ( men ga/z lo/gos o( de\ tou_ pza/gmatos. h&ecedil;c enim ratio .i. efinitio, nimirum appetitus vltionis e&longs;t ratio, hoc e&longs;t, froma s( de\ tou_ pza/gmatos, illa verò rei, i. lla definitio feruor &longs;anguinis qui circum cor, aut calidi e&longs;t rei q<26>e&longs;t compo&longs;itum, nam q<26> exi&longs;tit actu e&longs;t: atqui non forma extra materiam, &longs;ed in materia; hoc verò iam e&longs;t con­po&longs;itum. oportet enim e&longs;&longs;e hanc in tali materia, &longs;i exi&longs;tet, vt in &ecedil;dificio ratio talis e&longs;&longs;e poterit, <09> e&longs;t integu­mentum, q<26> prohibet noxam qu&ecedil; infertur à ventis, & imbribus & &ecedil;&longs;tib. Hic verò.&longs;. definiens dicet lapi­des, & lateres, & ligna: alter autem in his formam horum gratia. is ou_no( fusi)ku\s tou_twn; Quis igitur horum na­turalis? En tibi Ari&longs;t. dubitantem, non a&longs;&longs;erentem dialecticum definite per formam. Nunquid ilie qui circum ma­teriam, ronnem verò ignorans, an qui per ronnem &longs;olam; an potius qui ex vtri&longs;que? Vbi item videre potes ab Ari&longs;t. nihil e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;ertum, <09> definitio p materiam &longs;it naturalis. Rur&longs;us interrogat e)xq/nwn de/ th\tis e(xatezos; ide&longs;t, vterque autem illorum quis erit? i. ui aut per formam &longs;olam, aut per materiam &longs;olam definiet; phy&longs;icus'ne an dialecticus; an alius qui&longs;piam pr&ecedil;ter hos? qu&ecedil; verba oina relata &longs;unt ab interpretibus ad lo(gon, vt &longs;i &longs;ermonem dixeris explicantem quid e&longs;t; cum referenda &longs;int ad to\n o(zicona. & &longs;imilitudo generis in cau&longs;&longs;a fuit erroris. Rnndet con&longs;tituta di&longs;tinctione &longs;cientiarum, <09> quædam e&longs;t de rebus in materia, quatenus hmoni; alia de reb. quae &longs;unt in materia quidem, tnm, non quoad &longs;unt in materia, tertia qu&ecedil; de &longs;epararis à materia: itaque inquit. An non e&longs;t aliquis qui ver&longs;etur in materiæ pa&longs;sionib. quae non &longs;unt &longs;eparabiles mhd) h(+xwzisa\. i. uatenus non &longs;unt &longs;eparabiles; &longs;ed phy&longs;icus de oimbus qu&ecedil;cunque talis &longs;unt corporis, & hmoni materiæ opera, & pa&longs;siones. qu&ecedil;cunque verò non fuerint eiu&longs;modi, alius; & de quibu&longs;dam quidem artifex, &longs;i euene­rit, i. ortè, vt faber, aut medicus. Nam faber de naturalibus ent, non vt naturalia &longs;unt agit, vt qui de ma­chinis: etenim aliqua de mathematicis a&longs;&longs;umit; & fortè medicus, dum tractat vulnera circularia, tunc enim ad geometram confugit. Reliqua &longs;unt per&longs;picua. Ex qua interpretatione, qua nulla cum verbis Ari&longs;t. con­gruit magis; optimè cernis nihil ab Ari&longs;t. con&longs;titutum de definitione dialectica, & hinc oens Latinorum nugas atque dubitationes pro&longs;terni, & profligari. Sic igitur con&longs;ideratio formarum in materia &longs;en&longs;ili, quatenus hmoni, vniuer&longs;a e&longs;t phy&longs;ica, ex quo definitiones oens naturales ab&longs;olutæ ex materia con&longs;ta­bunt, & illa, vbicunque facta fuerit intelligenda, hoc e&longs;t, à conditionib. indiuidui &longs;ecreta, qu&ecedil; toto prior erit, formæ pars erit & quiditatis naturalis; <09> ab eo forma nequeat, neque item cogitationis virtute di­uelli. peà non male Lat. 1. de ortu diui&longs;erunt partes in materiales, atque formales has, <09> form&ecedil; partes e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;erent, illas <09> &longs;olius materiæ vicem &longs;u&longs;tinerent. Et illæ materia à Philo&longs;opho propriè nuncupat&ecedil;, & cum docuerit partes e&longs;&longs;e rei quæ definienda e&longs;t, & definitionem docere &longs;anè quid e&longs;t compo&longs;itum ex ea materia in qua actu forma con&longs;i&longs;tit, &longs;ed euolutionem eius q<26> à tali materia &longs;ecretum e&longs;t q<26> e&longs;t idem àc quiditas quæ e&longs;t ex forma; monuit hæc item &longs;ecum congruere partes rei, partes definitionis, ronnis, quidi­tatis, ac form&ecedil;: neque ppeà tnm &longs;equitur has e&longs;&longs;e formas & quid e&longs;t: nam quiditas & forma &longs;unt indiuidua & tota formaliter, vt dictum e&longs;t, verum partes earum e&longs;&longs;e qu&ecedil; &longs;unt materia per &longs;eip&longs;as, vti partes domus quae &longs;eparat&ecedil; non &longs;unt domus, &longs;ed partes & materia. Re&longs;tat nunc vt nonnullus antagoni&longs;tarum ronnes di&longs;&longs;ol­uamus, &longs;iquid fallaci&ecedil; continent, quae è no&longs;tris dictis &longs;eor&longs;um &longs;it indicanda. Occurrit autem nobis Auerroës inquiens, hoins quiditatem e&longs;&longs;e hominem vno modo, non hominem verò alio modo; e&longs;&longs;e autem hominem, i. for­mam hoins, non e&longs;&longs;e hominem, qui e&longs;t congregatus ex materia & forma, quæ item &longs;unt Ari&longs;t. p&longs;ius dicta; ex quib. pparet &longs;olam formam e&longs;&longs;e hoins quiditatem, neutiquae verò materiam. Et verò id a&longs;&longs;eueratum e&longs;t. Sed me­mini&longs;&longs;e oportet, duplicem nobis hominem offerri alterum vniuer&longs;alem collectum ex hi&longs;ce &longs;ingularib. n quo, vel vt rectius dicam, in notione cuius continetur etiam materies in qua &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tit actu forma quippe car­nes, & o&longs;&longs;a, qu&ecedil; toto po&longs;terior e&longs;t; alterum verò, qui e&longs;t homo mentis officio &longs;eparatus ab hac materia, &longs;ola ea re&longs;eruata, &longs;ine qua forma non pont nec e&longs;&longs;e neque cogitari, vt corpus organicum, qui e&longs;t alius ab hoine illo primo, & e&longs;t idem, atque e&longs;&longs;entia & quiditas ac forma qu&ecedil; definitione euoluitur: atqui horum pars e&longs;t ea materia, qu&ecedil; toto prior e&longs;t; ideoque. compr