FRANCISCI
Bonamici Florentini
EPRIMO LOCO PHILOSOPHIAM
ordinariam in Almo Gymna&longs;io Pi&longs;ano Profitentis,
DE MOTV LIBRI X.
principia &longs;ummo &longs;tudio collecta continentur.
NECNON VNIVERSAE QVAESTIONES AD LIBROS
De Phy&longs;ico auditu, de C&ecedil;lo, de Ortu, & Interitu
pertinentes explicantur.
& Græcorum, Aucrrois, aliorum que doctorum &longs;ententiæ ad The&longs;es
Peripateticas diriguntur.
ACCESSIT INDEX CAPITVM,
Etruriæ Ducem Sereni&longs;&longs;imum.
EX SVPERIORVM CONSENSV.
FLORENTIAE,
MDXCI.
FERDINANDO
MED. S. R. E. CARD.
AMPL MAGNOQ ETRVR.
DVCI SERENISSIMO.
dum omnes boni te vnum &longs;u&longs;piciunt, te in oculis vnum fe
runt & tibi vno con&longs;en&longs;u gratula
aliqua &longs;ignificatione meæ erga te pietatis gaudium meum
testificer, ac postquàm meæ lucubrationes multis ab hinc
annis inchoatæ, nunc demum ab&longs;olutæ in tua felici&longs;&longs;ima
tempora excurrerunt; patris,
charitatis monimentum diutius condi patiar? E ve&longs;tris
ergo magnificentiæ fontibus ortæ ad te properant, & quæ
e&longs;t animi tui benignitas, E cel&longs;itudo in aliquo e&longs;&longs;e apud te
loco non dubitant; iure autem tibi debitæ, quòd me &longs;emper
alueritis, & honesti&longs;&longs;imo huic meo
culpæ &longs;im affinis, ni&longs;i tantis beneficijs antehac prouocatus, quando maiora non po&longs;&longs;um; id
quod grati animi officium foret, aliquid olim reponam. Et quanuis hæc tenuuia &longs;int, cle
mentia,
lus in me de&longs;iderari po&longs;&longs;it. Ac &longs;i quid valet ad hoc perficiendum labor improbus, & in
du&longs;tria, rerum nouarum indagatrix ingenio&longs;a, vt non de&longs;perem, au&longs;pice te, &longs;i non plenis ve
lis in portum, at &longs;ecunda &longs;altem, vt aiunt, nauigatione peruenire po&longs;&longs;e, E &longs;i non vulgo pla
cere, cuius iudicia varia, incon&longs;tantia,
tibi tamen & antiquioris, hoc e&longs;t, græcæ Philo&longs;ophiæ cupidis, quod iamdiù &longs;axum voluo,
probari; cur enim à te con&longs;ilium meum non laudetur, qui Græcè &longs;cias, & eius linguæ pe
riti&longs;&longs;imos &longs;ummo in honore &longs;emper habueris, tanquam ab iis ip&longs;is omnes &longs;cientiarum fon
tes, Cur etiam non ab illis in&longs;ti
tutum meum commendetur, quos ego &longs;olus, & reuereor iam, & colo, quibus vetera &longs;anè,
nec tamen antiquata recolo, E vnus quidem non renouo, &longs;ed in tenebris abdita, E demer
&longs;a ad lucem in tuo nomine reuoco: & exempla dome&longs;tica imitatus aliquid po&longs;teritati re
linquere &longs;tudeo, cuius auxilio progrediatur vlterius; E via mon&longs;trata contendat in &longs;um
mum? fuit enim id ciuitati,
duè cogitarent quo domi, In hac incunabula, &
rudimenta præ&longs;tanti&longs;&longs;imarum artium ab Italia va&longs;tata reperiuntur Picturæ, Sculpturæ,
Iurisperitiæ, Poëtices, Oratoriæ; in hac primum auctore Ioanne Boccaccio Græcæ litteræ
&longs;unt excultæ. Quàm multa Medicinæ lumina protulit hæc vna ciuitas?
quot viros for
ti&longs;&longs;imos? vt hinc maximi Reges, & Duces præ&longs;tanti&longs;&longs;imos, & viros &longs;apienti&longs;&longs;imos
ad imperia regenda, tanquam &longs;ocios accer&longs;iuerint. Quocunque me verto, video etiam
nunc viros omni virtutum genere exornatos, quibus tanquàm &longs;tellis interstincta ditioVeter
n.
la
Quid
in politiorum liQuid in
arte medica non obtinuit Vidius, qui rem vniuer&longs;am ad tenue &longs;ic elimauit, & dulciter
clocutQueties me &longs;uo carmine rapit dulci&longs;&longs;imus cygnus ille
Bargæus? quidde Pi
Bapti&longs;ta dicam?
Mitto complures alios
quod inceperint, omnino perfecerint;
&longs;int, quam quippiam illorum indu&longs;Sed conatum &longs;olum
magno in pretio
Cel&longs;i&longs;&longs;ime. Namquis non &longs;ummis laudibus in cœlum tollat Americum Ve&longs;puccium?
Hic ignotas, & periculo&longs;as nauigationes adgre&longs;&longs;us cum primus è multis prouinciis, quæ
ad occa&longs;um, meridiem
opibus acce&longs;&longs;erit, cum &longs;acris, quæ gentibus illis
merces inde aduectæ, quibus humano generi &longs;alus magno cum commodo pararetur; im
men&longs;a the&longs;aurorum copia,
nem eas lu&longs;irandi præmon&longs;
primus ip&longs;e peragrauit, ex&longs;uo nomine nomen dedit. Ex quo liquidò con&longs;tat præmon&longs;ira
tori plus habitum fuPrætereo dein
du&longs;iria innumeros alios ciues tuos, qui nouarum artium inuentores maximas copias do
mum retulerunt, vrbem remplis augu&longs;ti&longs;&longs;imis, ædificiis ampli&longs;&longs;imis auxerunt, & imperij
fines vni tibi latè propagarunt. Vt non immeritò tu, qui tantos
deraris, in maximis Regibus numerari debeas: nam &longs;i magnum ille cen&longs;ebat imperare
non auro, &longs;ed habentibus aurum; tu nonmodo iis, quæ po&longs;&longs;ideant homines,
tibus hominibus imperes; &longs;ed po&longs;&longs;idere &longs;cientes tranquilli&longs;&longs;imè regas. Ego igitur, qui Pe
ripateticam Philo&longs;ophiam non ex riuulis, &longs;ed ex ip&longs;o fonte Ari&longs;totelico mi&longs;&longs;o omni fa
ctionum &longs;tudio nunc in&longs;tituerim haurire, & primus qui inter tuos in hac &longs;ecta libertate
recuperata meum iudicium planè &longs;equar; tamet&longs;i non perficiam; cur etiam laude aliqua,
quia &longs;im au&longs;us, quia cœperim, dignus non habear? Alij nos &longs;equentur qui indicata ratio
ne, & via magnum huic cœpto afferant incrementum, & id demum con&longs;equantur, quod
in omnia tempora clarum, n.
verè cogitata &longs;unt, diutius con
&longs;eruari &longs;olent, nec hominum interitu occidunt, &longs;ed iterantur in immen&longs;um, AEtas finem
trophæis affert, imperia collabuntur. Vna veritas perpetuò durat, ad quam cum omnium
proximè, quantum hominis ingenium fert, acce&longs;&longs;erit Ari&longs;toteles; nulla erit ætas, nulla
gens, nulla religio quæ ip&longs;um nonmodò non tactura, &longs;ed &longs;edulò tractatura, & a&longs;&longs;iduè in
manibus habitura &longs;it. Vnde etiam fore confido, vt qui in vnis auctoris huiu&longs;ce ve&longs;tigiis
in&longs;i&longs;tat, locum in philo&longs;ophia &longs;it &longs;emper habiturus. Video verò & propemodum auguror
te patris tui pij,
incumbere, vt breui talem quendam vi&longs;uri &longs;imus, qui quemadmodum à ciuibus tuis in cæ
teris artibus factitatum e&longs;t, qui eas à rudi illa vetu&longs;tate ad pri&longs;tinam illam integritatem
&longs;ua indu&longs;tria reuocarunt, ita Peripateticam di&longs;ciplinam ex omni Arabum,
cultura ad bonam illam, & expolitam &longs;it redacturus. Talia tu commoda cupidis optima
rum artium præ&longs;tas. Quare laudent ciues tui pietatem, magnificentia&mgrave; milites celebrent,
temperantiam tui familiares
niis tollant; mihi quidem vnum hoc munificentiæ genus dignum videtur, vt omnes oculosTu verè beatus, quia Poëtas, Oratores, Hi&longs;toriographos, Iuri&longs;con&longs;ultos, Theologos, Me
dicos, & Philo&longs;ophos omnibus doctrinis excultos vni tibi contigerit alere, & habere. Quanquàm e&longs;t id iam bonis temporibus inueteratum in ve&longs;tra familia,
factum. Extant etiamnum monumenta ampli&longs;&longs;ima Co&longs;mi,
mendata litteris hominum, quos virtutis ergô diuinis beneficiis affecere. Ex quo
e&longs;t, vt complura adiumenta ad &longs;cientias eorum opera &longs;uppetierint. Laurentius Platonem
per multa &longs;æcula &longs;epultum traxit ab inferis. Narrant etiam Leonem X. P.M. ab hoc
viuendi in&longs;tituto &longs;ic allectum, vt nonmodò
benigni&longs;&longs;imè complexus fuerit. Accepimus etiam cùm ti vitio
les viros, &longs;ed illos quidem bene doctos
tute E doctrina præ&longs;tantibus opem libenti&longs;&longs;imè ferre, quae talem cen&longs;uram veræ nobilitatis
e&longs;&longs;e crederet. Ita multos non incitauit tantùm, &longs;ed ad litter
decus eloquentiæ Florentinæ quam &longs;ummo &longs;tudio coluerant Danthes, Petrarcha Boccac
cius, E à viris illis ob&longs;oleta & de&longs;ita frequentabantur,
cari con&longs;ueuerant. Hæc veri
&longs;unt officia quæ diuinæ virtutis te&longs;tes &longs;empiterni &longs;int, non in&longs;anarum molium &longs;ub&longs;iructio
nes quib. exhauriuntur æraria, vectigalia minuuntur, non &longs;tatuarum locationes quæ cor
porum quidem &longs;imulachra &longs;unt, E imago quædamgloriæ adumbrata, non
E &longs;pecies expre&longs;&longs;a virtutis. Hæc munera verè regia, & admirabilia iis vti viris à quib.
in&longs;tituti &longs;ubiecti ritè regi, & optimis morib.
informari valeant,
quie&longs;cant
n. dedit imperia
imperio &longs;unt, atroci&longs;&longs;imè &longs;æuirent, &longs;ed vt Poëtæ verbis vtar,
e&longs;t vt gentes rerum ignaras ad &longs;uum
&longs;ibi ip&longs;i &longs;aperent, aliis Pupugit etiam hæc cura pij
animum, quô E erexit duo gymna&longs;ia, vt plurib. pateret aditus ad vires ingenij quas ip&longs;is
natura largi&longs;&longs;imè afflaui&longs;&longs;et, E exercendas, & retinendas. Vtor
tui viri clari&longs;&longs;imi exemplo, non eo certè con&longs;ilio, vt te inflammem: iam. n.
hoc &longs;iudium erga
litteratos in te radiceis alti&longs;&longs;imas egit, cùm
rationem dome&longs;tico
extitit, audiendo præclara facinora in eius imitatione te oblectes, & immortale hoc nomen
ad no&longs;tri beneficium cum iucunditate tueare. Nos igitur beati&longs;&longs;imos quibus tuis au&longs;piciis
operam philo&longs;ophiæ dare, E natur æ arcanaper&longs;crutari &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;erit. Quocirca
ip&longs;is
Nam quod in hi&longs;ce
&longs;tudiis plurimum
gitandum acutum, ad memoriam
tuo Quocirca
iter quod ad
bent. n.
vnde di&longs;cant.
&longs;ub Angeliis ingre&longs;&longs;us es, E &longs;ub
&longs;ed iugiter amplificas, qualia verò &longs;unt in&longs;tituta
ris &longs;ocios adiunxeris quorum opera & con&longs;ilio in omni publico
uer&longs;is animi virtutibus ornatos, &longs;apientia,
&longs;eros, admirabili &longs;eueritate aduer&longs;us &longs;celeratos admodum Illustres Carolum Antonium
Puteum Archiepi&longs;copum Pi&longs;anum, Petrum V&longs;imbardum, Ioannem 'B. Concinium,
Capponem Capponium, quorum ego patrocinio publicè
di au&longs;us &longs;um, Verùm
mi&longs;&longs;a hæc facio, ad no&longs;tra de&longs;cendo. Quæ &longs;anctior lex, quod maius con&longs;ilium quàm di&longs;ci
plinarum collegia con&longs;titui&longs;&longs;e, vt inter &longs;e collegæ de victoria litigantes
Ni teneant,
Hos &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;us alit, po&longs;&longs;unt, quia po&longs;&longs;e videntur.
memnonem primis illis Vly&longs;&longs;e & Achille mirandis inter &longs;e modis al
tercantibus, vt
celebratam qui æmulationem, veluti &longs;timulos quo&longs;dam intulerit reip. ac &longs;emper ade&longs;&longs;e &longs;tu
duerit, quod inter &longs;e ciues boni contendant, augente &longs;tudia contentione, concordia verò
cilianteQuo factum e&longs;t, vt viri docti&longs;&longs;imi, quanuis &longs;uos commentarios &longs;uppri
mendo reprehen&longs;ionem &longs;e fugere intelligerent, quia po&longs;teros tanto bono priuare non &longs;olùm
iniurium, &longs;ed impium E nefas e&longs;&longs;e iudicarent, quanuis
qui forta&longs;&longs;e plus, quàm ip&longs;i de &longs;e intelligerent,
contenti fuerint, &longs;i ita &longs;ua probarentur, vt tanquàm di&longs;putata contentius aditum ad ve
ritatem patefacerent, cuius
bet. Nam latet veritas in profundo, & diuer&longs;is veri&longs;imilibus inuoluta variis etiam mo
dis tentat mentes no&longs;tras, & in diuer&longs;a &longs;tudia rapit. Cùm igitur ego
Patre tuo in ve&longs;tra præelari&longs;&longs;ima collegia fuerim cooptatus & adhuc auctoritate tua
negocium publicè
nati&longs;&longs;imumque
ocium litterarum merito tuo mihi &longs;uppeditat, & v&longs;u quotidie cogno&longs;cendi
veritatis, quam &longs;i po&longs;teritati communicauerim, & grati animi officio erga te functus e&longs;&longs;e
videar, & in alios, &longs;i fieri Et
multa me ab incepto deterrebant, cum quia po&longs;teriores cogitationes meliores e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olerent,
tum quòd plura in dies experientia rerum magi&longs;tra &longs;apienti&longs;sima docerct, non pauca
lectio'iterata librorum,
ad meas manus quotidie
prode&longs;&longs;em, Acce&longs;&longs;erunt exhor
tationes
integerrimus vir Thomas Finckius Vuet&longs;pergen&longs;is, cuius
cerim, in hoc Quapropter è no&longs;tris &longs;ermonib.
di&longs;ceptationib.
tendit, clientis tui hoc vnum expetit; id &longs;i fuerit a&longs;&longs;ecutus, alacritatem
iam &longs;ub ei&longs;dem au&longs;piciis edere cogitauimus, vt ad te quam primùm aduolent, & perpe
tuæ erga te pietatis no&longs;træ &longs;int optimi te&longs;tes. Vale.
Pi&longs;is XIV. Kal.
Decemb.
CIC IC LXXXVII.
INDEX LIBRORVM
ET CAPITVM QVAE IN HOC
OPERE CONTINENTVR.
PRIMVS LIBER EST DE MVNERE PHILOSOPHI NATVRALIS
PROOEMIVM.
FINIS INDICIS CAPITVM QVAE IN HOC
VOLVMINE CONTINENTVR.
ERRATA SIC CORRIGITO. PRIMOLOCO PONITVR NVMERVS
Paginarum, &longs;ecundo Littera, tertio numerus Linearum, quarto correctio.
EX PRIMO LIBRO.
3. D 3. Architectoni & &longs;ic
6. non vid.
11. nil vetet.
f 6. vt nota.
h 2, inductiuæ rat.
5. b 11. cre
duntur. 6. e 5. rei &longs;eientia deficiet.
15. ponet.
f 10. euertetur.
7. d 3. di&longs;cedamus.
6. &longs;ed vel cog.
8. e 7. quòd iud.
12. opera.
f
7. quippe quòd. g 5. præcedit, 12. cuiu&longs;cuiu&longs;modi, h 11. fertur.
10. e 12. materiata.
d 2. hoc.
5. in
di14. e 13. tran&longs;ilimus.
g 1. iudicari 15. f 9. e&longs;&longs;ent.
18. f 14.
g 2. vox
20. e 13.
f 10. b 3. indicare.
d 3. creatio.
22. g 8. &longs;it.
h vlt.
guam. 13. ita fit.
25. b 3. producatur &longs;imile nunquam.
10. fit, vt.
c 2. nam dicere po&longs;.
d 11. Ati&longs;.
inter ita.
26. e 1. dum fit.
f 11.
En tibt. h 9. niti &longs;emper.
27. c 13 form&ecedil;.
29. a 2. mouet.
b 14 efficeret.
30. c 9. ab&longs;olutus.
g 2. &longs;int.
31. c 1.
32. e 11. corrige &longs;ic.
g 12.
34. c 4. an'num.
18. notucre.
g 1. di&longs;tortæ & per
plex&ecedil;. h 2.
4. audis.
5. quadrate.
37. a 9. quid &longs;it.
38. e 11. &longs;ine.
13. &longs;eparantur.
39. d 5.
40. h 12. Huic.
14.
42. h 3.
13. 14. ex partenece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e.
43. 27. vnmcilalis.
c 4 cueta.
g 12. de
negari. 44. e 8. negantem.
g 4. 10. &longs;ubalternans.
h 7. definitas.
45. 23. vt
49 a 8 quanque.
50. e 15.
f 15. philo&longs;ophiæ.
51. a 12.
14. earum c 12. medicos.
d 1.
8. liberali.
g 14. fi
53. a 9. 54. e 1. quod ad.
9 pareat.
10. &longs;iqua.
12. Phy&longs;icæ.
h 7. tran&longs;cendentiæ.
13
habeant &longs;ubitciuntur & determinantur. 55. d 11. fuerat
56. e 10. qua &longs;unt.
57. d 4. materiæ.
58 f 6. at &longs;ic.
7.
gnw/sews.c 6.
60. g 13. à diuino.
h 2. &longs;ubaltemantem ad hanc ab alia.
61. c 2. concipiamus.
7. cum
& fic 64. e 13. corpus.
g 2. fit.
13. qu&ecedil; ope.
h 1. e&longs;ficitur &longs;ecundum vt.
4.
65.
b 14. tum præterea c 11. vt vnum definitioni. 66. e 4. no&longs;te.
68. e 7. effectus.
g 5.
d 15. eclip&longs;i & &longs;ic
h 4. addimus.
8.
71. a 11. de prim.
72. g 10. fententiam.
73. c 2.
74. e 16.
g 11. in prima.
85. b 12. modo erit dial.
86. e 7. corrige verba Græca &longs;ic
quod. 87. a 15. pote&longs;t quae c 8. ex co e&longs;&longs;e ord.
90. g 3. recipiunt.
h 2. e&longs;&longs;e de &longs;ub&longs;t.
94. e 7. &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ vel acc.
14. omne.
g 12.
c&ecedil;dam quid de. 97. a 2. illu&longs;trentur.
b 6. &longs;impliciter.
107. c 12. & methodo 109. b 15. verum.
c 1. Placitis.
110. e 4. qua
dam. h 9. careat qu&ecedil;
111. a 6. &longs;ectatorib.
cius.
112. f 9
114. h 1. Abdcritic&cgrave;.
115. b 5. &longs;i verò.
c 11. accepta.
116. e 9.
119. c 2. prius natura &longs;it & id.
13. excie&longs;cat.
120. f 11. auhibent.
121. 7.
niti per &longs;e. 122. f 8.
EX LIBRO SECVNDO.
126. F 7. qua &longs;anè.
11. &longs;ecantur 127. b 13. categorias & &longs;ic vbique.
128. g 10. in diff.
130. e 5. aliquando.
131. a 5. e&longs;&longs;e vn
de, b 3. contracto c 12. mintrat. 132. h 11.
&longs;at.
134. h 1.
137. d 11. &longs;imul.
138. g 5. profc&longs;xi.
14. quæque.
15. di&longs;&longs;oluere.
140. h 1. indicand&ecedil;.
141 a 14. auctio.
d 8. illuminatio.
142. f 4. exprimatur.
143. c 10. lices.
d 15.
partes. 145. c 2. aliud ni&longs;i forma.
146. g 11. innitatur.
h 15. cauillum & &longs;ic
b 4. dictum e&longs;t.
d 13.
agens. 148. e 1. mutationi
150. c 9. deductione.
151. c 13. diffiuere.
153. d 15. vt cum.
154. a 13.
h
158. f 15. licet.
159. 22. &longs;unt.
d 11. mutatio
ne. 160. f 14. intelitgit.
162. f 14. di&longs;cimus.
h 12. fit.
163. c 10. illarum.
165. a 10.
12. retum po&longs;tulante.
b 2. in
ip&longs;o. 5. quo puncta.
166. f 3. vt dum.
h 11. lis inter.
167. d 5. ei&longs;dem.
169. b 2.
d 4. virtutem.
170. c 7. mutatione &
quan. 171. a 12.
d 3. quoquam.
172. g 5. perpe&longs;sionis pernicio&longs;&ecedil; gen&longs;.
173. b 3. motum proprie &longs;ub&longs;t.
175.
a 12. forma. 176. e 1. habcant.
2. conflantur.
f 12. rationis.
g 14. nominis.
h 5. &longs;i vt.
177. a 10. concedamus.
b 9 ill&ecedil;.
178.
e 5. interea. f 6. & ap.
7. rationalis &.
179. b 11.
14. cui.
c 4. po&longs;teriore.
180. e 7. e Themi&longs;t.
h 6. in&longs;tas.
14. hac mach.
15. approbas.
181. c 8. fundentur.
13.
d 7. canon.
10. priuationes.
12. &longs;icubi.
182. f 13. occidunt.
h
183.
b 7. &longs;tatue. c 12. ab&longs;entia.
actu e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e.
184. e 3. &longs;int.
g 12 manens.
h 12. &longs;unt.
185. a 10. con&longs;litutiones.
186. f 15. verè dicat.
g 7. dicemus.
h 4. vis.
187. b 15.
c 8. per &longs;e ip&longs;am 188. e 3.
f 4. aio infor.
8. materia concr.
15.
reftituitur, & intenditur. 189. b 1. tamen for.
d 14.
190. c 5. 7. capiat.
g 9 idonea.
191. a 6. plurib.
mate
riæ portionibus 198. g 8. illuminationis in.
199. a 7. interitus?
b 2. quod &longs;uum.
205. b 15. c&ecedil;tcris.
c 10. vt cius.
206. g 2.
&longs;upere&longs;t. h 1. naturale.
207. c 9. ibi affl 208. c 8. &longs;en&longs;u.
g 14. o&longs;&longs;enderimus.
209. b 7. ducitur.
c 4. &longs;i non in eo gen.
at in alio.
a 10. e 4. &longs;it per.
g 11. primò de illo de rel h 7. tribuitis.
212. f 8. con&longs;tat.
10. a&longs;&longs;ecutum e&longs;t.
13. demon&longs;trationis vi.
213. a 15.
aliquem. 16. omnia.
c 3. ibi non &longs;er.
214. e 15. præterea.
f 6. componeres.
g 15. mobilis.
217. a 3. e&longs;&longs;e de loco.
b 9. maneat.
c 4. mens no&longs;tra.
12. quoniam motum.
218. g 3. nec magis.
15. cominus.
h 4. præcederet.
220. e 14. res ip&longs;a.
h 14.
221. c 8. metiri tamet&longs;i.
222. e 12. nancilcatur.
f 14. quippe quae propè.
223. a 6. petitur à &longs;axo.
13
d 13. qua di&longs;p.
14.
po&longs;tulat. 225. b 4. ortu.
5. pellat.
d 6. a&longs;cen&longs;ui.
226. g 7.
227. b 3. vercor.
EX LIBRO TERTIO.
228 G 10. animus.
14. natura.
229. a 3. fuerit, &.
d 5. tran&longs;ilit.
230. e 5. &longs;u&longs;tinens.
g 14. de ip&longs;o vbi.
h 5. à reliquis.
231. c 2.
Burl&ecedil;us. d 6. particulis.
232. e 3. effectus.
f 7. opere.
g 6. requiri.
14 &longs;it.
233. a 6. dictum fuit: æger.
d 8.
&longs;picuum. 236. h 15.
238. h 11. in &longs;ub&longs;t.
239. a 2. natura.
24. d 3. &longs;u&longs;ctpiunt.
242. c 2. Hippo
cratis & &longs;ic 244. f
natura.
246. c 8. &longs;anari.
247. a 1. &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ.
c 3. e&longs;&longs;entiali.
248. h 6. quies verò.
249.
b 9. materia. c 1. inuenerat.
250. g 7. &longs;ignificati.
251. c 14. piæ&longs;erendam.
252. e 3. eum.
4. cum id aut.
f 10.
g 4.
partes. A B. 6. quin fieri.
253. a 5. &longs;ic progre.
b 11. extenta.
254. f 11. nece&longs;&longs;aria.
255. c 7
14.
256. e 12.
illa. f 5. oppo&longs;ito.
260. g 2. moueatur.
10. qui fit.
13.
261. c 14. potuit.
d 14. vera.
262. c 14. per
&longs;picuæ. h 5. &longs;eip&longs;o non moueri primo, & ab alio.
263. d 11. hyeme.
n.
264. f 3. ordmatim.
g 7. &longs;icca.
h 5. tibi &longs;u&longs;p.
15. mota.
265. a 15. &longs;ubactum.
266. g 6 antmales.
267 c 4. calore.
268. e 8. aut vbi.
f 3. ea.
269. a 4. quid ergo.
15. at certe.
270 g 11.
in&longs;it. 271. c 2. e&longs;t ei quod e&longs;t.
6. po&longs;tent.
d 5. nos qd.
272. e 9.
273. b 2. po&longs;tum.
5.
quid &longs;ibi. 274. h 3.
275. c 1. conuertit.
6. notus.
d 6. cuius cau&longs;&longs;am.
277. b 10. po&longs;t certè.
278. f 13. forma.
g 13. ac
cedat. 281. c 7. ip&longs;o term.
14. ne pro eo.
282. f 8.
283. d 4. &longs;en&longs;um pellere.
287. a 2. &longs;ecunda.
3.
b 6. po
terat. c 1. materia.
14.
288. e 3. &longs;ecus &longs;it.
f 7.
T. 27. h 6. motus
8. de&longs;inat.
15. denominatio.
290.
g 13. vtium'ne. 291. a 2.
b 2. nobis apparet.
292. e 8. habitus illi &longs;upponatur.
Quòd.
293. a 3. per
&longs;uam for. b 12. raro'ne.
13. monemus.
d 1. alens.
2. quod fit in.
7. tum nego.
294. e 10. habet
1
fic & illa.
f 8. &longs;imi
lts. g 7. &longs;ecundum &longs;e.
10. habet.
h 10. 1
295. b 15. eum e&longs;&longs;e.
296. g 7. motura e&longs;t vt hoc &longs;ine.
297. d 12. Simplicio.
303. a 1 eas e&longs;&longs;e.
304. g 2.
305. a 15. po&longs;sit in actum.
d 12. à quo vel quod &longs;em.
306. e 3.
cutibi g 7. nalitus.
h 5. inu&longs;tis.
307. d 1. quie&longs;t.
313. b 3. &longs;ic pars.
6. &longs;i per &longs;e.
13. &longs;ecundum quas.
c 1. hoc aut.
d 12. &longs;int confirm.
15. accidensm
314.
h 5. Alexandro. 14 gremio.
315. a 6. rex excel.
9. &longs;i deficiatur.
c 7. is.
316. f 8. aliquam.
h 1. ita vt ni&longs;i.
13.
317. b 5.
Prinium quia. 6. denominantur.
c 12. imper&longs;ecti.
d 13. plumbeus.
318. f 14. ita monet.
g 4. materia &longs;uæ 3. 9. b 8 leue &longs;ic.
11.
grauitate 321. c 5. animalt primumviuens pro port. d 5. mon&longs;trat.
322. g 1. hos mot.
323. a 6. mouere.
324. e in tit.
quas
ex. f 7. quæ ex &longs;e ip&longs;a.
h 2. in &longs;cupo.
325. a 7 violentiam.
12. quoquo.
d 6. &longs;emper ab alio.
326. f 14. te&longs;tetur.
h 1. ratio pro
pria. 12. dictorum.
327. a 17. vt à forma.
b 7. moueri.
c 12. pote&longs;tatum.
d 15. aibitror.
328. g 8. nil perfectè.
h 2. in pote&longs;t.
229. b 10. partienda.
d 10. igitur & materia.
330. e 8 materiæ proxim&ecedil;.
10. forent.
17. moueretur.
f 11. alterum quidem.
g 8. fit e&longs;&longs;e.
h 9. &longs;u&longs;&longs;iciente.
332. e 7. natura &longs;ic.
15. tibi pl.
h 3. admittant.
10. &longs;i non re &longs;ep.
336. f 12. auctor hic.
13. &longs;ol&ecedil;.
339. a 3. carere.
14. commeant.
b 12. continuas.
c 10. vbi cum.
EX LIBRO QVARTO.
g 42. H 4. paret.
344. h 9. intermutationem.
346. g 10.
11. repugnantiam.
11. tamen &longs;int.
347. a 16. vt aerem.
in tit.
actum à temou.
348. h 6. enim erit.
349. b 8. cuenit.
350. c 1. dei
2. quòd actus.
14. officio &longs;alua pote&longs;tate in fin.
f 1. h&ecedil;e quæ imped.
g 9. ci&longs;iciant.
351. d 15. nitatur.
352. c 10. motum non prof.
g 13. indicia.
h 11. illa.
354. g 1. is in infin.
h a.
octur.
357. a 8. ab&longs;oluta.
Ecce.
b 4 naturalem.
6.
358. c 14. diuer&longs;&ecedil;.
g 6.
359. a 7. non totius.
c 1. or
bes. 6. Arittoteles in illis.
n.
e&longs;t idem & agere.
d 7. iri
g 9.
361. c 3. reddi po&longs;sit 9. &longs;uæ
cupid. d 1. Theonem.
362. c 9 po&longs;ituræ.
f 6. hic in.
363. a 1. cam.
b 10. vt ip&longs;e.
c 11. indicandum.
364. g 4. loci.
365. a 16. de
potetia. 366. f 5. augmentationé.
367. a 13. Eum
368. g 11. pote&longs;tatis.
369. a 15.
370. c 2. tractus.
g 2. pater igitur ex dictis quòd.
371. d 4. ab
372. c 9
373. c 11.
374. g 12.
quicqu4.
h 14. defendunt.
381. b 10. vis
11. non nego.
382. e 15. in quo ine&longs;t.
g 10. differui
mus. h 12. efficiens.
efficcre.
384. f 13. initam.
h 7. &longs;it in.
385. a 1.
2. maximus lentor.
11. habita.
b 14. libratis.
386. f
11. eam e&longs;&longs;e. g 4. appeilemus.
6. quod ita.
h 13. in eo.
15. q alia.
387. b 14. propen&longs;io.
c 1. natura.
4. efficienti.
5. finis.
c 14.
Æthiopibus. 390. h 7. ca cadit.
391. b 1. Ægidij.
4. quanuis.
c 1. hos.
d 2.
393. b 1. inter bo
nos. c 1. & &longs;i.
394. e 1. dedi&longs;&longs;e.
f 4. ad coiuncta.
395. c 5. reuoluimur.
396. f 1. gemma.
9. hic motus.
g 9.
397. a 2. niti.
11. tutius.
16. audi tu.
quod revera.
400. f 5. potratur.
401. b 5. ip&longs;uim.
d 5. imprimunt.
402. f 6. recuperaturæ.
12. per &longs;en&longs;.
g 10. fit at.
h 8.
403. c 11. habeas.
407. d 7. quadam con&longs;tabat quod.
11. &longs;imile.
409. d 6. idem.
410. h 11.
e&longs;t ci. e 9. paribus.
412. g 13. pro&longs;ectum in forma.
413. a 5. ex
nos po&longs;&longs;umus.
415. b 13. natura.
d 8. Flere.
10. emode
randus. 416. f 13. apparabit.
flagitat.
417. c 6. quo ad eius.
d 5. per accidens.
6. omnino.
419. a 8. quærere.
b 11. cau&longs;&longs;a.
420.
f 13. in not. 421. a 5. tales.
b 6. &longs;int
422. h 15. vitio.
424. h 9. continui.
425. a 16. deducimur.
c 9. vt id.
11. vt non
corpus &longs;it. d 3. ille e&longs;t.
427. a 47. moles.
c 6.
8.
9.
428. c 9.
10. &longs;it.
f 5. fit in.
g 9.
h 15. fit.
429. a 14. fit.
b 15. Mathematica.
4. rectà.
430. c 10.
f 4. efficitur.
g 4.
h 15. Mathematico.
431. c 6. acci
dens. 432. c 13. illo.
f 3. aut.
434. g 7. in
14. qua &longs;unt.
h 7. e&longs;&longs;e quæ
435. b
11. loco circun. d 9.
436. e 8. verum &longs;it non.
g 11. tutius.
h 2. qua.
437. a 7.
b 6. innumera
438. e 3.
& locus. 11. & aqu&ecedil;.
439. a 11. genus.
b 4. &longs;ubiecti.
440. f 4. quomodo.
g 5.
h 3. de&longs;inito.
8. immobile.
441. c 12. &longs;e.
EX LIBRO QVINTO.
443. C 5. caducarum.
d 1. motuum.
444. g 1. quibu&longs;dam term.
12. e&longs;&longs;e.
11. a&longs;siduè.
445. a 12. manere.
b 4. po&longs;&longs;emus.
8. ca
&longs;orem. d 1. eum.
446. g 12. materiæ.
447. d 16. habcat.
448 e 9. perfectus.
14. Græci.
g 4. colum.
10. ob.
11. vacauit.
453.
a 15. e&longs;&longs;e confim. c 1. &longs;anæ.
2. tum motum.
459. f 8. magnitudinem.
14. feretur.
h 4. habebant.
9. manent.
458. c 11. ellip&longs;i.
g 13 terra.
461. a 3. medium.
462. f 3. minus.
g 2. e&longs;t terrenæ.
463. a 12 &longs;olum.
b 1. priuationes.
c 6. comparantur vt in.
7.
qucant. d 3. ex his &longs;int quæ &longs;imp.
10.
464. e 6.
f 2. pendere.
8. collatum.
13. afferente.
g 3. ille.
12. aërem
in aqua 13. noluit. h 3. con&longs;tituere.
465. a 1. minus.
7. cogatur.
c 2. in&longs;tar.
466. f 1. definitiones.
12. indicant.
13.
g 16. quam illi. h 12. præceps.
467. a 10. nubes.
b 12. omni.
d 15. diluta.
468. f 3. naturæ cond.
g 2. defendi.
8. erunt.
h 7.
accidens. 13. e&longs;t ctrcum&longs;.
469. b 14. albi&longs;simum.
c 14. &longs;iquis.
470. f 4. autem ex.
472. e 1. quod e&longs;t.
g 11. potitura.
473. a 14.
id quod e&longs;t præt. 15. pr&ecedil;ter naturam diutur.
co quod &longs;ecundum naturam.
b 8. qui cx &longs;ecrer.
d 12. E&longs;t huiu&longs;modi.
475. a 3. i&longs;te
4. illi. 476. f 5 repurgari.
h 6.
13. à leu.
477. b 1. con&longs;ci&longs;cat.
c 1. aërem.
478. f 15. &longs;i.
480. f 6. liberè.
14. maris.
g 4. commemorare.
5. cura &longs;upp.
9 habent: minus.
10. fers.
482. c 13. dela&longs;&longs;atæ.
484. e 3. terra.
f 3. materiæ.
g 5. quin.
h
13. nunc ad Aucr. 485. c 6. his ob&longs;i&longs;ti.
d 3. medici.
7. Facit.
486. f 7. &longs;alis.
8. &longs;alis.
9.
487. b 6. re&longs;per&longs;a.
illita.
c 13. conta
ctum. 488. e 1. den&longs;e&longs;cet 9. &longs;i lana qua.
g 3. perfungendum h 13. natura.
490. c 2. temporis.
8. acri.
f 4 organico.
7. humi
da. 491. a 7. cum docet.
b 12. pyramidem.
14. vero octa hed.
b 11. vi coact&ecedil;.
493. b 7. demer&longs;a.
11. iri demer.
d 5. ci
ferentia. 7. demei&longs;am.
495. c 12. ad id præ&longs;t.
d 2. exoriatur.
5. oppugnent.
496. f 12. con&longs;titit.
15. æqua.
497. b 13 excu
ditur. c 5. partes e&longs;&longs;e.
d 13. quam exercet.
498. c 10. dimi&longs;&longs;o.
h 13. quia non materia.
500. e 11. per &longs;e na&longs;e.
14. mobile 502.
e 6. æ&longs;timentur. g 6. lectoris.
h 9. vt materia.
15. Fit.
504. f 6. vacui.
11. cau&longs;&longs;æ.
g 1. penderet.
505. d 3. afferentur.
506.
f 12. explodatur. 507. a 5. proiectio.
15. remotè.
511. b 3. tolerante 512. g 9. hypeccaumati.
513. a 4. compo&longs;itus.
b 2 ignt.
d 4. amplificato.
515. a 15. &longs;iquodam illa.
16. iudicium.
b 2. ca verèd 516. f 15. mouet.
g 2. te docuit.
518. e 15. motu præt,
g 15. & à cau&longs;sis. h 3. inten&longs;um.
9. cidem.
519. d 14. vel ignem.
52
c 14. mon&longs;trat item vt latius.
523. c 13. vt in æqual.
d 14. hoc &longs;ic.
524. c 9. &longs;i fuerit.
15. quam.
525. a 4.
6. certi.
c 1. dela&longs;&longs;ari.
6. cert&ecedil;.
526. g 3. ca quæ.
h 4. proportionum.
527. a 11. acre.
b 5. Phy&longs;icarum.
6 explicatu.
528. e 7. e&longs;t propor.
14. ea quæ æquè.
h 15. dupliciter.
529. a 10. veloctorem,
530. e 13. tempori. f 15. con&longs;tituto variatur.
531. d 8. vtique.
532. g 11. cen&longs;um.
h 1. in infinitum.
533. c 14. quàm axem,
&longs;eu manub. 15. item &longs;int oportet.
d 9 continuare.
EX LIBRO SEXTO.
536. H 7. abdita.
539. a 3. exi&longs;timare &longs;i diucr&longs;as.
b 9. tandem oracula reddat.
541. b 9. eandem.
542 c 5. &longs;it de.
543. d 12.
abeant. 544. h 15. careamns &longs;i reliquimus, aut.
548. e 15. &longs;eclis.
550. g 4. eum.
h 7. fallaciam.
552. f 9. e&longs;t ex in mu&longs;.
15. pri
uationis nomine. 553. d 5. dixerim.
554. h 2. abire.
3. qua quer.
555. a 6. &longs;ubiecto.
d 6. potentia.
559. d 3. quendam.
14.
cum abeant. 560. g 5. dicuntur e&longs;&longs;e.
6. cen&longs;entur.
561. d 9. quæ nupet.
565. a 2. quantas.
d 3. id e&longs;t.
566. h 7. v&longs;us vt.
567.
b 14. genitura. d 5. actui contrarium.
568. e 14. ad
f 6. at hoc.
11. futuram.
h 3. & e&longs;t.
12. habitam.
569. a 11. deriuan
tur. 12. materia &longs;it.
570. e 2. ip&longs;ius.
f 2. accidit.
h 13. foima.
571. b 10.
c 2. natura.
572. c 4. oppo&longs;ita.
g 9. natura.
h 7. certi.
573. b 14.
574. f 10. intelligit.
g 3. e&longs;&longs;icientis.
575. a 9. modo.
12. &longs;ic.
b 7. varietur.
c 11. ab ip&longs;o.
d 7.
576. f 1. indicans.
578. f 8. igitur.
h 1.
580. e 3.
quitria. 582. c 13. habent.
f 2. munerib.
583. c 14. &longs;iue etiam.
d 2. a&longs;signari &longs;icut etiam reb.
artificio&longs;is.
584, g 9. a&longs;&longs;ecutæ,
h 2. properemus. 585. b 13. conntuenda.
587. a 9. curio&longs;us.
d 8. &longs;it nec'ne.
588. c 8. præditas &longs;ol.
593. a 11. inferiorum.
b 2.
aimus. 4. e&longs;&longs;entiæ.
594. h 13. præterea.
596. g 7. hic etiam.
597. a 5.
600. g.
1. in materiam.
h 1. quàm in homine quae rel.
4. generatim.
601. a 13. &longs;int.
602. c 7.
603. a 5. nec ab ip&longs;ius.
d 6. prærepta.
13. memoret.
604. h 12. quod &longs;i non.
605. b 11. &longs;ecere.
d 10. veiutos.
609. a 14. innitantur.
c 15. temeie.
610. g 15. appetituum.
611. b 10.
eam quæ. c 14. cuenirent.
d 2. qua&longs;dam.
612. g 14. foret.
613. b 1. &longs;it qui.
7. primum.
9. can&longs;l&ecedil;.
c 1. occidere.
d 1. vis.
614.
f 11. prædicati. g 15. perfectionis.
615. c 14. determinatè.
c 3.
616. f 3. naturæ.
h 13. hæc autem in materiæ.
po&longs;lunt.
617. a 15. contingentiæ.
c 13.
619. c 1. ex communt.
620. c 1. in primis.
f 2. quodam nodo.
h 7. pa
trare. 621. d 9. &longs;it aliquid.
623. a 1. fato.
d 1. nimium.
624. g 2. terminum.
625. c 3. verum.
627. b 13. aqua item.
628. g 2.
inquiens. 3. materia.
8. &longs;enibus.
13.
629. a 11. &longs;eae.
b 13. eum locum.
d 9. auctoritate.
10. qua vniu.
12. ne hilum.
630. f 13. odit.
631. a 10. laba&longs;cit.
634. g 4. videri.
h 1. æ&longs;tate.
635. b 6. careant.
13. &longs;implicius.
636. g 4. &longs;uccedere.
hæc ha
benda e&longs;t bona mala'ue fortuna. &longs;imile.
h 7. Chymi&longs;tas.
14. arte.
637. a 15. eadem.
c 12. vel modum d 4. mytulos.
638. c 2.
ex &longs;emine & ex. 6. certa.
f 2. propagantur.
6.
11. immanentem.
640. e 8. &longs;ignificata.
g 2. arbitra
mur. 641. b 11. di&longs;&longs;iciles.
c 5.
EX LIBRO SEPTIMO.
644. g 9. cum veter.
646. g 3. exi&longs;tunt.
647. d 4. complexionem.
649. 21. &longs;entientem.
b 11. natura.
651. a 7. indicabitur.
b 5.
d 6. aerem.
652. c 7. è corp.
g 4. & vi&longs;enda.
653. a 6. Bibuli
ludis.
b 5. &longs;ubiectum.
12. ratio.
d 14. co tan
tum nomine. 655. c 2. materia pr&ecedil;cedat.
656. c 12. in &longs;ub&longs;tantia.
f 5. dictum.
7.
b 6. earum actus.
658. e 3. quantitas.
14. in &longs;equentib.
659. a 13. quæ per.
661. a 7. ob&longs;eruata.
662. e 4. pr&ecedil;
finitur etiam quae totidem modis actus & pote&longs;tas accipiuntur quot &longs;unt categoriæ. g 7. præmon&longs;tratorem.
664. quod e&longs;t ex fig.
g 8. &longs;olet.
665. c 13. vt vna.
669. a 13. decreuerimus.
d 5. ob&longs;eruari.
670. f 11. video quæ.
h 1. æqu&ecedil;.
671. d 3. potiuntur.
5.
fignum per &longs;e. 675. c 8.
7. propo&longs;ita.
h 12. e&longs;t.
678. g 13. &longs;it actu.
680. e 10. co nomine.
13. &longs;ectioni.
681. a 6. &longs;oli, c 1. horremus.
6.
d 7. labe&longs;actetur.
682. g 12. fine & propter aliud; propt.
6
ibid.
nec
c 8. &longs;en&longs;um.
686. e 12. tum fit.
687. c 5. tn qu&ecedil;
7. profe&longs;lus e&longs;t aliquid
688, g 10. virtutem, &longs;ic, 690. f 13. procedit. 691. a 7. ad auctu.
b 8,
693. a 13,
b 6. i.
aug.
c 12, nunc &longs;ub.
d 1. vti, non de&longs;unt qui.
8. natura calor.
694. h 14. actionem.
695. a 5. comminut&ecedil;.
10. in&longs;trumenta.
b 14. valet.
c 13. vinen
tib. 15. alimentitij.
696. g 4. &longs;eparatus.
697. b.
14. & qua&longs;i in ipio.
15. nequiuit.
698 h 8. adipi&longs;catur.
699. c 3 fundetur item
à nutr, 705. b 6. eædem. c 3. hæc nobis.
d 9. natura dicitur.
706, c 7. formam.
11. The&longs;ei.
12. remorum.
f 4. adæquat.
8. par
té prob. 9. verbis.
707. a 5. atqui.
6. tribueretur.
9. fit per.
11. fit per.
15. certi.
b 6. e&longs;t auct.
c 6. nec per &longs;eip&longs;am.
8.
poterunt. d 8. quæ &longs;ic.
11. &longs;tatuat.
13. ferunt.
708. g 13. vt eius bene.
14. qualitate talem hoc e&longs;t, h 4. motiones.
11. refici.
17. patiente conuenit inter.
709. a 10. permcet.
d 6. materiam qu&ecedil; toto.
710. f 7. debeat.
in tit.
euertuntur.
712. e 16. ab il
lis. g 4. huc.
7. di&longs;&longs;ecetur nullo.
9. ne exh.
713. b 15. niti.
c 1. partib.
cont.
714. c 6. in quo primo.
13. po&longs;simus.
715. a 6.
abjtu. b 16. vt exhaur.
d 5. Byzantij.
11. Fui&longs;&longs;ent.
716. f 6. videre e&longs;t.
7. ex qua.
9. augentur.
717. a 4.
b 13. certa.
d 4. cum effic.
8. ab&longs;entia.
12.
16. altero.
718. c 4.
5. Sed hæc.
g 8.
719. a 16. quale.
b 9. adnexa.
16, mutationem.
d 12. fue
720. e 3. quantitatis.
5. &longs;it calidius.
f 10.
g 2. nec plurib.
16. cau&longs;&longs;am.
h 15.
721.
a 4. &longs;uccedente. 9. naturam.
d 15. fuerint.
722. e 4. præter naturam.
8. pote&longs;t.
14. den&longs;atum.
EX LIBRO OCTAVO.
723. C 10.
724. e 9. po&longs;&longs;e&longs;sione.
10. ill&ecedil;.
726. g 14. huius e&longs;t actu.
h 7. &longs;ub
&longs;tantiæ. 12. & à c&ecedil;ter.
e 16. Eri&longs;&longs;ic
727. c 15. nexum.
d 1. propter &longs;e fines.
2. po&longs;teriora.
14. &longs;pecta.
728. e 6. &longs;ic ordin.
g 4.
fit fieri. 10. impedientia.
729. c 11. motus qui.
d 16. illarum.
730. h 8. &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;u.
732. f 14. inueniendum.
733. c 11. actus ac
cidentis ex actu. 734. e 8. totam.
f 4. rationis.
737. b 7. acris.
738. h 16. hoc meo.
739. b 13. qualitati.
740. f 9. ac generib.
h 17. mendis.
743. b 12. innitatur.
d 15. cum tamen.
745. b 12. quam.
746. e 16. ip&longs;e.
g 10. tertio.
747. b 11. aut verò 13.
c 7. intendi.
749. b 4. ab&longs;olute.
750. f 12. profe&longs;si.
g 4.
h 15. nemo.
752. e 8. reparari.
754. c 6. item.
755. c 5.
fic &longs;olum. 8. per actum &longs;ecundum.
756. fin tit.
clem&ecedil;ntis.
8. mouentur.
9. deletur.
757. d 12. effecta.
758, e 2. &longs;en&longs;um 4.
&longs;uperiora. 7. Ari&longs;totelea.
g 6. remi&longs;siorem.
8. vt mos.
759. b 5. nix.
6. cos exi&longs;tit, 12. materiæ.
d 5. obtinebat.
760. g 12. ad
illas. 761. a 5. perfectioris.
b 8. colorum.
762. e 7. nobis.
g 4. permi&longs;&longs;ione.
763. b 4. fit.
11. pictoribus.
14. non &longs;it.
c 4. philo
&longs;ophotum. 764. f 7. eget.
g 10. contracto.
766. e 5. vt ternuni.
h 13. halitus.
15. halitus.
767. c 8. acutam.
14. donare.
d 15
&longs;cquitur. 768. c 11. non e&longs;t.
770 g 3. mucronc.
771. b 6. & nigro.
d
772. f 8. contraria &.
g 2. vim.
h 16. ex
æquo. 773. b 14. accipiet.
774. f 14. qualitates.
h 7. ponantur.
14. ambig&longs;
775. a 10. quo ex.
d 1. &longs;int.
3. conditione
777. a 14. &longs;en&longs;iles.
d 15. & fine.
778. e 3. hos bon.
6. defendes.
779. a 3. & &longs;unt.
8.
d 14. nullius.
17. ita.
780. g 1. repa&longs;sio.
2.
15. benefica.
h 4. communicat.
&longs;unt entia.
781. c 9. acrem.
d 10. propriore.
782 e 16.
fundum. h 17. non pote&longs;t.
783. b 13. contractam.
d 17. accidenti.
784. e 10. quæalij.
11. innitatur.
f 8. perhibetur.
h 10.
producenda. 785 a 2. po&longs;itura.
5. &longs;it vt.
d 16. quos tamen.
786. g 14. luminis.
h 10. d
787. a 3. nulla.
788. f 15 potiri.
16. terminos omnes.
789. b 11. fuerit.
16. nimium.
c 10. vel ex extr.
790. e 4. ob
rem.
14. primæ.
15. euidentior.
791. a 7. ab altero.
c 15. &longs;pectari.
792. g 11. &longs;ummè.
794. e 11. infigantur.
g 8. vnum.
795. d 5. fuerint.
796. g 7.
m797. a 8. debilitatum.
9. ni&longs;u.
b 4.
9. omni.
d 8. naturalis.
798. g 6. explicata.
11. è voto.
h 4. contrariis.
6.
præ&longs;tantia. 12. quidé actu.
799. a 12.
d 8. denominationes.
800. h 6. circum.
801. a 1. facilis.
d 7. forma.
802. e 2. ab
illis. 4.
803. a 2.
805 a 2.
c 8. coniuctis.
d 2. fuerint.
806. e 10. & ne clem.
f 2. vt &longs;i 807. a 8. motu.
d 6. perhibetur.
808. h 15. pr&ecedil;&longs;tat.
809. a 11. motus.
EX LIBRO NONO.
814. F 3. ille fuer.
h 6. Si quem.
815. a 9. hoc e&longs;t.
b 3. ip&longs;um.
816 g 13. tantum.
817. b 14. dicta.
e 13. aut fit.
14. dcderit.
818. f 8. terminum.
9. conuexum.
819. c 13. motui.
820. f 14. abeant.
821. a 13. nulla enim ratio.
b 9. teporem.
c 5. lis ami
citia'ue. 822. f 2. &longs;ed.
h 1. gnauiter.
823. a 5. re&longs;pondeas.
824. e 7. &longs;it minus.
f 10. iudicantium.
h 16. cau&longs;&longs;a.
825. a 12. effc
ctuum. effectuum, & cau&longs;t.
d 3. excel&longs;æ.
11. diluam ag.
829. c 8. optimæ.
830. e 1.
11.
831. a 5. ni prius.
d 14. exagitatio.
832. g 3. quoad tamen.
h 7. propinquius.
833. d 1. cogno&longs;cat.
834. g 5. incœpto.
h 4. feriendo.
835. b 8. &longs;ie
836. f 2. fecerint.
837. c 6. indicat.
838. e 15. per &longs;&ecedil; mouere aut mou.
f 9. vt in homin.
g 1. & id in iis à
prouc. h 11. at qui hoc.
13. &longs;it id.
839. a 15. illa.
10. qua exord.
c 7 qua ratione.
8. duab.
d 15. à parte.
840. f 5. i.
amplius
repon. g 2. tangeret.
841. d 11. ip&longs;um.
842. f 2. perpetua.
3. e&longs;&longs;e potius.
g 11.
845. a 12. cœlo.
d 12. perno&longs;cen
das. 849. a 13. Hunc ctiam.
b 11. Tum.
d 2. vt color in ir.
851. a 9. te&longs;tantur.
d 11. expetit.
8
854. e 12 oppo&longs;itam.
g 11. quod certè.
856. g 10. conditionib.
h 13. erit eadem materia.
857. d 10 lucem aff.
859. d 10.
860. d 10. ac phy&longs;.
861. b 13. Ca
d 12. a&longs;&longs;cucratur.
862. g 5. totius primus.
863. c 4. aliam.
864. c 1. offen
dat. 9 obtineat.
11. motum aggr.
12. 13. qui vere triplic.
865. b 6. partes.
c 2. quæ pote&longs;tati &longs;ub
866. g 15 quae a
867. a 3. fit vt 868. e 12. 13. obiiciebatur.
869. a 11.
b 9. cau&longs;&longs;a vel in &longs;patij difformitate, vel in mou.
c 6. a ccedit.
870. f 15. con&longs;tituitis?
h 16. fit in &longs;om.
871. d 9. motum.
871. f 2. offeret.
873. d 12. Tertium.
874. h 8. &longs;anè vidctur.
875.
a 4. diuerla. d 16. punctus.
876. h 4. ne&longs;citur.
877. b 4. Quanuis autem hic.
c 3. duplicetur.
c 13. in tit.
tempori.
878. e 13.
qualitates. 879. b 12. e&longs;&longs;entiæ.
881. c 4. videntur.
13. &longs;egiegatus.
882. e 3. accommodare.
7. tempori obn.
884. f 13. mo
tus. h 10. moueatur.
885. b 9. perfectioris.
888. c 8. cur item.
h 12. decas.
889. c 16. natura.
d 10. e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;t.
891. a 1. ha
bebant. b 6. po&longs;sts.
c 7. my&longs;ticè.
EX LIBRO DECIMO.
892. F 5. hine.
g 12. in&longs;pectione.
894. e 3. dominante &longs;ic.
16. abeat oppugnare.
f 16. pullulant.
g 7. pote&longs;t.
vt
T. 44. 12. annis.
896. e 14. quae a&longs;sid.
g 4. liber.
5. &longs;implicem.
897. a 5. vt phy&longs;.
6. quid tantum.
d 5. luceant.
899. a 11. pote&longs;tas.
b 2. manant.
c 6. vt primum.
d 2. a materia.
900. e 1. quae quorum.
902. e 9. exacta.
h 14. intelligantur.
903. d 11. ducitur.
904. e 1. ip&longs;e vnum.
11.
f 14. Hic tibi.
905. a 1. ignoratur.
c 13. quidam perfectiores.
906. e 4.
demon&longs;trant. 7. e&longs;t g 7.
907. a 3. alteram qua.
12. &longs;it eius.
c 11. ac real.
988. e 13. ad actum à pote&longs;tate.
15. Ægidio.
g 13. nece&longs;&longs;ariò.
909. a 10. ex &longs;ubiecto.
d 13. modum.
neq Perip.
910. f 10. ip&longs;e tibi.
h 4. &.
911. a 16. generatione g 4.
&longs;it quan. 916. e 12. potiendam.
15. Lyc&ecedil;i.
f 7. &longs;uff.
g 11. at.
917. a 8. comparari.
918. f 16. Atid.
920. f 7. po&longs;&longs;e.
h 6. &longs;ic.
921.
a 9. perpetuus. 13. materiæ.
922. f 2. hic e&longs;t.
h 10. mtelligetur.
924. f 11. hyppopotamum & &longs;ic
g 2. &longs;uppe
ditant. 927 a 14. Indicabat.
b 5. fal&longs;a.
d 1. exce&longs;s
928. e 11. nummus.
f 4. nummus vnus nummus ad decem multò.
929.
a 2. &longs;uperiore. b 3. voco.
14. &longs;upremus.
c 9. primum.
d 11. &longs;iquis eius.
933. b 5. duab.
935. d 4. motas di&longs;.
936. e 4. optimæ
affe. g 11. labores.
13.
397. a 3.
938. e 1. Græcis &longs;i, 14. quam.
15. vna omnis.
f 2. beatitatis'ue.
h 12.
at mob. 939. a 15. motum e&longs;&longs;e.
b 9. non habcant &longs;ociam.
non po&longs;&longs;unt.
10. oporteat.
c 2. vniu&longs;modi.
941. c 13. &longs;imilis.
942. f 13. &longs;imile.
15. vbi.
h 13. quartum.
943. c 6. &longs;ic &.
945. c 11. naturam.
946. c 5. eflc cta.
f 10. quia &longs;ola.
g 4. nos con
turb. 5. ex his verò.
947. a 15. vt etiam.
b 4.
c 5. di&longs;tinguat pr&ecedil;&longs;entes.
948. c 2. verò.
f 12. e&longs;ficacitas.
g 9. re&longs;pi
ciat. 949. a 15. ill&ecedil;.
fit.
950. f 7. cum valeat.
g 14. Lyc&ecedil;o.
951. a 1. verò b 7. calida.
15. quod mouetur.
952. e 9. po&longs;&longs;et
15. diuiduum.
f 2. vt efficiens,
8. concludit.
953. b 2. vim 8. &longs;i h&ecedil;c.
d 7. vt aliud.
954. f 10. quem cum.
h 2.
memento. 955. b8. fuit.
8. Phy&longs;.
c 10. probet d 16. verlaretur.
956. e 1 debeat.
14. opponit.
f 15. e&longs;&longs;entia.
g 11 eas &longs;tr.
h 3. naturæ indicari.
958. g 13. cos 14. Ethici.
16. animalis.
959 b 1. vnum quod e&longs;t 5. differentem c 15. cogitat.
d 5. con
coepit. 960. g 15. animæ actum.
961. c 1. Dens.
962. c 5. &longs;int.
g 9. ip&longs;is Deo.
h 11. Sic ergo.
964. f 3. ædificator 967. b 8.
natura quicquid. 968. e 1. etenim cau&longs;&longs;a.
972. e 10.
g 8. pertineret.
h 17. coleret.
973. a 3. petens.
d 12 cumula
ti&longs;simè. 974 e
976. h 2 nos e&longs;&longs;e.
981. b 16. princeps.
c 2. in vno.
982. e 10. di&longs;&longs;oluitur in mat.
985. a 6.
ine&longs;t. 988, c 9. & in intell.
989. a 9. producuntur.
11. æterna 14. ni&longs;i forma.
d 10. idearum v&longs;us.
13. illa ctiam.
14. ex eo cau&longs;
&longs;am. 990. f 12. ab&longs;trahant.
h 2.
991. c 1. fit alia.
4. fota.
992 e 16. operationem.
993. b 2. cum &longs;it.
c.
in tit.
9. reluptatem.
f 13. pr&ecedil;ftitura.
995. a 10. cau&longs;&longs;a qua quom.
996. f 16. promouet.
997. d 7. ille
Pherecy den puto. 999. b 9.
d 2.
1000. 25. pr&ecedil;&longs;tare non po&longs;&longs;.
9. bonæ val.
d 2. Pammonem.
1003.
a 13. b 13.
d 13. habeant'ne.
1004. g 1. à primis.
12. motus aùt.
1005. b 8. ade
ptum. 1006. e 10. officia.
14. Cholcodea, 1007. a 10. functionum.
b 3. 4. &longs;in vt de cau&longs;&longs;a proxima, & efficiente 1008. e 10.
12. apparabit.
1009. b 10. motionis.
c 4. dirigantur.
5. limitantur.
d 7. Hyda&longs;pes.
14. cultam.
adoration, 1010. g
13. &longs;alus. 1011. moueb.
d 5. angu&longs;ti&longs;sima.
11. tibi ip&longs;i charis.
Gr&ecedil;ca, ne lectores erratorum multitudine terrerent, humanitati
eorum
commendantur.
FRANCISCI
BONAMICI
PHILOSOPHI FLORENTINI
IN PISANO GYMNASIO
PROFITENTIS.
DE MOTV LIBER PRIMVS.
DE MVNERE PHILOSOPHI NATVRALIS.
Proœmium.
Motvs initia
venari proximè opero&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e atque diffi
cile, & multa de ip&longs;o volumina à Peripateticorum principe edita
la in eius Nam &longs;iue copia theo
in motus e&longs;&longs;entia ve&longs;tiganda nobis &longs;e&longs;e obiiciunt: etenim per&longs;i&longs;tit
parum motus; nec eius aliud quicquam, ni&longs;i pars aliqua, &longs;tabilis obtinens, quin' potius indiuiduus qui
dam finis eius tantummodò extat; vt facillimè elabatur: tum
quae multa complectitur, quæ naturis inter &longs;e di&longs;creta tantam caligi Augebat quoque difficultatem, quia plurima flagitaret, vt con&longs;titui po&longs;&longs;et.
Nullum enim cau&longs;
&longs;&ecedil; genus exi&longs;tit, ex quo non pendear motus: tempus item re&longs;picit.
&longs;ingula verò com
plura nobis &longs;uppeditant quidem, quæ dicamus; &longs;ed ea certè plena &longs;alebrarum & dubitationis;
verùm quæ præclaram philo&longs;ophandi occa&longs;ionem Quare
audaciæ forta&longs;&longs;e nobis ad&longs;cribetur, qui
veri perno&longs;cendi,
&longs;peculationis
mitis modis, à multis vitæ
cuius multò maxima parse&longs;t quæ de motu ampli&longs;sima præmia proponi,
&longs;ola bene
delectar, quàm laboris tum &longs;eip&longs;am &longs;uperat,
ver&longs;atur in rebus hone&longs;ti&longs;simis, in quibus optimo iure contemplatio motus numerari pote&longs;t.
His adde quàm &longs;it eius animaduer&longs;io nece&longs;&longs;aria, cùm planè informet
&longs;ibi propo&longs;uit ad explicandum illud
lati&longs;simè patet, atque adeò, vt ni&longs;i aciem mentis acerrimè intendas, &longs;olum tibi, inter ea quæ &longs;unt,
occurrat, certam
materiæ &longs;ubiectæ rationem in methodo illa ponit: ex quo efficitur, vt cuncta in &longs;cientia natura
li ad eius &longs;tateram reuocari oporteat. Hæc quidem per
ad omne genus v&longs;us ab homine accomodatur, & qua&longs;i officina
de &longs;upellex diuinæ contemplationis expromatur. Proinde
nis in tractatione motus impenditur. Oper&ecedil;precium ergo facturum eum confido, qui toto pe
ctore negocium de motu &longs;u&longs;ci piat, in explicando &longs;uam operam collocet.
Magna enim prin
cipij vis e&longs;t, vt
tum prædicetur. reb.
agendis, tum maximè in philo&longs;ophando
veri
tate ve&longs;tiganda, rationem
modi principia Sicut
petuò durare po&longs;&longs;unt: &longs;i minus; quicquid adiicitur breni corruat nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: &longs;ic de &longs;cienti&ecedil; prin
cipiis, & fundamentis cogitare oporter. Exigua &longs;anè principia &longs;unt; at verò maximè pollent.
Ex quo e&longs;ficitur, vt, quemadmodum in itinere faciendo paruus error ab initio maximus euadit
in extremo: &longs;ic principiis in methodo malè fundatis, demum longi&longs;simè aberremus à vero. Vnico enim dato ab&longs;urdo plurima &longs;uccedunt.
atque, vt monet Plato, velut in de&longs;cribendis figu
ris mathematicis, &longs;i exiguum quoddam primum ignotum &longs;it, reliqua deinceps multa
con&longs;en
no&longs;tris
Solet illa rectè &longs;ub manus &longs;uccedere:
Atque ædepol fe
Sic ei procedit po&longs;t principia. Denique &longs;i malus,
Aut nequam e&longs;t, malères vertunt quas agit:
Sin autem frugi e&longs;t, eueniunt frugaliter.
Idcirco multùm principiis in&longs;i&longs;tendum,
con&longs;iderandum vtrum rectè nec'ne
decernantur. his verò probè examinatis & qua&longs;i fundamentis benè iactis cætera cum ip&longs;is con
gruenter &longs;ubiicere &longs;uccedet. No&longs;trum igitur inftitutum e&longs;t nune naturam motus accuratè per
quirere & qua&longs;i in vnum breue corpus omnia cogere, qu&ecedil; pa&longs;sim ex communi &longs;en&longs;u doctorum
di&longs;cu&longs;&longs;a & à philo&longs;ophis acerrimè di&longs;putata &longs;unt;
no&longs;tri &longs;ententias de re ob&longs;cu
ri&longs;sima pronunciare, no&longs;trum dimi&longs;&longs;o omni partium &longs;tudio liberè, at non licenter
interponere; quibus etiam non pauca de no&longs;tro contexuimus; nimis forta&longs;&longs;e confidenter eorum
iudicio, qui maximè tribuunt (vt certè
dicare velint, & in intima no&longs;tra pr&ecedil;cordia penetrarint, vt proficiamus nos, & aliis prode&longs;&longs;e po&longs;
&longs;imus, neque pœnas huius audaciæ declinemus, dum no&longs;trorum dictorum reddere rationem,
& meliora dicentibus au&longs;cultare parati &longs;umus,
tempta
aut iniquitate factionum, aut etiam iniuria temporum à pura illa peripatetica di&longs;ciplina, anti
qua illa quidem, non tamen eiu&longs;modi, quæ debuerit, vt iam cœpit, antiquari, tam longo tempo
ris ætatum tractu lap&longs;a fuerant: quibus item acce&longs;sit acre
h&ecedil;ret tenaci&longs;simè; neque minus di&longs;trahit in diuer&longs;as opiniones, quàm
tas ad varia &longs;tudia pro&longs;equenda Neque
ab initiis &longs;tudiorum &longs;it imbutus: etenim quemadmodum celeriter arripiuntur; ita diutius re
tinentur, & à teneris annis amplexa vehementius amantur. ac veluti lanarum colores, quibus
&longs;implex ille candor mutatus e&longs;t, elui nequeunt; &longs;ic ea quæ rudes animi perceperunt non &longs;ine
&longs;ummo labore excutiuntur, quo fit etiam, vt cætera lentè probentur; ne dixerim,
funditus repudientur & re&longs;puantur. Quamobrem ferunt Theodorum tragœdum nobili&longs;simum
nulli concedere con&longs;ue&longs;&longs;e, vt ante &longs;e prodiret in &longs;cenam, quia nimirùm primis auditionibus &longs;pe
ctatorum animi nimium conciliarentur. Nos, quoad potuimus, Ari&longs;totelis vnius ve&longs;tigiis in
h&ecedil;&longs;imus, & ex interpretum &longs;ententiis illas &longs;ecreuimus quas ab ip&longs;o Ari&longs;totele profici&longs;ci, &longs;i non
per&longs;picuum &longs;it; at nos ita e&longs;&longs;e per&longs;uadere conati &longs;umus; vt neque etiam nos indu&longs;tria no&longs;tra
minus confi&longs;i quàm approbati&longs;simorum hominum auctoritatem &longs;ecuti fui&longs;&longs;e, nec ab eorum
&longs;ententia, ni&longs;i coacti di&longs;ce&longs;si&longs;&longs;e iure optimo videri debeamus. Quæcunque tamen ea &longs;int, quæ
con&longs;crip&longs;imus, non &longs;ine pertinaci labore confecta &longs;unt. Sæpius enim
hæc animaduerte
re oportebat: Platonis) ante
con&longs;picere, ne fortè deciperemur à nobis ip&longs;is: quaquidem fraude nulla magis e&longs;t capitalis:
quandò nunquam &longs;eductor abe&longs;t, nec vllo tempore à decepti latere diuellitur: ip&longs;a &longs;e&longs;e
abdidit in profundum. &longs;i quidem ea &longs;it conditio principiorum, vt Tantum.
minora,
Quàm quæ primùm oculi cœptant non po&longs;&longs;e tueri.
Quo circa neque mirùm e&longs;&longs;e debet, &longs;i res aut minus iucunda, aut etiam grauior,
videatur, e&longs;t enim methodi no&longs;træ ianua tri&longs;ti&longs;sima: verùm &longs;i prima tempora toleraueris (qui
vnus e&longs;t labor) non dubito, quin mirifica voluptate complearis. memineris, in cape&longs;&longs;endis
phy &longs;ic&ecedil; principiis ita faciendum e&longs;&longs;e, velut iis, quos vexat febris, aut quorum pars aliqua com
putruit, vt enim valeant, amari&longs;simos &longs;uccos bibere coguntur, cibis parcere, aridum quoque ne
colluant os frigida cauere; aut, quod grauius e&longs;t, ferrum pati: &longs;ic tibi, vt animo valeas,
magis, quo pretium maius e&longs;t animæ quam corpori, cuius morbus
e&longs;t in&longs;citia, &longs;alus autem di&longs;ciplina. En igitur naturæ prim
platione nunquam tractantur &longs;atis. Occa&longs;io vero &longs;cribendi voluminis ab ea controner&longs;ia &longs;um
pta e&longs;t, qu&ecedil; in Academia Pi&longs;ana inter no&longs;tros auditores ex orta e&longs;t de motu elemen
torum. Sed cùm multa quæ&longs;tio requireret, quæ de motu & natura generatim dicenda e&longs;&longs;ent,
primo con&longs;ilio &longs;ecundum &longs;ucce&longs;sit, vt de motu di&longs;ceptaremus vniuersè
communiter & &longs;peciatim perquireremus, ac &longs;ingulas partes & membra intueremur, cuncta faci
lius percipi po&longs;&longs;e &longs;perantes, &longs;i tota quæ&longs;tio &longs;cribendo explicaretur. Sed ne nimium longa &longs;u
matur oratio, de re ip&longs;a iam dicere incipiamus. Cœptis no&longs;tris Deus a&longs;piret, vt quod illo au
tore velle cœpimus, eodem etiam adiutore con&longs;equamur.
Cap.
I.
Optime verò factum e&longs;&longs;e arbitror, &longs;i in hac methodo bonos imitati mathematicos, aliqua
veluti fundamenta iaciamus, &longs;uper quib.
mur, extrui valeat. erunt verò hæc principia &longs;iue hypothe&longs;es, quibus phy&longs;ici &longs;ine demon&longs;tratione
frequentius vtuntur, vt enim docet Proclus principia &longs;ecundum naturam &longs;unt in rebus quidem
cau&longs;&longs;a, vt finis; in definitionibus di&longs;tinctio; in demon&longs;trationibus & &longs;cientiis hypothe&longs;es,
met&longs;i ab Ari&longs;totele prætermi&longs;&longs;a nouimus, vt pote per&longs;picua, & &longs;iquando opus fuerit ex analyti
co præcepto v&longs;urpata:
&longs;icis imprudenter etiam numerant aliquot conclu&longs;iones & &longs;uis locis ab Ari&longs;totele demon&longs;tratas,
aut multas item prætereunt, quæ pa&longs;sim ab Ati&longs;totele ip&longs;o, aut &longs;ine admonitione accipiuntur,
aut declarantur &longs;olùm; & nulla vi &longs;yllogi&longs;tica allata per&longs;uadentur. Neque tamen exi&longs;times ve
lim, me huc omnia conge&longs;si&longs;&longs;e, quæ à philo&longs;opho naturali &longs;ine demon&longs;tratione &longs;umuntur & &longs;o
lo &longs;en&longs;us auxilio note&longs;cunt, nimis enim putidum atque importunum fui&longs;&longs;et &longs;ingula recen&longs;ere;
&longs;ed ea quæ perpetuò &longs;ic &longs;e habent, & ad cape&longs;&longs;enda proxima demon&longs;trationum principia con
ferunt,
illa quòd homo &longs;edeat, aut tunica &longs;it alba: nihil enim hæc faciunt ad &longs;cientias, quanuis certi&longs;si
ma &longs;int, atque ex iis illa enarraie quæ crebrius occurrunt & &longs;unt veluti radices, vnde tanquam
&longs;oboles, complures aliæ pululent. Neque id ob&longs;tabit, quominus in numero hypothe&longs;eon &
principiorum, quæ demon&longs;trari non po&longs;sint, aliqua reponantur, de quibus multa di&longs;putari
&longs;olent, & plura verba vltrò nobis enim &longs;atis illud erit, &longs;i ita e&longs;&longs;e crediderint, qui
talia pronunciata oppugnant, licet voce aliter autu
phi&longs;ticis rem conficiant, nam parum à nob. hoc loco curabuntur: etenim verum cum vero per
petuò congruit: fal&longs;um non modo à vero, &longs;ed à &longs;eip&longs;o per&longs;&ecedil;pe di&longs;&longs;entit.
euenit, vt quædam con&longs;picua &longs;int, &longs;i prima fronte &longs;pectentur; veruntamen intus latebr&ecedil; con
duntur: hæ ni&longs;i intro&longs;piciantur, rei veritatem conturbare po&longs;&longs;unt: vt illa omnia ferè, quæ pri
mo Phy&longs;. ab Ari&longs;totele commemorantur, & in confu&longs;a referuntur, etenim liquet omne id
quod fit, ex contrario fieri, &longs;iquis autem opponat materiam veluti non contrarium, ex qua
fiat id quod fit, verè opponet & per&longs;uadebit non omne id quod fit, ex contrario con&longs;titui, &longs;ic
principium noti&longs;simum concutere videbitur. Verùm nos hîc corticem duntaxat attingemus
po&longs;thàc peragraturi rece&longs;&longs;us; iis po&longs;itis qu&ecedil; qui&longs;que vir &longs;ani iudicij & in rerum naturalium con
tem platione ver&longs;atus, nec aliena con&longs;uetus audire,
bit. probè &longs;cientes eum, qui mentis imbecillitate laborat,
dine deflexus e&longs;t, & analytica negligens
non admitteret, & illorum demon&longs;trationes quærere, quæ per &longs;e ip&longs;a con&longs;picua &longs;unt,
res ob&longs;curas accipere pro noti&longs;simis. Tali igitur auditori principia proponimus, qui futurus &longs;it
phy&longs;icus, nec aliarum &longs;cientiarum merita occupare decreuerit; ni&longs;i quantum h&ecedil;c velut à &longs;uperio
re quem &longs;ubalternantem vocant, offerentur, aut etiam velut à mini&longs;tro Architectori, quem pri
mum philo&longs;ophum, aut Theologum volumus e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;uppeditabuntur. Qu&ecedil; pluribus modis pri
mùm di&longs;tribuentur, vt in &longs;uas cla&longs;&longs;es &longs;ine vllo negocio redigi po&longs;sint, deinde in v&longs;um quotidia
num tanquam ex certo penu depromi. Ea verò nos in duo generalia capita partimur.
&longs;unt enim
principia cognitionis &longs;olum, vel principia cognitionis & rei &longs;imul; &longs;iue complexa &longs;int, &longs;iue incom
plexa, nihil refert, neque enim ita difficiles, aut moro&longs;i &longs;umus, vt ex huin&longs;modi principiorum
ordine incomplexa expungamus; qui nouerimus Ari&longs;totelem ea pronunciare motione ignorata,
latere vt incom
plexum, neque enim quæritur, an hoc vel illud moueatur; &longs;ed motio quid &longs;it, nec quenquam fu
giat e&longs;&longs;e aliquod principium, quo termini cogno&longs;cuntur, ex quib. &longs;truitur demon&longs;tratio,
ex principiis cognitionis,
ita ab Ari&longs;totele principium primum demon&longs;trationis in &longs;uas partes fui&longs;&longs;e di&longs;tributum: at, quin
&longs;ententia, non licet,
e&longs;&longs;e &longs;imul ea quæ &longs;int principia &longs;olius e&longs;&longs;e, nulla &longs;tatuimus, quod quidam aiunt:
gerimus apud Ari&longs;totelem,
quib. & quot con&longs;tet, teneatur.
Igitur omnia è quibus aliquid con&longs;tat, &longs;unt principia cognitio
nis eius, nam quanuis ex illo ordine videatur e&longs;&longs;e materia, po&longs;tea docebimus, etiam materiam,
vbi fiat intelligenda, principium cognitionis euadere. Principia verò cognitionis tantum illa
&longs;unt, quæ nob. nota ab Ari&longs;totele ponuntur; &longs;iue ea &longs;int effectus proprij & per &longs;e, è quibus vt an
tecedentibus demon&longs;tratio &longs;truitur à &longs;igno, & quorum facto quodam gyro mentis, quem regre&longs;
&longs;um, &longs;eu circulum dicunt; intelligitur cau&longs;&longs;a ope demon&longs;trationis ip&longs;ius propter quid e&longs;t. Sine
etiam &longs;int alia adiacentia & comitantia rei.
promi&longs;cuè &
nium proprius non pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e motus, cùm toto genere di&longs;tinguantur, veluti naturalis & mathe
matica. demon&longs;trationes autem ip&longs;ius quod e&longs;t aut ein&longs;dem &longs;int &longs;cientiæ, qu&ecedil; docet cau&longs;&longs;am,
vbi vna ad alteram &longs;e habeat, vt inferior ad &longs;uperiorem. Quapropter hoc principiorum genus
ab altero &longs;eparatur, quia non obtinet vim cau&longs;&longs;æ. Secundum genus principiorum omne genus
cau&longs;&longs;æ complectitur: quandò omnes cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; generatim in demon&longs;trationibus a&longs;&longs;umi queunt, &longs;ed
præcipuè pertinet ad interna principia quæ &longs;unt materies & forma: quod tibi qui iam analytica
tracta&longs;ti pluribus
demon&longs;tratione contineantur, principia verò rei comprehendantur actu; largior ero in a&longs;&longs;umen
dis principiis cognitionis, & &longs;i quando opus fuerit, vt in demon&longs;tratione quòd e&longs;t, etiam nota no
bis v&longs;urpabo. Quæcunque tamen principia &longs;int, idcirco principia &longs;unt, quia non requiritur
rum
ri
&longs;as &longs;uperiores, per quas o&longs;tendantur. Verùm in ea methodo, cuius principia &longs;unt, vt aliis modis
manife&longs;ta &longs;umuntur. Modi verò multi &longs;unt, ac &longs;i generales omninm modos recen&longs;ere libeat,
quibus principia tùm in philo&longs;ophia contemplante, tùm in agente, ac demum in &longs;cientiis, & arti
bus
tur; &longs;ed nihil de illis &longs;peciatim dicitur. Vnus e&longs;t qui &longs;olum re&longs;picit eam philo&longs;ophiæ partem,
quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in agendo, e&longs;t verò per con&longs;uetudinem: quando nimirum bene maléue agendo &longs;ic
aut aliter a&longs;&longs;ueuimus, & ex actionis illius frequentia contrahimus habitum, quo &longs;ic aut aliter iu
dicare cogimur, vt qui furando &longs;æpius eua&longs;it in furem, furtum iudicat bonum, & hoc illi veluti
principium e&longs;t con&longs;uetudine partum furtum e&longs;&longs;ebonum. Reliqui modi in omne methodorum
genus conuenire po&longs;&longs;unt vt inductio, qua plurium &longs;ingularium &longs;imilitudo colligitur,
liqueNanque inductione percipimus, &longs;i ab æquis æqua demantur, æqua e&longs;&longs;e quæ
&longs;uper&longs;unt, &longs;en&longs;u cogno&longs;cimus aquam e&longs;&longs;e frigidam, & primas primorum corporum qualitates. Aliis quoque modis principia no&longs;cuntur quos Ari&longs;toteles non exprimit.
Sed optimè Auerroes,
optimè item Eu&longs;tratius enuclearunt. Auerroes inquiens &longs;ignificari vias illas, quæ nullam vim af
ferunt menti, vt diui&longs;ionem, id quod etiam docuit Ari&longs;toteles,
ta natura, nobis autem ignota, fieri nobis per&longs;picua diuidendo & re&longs;oluendo illa quæ nobis per
&longs;picua &longs;unt. Additur item &longs;yllogi&longs;mus quem vocant hypotheticum per naturam, in quo nulla
extat vis dicti de omni, aut nullo, &longs;ed nece&longs;sitas &longs;ola con&longs;ecutionis, tùm quoque exemplum. præterea &longs;i vera de v&longs;u dialectic&ecedil; prædicat Ari&longs;toteles,
Nam
præter c&ecedil;tera multum confert dialectica ad inuentionem principiorum, qu&ecedil; &longs;cienti&ecedil; &longs;ibi &longs;umunt. Valet item ad hoc definitio principiorum, vt frigoris & caloris: quod item Socrates approbauit
in principiis exquirendis, imò excogitauit. Nam duo &longs;unt quæ Socrati iure proprio tribui po&longs;
&longs;unt,vtraque autem ad &longs;cientiæ principia
conferunt. Magna etiam vis e&longs;t experientiæ quæ na&longs;citur ex memoria rerum quas &longs;en&longs;us &longs;emel
atque iterum &longs;uppeditat: nanque ex repetita &longs;en&longs;ione memoria propagatur: muliæ verò eiu&longs;
dem rei memori&ecedil;
cipiorum cognitio gignitur.
ex a&longs;trologica experientia colliguntur: nanque ob&longs;eruatis apparentibus quantum &longs;atis e&longs;t, inuen
t&ecedil; &longs;unt a&longs;trologic&ecedil; demon&longs;trationes modo principia &longs;e habent in alia
tia vel arte. Itaque experimentum ea &longs;ubmini&longs;trat, qu&ecedil; verè in&longs;unt in rebus quorum &longs;i nihil
omi&longs;&longs;um fuerit, in promptu erit illa demon&longs;trare, qu&ecedil; demon&longs;trationem recipiunt, cuius verò
non e&longs;t demon&longs;tratio &longs;uapte natura, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;unt principia quæ nos hoc ip&longs;o tempore tracta
mus, ea manife&longs;ta facere. Quamobrem monente Ari&longs;totele plurimum pote&longs;t in &longs;cientiæ prin
cipiis &longs;tatuendis experientia. Quo miror magis hoc caput ab Auerroe prætermi&longs;&longs;um.
Ni&longs;i cum
con&longs;uetudinem experientia con&longs;equatur, quippe quòd omnis con&longs;uetudo po&longs;tulet
Atqui mihi magis iudicium Eu&longs;tratij probatur aliud facientis experientiam à con&longs;uetudine:
&longs;ingularium con&longs;imilium, vt quòd rhabarbarum purget flauam bilem, in hoc & illo ægroto ex
perimur; nec quicquam propterea con&longs;ueuimus. Quoniam verò dicere po&longs;&longs;es non omnem pla
nè &longs;ed aliquam experientiam cum con&longs;uetudine conuenire, o&longs;tendam ego id e&longs;&longs;e ex euento &
fortuitò, non nece&longs;&longs;ario & per &longs;e, quando multæ &longs;unt con&longs;uetudines, quæ &longs;ine vlla aduer&longs;ione,
&longs;en&longs;u notitiaúe contrahuntur, veluti quòd &longs;ibi qui&longs;piam vellicet barbam, aut curuus incedat, &longs;ine
illis verò nulla experientia n.
ob&longs;ecrò experimenti facies, ni&longs;i aduerteris?
quid
aduerteris, ni&longs;i noueris aut &longs;en&longs;eris? Hæc quidem omnia, quæ nuper commemorauimus princi
&longs;imè cogno&longs;cit & maximè credit, & ad eorum normam refert omnia, quæ con&longs;equuntur. Sed
cum è principiis rerum nonnulla &longs;int euidentia, neque præmon&longs;tratorem po&longs;tulent, alia recon
dita &longs;int & ignota nobis ea quæ paulò ante recen&longs;uimus, omne principiorum genus amplectun
tur, &longs;iue notum &longs;it nobis &longs;iue ignotum. Verumenimuero con&longs;ilium no&longs;trum e&longs;t in naturalis &longs;cien
tiæ ve&longs;tibulo con&longs;tituere illa quæ &longs;ine acri ratione note&longs;cunt, & in notis nobis
po&longs;teriora, &longs;eu priora natura, quæ de domo quicunque afferre &longs;olet, aut paucis admonitus à præ
ceptore, admittere; quæ in &longs;en&longs;u & experientia poni dicimus, & accipi ita e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olum, quia &longs;cili
cet nulla eorum cau&longs;&longs;a afferatur. Quocirca dictum quoque e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele
principium, non illud &longs;anè, quod legitur 2. Po&longs;t.
nulli Ethicorum interpretes opinantur; &longs;ed id, quod numeratur in præcognitis. Etenim prin
cipia &longs;ic præno&longs;cuntur, quòd &longs;unt. In phy&longs;icis autem à &longs;en&longs;u, & experientia trahunt originem,
his verò nititur inductio, quæ princi piis proximè terminatur; vnde mini&longs;terio facultatis &longs;entien
tis opera mentis &longs;uccedit. Hinc pendet vniuer&longs;a fides, qu&ecedil; demon&longs;trationibus habetur, quia per
&longs;e credunt, atque ita, vt cæteris, quæ deducuntur ab ip&longs;is, fidem communicent: neque enim cau&longs;
&longs;a vlla e&longs;t, cur vera &longs;int: &longs;ed quod ita principiorum termini &longs;e habent, vt aut indi&longs;&longs;olubili vincu
lo connectantur, aut quòd alter alterius rationem compleat. Ideo no&longs;cimus & credimus, quia
nouit mens eorum terminos,
non dubitet. Neque enim volumus e&longs;&longs;entialem illam connexionem quam aiunt imitatores
Auerrois, in vno indiuiduo percipi, aut ab vna inductionis particula &longs;ignificari, &longs;ed inductione
iam ab&longs;oluta, vt conuenit, quæ illic terminatur, vnde non &longs;uccurrit aliquod indiuiduum aliter
&longs;e habens: rem melius
affecti &longs;umus ad principia, quàm ad ea, quæ per demon&longs;trationem concepimus. Sed enim, quia
primus eorum exortus e&longs;t à &longs;en&longs;u, ip&longs;i verò præ&longs;entantur confu&longs;æ quædam &longs;pecies, & inh&ecedil;rentia
cum &longs;ubiectis, quibus inhærent, vt ri&longs;us compos in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, & in linea punctum, atque in &longs;ub
&longs;tantia &longs;enTum etiam, quòd tamet &longs;i incomplexa &longs;unt principia cogni
tionis, &longs;unt tamen remota: pronunciata verò & propo&longs;itiones &longs;unt proxima principia cognitio
nis, & demon&longs;trationis; ex hoc efficitur, vt non incomplexa pro principiis ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;tatuan
tur; &longs;ed &longs;ub forma hypothe&longs;eon, neque quòd &longs;int &longs;impliciter, vt plurimum pronunciamus; &longs;ed
vt inhærentia &longs;umimus, vbi e&longs;&longs;e adiacet, & pr&ecedil;dicatur. Itaque non dicimus &longs;æpius e&longs;&longs;e motum,
&longs;eu multitudinem, neque item e&longs;&longs;e naturam; quoniam hæc &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ili non exi&longs;tunt,
&longs;ed ita pronunciamus.
cie, aut numero, alii&longs;úe differentia modis. &longs;iquidem omnes has di&longs;tinctiones &longs;en&longs;us ip&longs;e patefa
ciat Atque hactenus de gene
rali principiorum con&longs;titutione dictum &longs;it, ad &longs;pecialia de&longs;cendamus.
Tim.
T. 25.
zar.
T. 9.
&longs;eg.
3.
1. Eth. c.
9.
Tt.
22. 26.
T. 71.
1. De ortu.
T. 14.
7. Eth. c.
10.
De Mem. cap.
3.
T.
26.
T.
1.
T. 6.
Tt.
5 25.
Tab.
principia
turalis.
1.
Phy&longs;.
T. 35.
mat. 1. Po
fter. c.
25.
T. 22.
T. 30.
cap.
7.
T. 3.
cap.
2.
cap.
4.
T. vit.
&longs;eg.
2.
&longs;um.
1.
te dicendi
cap. 10.
cap.
7.
T. 9.
8. Phy&longs;. T. 22.
T. 12.
pertinentia tanguntur. Cap.
II.
Qvia methodus omnis ex duabus partibus componitur modo &longs;ciendi nimirùm & &longs;cien
tia.
quibus viis atque rationibus confirmandum, & quo quidque loco di&longs;ponendum. Scientia rem
ip&longs;am declarante & definiente, demon&longs;trante, & docente; etiam methodi principia ad h&ecedil;c duo
capita commodè referri poterunt; erunt enim aliqua principia, quæ modum &longs;ciendi &longs;pectabunt,
nonnulla quæ &longs;cientiam re&longs;picient. Verum &longs;icut in methodo ratio tractandi, &longs;eu modus &longs;ciendi
&longs;cientiæ præponendus e&longs;t,
de principus, quæ pertinent ad modum tractandi, priore loco verba faciemus. Atque ea qui
dem non pauca &longs;unt, horum primas &longs;ibi vendicat, cum in omni contemplatione, tùm maximè in
dicio &longs;en&longs;us. Etenim et&longs;i generale e&longs;t in omni contemplatione &longs;en&longs;us officium: quia nihil e&longs;t in
phanta&longs;ia mentéue quod fores &longs;en&longs;uum non pepulerit, &longs;iue ex toto, vt in vera phanta&longs;ia, &longs;iue ex
parte, vt in fictione chimçræ, &longs;iuè proximè & per &longs;e, vt plenum, &longs;iue per aliud, vt inane, ac
rei &longs;en&longs;u deficiente, eiu&longs;dem At hoc in phy&longs;iologia poti&longs;simè requiritur.
Nam &longs;i philo&longs;ophus naturalis in terum &longs;en&longs;ilium con
templatione ver&longs;atur, earum verò nullus melior iudex e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t quàm &longs;en&longs;us
mum &longs;en&longs;us habebit in hac philo&longs;ophia momentum, v&longs;que adeò, vt qui rerum illarum, quæ &longs;ic
euidentes & per&longs;picuæ &longs;unt, velut illud e&longs;t, quòd &longs;it motus, demon&longs;trationem quæri
ceat e&longs;&longs;e motum, non po&longs;sit di&longs;cernere id, quod per &longs;e ip&longs;um votum e&longs;t ab eo, quod e&longs;t per &longs;e ob
&longs;curum, nec per&longs;picere, cùm
nihil occurrere po&longs;&longs;e, quod &longs;it eo notius, quod ip&longs;e con&longs;equens facit, idcirco &longs;ic mente obc&ecedil;ca
tus e&longs;t, vt ne&longs;ciat quid admittat aut re&longs;puat demon&longs;trationem.
tur, qui cæcus e&longs;t ab ortu; cum enim colorum vires ignoret, &longs;iquando di&longs;&longs;erat deillis, &longs;olùm no
mina ponit in medio; quorum nomina &longs;int nota, pror&longs;us ignotat.
nem requiret eius quod quippiam moueatur, nominis &longs;olius habebit rationem, nec quid eo no
mine &longs;ignificetur, vtique nouerit. qui certè &longs;i no&longs;&longs;et; tantum abe&longs;t, vt illa demon&longs;trare conare
tur, vt potius in aliorum demon&longs;tratione v&longs;urparet. Multo maior error committetur, &longs;i ratio
rei ve&longs;tigabitur, cuius oppo&longs;ituin &longs;en&longs;us iudicabit, vt illi fecere, qui vniuer&longs;a quie&longs;cere profiteban
tur, euenti rationes indagabant.
&longs;en&longs;us, quàm &longs;i vlla ratio ad id o&longs;tendendum accommodari po&longs;let, atque is qui ita progreditur,
male iudicat, quid melius peiu&longs;úe &longs;it, quid credendum, & non credendum, nec principium di
&longs;tinguit ab eo quod non e&longs;t principium,Etenim ad ali
quod primum a&longs;cendendum e&longs;t,
confirmationem ducatur aliter, vel ex infinitate principiorum vniuer&longs;a &longs;cientia funditus euerte
retur, aut exordiatur ab ignoto. Quamobrem qui magis ver
&longs;ati &longs;unt in naturalibus magis recipiunt principia quæ cum rerum natura con&longs;entiant, & valde
accommodata &longs;int ad efficiendam &longs;cientiam. &longs;uppeditat enim copia multarum demon&longs;tratio
num, quarum auxilio rem intro&longs;piciant. eaque diligenter animaduer&longs;a, con&longs;iderata tarditate
iudicium faciant cum ceteroquin illi qui dimi&longs;&longs;a rerum ob&longs;eruatione &longs;olam rationem per&longs;e
quuntur pauca re&longs;picientes de rebus ob&longs;curi&longs;simis ex tempore temereque effutiant.
con&longs;entaneum &longs;it iudicare ex euentis, & ex fine poti&longs;simum. Atqui finis &longs;cientiæ naturalis e&longs;t
eorum &longs;peculatio, quæ &longs;emper proprie &longs;en&longs;ui &longs;e obijciunt.in pe&longs;
&longs;imos errores inducuntur. Quin &longs;iquando ratio quippiam mon&longs;tret, & po&longs;tea &longs;en&longs;us indicet rem aliter &longs;e habere, &longs;en&longs;ui
magis erit quam rationi fides habenda.
&longs;trantur cum rebus ijs con&longs;entiant, quæ &longs;en&longs;u percipiuntur.
ad &longs;en&longs;um referenda erunt. Audi verò tu nunc firmum iudicium Ari&longs;totelis, de con&longs;truendis
rationibus ac mea quidem &longs;ententia, in omni philo&longs;ophia generatim, præcipuè verò in natura
li:
quaque ducatur huiu&longs;modi verò e&longs;t, quam &longs;emper, e&longs;&longs;e oportet, aut quæ ex con&longs;imilibus o&longs;ten
ditur. Atque vbi duæ &longs;int &longs;ententiæ repugnantes, quarum altera alteram tollat, illa recipienda,
quæ firmior: ea verò e&longs;t, quæ credibilior, & quæ &longs;emper citius ab omnibus quàm altera admit
tatur. It aque & quod ex tali &longs;ententia con&longs;equitur, magis approbandum, & illud repudian
dum, quod efficitur ex oppo&longs;ita. alterum
&longs;anè à di&longs;putatione Parmenidis acceptum, atque alterum à ratione Xenophanis. Atque ille
quidem motum &longs;ine vacuo fieri non po&longs;&longs;e &longs;tatuens, ex eo quod vacuum non e&longs;&longs;et, tollebat
etiam motum. Et tamen &longs;i hæc &longs;ecum conferantur, & facilius qui&longs;que vacuum e&longs;&longs;e dabit, quàm
neget motum. Quapropter accipiendum e&longs;t potius e&longs;&longs;e motum, & ex eo vacuum e&longs;&longs;e conclu
dendum. quàm motus vacui &longs;ublatione tollendus.
Xenophanes autem &longs;ic ratiocinabatur, ex
nihilo nihil fit. Ergo ens infinitum & æternum.
Non igitur motus.
Tamen qui&longs;que promptius
dabit ex nihilo aliquid fieri, vt etiam multi dedere, & fides no&longs;tra pro certo habet quàm reij
ciat motum. Proinde &longs;ic potius concludendum fuerat.
Motus e&longs;t.
Ergo ex nihilo aliquid fit;
quàm vt fecit Xenophanes. & fide nitendum, quam præ&longs;tat &longs;en&longs;us, qui &longs;i quandoque decipitur;
non id perpetuo neque in omnibus efficit. Neque verò id huius philo&longs;ophiæ proprium e&longs;t: &longs;ed
omnis artis atque &longs;cientiæ apud Ari&longs;totelem. Nam quòd ille futurus &longs;it huius methodi norma
per&longs;picuum e&longs;t, ex eo loco,
l
nobilitate compen&longs;et hoc damnum, ac dum eius difficultatis cau&longs;&longs;am reddit, id vniuer&longs;um triMinus enim, in quit, diuinam partem contemplari
contingit quòd non multum illius pateat &longs;en&longs;ui, cuius beneficio tum de ea ip&longs;a parte diuina,
tum deijs, qu&ecedil; no&longs;&longs;e cupimus, facultas cogitandi, & indagandi nobis &longs;uppetat. Sed ad alias
quoque artes translatum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele huiu&longs;modi pr&ecedil;ceptum, quippe qui clari&longs;simè te&longs;tetur,
deficiente aliquo &longs;en&longs;u deperire item cum eo aliquam &longs;cientiam, vt vi&longs;u deficiente colorum,
auditu verò &longs;onorum.
que omni &longs;cientia priuaremur. Idem quoque mon&longs;trat &longs;cientiæ cuiu&longs; que principia colligi per
inductionem, & à &longs;en&longs;u deduci.
uilis philo&longs;ophus, nam &longs;iue re&longs;piciant rerum veritatem, atque naturam, &longs;iue actionem; in &longs;en
&longs;um nece&longs;&longs;ariò re&longs;oluuntur: quando ad rerum veritatem perno&longs;cendam requiratur inductio,
quæ e&longs;t de &longs;en&longs;ilibus; ad actionem verò con&longs;uetudo,
rium. Valeat ergo Parmenides, qui iudicium &longs;en&longs;us omnino detrectat & ita pr&ecedil;cipit impuden
ti&longs;sime, licet habuerit a&longs;&longs;eclam Hippocratem, qui ne&longs;cio qua ratione ductus
e&longs;t menti non &longs;en&longs;ui fidere nos voluit.
de part. an.
cap.
1.
T. 15.
Galen. 2.
de temp. c.
2.
T. 29.
T. 6.
T. 22.
T. 26.
ad Hiero
nem. 4. Met.
T. 9.
T. 6.
ner. 7. T.
10 T. 61.
ner. an.
c.
10.
de
plac. cap.
1.
e. an cap.
5.
Neue oculus fallax, aut lingua auri&longs;úe &longs;onora
Decipiat, varium ratio det rebus honorem.
Quantò rectius vetus ille quidem inter Latinos, &longs;ed eleganti&longs;simus & iudicio eruditi&longs;simus
poëta cecinit ea de &longs;en&longs;u?
Sen&longs;us, cui ni&longs;i prima fides fundata valebit,
Haud erit occultis de rebus, quò referentes
Confirmare animos quic quam ratione qucamus.
Nollem hic multus e&longs;&longs;e: veruntamen ad &longs;e rapit me Galenus
qui fidem facere &longs;tudent ex ijs quæ adhuc ignorantur, cum ceteroquin ea quæ &longs;umuntur ad de
mon&longs;trationem vel euidentia &longs;int oportet, vel antea demon&longs;trata: & rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium legitimum
iudicem clamans e&longs;&longs;e &longs;en&longs;um, vt pote tactum primarum qualitatum. Nam &longs;i alia via, inquit,
&longs;uccurrat, qua illæ no&longs;cuntur, eam quæ&longs;o demon&longs;trent. inauditam enim &longs;apientiam promit
tunt, immo, &longs;i verum fateri licet, &longs;tuporem potius, &longs;i quidem rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium meliorem &longs;e iu
dicem habere putent, quàm &longs;it ip&longs;e &longs;en&longs;us. ac &longs;i de rebus &longs;en&longs;ilibus demon&longs;trationes inquirunt,
iam de niue di&longs;putandum erit, &longs;it ne candida cen&longs;enda, quemadmodum omnibus apparet: an
atra potius, vt pr&ecedil;dicabat Anaxagoras; & de pice &longs;imiliter: neque enim, &longs;i vi&longs;ui de albo, quod
viderit, fides habenda non e&longs;t, de nigro &longs;ine demon&longs;tratione credendum erit. Omnia igitur quæ
&longs;en&longs;ui apparent, &longs;i iam fide carere dicunt: nec cygnum e&longs;&longs;e album fateantur, ni&longs;i prius id ratio
ne con&longs;pexerint, neque diem neque Solem. ad eundem modum & de voce auribus fidem ab
rogent & de odore naribus & de omni tactili ip&longs;i &longs;en&longs;ui tactus. Quæ &longs;anè nihil di&longs;tantab hæ&longs;i
tationibus & nugis Pyrrhonianis. Aequum verò fuerat eos qui optimam &longs;ectam in philo&longs;ophia
delegi&longs;&longs;ent, quæ primas qualitates per elementa principia que ponit, non tam de&longs;ciui&longs;&longs;e à com
muni hominum &longs;en&longs;u, vt, quæ omnis demon&longs;trationis principia &longs;unt & quæ &longs;en&longs;ui mentique
patent, non cogno&longs;cerent. Et profecto qui&longs;quis de his addubitat, fru&longs;tra de alijs inquirit, vt po
te nil &longs;ibi relinquens, vnde &longs;it incepturus. Sed illud vnum prauorum dogmatum principium e&longs;t,
nihil de demon&longs;tratione prius meditatum &longs;imul res ip&longs;as inquirere: veluti, quid nam demon. &longs;tratio &longs;it, demon&longs;trare tentare.
Placet &longs;anè mihi Diogenes, qui cùm de motu interrogaretur,
nihil quidem re&longs;pondit, &longs;ed &longs;urgens ambulauit, per ip&longs;am euidentiam &longs;ophi&longs;tæ &longs;en&longs;um expro
brans, & planè, qui hæc non norunt egent &longs;en&longs;u, ne dicam pœna,
&longs;e non &longs;entiat, conijciatur in ignem. Non e&longs;t ocium nunc de fide &longs;en&longs;ibus adhibenda di&longs;putare.
Satis &longs;it hunc rerum naturalium e&longs;&longs;e debere normam, & regulam qua cuncta exploremus,
que ab eius iudicio ne latum quidem vnguem di&longs;cedemus. Ei primò vel omnium maximè &longs;e&longs;e
offert motus:
effectum e&longs;t, vt naturalis omnium prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;tatueretur: nec vero quòd omnes &longs;cientiæ
motum adhibeant, vel cogitando, vel ex motu ratiocinando, vel etiam ficto motu ad maiorem
explicationem, veluti mathematici, dum ex fluxu puncti lineam ex huius item fluxu &longs;uperfi
ciem, & ex &longs;uperficiei fluxu corpus efformant. Neque hæc eò dicimus, quominus arbitremur
magnam quoque rationem mentis e&longs;&longs;e habendam: &longs;ed, vt &longs;eligamus illud mentis iudicium de
rebus ab&longs;tru&longs;is quas &longs;en&longs;us attingere nequit, quod futurum &longs;it rectum. tale autem erit, &longs;i illa acci
piat, quæ nihil euertant eorum, quæ per &longs;e & propriè &longs;entiuntur, hoc e&longs;t in quorum &longs;en&longs;ione
nullus error committitur, quod tum euenit, cum omnia ritè di&longs;po&longs;ita &longs;unt, vt optimè &longs;en&longs;io fiat. Quod &longs;i minus liceat, vt inue&longs;tigatione c&ecedil;le&longs;tium corporum,
tiarum quæ &longs;unt liber&ecedil; & &longs;olutæ à materia, quorum aliqua nullo pacto &longs;ubiiciuntur &longs;en&longs;ibus;
dem valde infirmus; ita ratio gubernabitur, vt nihil oppugnet ea, quæ verè &longs;entiuntur & veluti
noti&longs;sima po&longs;ita iam fuerunt. Et id &longs;i placuit Hyppocrati, ip&longs;um quoque commendabimus, &
rationi, non &longs;en&longs;ui confidendum e&longs;&longs;e eo tempore decernemus. Tum verò optimè nobi&longs;cum
agetur, &longs;i &longs;en&longs;uum fidem cum ratione, cum &longs;en&longs;ibus habeamus.
Denique &longs;en&longs;us &longs;it
totius phy&longs;icæ principale Ex eo qui iudicio &longs;en&longs;us &longs;tandum e&longs;t efficitur, vt accidentium cuiu&longs;que rei &longs;peculatio, valde ad
modum conferat ad rerum e&longs;&longs;entias perno&longs;cendas
propagare po&longs;sint ea quæ in&longs;unt. Quanquam alio modo nos in &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notitiam accidentia
perducunt. quandò tota &longs;pecies indiuidui recipitur à &longs;en&longs;ibus externis,
ponitur in phan
ta&longs;ia & phanta&longs;ma efficitur, cuius partes &longs;unt accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quæ po&longs;tmodò mentis effi
cientis opere di&longs;cernuntur. Itaque et&longs;i certus e&longs;t progre&longs;&longs;us, à definitione ad accidentia, nem
pe demon&longs;tratiuus: etiam methodus conuer&longs;a multum iuuat ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t. Nam
definitio dare quidem &longs;olet occa&longs;ionem adipi&longs;cendi notitiam cau&longs;&longs;arum, ex quibus accidentia
rei na&longs;cuntur. Ari&longs;toteles qu&ecedil;rebat quid e&longs;&longs;et locus,
&longs;.
quæ in loco &longs;unt, cau&longs;
&longs;as inueniret; ordo tenetur in mathematicis, quæ demon&longs;trationis per&longs;picuitate reliquas
omnes excellunt. ip&longs;æ enim accidentia quanto per definitiones inueniunt, & cognito quid &longs;it
triangulus, aut rectum nobis aperiunt triangulum habere tres angulos æquos duobus rectis, at
que omnino vbi definitio non præ&longs;ter eorum notitiam, quæ in&longs;unt rei, pro dialectica communi
& inani habenda e&longs;t. Sed etiam cognitio rudis, &, vt Gr&ecedil;ci dicunt,
accidentium aut omnium, aut plurium, nobis &longs;uppeditat, quæ de rerum e&longs;&longs;entia dicamus: non
&longs;anè, quia demon&longs;tratiuam cognitionem efficiat; quippe qui omnis demon&longs;trationis principium
&longs;it definitio, &longs;ed tamen eiu&longs;modi vt aditum patefaciat ad con&longs;tituendam rei propo&longs;itæ defini
tionem. Propterea de loco di&longs;&longs;erens Ari&longs;toteles accidentia quædam definitioni loci præpo&longs;uit,
è quibus po&longs;tea collegit quid e&longs;&longs;et locus. eandem quoque viam tenuit, dum incrementi e&longs;&longs;en
tiam exquireret.
& cognitione vires animi vniuer&longs;as inuenerit & explanarit, vnde, qua&longs;i retrocedens accidentium
illorum vim multò certius expo&longs;uit; &, cùm ante definitionem rudi quodam modo nob. notui&longs;
&longs;ent; po&longs;tquàm definitio comperta e&longs;t, accurati&longs;simè euoluit, nimirùm demon&longs;tratione, qua via
philo&longs;opho naturali plurimum in&longs;i&longs;tendum e&longs;t, cui &longs;æpius effectus quàm cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;unt notiores. Neque illud ob&longs;tat quod Ari&longs;toteles aliquando reiecerit accidentia,
tionem comparandam. Aut etiam prædicarit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam accidenti & natura & cognitione
præcedere.
quid e&longs;t. atqui accidentia non &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi.
verùm nob.
indicant &longs;olùm partes ip&longs;ius quid
e&longs;t, & &longs;ub&longs;tantia cognitione procedit, vt po&longs;teà narrabitur, quia nulla notio pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e acciden
tis, quin includat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam; &longs;ed ea notio confu&longs;a e&longs;t & imperfecta, quod philo&longs;ophi quidam
non videntes à vera item ratione pronuntiati præ&longs;entis aberrarunt. Nam lego apud nonnullos
talem poni ordinem inter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & accidens. quod ita cognitio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ præcedat acci
denti, quia &longs;it eius cognitio perfectior. tunc enim quanque rem cogno&longs;cere videmur, cum eius
&longs;ub&longs;tantiam nouimus; vt vbi nouimus quid homo &longs;it, non autem cuiu&longs;modi &longs;it. &longs;ic etiam me
lius cogno&longs;cimus album, quando nouimus quid &longs;it album, quæ videtur e&longs;&longs;e cognitio &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;
& e&longs;&longs;entiæ, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;it albi e&longs;&longs;entia, quàm &longs;i ip&longs;um &longs;ub alicuius attributi ratione no&longs;camus. At verò prior e&longs;t origine accidentis notitia quàm &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ: quandoquidem nihil in mente &longs;it,
quin prius attigerit &longs;en&longs;um. Atqui &longs;en&longs;us non e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; iudex, &longs;ed vnius accidentis.
Quam
obrem &longs;en&longs;ilia qu&ecedil; &longs;unt accidentia, prius à nobis quàm &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cogno&longs;cuntur. Et planè quod
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notitia &longs;it perfectior, inficiari non licet, attamen aliqua de primo capite dubitari po&longs;
&longs;unt. Quandoquidem mihi videtur ille qui hæc effatur, dare accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia percipi à
&longs;en&longs;u. at qui ide&longs;t ab&longs;trahere, ab&longs;tractio verò non e&longs;t opus &longs;en&longs;us, &longs;ed mentis.
In&longs;uper indiuiduum
per &longs;e &longs;en&longs;ile e&longs;t, at &longs;en&longs;ilium iudex e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;us; ergo & indiuidui. Quare, cùm &longs;it indiuiduum
è genere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & illius igitur erit &longs;en&longs;us. Cùm ergo ab illo non &longs;egregentur accidentia &longs;en
&longs;ilia, proinde efficitur, vt neque origine accidentium notitia pr&ecedil;cedat cognitioni &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Quinimmo &longs;ic coniuncta e&longs;t accidentis notitia cum cognitione &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, vt be&longs;ti&ecedil; quoque &longs;ub
&longs;tantiam no&longs;cant. Etenim optimè D. Thomas.
ceptione non deciperentur, vt liquet in alimentis. Neque enim quicquam in eo decipi pote&longs;t,
quod pror&longs;us ignorat. Itaque totum indiuiduum, quod e&longs;t veluti ma&longs;&longs;a quædam omnium pr&ecedil;
dicamentorum accipitur à &longs;en&longs;u, & de vniuer&longs;o fert iudicium. Nanque vbi po&longs;teà &longs;ub&longs;tantia
cogno&longs;cenda &longs;it &longs;ub ratione &longs;ola &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, quia &longs;eparatur ab accidentibus, à quibus efficieba
tur &longs;ingularis, non permanet amplius indiuidua, &longs;ed fit vniuer&longs;alis. Nec refert, vtrùm hoc iudi
cium &longs;it &longs;en&longs;us interni, vt nonnulli arbitrantur, an externi: quandò nullum e&longs;t officium &longs;en&longs;us, Verum quia non dubitatur
id, accidentiaúe valeant ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t, quod philo&longs;ophus natu
tur vti demon&longs;trationibus à &longs;igno, hoc tanquam firmamento con&longs;tituto, quæramus de modo
quo accidens id efficiat. Omnium &longs;ententi&ecedil; meo quidem iudicio, ad duo capita referti po&longs;&longs;e vi
dentur.
di po&longs;&longs;unt, qualis e&longs;t inter materiam & formam naturalem. Nam veluti materia non accipit
formas naturales &longs;ine quadam affectione pr&ecedil;currente nimirum accidentium, &longs;ic mens non po
te&longs;t, inquiunt, accipere formas intelligendas &longs;ine pr&ecedil;cedente affectione, hæc verò accedit per
accidentia quæ mouent &longs;en&longs;um. At verò præter id, quod incidunt in errorem communem,
quia putant albedinem à &longs;en&longs;u cogno&longs;ci, quando cogno&longs;citur hoc album, ne&longs;cio vtrum mens
requirat eiu&longs;modi affectionem nécne: &longs;iquidem mens videatur e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;tas qu&ecedil;, vbi pr&ecedil;&longs;ens fue
rit obiectum, è ve&longs;tigio operatur, & percipit. flagitat &longs;anè phanta&longs;ma, vt mens efficiens habeat,
quod illu&longs;tret & intelligendum faciat, &longs;ed vt afficiens, non puto. Namque ea quæ affectionem
po&longs;tulant, docet experientia tempore quoque ab&longs;olui. Accedit etiam quod affectio præcedit in
eadem materia, in qua debet accipi forma. Sed mens per &longs;e non afficitur, ni&longs;i à re intelligenda,
hæc verò iam actu facta vt à mente efficiente, vt ip&longs;i volunt, aut à forma ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ per
&longs;e mentem informat. Nihil ergo præcedit in mente, quod afficiat mentem ad intelligendum.
Cui quoque rei &longs;ignum e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t quod vti affectio præcedat à minore tenditur ad maius, & ab
imperfecto ad perfectum. Atqui mens vbi percepit maius, multò facilius concipit
Docent alij &longs;ic accidentia nos in notitiam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ ducere, quia &longs;ub&longs;tantia non po&longs;sit excitare
facultates cogno&longs;cendi &longs;ine accidentibus qua&longs;i vtatur animus his accidentibus, vt &longs;ic dixerim,
pro vehiculo &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum. Quæ item ratio videtur imperfecta; quia de&longs;iderarem ego mihi
explicari modum quo, po&longs;tquàm &longs;ub&longs;tantia per accidentia concepta &longs;uerit, mens &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ no
titiam con&longs;equatur: vt puta, quomodo ex eo quòd Luna lumine priuetur, percipiamus cau&longs;&longs;as
& definitionem defectus. Itaque mihi videtur ita &longs;en&longs;i&longs;&longs;e Ari&longs;toteles.
Cùm globus ille pr&ecedil;di
camentorum omnium, quod vocamus indiuiduum, pepulit &longs;en&longs;us no&longs;tros, & ex repetitione
facta memoria productum e&longs;t vniuer&longs;ale, quod, vt alibi docui, concretum e&longs;t vt album, quan
tum, mobile, re&longs;oluitur à mente in &longs;uas partes & illo inuento &longs;ine quo c&ecedil;tera non exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ed il
lud &longs;ine aliis, hoc verò e&longs;t ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tantia, &longs;iue vt primum excipiens, velut animus, &longs;iue vt cuius
e&longs;t aliquod primum excipiens, vt animal, vt po&longs;tea declarabimus, tum concipi &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. Huius autem re&longs;olutionis duo fundamenta e&longs;&longs;e coniicio.
primum analyticum quod traditur ab
Ari&longs;totele, cum docet Nam
proponitur in primis aliquod inue&longs;tigandum, eius vniuer&longs;a attributa percen&longs;entur, & vbi vnum
ex illis occurrat, quod ita &longs;e habeat ad attributum, vt eo po&longs;ito primò ponatur, & cum &longs;ublatum
fuerit &longs;ecum quoque perimet attributum, id dicimus ine&longs;&longs;e quatenus ip&longs;um, & illam e&longs;&longs;e
cau&longs;&longs;am & e&longs;&longs;entiam accidentis, quæ prius elucet in demon&longs;tratione, po&longs;tmodo degenerat in
quid e&longs;t, & in definitione &longs;umitur. Alterum &longs;undamentum petitur è prima philo&longs;ophia.
Quo
niam accidens ita &longs;e habet ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, vt ad ip&longs;am nece&longs;&longs;ariò referatur, & &longs;icut vnum è rela
tiuis &longs;uapte natura notionem affert alterius, &longs;ic accidens affert notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ in qua ine&longs;t;
ac primum &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, cum qua comprehenditur, vt album in cygno cogno&longs;citur, aut charta;
quia tamen non appiicat &longs;e&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;ariò ad chartam aut cygnum; &longs;ed &longs;ine vtri&longs;que percipi po
te&longs;t, non tamen &longs;ine aliquo, notionem affert &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;impliciter, ad extremum indicat illam
&longs;ub&longs;tantiam, cui perpetuò comitatur, vt &longs;ine ip&longs;a non exi&longs;tat, & vbi hoc &longs;it, illa quoque ad&longs;it. oporteat, & per illam cæteris in&longs;it, quæ vbi fuerit euoluta, per &longs;e ip&longs;am patet, & ita lucet, vt acci
dens quoque quod ex ip&longs;a pendet, illu &longs;tret. Quapropter ille progre&longs;&longs;us ab accidentibus ad &longs;ub
&longs;tantias pertinet ad doctrinam confu&longs;am & incohatam, cùm ceteroquin in doctrina di&longs;tincta
& ab&longs;oluta accidens ex &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;catur. Neque verò te intelligere velim progre&longs;&longs;um ab
accidente ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam eiu&longs;modi e&longs;&longs;e, vt accidens prius &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;catur; neque
enim notio relatiui ab alterius notione &longs;eiungitur: &longs;ed cum eo tempore &longs;imul cum accidentibus
&longs;ub&longs;tantia no&longs;catur accidentia præ&longs;tant, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia per &longs;e concipi queat. Ita fit, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia
& cau&longs;&longs;a per &longs;e po&longs;t primam notionem, quæ auxilio &longs;en&longs;us accedit, vt ens &longs;impliciter accipiatur,
& efficiat primam &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; notionem, mox appareat, vt cau&longs;&longs;a, & &longs;ic notionem complexam fa
ciat ex qua principia demon&longs;trationis exi&longs;tunt; vltimo accipiatur, vt quid e&longs;t, & compleat defi
nitionem. Sic igitur accidentia non proximè &longs;ed remotè perducunt ad quid e&longs;t, tùm quòd non
&longs;unt pr&ecedil;dicata in quid, &longs;ed ea &longs;ignificant qu&ecedil; pr&ecedil;dicantur in quid; tùm quòd per multos gradus
eu ehi, & regredi oportet mentem no&longs;tram, vt a&longs;&longs;equatur ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t. Non omnia tamen ac
cidentia conducunt ad huiu&longs;modi progre&longs;&longs;um: quippe quod ea, qu&ecedil; &longs;unt per accidens, ide&longs;t, non
habent certas cau&longs;&longs;as ex hoc ordine deiiciantur. cùm enim certas cau&longs;&longs;as non habeant, &longs;olum af
ferunt notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;impliciter, quia &longs;ine illa nunquam exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ed nihil amphus, quod
po&longs;sint. Oportetigitur vt accidentia &longs;int per &longs;e & hæc, vel &longs;int generis vel alicuius partis eius.
quanquam & valent ad hoc &longs;eparatim, vt &longs;en&longs;us ad animal digno&longs;cendum; vel etiam coniun
ctim plura, quæ aliquod commune præ&longs;entent,
&longs;peciatim medici &longs;igna habent, quæ pathognomonica appellant, quorum auxilio certa genera ve
nantur: pluribus &longs;en&longs;ibus vnà de eadem re
gula communius aliquod offerant. Proptereà, quanquam notitia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ tempore acciden
tis notitiæ præfertur; aut agitur de doctrina di&longs;tincta, aut præcedere tempore accipiendum pri
uatiuè quòd vnà, nec po&longs;terius &longs;ub&longs;tantia no&longs;catur: nam &longs;iquid anrecedit, tamet&longs;i non tempo
re; id e&longs;t, vt aiunt, in&longs;tans naturæ: e&longs;t enim accidens ratio per quam &longs;ub&longs;tantia recipitur à &longs;en&longs;u. Con&longs;ertitem accidens ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t, quòd ex eius natura qu&ecedil; multiplex e&longs;t, vel ma
teriam, vel
vteretur materia &longs;en&longs;ili, quòd materia intelligenda, vel abiiceret omnino materiam. Et hoc in
philo&longs;ophia Peripatetica triti&longs;simum. Nam cùm ip&longs;a &longs;it de rebus &longs;en&longs;ilibus principia &longs;en&longs;ilia
&longs;umere cogitur. At, inquies, materia prima &longs;en&longs;ilis non e&longs;t: & tamen e&longs;t principium rerum &longs;en
&longs;ilium. Con&longs;ueuerunt maiores no&longs;tri re&longs;pondere cau&longs;&longs;as accipi non omnes, &longs;ed propinquas;
has enim &longs;olas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;en&longs;iles, quippe quòd in &longs;ingularibus proximè in&longs;ideant. At verò quod docet
aliquando philo&longs;ophus monet me, vt &longs;en&longs;ile communius accipiam, ac dicam &longs;en&longs;ile nonmodo
id quod &longs;en&longs;ui pote&longs;t &longs;ubiici, &longs;ed quod quoquo pacto re&longs;picit materiam. Proptereà neque
Deus, cùm &longs;it auctor motus, effugit
& cadunt in &longs;en&longs;um; quia &longs;unt principia &longs;en&longs;ilium: vt quanuis per &longs;e non &longs;entiantur, quia fa
ciant &longs;en&longs;ilia, ad &longs;en&longs;ilia referantur, vel vt ferrum, quo fit &longs;anitas, ad &longs;anitatem; vnde item &longs;a
num vocatur. Et rerum quidem &longs;en&longs;ilium &longs;emper & propriè &longs;cientia ponitur vt &longs;ubiecti: ho
rum verò &longs;cientia propriè non e&longs;t. itaque nec ea per &longs;e &longs;entiantur oportet; verum &longs;at e&longs;t, vt &longs;en
tiantur eo qui dictus e&longs;t, modo: nec ob id tollitur quin rerum &longs;en&longs;ilium &longs;it &longs;cientia naturalis. & talia &longs;unt etiam remoti&longs;sima à &longs;ingularibus, & vniuer&longs;alia maximè, quod &longs;anè multi philo&longs;o
phi præ&longs;ertim Platonici
quas extra materiam e&longs;&longs;e voluere. Parum ab his abfuere Pythagorici.
Nanque et&longs;i numeros
accepere qui e&longs;&longs;et in &longs;en&longs;ilibus, & eos vt numero &longs;pectarunt, numerorum conditiones illis attri
buentes,
tenus materia fundantur, quod eum facere oportebat, qui naturalis &longs;cientiæ principia ve&longs;tiga
ret. Eiu&longs;dem quoque notæ &longs;unt, qui puncta, plana, & figuras rerum naturalium principia po
nunt, è quorum etiam numero fuit Plato, quanquam hi minus errarunt, quòd illa &longs;tatuerunt,
è quibus ratio probabilis reddi po&longs;&longs;et aliquorum, quæ conducerent ad motum. Ita eueniet, vt
in phy&longs;icis demon&longs;trationibus componendis à primis v&longs;que ad vltimas cau&longs;&longs;as procedere liceat,
& accipere item illa quæ &longs;unt nota natura & &longs;ecundum rationem, non &longs;ecundum &longs;en&longs;um, & ea
tamen &longs;int principia &longs;en&longs;ilium, nec à phy&longs;ica methodo aliena. Neque enim &longs;ine his vlla de
mon&longs;tratio pote&longs;t ab&longs;olui, &longs;eu prima &longs;int, &longs;eu po&longs;trema: &longs;iue in eadem &longs;erie cau&longs;&longs;arum, &longs;iue in
alia: habent nexum quendam in&longs;olubilem & varia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera inter &longs;e & in eodem ordi
ne, ex quo erumpit effectus, & cùm hic &longs;it &longs;ingularis à &longs;ingularis cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; &longs;ocietate neutiquam di
uelluntur, qualia verò &longs;int quibus principatus effectus &longs;it commirtendus non in omni cau&longs;&longs;arum
genere communis ratio fortè poterit a&longs;signari, primas in quibu&longs;dam ferente cau&longs;&longs;a priore &longs;ecun
dum naturam, & remotiore, contrà in aliis. Sed hæc po&longs;tea di&longs;&longs;erentur vberius.
In his princi
piis & illud numerabitur: Methodum imitari naturam quo ad eius fieri pote&longs;t. Nam, &longs;i metho
dus e&longs;t &longs;cientia artificio tradita, ars verò naturam, quo ad pote&longs;t imitatur, & inuenit quod ip&longs;a de
&longs;iderat, & &longs;equitur quod o&longs;tendic, methodus quoque nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t imitetur naturam, & eundem
progre&longs;&longs;um propemodum faciat. Itaque, veluti natura nihil fru&longs;tra molitur, & ni&longs;i impediatur,
ad finem v&longs;quam perducit, ac fine propo&longs;ito mox illa præparat, quibus fine &longs;uo commodè po
tiatur; &longs;ic ars omnia &longs;truit ad v&longs;us humanos, ac &longs;copo con&longs;tituto prius ordine di&longs;ponit deinceps
ea &longs;ine quibus con&longs;equentia non con&longs;i&longs;tunt. Ita re&longs;oluendo, prius ab eo quod e&longs;t ptimum in
optatis, ad ea &longs;ine quibus hoc non exi&longs;tit, mox componendo, ab eo &longs;ine quo cætera non con
&longs;tant, progreditur ad finem, eumque ordinem &longs;eruans nihil omittit, nil &longs;uperuacaneum, & inu
tile machinatur. Eodem modo methodus &longs;cientia &longs;ibi propo&longs;ita prius de principiis cogitat tan
quam fundamentis: his &longs;uper&longs;truit demon&longs;trationes in&longs;i&longs;tens ea via qua res dilucidè explicari
queat, vt nihil inculcet inane, nihil redundans: neque &longs;ic præcisè eloquatur, vt oratio pariat ob
&longs;cutitatem, in id præcipuè collimans, vt auditoris habeat rationem, ad cuius ingenium & captum
&longs;ingula referre &longs;tudet. Ad hæc mirificè confert ordo, cuius admonitu nece&longs;&longs;aria per&longs;equitur:
vnde etiam &longs;icut in natura vnum quoddam e&longs;t, quod caput e&longs;t vniuer&longs;i ordinis, & ex quo c&ecedil;tera
deriuantur: &longs;ic in methodo &longs;olet e&longs;&longs;e vnum principium commune, quod reliquis omnibus &longs;upIta in prima phi
lo&longs;ophia primum illud. De quolibet verbum e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;erere, vel negare, in Morali bene educatum
e&longs;&longs;e, in mathematica continuum diuidi in infinitum, ex hoc quòd inter duo puncta quant&ecedil;uis
linea ducantur, quòd in quolibet eius &longs;igno figura de&longs;cibi queat: in
arte medica fortè illud. Contrariis contraria çurari, in hac no&longs;tra Motum e&longs;&longs;e.
Proximè ab ordine e&longs;t via à notis no
bis quæ rerum oçcultarum tractationem ad rudium aures accommodat, po&longs;tmodo in&longs;trumen
ta, quibus fidem facit & docet. Itaque magis ij laudantur, qui &longs;çientiarum principia finita con
&longs;tituunt, quàm qui infinitatem acceperunt,
reddere certiores de cunctis problematis qu&ecedil; in con&longs;iderationem naturalem cadere queunt,
Atque id non temerè à philo&longs;opho &longs;umptum. Siquidem nihil &longs;ciri po&longs;sit principiis ignoratis.
Atqui &longs;i principia fuerint infinita, incerta &longs;int nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t.
Nanque id quoque tanquam certi&longs;si
mum ratio &longs;umit.
&longs;iue etiam forma, pror&longs;us e&longs;&longs;e ignotum, vt &longs;i formæ infinitæ inter extrema intercedant,
quas oporteat fieri mutationem; &longs;i etiam ab imis ad &longs;umma quibus tanquam terminis pr&ecedil;dica
mentum vnumquodque con&longs;i&longs;tit,
uer&longs;um infinitum, quemadmodum voluit Meli&longs;&longs;us, aut denique multæ &longs;pecies infinitæ, vt cen
&longs;uit Anaxagoras: vel infinita çorpu&longs;cula per inane volitantia, vt accepit Democritus; non po
te&longs;t hæc neque &longs;en&longs;us, neque mens pertran&longs;ire, neque comprehendere. Quanquam hîc te mo
nere volumus, infinitum non id ignotum e&longs;&longs;e, quod imperfectum e&longs;t, & perducendum e&longs;t ad
aliquem finem, quodq, vlterius promoueri
dum tran&longs;it, vt veteribus placuit.
tem pro attributo, hoc e&longs;t id de quo prædicatur infinitum, ignotum e&longs;t: ratio verò infiniti, vt
quid &longs;it id quod infinitum dicimus, & nota e&longs;t, & à phy&longs;ico tractatur. Conuenit item in bene
in&longs;tituta methodo, ni&longs;i quid certi&longs;simè indicet &longs;en&longs;us, aliqua ratione per&longs;uadere, vel inductio
ne,
plicare definitione, vt talem pateat eius e&longs;&longs;e naturam, qualem accepimus. Nolo tamen te po&longs;tu
lare, definitionem hîc exqui&longs;itam, quæ nulla e&longs;t, ni&longs;i &longs;peciei &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, &longs;ed expo&longs;itione nomin is
e&longs;&longs;e contentum, & ip&longs;a vi termini, vt factum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;torele in explicatione principij.
&longs;i cau&longs;&longs;a po&longs;sit, afferri cau&longs;&longs;am apponere oportet; rerum enim cau&longs;&longs;as habentium nulla cognitio
certa e&longs;t &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a. Neque id prohibere valet, quo minus cau&longs;&longs;a reddatur, quia res ita perpe
tuò &longs;e habeat. Nam quòd triangulus
hæret perpetuò; atqui cau&longs;&longs;a talis euenti redditur à mathematico, quia nimirùm habeat angu
lum externum æqualem duobus internis è regione con&longs;titutis. illa æterna quæ principia
&longs;unt, cau&longs;&longs;a vacant: non omnia perpetua generatim. Et cau&longs;&longs;a quæritur, cur duo motus ex ad
ner&longs;o fiant in cœlo quos tamen æternos e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;ica concludit. Si verò non libeat &longs;ubnectere
cau&longs;&longs;am,
præ&longs;entia parcendum &longs;it: &longs;altem &longs;ub forma hypothe&longs;eos accipiendum e&longs;t, id quod velis, non ab
folutè pronunciandum, vel, vt fieri con&longs;ueuit in legibus edicendum. Hæc præcepta &longs;eruans ad
amu&longs;sim præ&longs;tanti&longs;simus doctor, eo nomine celebratur ab Auerroë, quod nihil vnquàm &longs;ine va
lida ratione dixerit. Neque verò quia &longs;emper cau&longs;&longs;am dictis &longs;uis ad&longs;crip&longs;erit, quî enim rerum,
qu&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;a vacarent, cau&longs;&longs;a reddi poterat? eiu&longs;dem enim vitij po&longs;&longs;et argui quod ip&longs;e aliis obie
cit, quippe quòd non interno&longs;cerent, quid demon&longs;trationi foret obnoxium, & quid contrà à
demon&longs;tratione abhorreret: verùm, quia quicquid con&longs;tituit & accepit, ita di&longs;po&longs;uit, vt cuique
redderet id quod &longs;uum e&longs;t, & ratione v&longs;us fuerit, vbi ratio quæreretur,
leni pro rei tractandæ
&longs;a, vel quòd alio quodammodo note&longs;ceret, prout de principiis anteà dictum e&longs;t, tamen non &longs;ine
valida ratione pronunciarit, quòd afterre potuit rationem ex illo habitu, qui pertinet ad modos
&longs;ciendi ductam, qua commotus hoc cum ratione, illud verò &longs;ine ratione acceperit. Igitur non
&longs;ine valida ratione locutus e&longs;t Ari&longs;toteles; &longs;iue ex propriis ip&longs;ius rei principiis duceretur, &longs;iue ex
altero habitu, cuius e&longs;t tractare modos &longs;ciendi. Non erit item alienum ab habitus huiu&longs;ce prin
cipiis, &longs;i & hoc adiiciamus, quod frequenti&longs;simè &longs;olet à phy&longs;icis v&longs;urpari. Vnumquoque, &longs;.
im
petrare &longs;uam appellationem ab actu.
rere, &longs;ed illa afterre in medio quæ pertinent ad propo&longs;itionis huiu &longs;ce notitiam. Scireigitur li
cet ea quæ nominibus &longs;ignificantur, ad hæc capita referri, formas,
motionis, e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entia tota, quæ comprehendit materiam quæ cadit in mentem,
autem hæc principia definitione euoluuntur. &longs;i idem &longs;ignificant nomen & definitio; pro&longs;ectò
nomen &longs;ic formam &longs;ignificabit, vt vniuer&longs;am notet e&longs;&longs;entiam. tamen quae in e&longs;&longs;entia primæ &longs;unt
Itaque cum cætera per formam &longs;igni&longs;icentur, & vt re&longs;piciunt &longs;ormam quæ item e&longs;t finis, rectè
dicitur Quapropter animal animam qu&ecedil;
forma e&longs;t, præcipuè &longs;ignificat.
rit anima, &longs;ed embryon, aut &longs;emen. imò non ex forma &longs;impliciter ducitur nomen, &longs;ed vbi iam ex
tirit actus &longs;ecundus, id Ari&longs;torele docentes 5. de Gen. anim.
Idem
do non prius appellatur &longs;camnum, quàm ip&longs;i
proximè nomen &longs;ignificat Et rationi
&longs;entaneumn.
liberius hac voce, quàm politiores hactenus declinarunt, quia lege
rim eam à C. Iulio Ce&longs;are fui&longs;&longs;e receptam) ens, inquàm, primùm &longs;ignificare &longs;ub&longs;tantiam,
& inter &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ parteis ip&longs;am formam, ob eam
rè
modo reliqua prædicamenta dicimus primùm notare formam, tum deinde compo&longs;itum. po&longs;
&longs;umus item nominationis huiu&longs;ce originem altius aliquantò repetere, vim prædicamentorum. &longs;pectantes: quippe quae duas habitudines præ&longs;eferant: alteram, qua &longs;ubiecta re&longs;piciunt, in quo
rum ratione m&longs;unt: atque alteram, qua &longs;ub&longs;tantia concipitur. neque.n.&longs;ola qualitas hac voce
notatur, &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantia qualis: &longs;iquidem accidens ab Ari&longs;totele ponatur in&longs;eparabile,
&longs;impliciter, &longs;ed ens aliquid, vel aliquo modo & velut aliud quid exi&longs;tens, quia videlicet non &longs;it
albedo, &longs;ed album quod e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia, Vt igitur quantum & quale &longs;unt talia propter formam: nomen &longs;ignificat primo formam accidentis, deinde compo&longs;itum in &longs;uo
(con&longs;tar enim &longs;ingula prædicamenta ex pote&longs;tate & actu pro portione)
quæ re&longs;piciunt
&longs;tantiam, hæc verò e&longs;tens propter formam. Ab eadem forma dicitur quoque compo&longs;itum,
vt e&longs;&longs;iciens. (Nam compo&longs;itum e&longs;&longs;e id quod e&longs;&longs;icit propriè, docebitur in progre&longs;&longs;u) &longs;i vniuo
cum fuerit, vt pleraque e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olent, de quibus regulæ traduntur in methodis: tum quòd habet
in &longs;eip&longs;o &longs;ormam per quam agit, tum quia gratia formæ operatur, & e&longs;ficiendo tribuit Materia quoque a&longs;&longs;ecuta e&longs;t appellationem
quale e&longs;t actu Atque hoc quidem in natura & arte commune e&longs;t, licèt e&longs;&longs;icientis denominatio non
per modo procedat, vt mox apparebit. Etenim libet prius ordinis no&longs;tri cau&longs;&longs;am reddere, ne vi
deamur cum Ari&longs;totele pugnare. quandò nos materiam efficienti po&longs;tpo&longs;uimus & compo&longs;ito,
compo&longs;itum cum efficiente collocauimus.
Ati&longs;toreles autem proximè à forma po&longs;uit
materiam, in extremo verò recen&longs;uit efficiens. Atqui nos ordinem nominationis &longs;pectauimus
& efficiens cum compo&longs;ito numerauimus, vt partem eius. Ari&longs;toteles autem in phy&longs;icis ordi
nem principij re&longs;piciens, quia materia foret
verò philo&longs;ophia motui &longs;ubiecit efficiens,
tò interius; efficiens externum e&longs;&longs;er, & à rei &longs;ub&longs;tantia remotum. Re&longs;tat vnus motus qui com
plectitur
&longs;umere. tamet&longs;i aliter in arte ac natura
to, vt nonnulli, neque id in Ari&longs;totelici contextus explanatione nece&longs;&longs;arium,
mon&longs;trant verba ip&longs;ius Ari&longs;totelis) &longs;iquidem in arte nominatio motus ab efficiente
&longs;umatur; in natura non ab efficiente; &longs;ed, vt reliqua, à fine. Verùm
&longs;am libet indagare, cur ab efficiente, non à fine motus in arte qui e&longs;t effectio, nuncupetur, præci
pue propter Auerroëm qui lib. 4 Collectaneorum rationem quandam reddit, ex nobiliore lo
co, vt potè è 2. Phy&longs;. repetitam cui plurimum tribuit.
Ea verò talis e&longs;t.
Motum &longs;umere no
men ab eo, cum quo magis conuenit genere. Sed motus in arte cum genere efficientis conue
nit magis. Et motus igitur in arte &longs;umit nomen ab efficiente.
Nunc explicandum e&longs;t, quem
admodum effectio cum genere efficientis potius quàm materiæ, &longs;eu formæ conueniat: quandò
terminetur forma, & ab ea tanquam per
ducatur ad &longs;ummum, ab efficiente verò &longs;egregetur. & videndum quid verba &longs;onent Auerrois.
Cau&longs;&longs;æ
patronis. etenim
ex eodem genere cum efficientibus, quo enim pacto medicatio & ædificatio &longs;unt eiu&longs;dem gene
ris cum medico & ædificatore? &longs;iquidem medicus & ædificator, &longs;eu medicina & ars ædificandi
&longs;inr habitus: medicatio verò & ædificatio &longs;int pa&longs;siones (& hîc etiam liceat ea voce vti, quam
M. Varro non e&longs;t a&longs;pernatus) vbi pro forma fluente &longs;umantur: intellige nunc formam fluen
rem eam quæ ab imper&longs;ecto ad perfectum promouetur, vt albedinem &longs;ecundi gradus quæ ad
quartum e&longs;t deducenda. proptereà &longs;ubiunxi&longs;&longs;e Auerroëm, aut &longs;altem ita videri.
Verùm e&longs;to id.
At oportebat etiam reddere cau&longs;&longs;am, cur ita videretur.
Itaque alij Diui Thom&ecedil; explanationem
dam ratione magis e&longs;t affinis efficientis quàm form&ecedil;;
ab efficiente nuncupationem
&longs;umit. atqui generatio qu&ecedil; e&longs;t opusnaturæ, e&longs;t affectio & pa&longs;sio, quæ note&longs;cit ex termino ad
i. quo motio finitur.
Veruntamen quia tam in arte quàm in natura idem re &longs;unt,
&longs;ola
actio & pa&longs;sio di&longs;iunguntur; ex hoc efficitur, vt nullum nominationis di&longs;crimen intercedere de
beat inter motus naturales & eos qui fiunt ab arte. Ob&longs;eruant alij formas artis à formis natu
ræ di&longs;crepare, quòd in artis materia nulla pote&longs;tas e&longs;t &longs;ormæ efficiendæ, neque per&longs;ecta, neque
imperfecta: formis verò naturalibus pote&longs;tates in materia &longs;upponitur. Idcirco quoniam forma
artis tota na&longs;citur ab externo, & proinde motus eius naturalis forma non item, ob rem ne
que generatio forma artis e&longs;t magis è genere efficientis: contrà verò &longs;orma naturalis ex genere
finis. proptereà motio quæ fit ab arte, nuncupatur ab efficiente, à fine verò motio naturalis.
Et &longs;ane proximè accedit ad verum hæc explicatio.
ni&longs;i quòd genus videtur acceptum fui&longs;&longs;e li
centius. Neque enim mouens & motus in genere conueniunt, vt dictum e&longs;t.
Et e&longs;&longs;entia motus
magistermino ad quem, quàm efficiente completur, vt aliàs o&longs;tendemus. Alij nectunt alias
cau&longs;&longs;as, atque illas quidem &longs;atis iu&longs;tas, quia &longs;cilicet efficiens naturale conuenit in nomine cum re
facienda, artifex verò minimè. hinc fit, vt nomen motus in arte diuer&longs;um queat accipi à nomine
finis, in natura non item. Verum mon&longs;trat id licere tantummodo, non tamen docet, cur non
accipiatur à fine: quando etiam motus illius e&longs;&longs;entia fine completur. debuit enim &longs;ic efficere no
menclator; vt cùm &longs;uccurreret finis, vnde nominatio &longs;umeretur in arte, imitando naturam, à fine
päriter motum nuncuparet. Po&longs;trema cau&longs;&longs;a, quia mouens in arte con&longs;picuum e&longs;t &longs;ingulare &
fen&longs;ile: naturale autem &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ in&longs;en&longs;ilis e&longs;t. illud e&longs;t notuni; hoc ignotum: à notiore
verò nominatio &longs;umitur. At qui hæc profitetur, non videt etiam formam, à qua nuncupatur mo
rus, e&longs;&longs;e in&longs;en&longs;ilem e&longs;&longs;e & ignotam, vt ergo ab efficiente ignoto non erat acci
pienda nuncupatio: &longs;ic neque à fine, quòd e&longs;&longs;et ignotus. Neque per&longs;picit is, qui hæc dicit, eo
dem modo e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ingulare & &longs;en&longs;ile efficiens in natura &longs;icut in arte. Prætereà, &longs;i hæc cum Auer
roë dicuntur; ni&longs;i turpem repugnantiam inter eius &longs;ententias, quod i&longs;ti nefas arbitrantur, incul
care velint, ea legant quæ idem auctor &longs;crip&longs;it,
ca&longs;&longs;e, “quam talem e&longs;&longs;e docet; qua&longs;i &longs;it eadem quam modo tractamus. quòd permutatio e&longs;t ge
nus rei, ad quam permutatur virtus: & hæc e&longs;t contrarium plu&longs;quam genus rei ad quam permu
tatur.” virtus autë in eis e&longs;t manife&longs;ta magis, quàm in ea, à qua fit permutatio. Modò videant i&longs;ti,
num h&ecedil;c congruant cum iis, quæ narrantur è a. Phy&longs;.
tùm etiam cum cau&longs;sis ante allatis.
Equi
dem, vt fateor in his verbis, aut nullam contineri &longs;ententiam, aut eam maximè latêre; vt etiam cer
tò credo nihil h&ecedil;c conuenire cum iis, quæ &longs;cribuntur 2. Phy&longs;. &longs;ic opinor vera &longs;en&longs;i&longs;&longs;e Auerroem.
& tralatorum culpa loca hæc fui&longs;&longs;e con&longs;purcata;
Deus, ne alia permulta in tam graui &longs;cri
ptore &longs;int hi&longs;ce con&longs;imilia, ne tantam iacturam philo&longs;ophi facerent. hæc certè talia &longs;unt, vt nullus
fortè &longs;en&longs;us ex eius verbis elici valeat. Cùm igiturij, quos ego viderim, nihil afferant quo &longs;atis
commodè tueantur Auerroëm; nec eius &longs;ententiam fortè a&longs;&longs;equantur; audeo quoque dicere,
neque liceat vllam colligere; auguremur hîc nos; & &longs;imul cau&longs;&longs;am di&longs;criminis illius denomina
tionum certiorem conemur afferre; & cum verbis Auerrois componere &longs;tudeamus. Mihiau
tem videtur eiu&longs;modi varietatis cau&longs;&longs;am ex Philopono colligi po&longs;&longs;e quæ nititur duobus funda
mentis; & primo quidem. Artificem non facere &longs;ibi &longs;imile, quemadmodum facit natura.
Quamobrem finis & efficiens idem nomen non habent in arte, &longs;icut habent in natura.
Deinde
verò. In arte efficiens apparêre, & e&longs;&longs;e con&longs;picuum; finem verò non extare.
quod euenire puto
in medicina; cum &longs;it ex eo genere artium, qu&ecedil; coniectura vtuntur, in quarum pote&longs;tate finis non
e&longs;t po&longs;itus, & &longs;æpe fallit (loquor nunc de fine motionis, non autem de propo&longs;ito, quod e&longs;t in
mente artificis: etenim hic &longs;emper obiicitur; & initium e&longs;t vniuer&longs;arum actionum, nec fallit vn
quam.) Ex his efficitur, vt nomen motionis in arte po&longs;sit &longs;umi diuer&longs;um à nomine finis, & ab efficiente tanquam noto deduci.
Fortè igitur h&ecedil;c, vt Gr&ecedil;corum fuit expre&longs;&longs;or Auerroës, &longs;i
gnificare volebat, quæ nos locum lap&longs;us aliis iudicantes', audacius. nunc veritatis ergo immuta
uimus. Nam quod dicitur, permutationem e&longs;&longs;e genus rei, ad quam virtus permutatur, genus
exponimus, quòd habeat cognationem, ac virtutem i.
pote&longs;tatem materiæ &longs;ignificari di
cimus: cognationem verò dicimus e&longs;&longs;e permutationis cum forma, ad quam materia tendit. Cùm &longs;ubiicitur.
Virtus e&longs;t contrarium magis quàm genus rei, ad quam virtus permutatur.
Vir
tutem hîc eodem nomine
rium, hoc e&longs;t, diuer&longs;um, quam genus rei, ad quam virtus, qu&ecedil; e&longs;t materia, permutatur, i. quam for
ma & finis; vbi noto di&longs;crimen inter finem & formam in arte, de quo dictum e&longs;t &longs;upra, & hanc
virtutem notiorem e&longs;&longs;e fateor, quàm eam, in quam fit permutatio, quæ e&longs;t finis. Sic paucis voci
bus immutatis colligo &longs;en&longs;um è verbis Auerrois, quem item
dicitur tanquam per di&longs;iunctionem prolatum, aut famo&longs;um, atque exponitur, quia &longs;ic videatur;
Tu nunc boni con&longs;ule. Quicquid tamen &longs;it; ab efficiente tanquam ab actu nominatio petitur.
Fuit hoc item in phy&longs;iologia præceptum Ari&longs;totelis, vt illa veluti
in omnibus naturæ operibus eodem modo &longs;e haberent; quod item non modo à c&ecedil;teris phy&longs;icis
in hac methodo v&longs;urpatum fui&longs;&longs;e &longs;u&longs;picari po&longs;&longs;umus; verum etiam ab ip&longs;omet Ari&longs;totele &longs;ine vl
la intermi&longs;sione ob&longs;eruatum fui&longs;&longs;e; cuiu&longs;modi illud e&longs;t. Naturam nihil efficere, quod fru&longs;tra
&longs;it; eandem niti in id, quod optimum e&longs;t, de quibus po&longs;thàc &longs;ermo habendus erit; eiu&longs;modi ta
men, vt ab his de c&ecedil;teris debeat accipi fides, tot enim de principiis, quæ ad modum &longs;ciendi perti
nent, dicta &longs;ufficiant.
cap.
2.
ad
uer&longs;us pla
cita phil. cap.
1.
lo T. 34.
An.
tu.
An.
1.
de An.
10.
C. de vni
uer&longs;.
1.de An.
T. 41. 50.
T. 35.
dc
&longs;en&longs;u c. 6.
T. 42.
T. 15.
al.
c.
4.
tu T. 42.
T. 10.
2. de An. T. 49.
T. 7.
T. 10.
T. 14 39.
1. de an.
T. 78.
Cap.
de na
tura.
T. 4.
T. 14.
I.
4.
T. 28.
de
ince&longs;. an.
cap.
2.
Cap.
III.
Svccedvnt nunc &longs;cientiæ principia, qu&ecedil; nos item iam cum acceptis concordantia &longs;ume
mus; quippe quod vno &longs;en&longs;u niti contendimus, & huc omnia referri volumus in hac me
thodo: neque h&ecedil;c munera tran&longs;ibimus, tamet&longs;i nouimus e&longs;&longs;e complura qu&ecedil; no&longs;tra placita fun
ditus tollant, & euertant planè phy&longs;ica fundamenta.
Nos hîc phy&longs;icum agimus, & cau&longs;&longs;as reddere conamur problematum quæ renitenti per&longs;ua
dere &longs;en&longs;u po&longs;simus: quicquid his cancellis excluditur, &longs;ublimiori philo&longs;opho delegamus, &
agno&longs;centes quàm parùm opibus humani iudicij freti valeamus, admiranda Dei O.M. opera con
templantes vni & &longs;oli, conditori, motori, con&longs;eruatori, rerum vniuer&longs;arum creatori maximas gra
tias agimus & habemus. His &longs;tantibus quæ conuelli nefas e&longs;t de re propo&longs;ita dicere aggredia
mur primùm communiora tractantes, mox ad &longs;pecialia de&longs;cendentes. Neque hîc expectandum
e&longs;t, vt omnia generalia numerentur. Nos ea tantum recen&longs;ebimus quæ aliquam declarationem
requirunt, quæ verò in omni&longs;cientiarum ordine certa & explorata &longs;unt, vt auditoris mentem
nullo modo torqueant, de indu&longs;tria præteribimus, & ea poti&longs;simè con&longs;ectabimur quæ non di
cam maioris ponderis', aut v&longs;us erunt; &longs;ed quorum maior affinitas erit cum rebus naturalibus.
Inter hæc autem illud placet e&longs;&longs;e primum. Omne ens e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam vel accidens, ita vt nulla
&longs;it res quæ inter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & accidens intercedat & indicabimus quemadmodum hæc di&longs;tri
butio per omnia pertineat quæ in rerum vniuer&longs;itate exi&longs;tunt, &longs;iue animum re&longs;piciant, &longs;eu cor
pus. In primis autem in hac rudi & inchoata notitia quam modò per&longs;equimur.
Ens quod per
&longs;en&longs;um &longs;e&longs;e in&longs;inuat, iudicari putamus. itaque &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem quæ ex materia
conflata e&longs;t & accidens quod illi inh&ecedil;ret & nouem pr&ecedil;dicamenta complectitur, ea partitione
comprehendi volumus, quidquid pr&ecedil;ter hæc exi&longs;tit, non vt notum nobis & vt principium &longs;ta
tuetur; quippe quod longa commentatione opus &longs;it, ad inueniendum aliud &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genus vl
tra &longs;en&longs;ilem. Verùm quicquid in rerum natura extat, quicquid item in no&longs;tram cogitationem
cadit, ad hæc duo capita refertur. Neque enim nos induci po&longs;&longs;umus, vt aliter cogitemus, quàm
quòd quodcunque e&longs;t, &longs;it &longs;ubiectum, aut in &longs;ubiecto. Itaque quod concipitur, tamet&longs;i non e&longs;t
&longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis, aut accidens; nihilominus affert nobis notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ vel accidentis. Et planè ratio cogit vt credamus omne quod e&longs;t generatim aut &longs;ubiectum e&longs;&longs;e, aut in &longs;ubiecto,
aut &longs;altem ho&longs;ce ip&longs;ius e&longs;&longs;e modos imitari. En tibi Deum; hunc philo&longs;ophia demon&longs;trat vnum
e&longs;&longs;e atque adeò &longs;implici&longs;simum, nihil in &longs;eip&longs;o habens quod ab ip&longs;o &longs;egregetur. Itaque nullius
&longs;ubiectum, in eo nihil. Et tamen harum rerum nobis familiarium exemplo ducta mens no&longs;tra
Deum concipit, & ita cogitat ac &longs;i quidpiam in illo in&longs;it, quamuis nullis &longs;ubiiciatur
à &longs;en&longs;uum con&longs;uetudine &longs;e reuocare non valens. Ergo ens etiam, quodcunque &longs;it, aut e&longs;t acci
dens, aut &longs;ub&longs;tantia, aut per modum accidentis &longs;ub&longs;tantiæúe comprehenditur: & vt comprehen
ditur, ita ei&longs;dem figuræ dictionibus exprimitur. Quare audis aliquan
tra &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, & tamen explicas nomine quo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ modus exprimitur; dicis nonnulla e&longs;
&longs;e ad aliquid (vt vulgò fertur) &longs;ecundum famam, & &longs;ecundum dici: &longs;ic illas e&longs;&longs;e non re vera qua
litates, &longs;ed ita modo qualitatis ip&longs;ius proprio notari. Neque ob&longs;tat id quod Scotus opponit, ali
quid obtici menti no&longs;tr&ecedil; quod ignoremus &longs;ub&longs;tantia ne &longs;it, an accidens, vt de natura luminis op
poni &longs;olet,
quòd &longs;ubiectum &longs;it, aut in &longs;ubiecto, nec vt quiddam ab hi&longs;ce notionibus alienum vllo tempore
cogitabo. Opponet aliquis &longs;pecies rerum quæ &longs;unt in anima: neque enim &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, cùm
&longs;int in aliquo; neque &longs;unt accidentia, aut formæ quæ in &longs;ubiecto in&longs;ideant quippe quòd ab hoc
inh&ecedil;rentium genere &longs;ubiectum nuncupari con&longs;uerit, vt ab albedine album: atqui non albus ani
mus nominatur. Tùm &longs;ecundò Differentiæ non &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;:
de &longs;ub&longs;tantia: quare neque item &longs;unt accidentia. Tertiò omnia pr&ecedil;dicamenta cùm &longs;ub&longs;tantia,
tùm quoque accidentia prædicantur in quid e&longs;t. Sed accidens quod à reliquis vniner&longs;alibus di
&longs;tinguitur, de nullo pr&ecedil;dicatur in quid: non igitur &longs;ub&longs;tantia vel accidens. At quod ad &longs;pecies
Nam &longs;iue &longs;it &longs;en&longs;i
lis, &longs;eu talis, qu&ecedil; mente concipienda &longs;it, e&longs;t actus quidam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cuiu&longs;piam à forma defiuens,
& aduentitiè in hærens, vt in aëre lumen à lucido corpore emi&longs;&longs;um. Sic in animo &longs;pecies, & &longs;i
mulachra &longs;e habent. Itaque docet Ari&longs;toteles, has &longs;pecies in &longs;anguine & &longs;piritu in&longs;idere,
menti offerre res à quibus emittuntur vt lumen &longs;olem nobis o&longs;tendit à quo effunditur. Idcirco
geminam rationem & vim &longs;pecies obtinent: alteram qna &longs;unt habitus, & ita qualitates, atque
alteram, qua &longs;unt &longs;imilitudines & re&longs;pectus, &longs;iue habitudines, qua referunt obiecta. Suntigitur
&longs;pecies accidentia. Neque ita ab&longs;urdum e&longs;t à &longs;pecie facultates animi nominari, quin vi&longs;io co
lorata dicatur, & animus fieri leo & equus; &longs;icut manus cum en&longs;e fit en&longs;is & cum calamo cala
mus: ex quo etiam dicitur forma formarum &longs;ic vt manus organus organorum. Differentiæ
quoque ad alterum ex his membris nece&longs;&longs;ariò re&longs;eruntur: ac &longs;i quo pacto media &longs;int habendæ
inter accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ic &longs;tatuendum e&longs;t eas non per vtriu&longs;que extremi negationem,
&longs;ed participationem potius eiu&longs;modi e&longs;&longs;e. Nam cùm in prædicamentis in&longs;it ratio duplex; al
tera quidem, qua rerum natura con&longs;tituitur; vnde earum formas proprias, & communes ordi
ne quodam proponunt; altera verò qua formas illas voce declarant, & certa loquendi for
mula &longs;ignificant. Si rem &longs;pectes differentia pror&longs;us e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia: &longs;i verò modum aduertas, quo
voce exprimitur, imitatur qualitatem. Non e&longs;t enim in &longs;ubiecto differentia, &longs;ed dicitur
de &longs;ubiecto; &longs;ub&longs;tat etiam: quandò aliqua ip&longs;am con&longs;equuntur & peream pertinent ad &longs;ub
ftantiam compo&longs;itam: quamobrem e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum, quòd primò excipit & pars eius quod de
nominatur. Etenim notio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ vtrunque &longs;ubiecti genus amplectitur.
&longs;iquidem ani
mus &longs;it &longs;ubiectum, & corpus itidem in quo e&longs;t animus. Id verò, quòd accidens à Porphy
rio de&longs;criptum ab illo accidente &longs;eparetur, quod in entis diui&longs;ione accipimus non prohi
bet, quominus afferat aliquam notionem ex his quæ in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, vel accidente continentur. Nanque accidens, vt e&longs;t aliquid &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;, & vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ic affecta; &longs;ic etiam imaginem &longs;ub
&longs;tantiæ retinet, & eius aliqua ve&longs;tigia qua&longs;i fingit, & imitatur. Ex his a&longs;&longs;equutum e&longs;t, vt prædi
cetur in quid, Itaque quantum e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entia li
neæ;finitatis &longs;ubiectum & æqualitatis particeps; quapropter omnia propter quantum
finita vel infinita dicuntur. referunt ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notionem.
neque id, quod ita ine&longs;t in acci
dente, ine&longs;t àc &longs;i foret accidens. quî enim cogitari pote&longs;t aliquod accidens in altero, vt in acciden
te in&longs;idere? &longs;emper enim mens illud ve&longs;tigaret, cui in&longs;idet; & in infinirum producta non habe
ret vbi &longs;i&longs;tere valeret. Sed &longs;ic inh&ecedil;ret, vt in &longs;ubiecto: atque iam hoc notionem &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; præ
&longs;e&longs;ert. tamet&longs;i moneo in ea notione accidentis vnà notionem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ concipi, & ita cogitari
quantum e&longs;&longs;e finitatis &longs;ubiectum: qua&longs;i &longs;ubiectum &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia quanta notionem accidentis &longs;e
paratam non e&longs;&longs;e perpetuò defendens, &longs;ed incomplexam quidem, quia &longs;it vna notio accidentis
cum &longs;ub&longs;tantia; ac &longs;i denominatum aliquod cogitemus. Tum verò e&longs;t accidens, & ita definitur
à Porphyrio, & in Topicis; quatenus ad aliud refertur, &longs;ine quò &longs;anè non exi&longs;tat, &longs;ed e&longs;&longs;entiali vin
culo non iungatur. Non igitur re, &longs;ed modo & habitudine accidens à c&ecedil;teris vniuer&longs;alibus &longs;epa
ratur, & ab ip&longs;is prædicamentis. Ita fit, vt nulla notio &longs;it quæ fugiar alterutram notionem &longs;ub
&longs;tantiæ vel accidentis. multò minus aliqua res excluditur illa partitione: quod vereor ne dare
cogantur ij, qui elementorum formas intendi & remitti volunt; quia
accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. Et profectò notio form&ecedil; &longs;emper e&longs;t, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, cùm ip&longs;a multa &longs;u
&longs;tineat, quæ compo&longs;ito impertit. Atqui dices, ita imperfecta e&longs;t, vt accidenti con&longs;imilis e&longs;&longs;e vi
deatur. At non e&longs;t hoc alterius extremi naturam participare, & &longs;ubiacere conditionibus acci
dentis; &longs;ed in genere &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; contineri, & vim retinere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ; &longs;ed eam defeti&longs;centem, &
imbecillem, conditiones eiu&longs;dem, licet infimo quodam modo, accipientem. Quare medium
non admittunt accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Verumenimuero accidens in nouem genera di&longs;tribui
tur; quod item in omni &longs;cientia, arte, & methodo recipitur, vt per&longs;picuum. Nam lu&longs;tranti quot
modis res in mentem no&longs;tram, &longs;eu rectius dixerim, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cadere queant, & quot modis voce
explicari, & alteri &longs;ignificari po&longs;sint, hi decem &longs;oli occurrant. Itaque & dialecticus hæc decem
principia rerum accipit, & moralis, & philo&longs;ophi omnes, quorum &longs;ingulis vnum par attribuunt
contrariorum. Id quod inde arbitror colligi, quia genus e&longs;t vnumquodque ex his principiis
quæ pr&ecedil;dicamenta dicuntur; genus autem præ&longs;efert quiddam quod &longs;ecari po&longs;sit in oppo&longs;itas
differentias.
in vnoquoque genere igitur &longs;unt prima contraria; perfectè verò differentia mon&longs;trat inductio, Porrò
prima contraria cùm bifariam &longs;umi po&longs;sint vel &longs;ecundum rationem, vel &longs;ecundum rem, ac &longs;ecun
dum rationem quidem forma & priuatio quæ maximo di&longs;tant interuallo, vt nihil longinquius
in ordine rerum mens concipere queat, nec quicquam &longs;it, quod minus alterutrius natur&ecedil; &longs;it par
ticeps quàm e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;unt verò &longs;ecundum rationem, quòd con&longs;i&longs;tunt terminis, quibus &longs;.
& non ente &longs;ecundum
quodam oppo&longs;ito &longs;emper priuatio nititur, ea verò &longs;emper &longs;unt aut in eodem genere, aut diuer
&longs;orum generum, aut ip&longs;a diuer&longs;a genera, &longs;emper tamen in eodem prædicamento. illa nos hic
accipimus, quæ &longs;unt prima &longs;ecundum rationem, quæ duo in vnoquoque genere prima defendi
mus: & cùm genus, vel vt prædicatum in quid, vel vt &longs;ubiectum con&longs;iderari po&longs;sit, cùm ex illis
item duplex contrariorum genus exi&longs;tat;
&longs;teriore quod &longs;ecundum materiam; hoc quidem quod præ&longs;efert aliquam vici&longs;situdinem, illud
verò immutabile: & &longs;ecundum rationem quoque in vtroque prima contratia formam, & pri
uationem e&longs;&longs;e dicimus, cùm &longs;ecundum rem multa ip&longs;orum paria po&longs;sint exi&longs;tere. hinc eiu&longs;dem
generis multæ oppo&longs;itæ differentiæ quarum nullus e&longs;t ordo;
in contradictionem, vel oppo&longs;itionem habitus & priuationis, vt rationis particeps, & brutum,
in brutum, & non brutum, rationis particeps, & non. Ob eamque rem acceptum e&longs;t &longs;ine pro
batione ab Ari&longs;totele. In vno genere vnum e&longs;&longs;e par contrariorum primum.
Hæc, tamet&longs;i pri
mum re&longs;piciunt genus, quod pr&ecedil;dicatur, &longs;iue pertinent ad genus, quod e&longs;t vt &longs;ubiectum & ma
teria; re&longs;piciunt quoque facultates, vt &longs;cientiam & medicinam; quòd ea &longs;it obiecti cuiu&longs;piam,
in quo contraria exi&longs;tunt: nimirum corporis humani, quod capax e&longs;t bonæ valetudinis.
Vnum verò contraria non e&longs;&longs;e docemur ex vi terminorum: &longs;iquidem contraria contineant ha
bitudinem quæ non con&longs;i&longs;tit in vno: non e&longs;&longs;e verò plura quàm duo ratio conuincit & &longs;i obijci
tur virtus & medium quæ duobus vitijs & extremis aduer&longs;antur: nam contrarietas, vt &longs;ic dixe
rim, e&longs;t maxima differentia; &longs;i maxima perfecta, &longs;i per&longs;ecta finita: quapropter extra illam nihil
accipi pote&longs;t. Ergo duo &longs;unt &longs;olum ip&longs;a contraria; aliter vltra extremum aliquid e&longs;&longs;et.
Etenim
cogitare oportet contraria continere &longs;patium quoddam: veluti terminos, quod indicat &longs;en&longs;us. Omnis autem vnius &longs;patij terminati duo &longs;unt termini non plures: aut enim termini non e&longs;&longs;ent
intra illos; & &longs;ic contraria non maximè di&longs;tarent: aut illi termini non e&longs;&longs;et; proinde neque con
traria, &longs;i qua maior e&longs;&longs;et di&longs;tantia. Duo &longs;unt igitur extrema.
Ergo & omnis contrarietatis, h&ecedil;c
verò contraria &longs;unt. Nec ob&longs;tant medium & virtus.
nam medium non opponitur extremis vt
contrarium, &longs;ed vt ad aliquid: & virtus opponitur vitijs, vt moderatum immoderato, vel vt bo
num malo: nunc mali & immoderati du&ecedil; &longs;unt &longs;pecies plus & minus ex quo exi&longs;tunt vitia. Sed
redeo ad illa. Quicquid e&longs;t, e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam vel accidens.
eodem quoque gradu procedunt
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ partes & accidentis: &longs;iquidem partes accidentia accidentia &longs;int, & qualitatis qualita
tes, quanti quanta, & c&ecedil;terorum omnium partes pro ratione. Quamquam nonnulli &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil;
partes in dubium reuocarunt; & rationibus quibu&longs;dam colligere voluerunt partes
non e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias, eorum ergo rationes diluere placer, ne fortè nos po&longs;tea perturbet. In primis
illi accipiunt. In quibu&longs;cunque finis aliquis e&longs;t, huius gratia agitur quod prius e&longs;t,
con
&longs;equitur. Sed animata corpora fiunt è &longs;implicibus & pror&longs;us inanimis.
Ergo &longs;implicia & inani
ma animatorum gratia &longs;unt. Itaque illorum forma; &longs;iquidem finis & forma idem &longs;int poti&longs;si
mè in habentibus animam. Signo etiam e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t: nanque vbi &longs;eparentur à toto animato, non
amplius eandem &longs;eruant rationem, &longs;ed ambiguè talia &longs;unt, nec digitus amputatus amplius digi
tus appellatur. Deinde mixta inanima carent fine: non ergo &longs;unt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ.
Probatur verò
antecedens. quòd de illis di&longs;&longs;erens Ari&longs;toreles efficiens expo&longs;uit & materiam: de illorum fine
meminit nu&longs;quam. quod verò con&longs;equitur, ita colligitur.
Nam quicquid e&longs;t vel e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia
vel accidens. At accidentia &longs;iunt ex con&longs;equente; neque finem omnino habent: ergo quicquid
habet finem e&longs;t nece&longs;&longs;ariò &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Po&longs;tremò lapides & metalla putre&longs;cunt &longs;olùm & ita cor
rumpuntur; atque aliter ac animalia, ip&longs;a enim prius corrumpuntur, po&longs;tea putre&longs;cunt. quòd &longs;i
non corrumpuntur; nec generantur igitur. &longs;i non generantur: ergo neque &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt, &longs;iqui
dem generatio &longs;it propria &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum. Sed enim mihi videtur Ari&longs;toteles etiam cum &longs;ub&longs;tan
tijs partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ numerare, & tradere notas, quibus eas digno&longs;camus e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias, quo
modocunque &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ partes. quando no&longs;ti partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ dupliciter e&longs;&longs;e, vel quæ cor
poris totius molem compleant, quas integrantes cum c&ecedil;teris vocare liceat, vel eas quibus e&longs;&longs;en
tia continetur. Nam &longs;i integrantes accipias, ob&longs;eruabis eas collocari in natura con&longs;tantibus, quæ
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt, at differuntab accidentibus quæ &longs;unt ex natura.
componuntur quæ per &longs;e &longs;unt; & idcirco illa etiam quæ conf&longs;antur ex his, &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;unt, per&longs;pi
cuè verò numerantur in &longs;ub&longs;tantiis partes ab Ari&longs;totele.
&longs;us in&longs;picias e&longs;&longs;enti&ecedil; partes. hæ quoque tanquam membra &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ recen&longs;entur: cùm &longs;ub&longs;tan
tia triplex &longs;it, compo&longs;itum, forma, & materia, quæ &longs;unt partes compo&longs;iti. Idem quoque Ari&longs;to
teles illa monet e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias, partes non &longs;unt in &longs;ubiecto,
&longs;unt hoc aliquid.
cur ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ non erunt?
Docuit item partes &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;ub&longs;tantias e&longs;&longs;e quandoquidem id quod &longs;e habet vt accidens, &
e&longs;t in &longs;ubiecto, non e&longs;t pars: v&longs;que adeo vt neque credam partem quanti in quanto e&longs;&longs;e vt acci
efficitur, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia fieret è non &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Neque argumentationes diluere mea quidem &longs;en
tentia difficile e&longs;t; &longs;iquidem in prima &longs;ub&longs;it fallacia ab eo, quod e&longs;t quodammodo ad id quod
e&longs;t &longs;impliciter. Nanque & &longs;i animus e&longs;t inanimorum finis, quòd per varias mutationes, & fata
promoueri po&longs;sint ad formam nobili&longs;simam, & hoc poti&longs;simè natura re&longs;piciat; at non de&longs;erit
illa, neque &longs;poliat omni forma, neque ex omni gradu &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ deturbat. Et videt qui&longs;que ho
minem e&longs;&longs;e cui tanquam fini reliqua natura parauerit: nihilominus &longs;ingula per &longs;e con&longs;tituit, vt
etiam extra hominem &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tere queant. Animus igitur e&longs;t finis, &longs;ed remotus, alius e&longs;t finis pro
prius, qui item in ordine &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ collocatur, quo neque cetera carent qu&ecedil; non viuunt. Neque
eorum finis e&longs;t animus &longs;impliciter: &longs;ed tum finis e&longs;t, cùm &longs;ic ip&longs;a di&longs;po&longs;uir alma parens natura,
vt talis forma proximè po&longs;sit induci, veluti finis marmoris non e&longs;t &longs;tatua, ni&longs;i, cùm iam marmor
expoliri cœpit; nihilominus per proprium finem Confirmatio
quoque fallax e&longs;t præ&longs;eferens errorem in con&longs;equente. Nanque & &longs;i partes à toto &longs;eiunctæ &longs;unt
ambiguè animalia &longs;eu partes, at non &longs;unt ambiguè &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Accipitur item mixta inanima
carere fine. Tùm etiam ponitur accidens carere fine.
Et &longs;anè accidens fine careat, non nece&longs;&longs;e
e&longs;t; vt os pellucidum e&longs;t, ne offendamus. e&longs;t mixta carere fine.
Nam &longs;i partes ani
malium futur&ecedil; &longs;int; iam animus pr&ecedil;&longs;to e&longs;t. &longs;i minus; at tum per propriam formam exi&longs;tunt.
Neque fines i&longs;ti ab Ari&longs;totele pr&ecedil;termi&longs;si &longs;unt, vt primo de part.
anim.
rum formas latere magis quo ad elementa propius accedunt. Quanquam, fi formam &longs;yllo
gi&longs;mi &longs;pectemus, impotens e&longs;t, quippe quæ &longs;ic complicetur. Omne accidens caret fine.
Mixta
inanima carent fine. Sunt igitur accidentia.
Ex eo quod form&ecedil; latent, extat temperies, per
formæ de&longs;cribantur; fit, vt putredinis illorum ratio duntaxat habeatur, nulla interitus. enidens
enim temperies e&longs;t, forma autem &longs;ubob&longs;cura. Nil ergo medium habent accidens & &longs;ub&longs;tantia:
ordinem planNanque &longs;ub&longs;tantia prior e&longs;t accidente omnibus mo
dis, quando neque re neque ratione &longs;eparatur accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia, &longs;i
&longs;en&longs;um con&longs;ulimus, quem no&longs;træ methodi normam e&longs;&longs;e volumus. &longs;emper igitur rationem &longs;ub
&longs;tantiæ flagitat, tempore con&longs;equitur, quòd accidens illi &longs;uperueniat, quod iam e&longs;t
in actu. Sed &longs;i proprium &longs;it
inhærens, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ notio dicitur antecedere, quando
quidem &longs;ine illo &longs;ub&longs;tantia concipi pote&longs;t. ni&longs;i tempus fortè non vt vulgò conuenit; &longs;ed vt non
nunquam apud veteres metaphoricè pro nobilitate &longs;umatur.
idem enm valet ma
ximè honorandum, & vetu&longs;ti&longs;simum Propterea quoque Galenus
e&longs;t vocare Hippocratem Neque præcurrentes affectiones ob&longs;tant, quæ
rei generandæ anteire videantur: nanque illa &longs;ub&longs;tantia nituntur, quæ interir, dum altera gene
ratur. Itaque &longs;ub&longs;tantia accidenti &longs;impliciter antecedit, vt phy&longs;icè &longs;umi queat, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam ex
non &longs;ub&longs;tantia fieri non po&longs;&longs;e; Quare & hoc in principijs re
ponetur, cùm ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;ine ratione &longs;umatur, qua&longs;i cum proximo effato idem valear.
&longs;ub&longs;tantia prior &longs;it omnibus modis accidente, patet etiam, accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparari
&longs;e, neque reip&longs;a, neque cogitatione. atque adeo, vt nonmodo quod &longs;it, quod e&longs;t actu e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;
exi&longs;tere, & quod Gr&ecedil;corum vulgus
obtineat, quæ per definitionem explicatur, acceptum &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; referat. E&longs;t enim acci
dens in &longs;ubiecto, ide&longs;tita in alio, vt e&longs;&longs;e nequeat &longs;ine illo in quo e&longs;t, non tamen vt pars, & e&longs;t
aliud quid exi&longs;tens, non &longs;cilicet per &longs;e, &longs;ed per aliud, non quantitas, &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantia quanta, & in
&longs;ub&longs;tantiam denique re&longs;oluitur. Nec cogitari pote&longs;t accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia; &longs;iquidem e&longs;&longs;e in
&longs;ubiecto &longs;it eius natura à qua accidentis ratio diuelli nequit Inconueniens enim e&longs;t (inquit Ari
&longs;toteles) ip&longs;um &longs;eparare, &longs;i oporter nullum enim
&longs;eparari pote&longs;t pr&ecedil;ter Nec id menu
&longs;uccedere pote&longs;t; cùm &longs;it inconueniens illa mens quæ quærit ea quæ fieri nequeunt, & id aggre
ditur quod effici non pote&longs;t. Valet ad id quoque firmandum, quòd multò magis &longs;unt formæ na
turales quàm accidentia, neque tamen formæ naturales à materia &longs;eparantur, multo mi
nus igitur accidentia præ&longs;ertim quæ &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;unt: neque mens (vt mea fert &longs;ententia) rerum na
turas immutare pote&longs;t. Sed accipiat hic Ari&longs;toteles &longs;egregationem, quam natura præ&longs;tat de ea
quæ mentis opera cogitando fit, nihil agat. Atqui neque accidens citra &longs;ub&longs;tantiam cogitare licet.
Te&longs;tem apello Themi&longs;tium qui monet, ne cogitatione quidem accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparari
po&longs;&longs;e, re autem multo minus. Sub&longs;tantia planè à ceterorum generum vniuer&longs;itate pote&longs;t fepa
rari non &longs;anè quod accidentibus omnino &longs;en&longs;ilis &longs;ub&longs;tantia nudetur: &longs;ed, quia &longs;ub&longs;tantia vna
demquead numerum permanens, modo hoc modo illud accipiat.
Deinde quæ mens &longs;euocare po
re&longs;t rem à &longs;ua quidditate? &longs;imile enim foret ac &longs;i hominem aliud e&longs;&longs;e cogitarem, quàm animal
ratione vtens. Cùm ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantia compleat quidditatem accidentis planum quod accidens à
&longs;ub&longs;tantia non pote&longs;t ab&longs;olui, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam verò &longs;impliciter accipio non ignarus ab hac vel illa Fortè re&longs;pon
debis. Accidens præ&longs;eferre geminam notionem, alteram quidem qua e&longs;t accidens, hoc e&longs;t in
&longs;ubiecto, & &longs;ic accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogitari non po&longs;&longs;e fateberis; ita enim e&longs;t ad aliquid ne
ce&longs;&longs;ariò; alteram verò qua e&longs;t ens & in vniuer&longs;itate naturæ, &longs;ic pones in ip&longs;o non contineri &longs;ub
&longs;tantiam. Itaque & accidens non denominatiuè, &longs;ed nonnunquam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ modo per dictio
nem exprimitur. idem quoque definitur.
At definitio non entis &longs;olùm, &longs;ed entis per &longs;e exi&longs;tit.
Et ratio confirmat. Siquidem exceptis ijs quæ &longs;unt ad aliquid, reliqua &longs;unt entia ab&longs;oluta ergò
à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparatur accidens: aliter ens ab&longs;olutum non e&longs;&longs;et. Deinde accidens habet
genus, & propriam differentiam quæ ex eadem &longs;erie &longs;umuntur, per quæ definitur. itaque &longs;ine
&longs;ub&longs;tantia cogitatur. Attamen hoc neutiquam à Periparetico probari po&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eo.
quando
quidem notio entis aut generalis quædam accipitur, qua complectitur ea quæ in &longs;ubiecto &longs;unt,
& ea qu&ecedil; non &longs;unt in &longs;ubiecto. aut manet entis ratio in &longs;uis partibus vt non multò po&longs;t indica
bimus. &longs;ed quomodocunque ens vniuocè dicetur de &longs;uis partibus & &longs;ecus ac con&longs;tituerit Ari&longs;to
reles. Etenim e&longs;&longs;e in &longs;ubiecto & non e&longs;&longs;e tanquam contradicentia diuidunt omne ens.
alterum
ergo ex his ens &longs;it, nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. Accipiatur nunc accidens vt ens,
non, vt in &longs;ubiecto e&longs;t,
concipiatur à nobis, aliter in eius notione comprehenderetur &longs;ubeectum; ergo eadem erit notio
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ & accidentis, &longs;iue entium omnium, in &longs;ubiectò nimirum non e&longs;&longs;e. Itaque ens vni
uocè complectetur omnes &longs;uas partes. magis &longs;i rationem quandam communem cogr
temus quæ partibus eius communicetur. Verùm audiamus etiam Ari&longs;totelem, qui tractans ac
cidens, vt ens ip&longs;um à &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparari non po&longs;&longs;e docet
meminit. Ita enim, inquit, &longs;e habet definitio vt quodquid e&longs;t.
Ceterùm quod quid e&longs;t non e&longs;t
vniu&longs;modi; &longs;ed vnius primò nempè &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, ceterorum ex con&longs;ecutione & &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; &longs;impli
citer, accidentium quodammodo, & propè &longs;icuti Logici dicere &longs;olent, non ens e&longs;&longs;e ens
&longs;impliciter &longs;it non ens, &longs;ed quia non &longs;it quodammodo, videlicet priuatio entis, nanque, & non
ens &longs;i&longs;tit mentem; & qui audit, quodammodo quie&longs;cit qua&longs;i re&longs;pondeat illi certa notio &longs;i
militudo, vt reliquis nominibus &longs;ic & accidentia non dicimus e&longs;&longs;e quantitatem, aut qualitatem,
&longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quantam &longs;ub&longs;tantiam qualem. Vnde in&longs;ert Ari&longs;toreles definitiones e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tan
tiæ &longs;impliciter, aliorum verò quodammodo. Rur&longs;us a&longs;&longs;erit
&longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem cum accidentibus, &longs;iue etiam &longs;
partes, &longs;ed vt ordine quodam con&longs;titutas, &longs;ub&longs;tantia prior e&longs;t reliquis: illa enim non &longs;unt &longs;im
pliciter, quantum & quale, verum qualitates & motus &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, nec aliter &longs;e habent (&longs;æpè
enim ea vox apud Ari&longs;totelem &longs;umitur, vt nota comparationis) ac non album aut non rectum,
neque enim hæc per &longs;e &longs;unt, &longs;ed propter album & rectum, & eorum priuationes, nec &longs;unt entia
&longs;impliciter, non ad aliud, ni&longs;i quòd &longs;unt aliquid &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ. Vides igitur & accidentia con&longs;ide
rata vt &longs;unt entia, non ab&longs;olui à &longs;ub&longs;tantia. Si in eo quod &longs;unt non exi&longs;tunt &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia, con
&longs;equens item e&longs;t, vt per &longs;ub&longs;tantiam definiantur. eadem enim &longs;olent e&longs;&longs;e principia cur exi&longs;tat res,
& quæ in definitione &longs;umuntur. Igitur & quòd &longs;it & quid &longs;it à &longs;ub&longs;tantia redundat in
Atque vt de eo quod e&longs;t accidens in primis verba faciamus.
planum e&longs;t ip&longs;um ita &longs;e habere ad
&longs;ub&longs;tantiam, vt in &longs;ubiecto quòd e&longs;t dupliciter. vel enim e&longs;t vt primum excipiens & alteri tra
dens quod Latini vocant inh&ecedil;&longs;ionis, vel cuius e&longs;t aliqua pars primò excipiens, quod denomina
tionis appellare con&longs;uerunt, e&longs;t verò compo&longs;itum, vt vita ine&longs;t in animali per animum animus
primum excipit vitam po&longs;t communicat ip&longs;am animali ex hoc &longs;ubiectorum genere po&longs;&longs;unt e&longs;&longs;e
cau&longs;&longs;æ omnes, à quibus aliquod attributum proximè pendet. attamen ita &longs;e habent, vt materiam
imitentur in eo quòd vt materia &longs;e habet ad id, ex quo quiddam nece&longs;&longs;ario con&longs;equitur. vt ad
rubiginem ferrum &longs;ic & cau&longs;&longs;æ ad effecta, idcirco ex his con&longs;tituitur medium demon&longs;trationis. quoniam h&ecedil;c principia con&longs;tituunt ac
cidentia, vt ex eorum definitione patet, vbi è demon&longs;tratione elicitur. Et profectò &longs;ic rationi
con&longs;entaneum e&longs;t. Nanque vbi primum quidpiam alicui conuenit, ceteris ab illo communica
tur. Sed quid e&longs;t primùm e&longs;tip&longs;ius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ.
Ab illa igitur de&longs;cendit in accidens.
Oppones
hic tu accidens quod exprimitur figura dictionis quæ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ conueniat. ob&longs;eruabis ip&longs;um,
quatenus definiri pote&longs;t, &longs;ic verò vt non in alio, &longs;ed vt per &longs;e exi&longs;tens accipitur. An h&ecedil;c non pro
hibent quominus accidens cum &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogitetur. &longs;ed id præ&longs;tant &longs;olùm, vt menti &longs;ubijciant
in primis ip&longs;um accidens. Neque ordinem naturæ peruertunt, &longs;ed ordinem concipiendi mu
tant. Nanque eadem natura e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quantæ, & quantitatis.
&longs;iquidem quantitas non e&longs;t
&longs;impliciter &longs;ed &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quantitas. At qui concipit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quantam, primum &longs;ubijcit
quantitati &longs;ub&longs;tantiam & quantum vult e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; attriburum, qui uerò concipit quantita
tem, concipit eam quidem, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quantitatem; &longs;ed cùm duo &longs;int ratione diuer&longs;a, quan
titas & &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quantitatem primo vulrintueri. qua&longs;i &longs;pectet non quid &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;implici
ter eueniat, &longs;ed quid, quatenus e&longs;t quanta. Quare ab&longs;tractum nihil aliud efficit quàm vt de
& hoc modo fit ab&longs;tractio mathemati
ca, non autem quia quantitas &longs;impliciter à mathematico con&longs;ideretur, &longs;ed quia quantitatis &longs;ub
&longs;tantiæ ratio quidem habeatur, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ verò nequaquam. Ita & hoc e&longs;t, quod ad definiendum
proponitur, non quantitas &longs;impliciter: &longs;ed quantitas &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & ita concipitur ab&longs;tractum,
& ob eam cau&longs;&longs;am figuram dictionis immutat. Quòd opponitur e&longs;&longs;e nouem prædicamenta ab
&longs;oluta nec in habitudine po&longs;ita. facile intelligetur, vt verum &longs;it, &longs;i vim ab&longs;oluti explanemus.
Porrò ab&longs;olutum illud e&longs;t, quod ita ex &longs;e e&longs;t, vt à nullo pendeat, neque vt &longs;it, neque vt con&longs;er
uetur. Inter ea verò, quæ &longs;unt in vniuer&longs;o proprium, ide&longs;t, D. O. M. vt à nullo pendeat, &longs;ed ex
&longs;eip&longs;o &longs;it ex illo cetera &longs;int. & &longs;ic in eo re&longs;pectus ine&longs;t, non vt quicquam extra &longs;e re&longs;piciat; &longs;ed vt
re&longs;piciatur à ceteris, Secundo modo etiam id quod re&longs;picit aliud à &longs;e pote&longs;t dici ab&longs;olutum,
&longs;iquando non re&longs;piciat aliquid, à quo pendeat vt con&longs;tituente, ide&longs;t, vt à materia, vel &longs;orma. Sic quoque &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt ab&longs;olutè, quòd tamet&longs;i à Deo pendent, non ita pendent ab ip&longs;o, tan
quam materialiter &longs;u&longs;tentante. Tertio ab&longs;olutum illud e&longs;t, quod, & &longs;i pen det ab alio, tamen
non con&longs;tituitur ex alio &longs;uppo&longs;ito, ide&longs;t, habet in eodem &longs;uppo&longs;ito cau&longs;&longs;as omnes per quas exi
&longs;tit. Ab&longs;olutum quoque dici po&longs;&longs;e videtur, quatenus habet certum &longs;uum modum quo e&longs;t, qui
non petitur aliunde quàm ex &longs;e: omne enim prædicamentuin habet &longs;uum e&longs;&longs;e & &longs;uum quid e&longs;t
quo di&longs;cernitur ab alio, licet nunquam ab&longs;oluatur à &longs;ub&longs;tantia,
niter ad relatiua, & generatim & &longs;peciatim, vt etiam &longs;eruus & &longs;i pendet à domino, habet &longs;uam
certam rationem per quam &longs;eruus e&longs;t vt humilitatem & obedientiam. Hoc igitur & tertio mo
do dicimus accidentia e&longs;&longs;e res ab&longs;olutas, &longs;ecus ac ea dicamus, quæ &longs;unt ad aliquid. erenim &longs;er
uus in Dauo non habet cau&longs;&longs;as omnes, per quas exi&longs;tit: ni&longs;i enim fuerit Simo dominus; neque
etiam &longs;eruus e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t. ac &longs;i eundem patrem & filium e&longs;&longs;e fingamus, non habet tamen in &longs;e ip
&longs;o cau&longs;&longs;as quod &longs;it, &longs;ed adhuc ex alio pendebit vt pater, & ut filius ex alio. At album & quan
tum in eo &longs;unt, quod album e&longs;t, & quantum; & illius &longs;unt qualitas & quantitas, in quo &longs;unt;
ita vt, & &longs;i nihil aliud exi&longs;tat; &longs;int nihilominus album & quantum, non &longs;ic &longs;eruus exi&longs;tit, &longs;ed
aliud præterea flagitat numero diuer&longs;um, ad quod referatur. Obijcitur accidens definiri po&longs;&longs;e
per terminos eiu&longs;dem pr&ecedil;dicamenti qua &longs;i &longs;it ab&longs;olutum quoddam. At nonne idem iudicium
de genere, & differentia faciemus? etenim & color e&longs;t alicuius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, & di&longs;gregare vi&longs;um
e&longs;t actio cuiu&longs;dam &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ & in recto pronunciatur vt id notetur, quod mens primùm re&longs;pi
cit altero non exclu&longs;o. Tùm etiam hæc e&longs;t pars definitionis, quæ additamento &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; com
plecta e&longs;t, & cum definitio &longs;oleat illud euoluere, quod nomen confusè &longs;ignificat; dicemus etiam
confusè &longs;ub&longs;tantiam accidentis nomine &longs;ignificari. Quare &longs;ub&longs;tantia in definitione accidentis
non ita &longs;umitur qua&longs;i extrin&longs;ecum quiddam, &longs;ed etiam in accidentis ip&longs;ius &longs;implici notione con
tinetur. quia &longs;it accidens aliquid illius.
ob id ine&longs;&longs;e & inh&ecedil;rere notionem con&longs;tituit accidentis,
vt vides. Si &longs;ub&longs;tantia nunquam fit ex non &longs;ub&longs;tantia; profectò multò minus ex nihilo fiet.
Hic e&longs;t communis omnium phy&longs;icorum con&longs;en&longs;us, atque ita ab Ari&longs;totele approbatus, vt ope
r&ecedil;pretium fore non putarit, &longs;i id conficeret argumentis; in eo quoque &longs;ecum melius agi putans,
&longs;i vnum &longs;en&longs;um con&longs;uleret qui nu&longs;quam ex nihilo quicquam fieri iudicaret quàm &longs;i rationes
per&longs;equi vellet, quas &longs;anè multas ad hoc ip&longs;um firmandum quia corroga&longs;&longs;et Epicureus ille; Lu
cretius bellè quidem, &longs;i lepôrem carminum &longs;pectes; &longs;i ius methodi requiras, operam lu&longs;i&longs;&longs;e po
tius quàm compendium feci&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;ebis. Nil autem mirum quòd propter
ticorum (fuit autem commune vitium vniuer&longs;æ antiquitati) à demon&longs;trandis certa non di&longs;tin
guebant. Ceterùm quòd ex nihilo nihil fieri con&longs;titutum e&longs;&longs;et: & &longs;i Ari&longs;toreles oculos inten
di&longs;&longs;e videtur in materiam; at primo intuitu materia non extabat, & ijdem philo&longs;ophi, qui nihil
ex nihilo fieri autumabant, ne&longs;ciuere materiam. Quapropter ex nihilo intelligendum erat
quod cunctis erat per&longs;picuum, ex eo quod actu non e&longs;&longs;et, &longs;iue id &longs;imile foret, vt cen&longs;uit Anaxa
goras, &longs;iue contrarium, vt plerique &longs;tatuerunt. Cuius item iudicij fuit: vt ex nihilo fit nihil,
ita quoque nihil in nihilum re&longs;olui, &longs;ed in non contrarium.
prima.
de
Mem. c.
3.
T. 29.
Tt.
13. 14.
T. 24.
10.
Met.
7. Met.
ab initio.
c&ecedil;l. T. 1.
T. 1.
T. 5.
tit.
4.
&longs;um.
2. c.
1.
c.
6.
Tit.
52.
Tit.
14.
tit.
14.
tit.
1.
Remgigni patitur, ni&longs;i morte adiuta aliena.
Hoc ita creditum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele, vt multa &longs;uper hoc fundamento in vniuer&longs;a &longs;ua philo&longs;o
phia &longs;truxerit: vt qui &longs;u&longs;picentur Ari&longs;totelem non dicam noui&longs;&longs;e, &longs;ed approba&longs;&longs;e creationem;
ij parum viderint de rebus Ari&longs;totelicis. Quinimmo ne&longs;cio &longs;atis'ne exercitati &longs;int in naturali
philo&longs;ophia, qui humana ratione creationem colligi po&longs;&longs;e arbitrantur. Nimium confidimus
nobisip&longs;is; non per&longs;picimus non po&longs;&longs;e homuncionem ad tam alta my&longs;teria peruenire. maiore
luce opus e&longs;t. Nam quòd aliquid de creatione &longs;ubodoratus &longs;it Ari&longs;toteles; ip&longs;emet a&longs;&longs;eruit qui
etiam multorum opinionem extiti&longs;&longs;e profitetur, verba citat in eam &longs;ententiam quòd
principiò genitum &longs;it chaos, tùm deinde tellus, proximè autem amor, chaos verò & terra ex ni
hilo facta fuerint. multos commemorat qui dicunt e&longs;&longs;e nihil, &longs;ed omnia fieri; fieri verò
&longs;tatur. Quinimmo ibidem monet nos Ari&longs;toteles non e&longs;&longs;e eo placito liberè vtendum; nimirum
nihil ex nihilo fieri; cùm &longs;it comprehen&longs;io quædam quam accepimus rerum &longs;uperficiem &longs;olam
&longs;pectando, non autem &longs;crutando interius. Attamen & &longs;i ignota non erat creatio; neutiquam
tamen approbata. Et He&longs;iodus numeratur in Theologis; ex quo e&longs;fici
dixit Ari&longs;toteles intelligat propriè phy&longs;icos cum ceteroquin alij multi qui
&longs;unt phy&longs;ici, denatura &longs;e &longs;cribere profiteantur, &longs;ed nos hic phy&longs;icum agimus, et&longs;i verbis Ari&longs;to
telis vti licet, vt cernas, quæ nobis con&longs;tituenda &longs;unt, illiu&longs;modi fore, vt nos humano modo ve
limus habere ad credendum. & validiorem Theologo delegemus; illud in animo &longs;emper ha
bentes Chri&longs;tianam pietatem e&longs;&longs;e talem, vt &longs;ola &longs;uo iure principia ponere po&longs;sit, nec aliunde
mutuare; memores eò non peruenire &longs;en&longs;um quem omnium humanarum artium autorem e&longs;&longs;e
vult Ari&longs;toteles. Nanque & ip&longs;e docet veritatis & fidei principium duplex e&longs;&longs;e, quorum
e&longs;t mens, alterum mente &longs;ublimius, nempe Deus, qui motiones efficit in ijs quos
&longs;elices appellant, & &longs;anè multò admirabiliores quàm illi &longs;int qui duce ratione rebus gerendis
vtuntur. Hoc principium à diuini&longs;simo
Euryale? An &longs;ua cuiq, Deus fit dira cupido?
E&longs;t & aliud principium, quod &longs;uperat mentem, atra nimirum bilis qua qui agitantur; &longs;upra
captum hominis præno&longs;cunt, & futura præ&longs;agiunt. Sed nos humano modo nunc loquimur.
Porrò humanum morem, qui &longs;it, docet Laert.
Pyrrhone illo v&longs;um fui&longs;&longs;e Hippocratem,
& longè antè Homerum. e&longs;t verò hic ambiguus, & qui in vtranque partem facilè trahi po&longs;sit, &
vbi denique contradicere liceat. Itaque Homerus.
Lingua volubilis e&longs;t; hominum
re&longs;erta &
Verborum hinc atque hinc ingens e&longs;t copia culuis
Atque ille quidem congruens e&longs;t rebus naturalibus quæ propter infinitatem materiæ nece&longs;
&longs;itatem di&longs;fici&longs;è admittunt. Itaque ex nihilo nihil fieri recipimus.
Attamen & ex nihilo nihil
fieri &longs;ic contingit, vt ex eo quoque nonnihil fieri po&longs;sQuocirea etiam laudatur Parmenides
in omnem mutationem nece&longs;&longs;ariò conuenire. Verùm non idcirco creatio quamuis &longs;ecundum
veritatem credenda conceditur ab Ari&longs;totele. &longs;iquidem id quod fit, non ex nihilo &longs;impliciter &
per &longs;e (quod creatio requirit) efficiatur; &longs;ed ex euento; & quatenus &longs;ube&longs;t materia priuationi. Proptereà di&longs;tinguendum fuit, vt ex nihilo nihil, & vt ex illo quippiam fieri po&longs;&longs;et; neque illò
perueniebat &longs;en&longs;us: quapropter etiam longiore di&longs;qui&longs;itione opus &longs;uit, vt no&longs;ceretur. Hoc er
go &longs;it principium phy&longs;icum ex nihilo nihil; vt oppo&longs;itum &longs;impliciter à phy&longs;ico doctore &longs;it repu
diandum, vtpotè quod ex eo na&longs;catur &longs;yllogi&longs;mus contrariæ deceptionis. Quamobrem hoc lo
co &longs;uccurrit vt admiremur eos qui phy&longs;icè, aut etiam Ari&longs;totelicè oppo&longs;itum huius perorare &longs;e
po&longs;&longs;e con&longs;idant; nec è fontibus pietatis hauriant. Sed cùm id conficiant argumentis, quibus plu
ra no&longs;tr&ecedil; methodi principia &longs;upponuntur; muneris quoque no&longs;tri e&longs;t ad illa aliquid dicere: &longs;unt
enim ea nobis di&longs;&longs;oluenda, quæ qui&longs;piam è principijs ducta probatione, fallaci conclu&longs;ione effi
ciatNeque verò hic ego dubitabo, quin &longs;tudio pietatis adducti &longs;ancti&longs;simi viri conferant in
hunclocum &longs;uos conatus; neque &longs;tudium reprehendo. ab ijs non recedere certum e&longs;t
in eo quod religio iu&longs;sit. &longs;ed quantum ego rem ita &longs;e habere noui, tantum dubito phy&longs;icè ne
confici queat.
Tit.
79.
T. 11.
Multa &longs;anè contrà afferuntur illa, hoc loco attingam qu&ecedil; &longs;ub initio no&longs;træ methodi exitum fa
cilè indenient: &longs;iqua maiorem eruditionem diligentiam ve po&longs;tulabunt, eò reijciam, vbi de mo
tus &ecedil;Hæc verò inter alia afferuntur.
Modus agendi &longs;equitur modum quo
res e&longs;t: & quale e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e rei, talis e&longs;t actio.
Sed Deus in eo quod e&longs;t, à nullo pendet, nihil
pr&ecedil;requirit, aut præ&longs;upponit: ergo nec in agendo. Hæc e&longs;t etiam notio Dei naturaliter animis
in &longs;ita & impre&longs;&longs;a. Deum e&longs;&longs;e ens primum, perfectum, à nullo pendens, per &longs;e &longs;ufficiens, nullius
indigum; ergo per &longs;e &longs;u&longs;ficit ad agendum: itaque non eget &longs;ubiecto. Affertur & illud.
Deum
e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am omnium rerum: ceteroqui pr&ecedil;ter Deum aliquid e&longs;&longs;et &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a, habens e&longs;&longs;e à &longs;e:
id verò fieri nequit: neque enim omnia penderent à Deo. Sed multa &longs;unt, vt materia prima,
c&ecedil;li, mentes beat&ecedil; quæ non potuerunt habere e&longs;&longs;e à Deo ex materia per motum: per creationem
igitur. Quòd &longs;i accipias huiu&longs;modi res habere e&longs;&longs;e à Deo ex æterno tempore.
Atqui id creatio
ni non ob&longs;tat: eius enim ratio po&longs;ita e&longs;t in eo quòd &longs;it ex non &longs;ubiecto non autem quòd de nouo
exi&longs;tar. Immo &longs;i potuit hoc ex æterno tempore efficere, poterit etiam nunc & fortè multo ma
gis; & quo æternum non æterno difficilius e&longs;t. In productione quoque cuiu&longs;que &longs;ingularis, vt
& per&longs;ectum priora &longs;unt pote&longs;tate & imper&longs;ecto. Itaque generatio hominis vt homo e&longs;t, non
eget &longs;emine, cùm &longs;it homo &longs;impliciter &longs;emine prior. Igitur alium modum productionis habe
bit nimirum per creationem. Memini etiam me legi&longs;le apud quo&longs;dam &longs;criptores hac via con
firmari po&longs;&longs;e creationem: &longs;iquidem hæc quæ natura &longs;unt, alicuius rei gratia hant à natura: ergo
prius aliquam notionem extiti&longs;&longs;e in effectore nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: in hoc igitur rei facienda ratio ex qua
res extitêre: quapropter creatio. Hæc quidem ingeniosè excogitata: veruntamen eiu&longs;modi, qu&ecedil;
Ari&longs;totelis principijs aduer&longs;entur huic tu rei nunc cau&longs;&longs;as accipe. Nam quantum e&longs;t de prima
ratione, videtur in ea committi peccatum à &longs;ecundum quid ad &longs;impliciter. Etenim ex actioni
bus quæ Deo manife&longs;tè tribuuntur (ex ijs enim qu&ecedil; à quoque &longs;ani iudicij facilè dabuntur,
di&longs;ceptationem, quoad licebit, peragemus) aliquæ &longs;untip&longs;ius propriæ, vt contemplari &longs;eip&longs;um,
nobis enim liquet hoc in nobis ip&longs;is experientibus contemplationem externæ rei nullius egêre:
aliæ cum corpore communicantes, vt mouere & ambulare: ac verum quidem e&longs;t actiones pro
prias imitari e&longs;&longs;entiam; de communibus aliter &longs;entiendum e&longs;t. Ex illo igitur quòd aliquæ fun
ctiones &longs;ine corpore exercentur, quæ &longs;anè propriæ &longs;unt; in&longs;ertur, omnes &longs;ine corpore exerceri
po&longs;&longs;e, quanuis &longs;int communes. & ex eo, quòd agit contemplando &longs;ine corpore, concluditur ip
&longs;um pror&longs;us &longs;ine corpore agere quodcunque & &longs;impliciter. conuenientiam igitur, & &longs;imilitudi
nem actionum omnium, quas Deo tribuunt, vel &longs;en&longs;u, vel inductione iudicare oportebat. At
qui non licet. Nec qui&longs;quam Peripateticus aliam Dei propriam actionem cognouit quàm &longs;ui
contemplationem. Eodem propemodum vitio &longs;ecunda ratio laborat.
Damus enim planè
Deum e&longs;&longs;e ens primum, omnium ab&longs;oluti&longs;simum, nullius indigum, & non egêre &longs;ubiecto ad
agendum: &longs;ed addimus ad præ&longs;tandum propriam actionem quam dicimus e&longs;&longs;e contemplatio
nem: quòd &longs;i &longs;uerit actio communis, adhuc exquiret phy&longs;icus confirmationem talis a&longs;lumpti
quam à &longs;en&longs;u peti po&longs;&longs;e negamus. In tertia verò ratione duo &longs;e&longs;e of&longs;erunt &longs;pectanda, quorum
primum e&longs;t. Impe
qu&ecedil; generantur a&longs;siduè, qu&ecedil; ex iugi c&ecedil;li conuer&longs;ione producuntur, illam verò Deus &longs;olus præ
&longs;tat: verùm quoque e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e perfectum, quod &longs;cilicet &longs;ineip&longs;o non exi&longs;tat in actu &longs;ecundo, nec
proprio munere fungatur &longs;ine præ&longs;entia Dei; veluti Legatus e&longs;t homo quidem per &longs;e; &longs;ed per
eius virtutem, qui legauit, in dignitate con&longs;titutus e&longs;t, & &longs;ungitur legatione. Alterum e&longs;t, quod
ratio phy&longs;ica conuincit, aliquid e&longs;&longs;e æternum per &longs;e præter Deum O. M. Quibus po&longs;itis in ar
gumento duplex vitium latet. &longs;iquidem in argumento vitium illud quod e&longs;t ex ignotis proce
dere committatur
motum extiti&longs;&longs;e, vel creationem; idque inter phy&longs;icos &longs;en&longs;um per&longs;equentes & Theologos à lu
mine Diuino illu&longs;tratos e&longs;t maximè controuer&longs;um, accipiunt Theologi nullum e&longs;&longs;e huiu&longs;modi. concluditur à phy&longs;ico tale rerum genus reperiri.
Cùm igitur id a&longs;&longs;umant Theologi quod à phy
&longs;ico dubitatur, immò cui concluditur oppo&longs;itum: pater hîc e&longs;&longs;e progre&longs;&longs;mn ex ignotis qui mo
dus e&longs;t non probandi propo&longs;itum. Deinde cùm phy&longs;ici probent e&longs;&longs;e tertium genus eorum &longs;ci
licet, quæ cùm &longs;int æterna; pendent tamen à Deo; ine&longs;t in argumento fallacia con&longs;equentis. Etenim negabit phy&longs;icus ille quem nos in hac methodo imitamur.
Quicquid e&longs;t à Deo, aut e&longs;&longs;e
per motum, aut per creationem. &longs;ed tertium modum adijciet vt puta e&longs;&longs;e formaliter eo, &longs;.
po&longs;ito
vt hoc &longs;it, non effectiuè. ita cùm diui&longs;ionis membra non om nia fuerint accepta: con&longs;tat nullam
e&longs;&longs;e vim argumenti illius hypothetici ex diui&longs;ione con&longs;tructi. Iam verò &longs;i datur id, quod acce
pimus, e&longs;&longs;e aliquod æternum per &longs;e pr&ecedil;ter Deum O. M. patet pro&longs;ectò parum po&longs;&longs;e apud reni
tentem id quod ad&longs;cribitur de æterna illa creatione, & quòd eiu&longs;dem &longs;iquidem ibi &longs;emper exi&longs;tat materia, qu&ecedil; &longs;up
ponatur; nec requiratur vlla mutatio vt &longs;int; cùm per &longs;e exi&longs;tant ab æterno quæ vtraque in noua
creatione con&longs;titui nece&longs;le fuit. Neque aliud certè arguet quod oratio ponatur ab æterno, ni&longs;i
quòd ex Deo &longs;int aliqua formaliter, quod non negamus,
quarta ratione notemus, in omni generatione duo principia requiri, actum &longs;cilicet &
& pote&longs;tas quidem e&longs;t &longs;ingularis, & æqualiter re&longs;piciens e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e. Actus e&longs;t determina
tus & po&longs;itus e&longs;t in e&longs;&longs;e: quapropter æternus e&longs;t per &longs;e. nec, quatenus actus, vnquam generationi
redditur obnoxiusItaque generatur hic homo qui quidem ex &longs;emine procreatur.
homo vt
actus æternus e&longs;t. Inde igitur creatio non inferetur: at illud, quod ad extremum propo&longs;uimus;
&longs;atis foret iis qui Peripateticè profitentur; &longs;i rationis illius autor &longs;e illa Peripatetica non habere
te&longs;tatus e&longs;&longs;et. Verùm quia nihil e&longs;t non Peripateticum, quod ratione, quæ iudicium &longs;en&longs;us non
euertat, approbari pote&longs;t; Igitur, cùm &longs;umitur ea quæ &longs;unt natura, e&longs;&longs;e alicuius rei gratia; fatemur in iis, quæ fiunt: cum
etiam in natura &longs;it id, cuius gratia &longs;int nonnulla. Cùm etiam ponitur eorum quæ &longs;unt alicuius
gratia notionem, &longs;en rationem quandam in effectore antecedere; notionem &longs;anè damus in iis
adæquet &longs;ormam: atque illam quidem tribuimus cau&longs;sis e&longs;
uer&longs;alibus vt c&ecedil;lo & Deo, cùm illam mentem Ari&longs;totelis &longs;uille cen&longs;eamus cau&longs;&longs;as vniuer&longs;ales
ita &longs;e extuli&longs;&longs;e ab his in&longs;erioribus vt illorum gratia nihil agant; nec rationibus oppo&longs;itis aliud in
duci po&longs;&longs;um vt credam, quod &longs;uo loco tractabitur. C&ecedil;terùm detur hoc, ne &longs;imus moro&longs;i
Fateamur item ex ea ratione produci id quod fit, at quòd ex nihilo negamus.
Etenim, ex ea ra
tione &longs;it id, quod fit, vt efficiente, vel con&longs;tituente e&longs;ficiens: at verò id ego dicam ab efficiente
produci, &longs;ed ex materia. Quocirca probandum fuit e&longs;ficiens per talem rationem &longs;ine materia
po&longs;&longs;e producere; qu&ecedil; vniuerla peruicax, & qui &longs;e duci patitur à len&longs;u & experientiis, quod Phy
&longs;ici faciunt; & inficiabitur, & conuinci non poterit. Hæ non eò dicta &longs;unt à nob.
vt creationem
euerteremus, &longs;ed vt ab Ari&longs;totele & phy&longs;icis haud approbatam &longs;ui&longs;&longs;e per&longs;piceres, & agno&longs;ceres
altius &longs;e&longs;e extuli&longs;&longs;e no&longs;træ &longs;alutis initia quàm vt à phy&longs;ico. rationibus quæ &longs;en&longs;u niterentur, at
tingi po&longs;lent; atque vt doceremus id e&longs;&longs;e principium in hac methodo, vnde omnia quæ in hac
philo&longs;ophia colligerentur repugnantia veritati, per eius
oppo&longs;itum diuino beneficio multò magis e&longs;&longs;et per&longs;picuum: neque iis vllo modo no&longs;tra mens
adhære&longs;ceret. Nec me later, cùm hic nonnulla ex Peripateticorum &longs;ontibus hau&longs;ta &longs;ui&longs;&longs;e, tù
etiam alia pr&ecedil;termi&longs;&longs;a, quæ &longs;olent in confirmationem eiu&longs;dem theorematis afferri; de quibus
phy&longs;ico adhuc plura dicenda forent. nos omnia &longs;uo loco declarabimus, eo nunc contenti; quòd
ex nihilo nihil fieri, pro principio philo&longs;ophiæ naturalis ab Ari&longs;totele con&longs;titutum fuerit, & ni
hil ex hac philo&longs;ophia depromi po&longs;sit, quod ip&longs;um demoliatur. Tertium effatum naturale pr&ecedil;
cipua naturæ munera quæ cuique &longs;unt euidentia continebit. ea quanquam innumerabilia &longs;unt,
in decem capita digerentur. Itaque ea quæ fiunt, aut à natura fiunt, aut à nobis, aut ab aliis cau&longs;
&longs;is, vtputa ca&longs;u, & fortuna. A nobis ea quæ fiunt, incertos exitus habent, & à no&longs;tra voluntate
profici&longs;centia, quemadmodum facultas e&longs;t mutabilis & incon&longs;tans, ita & ortum & euentum
&longs;imilesEorum quæ &longs;emper aut frequenter eueniunt, cau&longs;&longs;am nemo, ni&longs;i fortè Em
pedocleus fortunæ ad&longs;crip&longs;erit; vt quòd &longs;emper hyeme pluat; aut quòd &longs;ub cane &longs;it æ&longs;tus: &longs;ed &longs;i
pluat, dum &longs;ub cane &longs;ol e&longs;t, aut &longs;i media hyeme nos æ&longs;tus inuadat. Re&longs;tat igitur, vt eorum &longs;it
auctor ip&longs;a natura, quæ plurimum &longs;emperúe fiunt eodem modo, & ea &longs;ecundum naturam fieri
optimo iure dicentur quæ maxima ex parte fient: hoc e&longs;t in pluribus eiu&longs;dem &longs;peciei &longs;ingularib. & &longs;requentius, aut &longs;emper: naturale enim e&longs;t cane&longs;cere, licet in &longs;enectute contingat, quod om
nis homo &longs;erè, cùm venerit ad &longs;enectutem, cane&longs;cit, & naturalis hyeme pluuia, quia &longs;it frequen
tior in ea tempe&longs;tate, & iis poti&longs;simè natura con&longs;i&longs;tit quæ non &longs;emper &longs;unt; horum enim maxi
ma pars e&longs;t. Itaque Prolemæus
&longs;unt &longs;ecundum naturam, quæ certis quibu&longs;dam interuallis repetuntur, vt æ&longs;tas & hyems: quo
niam circuitus ille perpetuitatem habeat in tali &longs;ucce&longs;sione po&longs;itam: &longs;emper enim &longs;ui &longs;imilis e&longs;t
illa &longs;ucce&longs;sio. Natura quoque &longs;unt eclip&longs;is &longs;olis & lunæ, quæ tamen neque &longs;emper neque fre
quenter exi&longs;tunt. Veruntamen, cum cau&longs;sis illis concurrentibus nece&longs;&longs;ario fiant, cau&longs;&longs;arum ve
rò certus fit reditus, & circuitio & tempe&longs;tates & eclip&longs;is in perpetuis numerari queunt. At verò
&longs;i natura e&longs;t eorum cau&longs;&longs;a quæ plurimum &longs;emperúe fiunt: & ea, quæ natura &longs;unt, plurimum
&longs;emperúe contingunt. igitur ea quæ non &longs;emper plurimumúe eueniunt, non &longs;unt natura.
Atqui
violenta &longs;unt naturæ contraria; non ergo plurimum &longs;emperúe contingunt. Etenim &longs;i contraria
naturæ plurimum, aut &longs;emper euenirent non e&longs;&longs;et natura de iis qu&ecedil; plurimum, &longs;ed rarò, aut nun
quam exi&longs;tunt; id verò fieri nequit. Nihil etiam &longs;ru&longs;tra efficiunt Deus & natura cuius &longs;cilicet
non &longs;it aliquod munus, o&longs;ficium, vel v&longs;us, nihil ocio&longs;um, nihil redundans vt calceus ille fru&longs;tra
e&longs;&longs;et, quo, cùm non e&longs;&longs;et habilis & aptus ad pedem, vti non po&longs;&longs;em. Natura, inquàm, illa quæ po
&longs;ita e&longs;t in nexu cau&longs;&longs;arum, vis &longs;cilicet per omnia corpora penetrans, & &longs;ine ratione ciens & exci
piens motus in corporibus nece&longs;&longs;arios, & Deus omnium princeps, à quo omnes i&longs;ti motus re
guntur & gubernantur, cur&longs;us a&longs;trorum, mutationes temporum, rerum vici&longs;situdines con&longs;eruantur.
Deus igitur & natura nihil fru&longs;tra moliuntur cunctis rebus v&longs;um exhiben
do, quo &longs;eip&longs;a tueantur & in mundi theatrum conferant, & ad hominis v&longs;um præcipuè; quo
&longs;anè vinculo mundi partes ad&longs;trictæ, &longs;iquid &longs;eor&longs;um detrimenti capiunt ab externo, vniuer&longs;am
tamen naturam quæ &longs;ingula corpora cohibet, labefactare non po&longs;&longs;unt. Proinde vbi vnum &longs;uf
ficiat in&longs;trumentum,
ræ minus impediret, & grauitarem afferret quàm mole&longs;tia nos afficiat &longs;extus digitus quem ma
nui natura peccans a&longs;finxerit. Itaque vbi commodè id e&longs;fici potuerit; ad officia complura abu
titur vno in&longs;trumento, vt lingua ad gu&longs;tatum,
pulmonem ad cibi &longs;umptionem, & re&longs;pirationem. vt nihil planè &longs;ine optima ratione feci&longs;&longs;e vi
deatur. Neque verò, quia natura &longs;it vis quæ ratione vtatur, iam enim ratione vti e&longs;t animæ, non
naturæ. Natura porrò
bus, non e&longs;t ideo, quia ratiocinans agat; &longs;ed vel quòd agendo proce&longs;&longs;um rationis imitetur; vel
quia nil pror&longs;us efficiat; cuius non optima ratio po&longs;sit afferri quæ petitur à duobus initijs: alte
ro quidem, quod aliter e&longs;fici non potuerit: atque id à materia ducitur, vt quòd cornigera
dentibus &longs;uperioribus: neque enim materia, cùm abierit in cornua, &longs;uppetit dentibus, aut quòd
ita fieri præ&longs;titerit: hoc verò pendet à fine ex quibus omnis rerum naturalium ordo deriuatur,
& cunctorum &longs;en&longs;ilium commen&longs;us conuenienti&longs;simus exi&longs;tit quem generali nomine
& rationem licet appellare. Quamobrem &longs;ic omnia di&longs;pen&longs;antur in vniuer&longs;o, vt vis illa com
munis & vniuer&longs;alis quæ &longs;cilicet per omnia pertinet, tamet&longs;i tum &longs;uum robur o&longs;tentat atque, vt
ita dixerim, &longs;apientiam, cùm animal producere aggreditur: non &longs;ine &longs;ummo iudicio cum pru
dente patrefamilias ab Ari&longs;totele conferatur.
commodi po&longs;sit, & ita di&longs;pen&longs;at in cura rei familiaris, vt optimus cibus liberis præbeatur, dete
rior &longs;eruis, omnium pe&longs;simus &longs;ociis animalibus, &longs;ic in ortu ip&longs;o natura ex materia &longs;ynceri&longs;sima
carnem & aliorum &longs;en&longs;uum corpora conficit: in excrementis o&longs;&longs;a, pilos & reliqua generis eiu&longs;
dem con&longs;tituit. Ab his tu de c&ecedil;teris iudicium facito.
Nil igitur in natura, quin illius v&longs;us, aut
vnus, aut plures indicari po&longs;sint quo, &longs;i careat, aliter habendum non erit, quam manus mort
&longs;ine lapidea quæ &longs;olo nomine &longs;unt manus, ratione verò non item. Nam cuncta o&longs;&longs;icio, & pote
&longs;tate definiuntur,
quam vnum rei vnius v&longs;um pro natura expectare oportet qui quidem &longs;it præcipuus. Sic enim
optimè in&longs;trumenta proficiunt, &longs;i eorum &longs;ingula non multis o&longs;&longs;iciis, &longs;ed vni de&longs;eruiant. Neque
tale quippiam natura facit, vt fabri ferrarij propter inopiam &
gladium delphicum. &longs;ecandas & ad c&ecedil;dendos &longs;onteis
vterentur. nec vt illi qui propter frugalitatem veru fabricabant, quo item lucerna figeretur: ex
quo dicebatur Atque arti
quidem materia deficere pote&longs;t; natura copiis omnibus affluit & abundat: itaque vnam rem vni
muneri delegat; & &longs;iqui alij v&longs;us o&longs;tendantur, huic vni quodam modo &longs;eruiunt, vt aliàs o&longs;ten
demus. Cùm verò nonnunquam eueniat, vt plura quidem o&longs;ficia, veruntamen non &longs;e&longs;e vici&longs;
&longs;im re&longs;picientia pr&ecedil;&longs;to &longs;int; quid enim gu&longs;tui cum locutione, aut re&longs;pirationi cum alimento? &longs;ic
natura rebus omnibus prudenti&longs;simè con&longs;uluit quæ propter melius ita effecerit: id verò &longs;ic con
tingit, quòd vnum præ&longs;tat o&longs;ficium, quia nece&longs;&longs;arium &longs;it; alterum commoditatis ergò &longs;ubiungit.
Nece&longs;&longs;arius enim fuerat gu&longs;tatus: quippe quòd animal &longs;u&longs;tineri non po&longs;&longs;et, ni&longs;i aleretur, alimen
ti verò &longs;en&longs;us e&longs;t gu&longs;tus qui quidem in perfectis perfectus e&longs;&longs;e perhibetur, & imperfectus in im
perfectis. os item nece&longs;&longs;arium, vt eo &longs;umatur alimentum.
&longs;ed ita &longs;abricatus e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;us ille, vt non
alio in&longs;trumento, aut loco natura locutioni melius prouidere potuerit. Sic etiam po&longs;tquàm ore
cibus erat capiendus, indè quoque perbellè valuit &longs;ubuenire calori &longs;piratum efficiens per quem
exhalare po&longs;&longs;et, ne copia &longs;uffocatus extingueretur, & animal enecaret. Neque hic talpæ oculos,
aut muli genitalia commemorare oportet, quorum nullus &longs;it v&longs;us in rerum natura. &longs;unt enim
hæc orbata & imperfecta, quòd efficientium progre&longs;&longs;us impediuntur &longs;uperante materia. vt ta
met&longs;i efficientia &longs;ummum conficere &longs;tudent; ex hac materia non aliud po&longs;sint efficere, neque
vlterius promouere: non &longs;ecus àc &longs;i optimus pi&longs;tor panem candidi&longs;simum ex hordeo, &longs;icut è
tritico vellet interere. Neque enim ad eum candorem &longs;e perduci hordei materia pateretur.
quanuis &longs;u&longs;picandum non &longs;it, naturam rei potiori con&longs;ului&longs;&longs;e quam tamen, &longs;i pr&ecedil;&longs;tare voluerit,
illud mali perpetuo &longs;it affixum, vt &longs;i cui legislatori ciuitatem ex opulentis con&longs;tituere libeat, ade
runt nece&longs;&longs;ario pauperes, qui diuitum erunt a&longs;&longs;eclæMulti enim &longs;unt, qui diuitum ope indi
geant. Vnde illud e&longs;t Simonidis poëtæ dictum de &longs;apientibus & diuitibus.
Nam cum Hieronis
Syracu&longs;arum regis vxor, aliquando rogaret Simonidem, vtrum melius e&longs;&longs;et &longs;ieri &longs;apientem, an
diuitem? ille re&longs;pondit è ve&longs;tigio, fieri diuitem.
quoniam viri &longs;apientes diuitum domos &longs;requen
tarent, & ab iis nece&longs;&longs;aria ad humanum victum petere cogerentur. Facit igitur ea natura, &longs;eu vi
detur potius facere fru&longs;trà; quoniam, vt faceret id, quod in eo genere optimum foret, parum hoc
mali admittere coacta e&longs;t. Atque id quidem rarò contingit, vt in tanta mole non videatur e&longs;&longs;e
curandum. Neque hoc ip&longs;um etiam præter naturam &longs;impliciter, quippe quòd ex materiæ ne
ce&longs;sitate proueniat. Nil igitur fru&longs;tra natura & Deus efficiunt.
Ex eo quoque fonte dimanat,
quòd nihil idem per &longs;e e&longs;&longs;e, & ab alio fieri queat; quo pronuntiato v&longs;us e&longs;t Ari&longs;toteles 1. de An.
idque generatim &longs;ump&longs;it; &longs;iue ab aliquo, vt ab efficiente, &longs;iue vt à fine penderet: nam quid opus
e&longs;t, vt quod ex &longs;e habet, ab alio mendicetur? præterquàm quòd eueniret, vt contradicentia con
&longs;i&longs;terent: &longs;iquidem: quatenus ex &longs;e iam haberet; quatenus ex alio; deficeret. Verùm neque etiam
ac &longs;iquando hoc eueniat, id incerto quodam ca&longs;u
fit, quo materia quidem contumax e&longs;t; nec ritè eam tractantibus obedit: verùm, quia non pen
det ex nece&longs;sitate materiæ, non perpetuum e&longs;t, velut illa quæ de talpa & mulo pronunciauimus; H&ecedil;c verò &longs;unt præter naturam &longs;impliciter, & ad
mon&longs;tra re&longs;eruntur. Neque verò illud mon&longs;trum e&longs;t, quòd mulus non propaget, & talpa non
cernat. &longs;emper enim &longs;ic euenit, aut plurimum; & &longs;ecundum naturam igitur.
Sed quòd hic &longs;ine
oculis, aut digitis oriatur, in&longs;requens e&longs;t: itaque præter naturam. C&ecedil;terùm de hi&longs;ce differentiis
pluribus po&longs;teà di&longs;&longs;eretur. At verò &longs;i non abundat natura, neque deficit; certè complebit om
nia quæcunque aggredietur, vt omnibus &longs;uis numeris & partibus ab&longs;oluta &longs;int quæ quidem pro
cuiu&longs;que rei ratione de&longs;iderantur. Nil igitur erit in natura (ni&longs;i quæ vis ob&longs;titir) imperfectum;
quando ad extremum &longs;ui motus natura peruenerit. Neque &longs;olùm; quia naturæ mouentis offi
cia non amplius flagiter: verùm etiam, quod in eo genere &longs;ummum &longs;it & extremum quo natura
queat a&longs;pirare. Et verò vt negari non pote&longs;t, in omni rerum in&longs;titutione e&longs;&longs;e aliquid extremum,
atque per&longs;ectum, pictura enim & fabrica artes habent quendam ab&longs;oluti operis
&longs;ic in vite & homine dandum e&longs;t naturam &longs;uo quodam itinere peruenire ad extremum quod in
eo genere &longs;it præ&longs;tanti&longs;simum, atque illud e&longs;t, vt &longs;uo quæque res munere fungatur, veluti quòd
plantæ &longs;ructum ferant, & animalia con&longs;imile generare po&longs;sint. Quocirca neque etiam videtur
aggredi id quod &longs;e adepturam non &longs;perat, cùm perpetuò contendar in finem, quo impo&longs;ito tum
res ab&longs;oluta e&longs;t: hic &longs;i tollatur, iam non habebit natura quo properet. ecquid igitur cau&longs;&longs;æ, cur
mouere incipiat? &longs;emper enim malè habebit & &longs;ru&longs;tra laborabit.
præ&longs;tat ergo quie&longs;cere.
Verun
tamen, cùm ex artibus aliquæ
natura non pote&longs;t, vt chirurgica, neque enim natura pote&longs;t os luxatum componere; &longs;ic
in agticultura
natura cuncta perficiet, quæ natura exi&longs;tunt. Ni&longs;i dicamus artem &longs;ic perficere ea, quæ lunt na
tura, quatenus &longs;ine illius ope natura non po&longs;&longs;et opera &longs;ua pr&ecedil;&longs;tare; qua&longs;i ars in operis partem ac
cipiatur, quandò non &longs;ubmini&longs;trat ars agendi patiendiúe facultatem rebus naturalibus: &longs;ed ap
plicat agentia ad patientia, & è medio tollit impedimenta. his expeditis, natura tum per &longs;e ip
&longs;am operatur, vt o&longs;&longs;a conglutinat. Itaque medicina
artes naturæ mini&longs;træ dicuntur.
Quinimmo, &longs;i rem ip&longs;am diligentius ob&longs;erues, natura perficit ea quæ fiunt ab arte.
agticola, is vere pluuiam exoptat qu&ecedil; promoueat &longs;egetes, & &longs;olem, qui &ecedil;&longs;tate maturet; at que ita
&longs;ementem accommodat ad anni tempe&longs;tates, vt cum frugum profectu congruant. Aedificator
etiam &longs;a&longs;tigium conficit fornicatum, quia lapides nuproprio pr&ecedil;grauantes, conten
dendo ad centrum, & &longs;e&longs;e vici&longs;sim comprimendo, redduntur immobiles. Itaque iam hic ars
perfectis vtitur; &longs;ed quoniam aptat ad v&longs;us humanos; etiam perficere perhibetur. Ergo &longs;impli
citer per&longs;ectio profici&longs;citur à natura quam ita per&longs;equitur, vt ab eo progre&longs;&longs;u ne digito quidem
recedat. Itaque ars etiam naturæ motibus ob&longs;equitur & hunc illi opponit, vt vim naturæ &longs;upe
rantis reprimensAt verò perfectionem præ&longs;tat na
tura, quòd vnaquæque res naturalis &longs;ic agit; quia &longs;ic natura comparata e&longs;t. Et (ni pror&longs;us fallor)
aliter &longs;e res habet atque in c&ecedil;teris, quorum v&longs;us aliquis e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olet. Siquidem alia &longs;unt huiu&longs;mo
di, vt ijs vtamur; at nos i&longs;tis vtimur quia &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi: exempli gratia, &longs;ic frenum e&longs;t compa
ratum, vt eques illo vtatur. atid fabricatur ex ferro, quia ferrum tale e&longs;t, vt eo po&longs;sit vti in illo
o&longs;ficio pr&ecedil;&longs;tando. Quapropter opinor in iis qu&ecedil; &longs;truuntur, vt cæteris v&longs;ui &longs;int, quarum artium
v&longs;us e&longs;t proprius, eas e&longs;&longs;e præferendas: &longs;ic in cæteris vbi v&longs;us &longs;it, quia &longs;int huiu&longs;modi rem aliter
&longs;e habere puto, nimirum cedere illam, quæ vtatur. aut ita di&longs;tingueres ex v&longs;u fieri bonas; aut
quòd iis vtamur; quia bonæ &longs;unt eæ quidem vtente &longs;unt imperfectiores, has etiam antecellere
vtenti non inconuenit. Ita &longs;it, vt naturam &longs;emper arti pr&ecedil;ponam; aut &longs;iquid &longs;uperioris
in v&longs;u rerum naturalium, id ego hominem faciam, qui & ip&longs;e e&longs;t præ&longs;tanti&longs;sima natura, cui om
nia quodammodo nata e&longs;&longs;e docent philo&longs;ophiSed redeamus ad naturam.
Ea
&longs;anè quemadmodum antè monuimus, eundem tenorem perpetuò &longs;eruat, quippe quæ &longs;implex
&longs;it, nec varios v&longs;us re&longs;piciat, &longs;ed id &longs;olummodo, quod &longs;uum ip&longs;ius proprium e&longs;t. Itaque &longs;em
per ignis a&longs;cendit, & vbi in &longs;uperiorem locum peruenerit, ibi quoque manet &longs;uapte natura: ter
ra item de&longs;cendit ad centrum in quo perpetuò quie&longs;ceret, ni&longs;i ob&longs;taret cau&longs;&longs;a violans. ac &longs;i &longs;ecus
eueniat, externa aliqua cau&longs;&longs;a pote&longs;t a&longs;signari varietatis illius,
ratione naturæ, vt &longs;i terra maneat in loco &longs;uperiore, aut è loco &longs;uo moueatur: & cau&longs;la reddi
pote&longs;t, cur de&longs;cendat nunc, mox autem quie&longs;cat. illud enim e&longs;t naturæ imperfectæ, qu&ecedil; ad per
fectionem tendit, hoc iam eius qu&ecedil; perfectionem &longs;uam con&longs;ecuta fuerit. Semper ergo &longs;ui &longs;imi
lis e&longs;t ip&longs;a natura, vt etiam de con&longs;imilibus idem iudicium non ab&longs;urdè fia, aut item afferenda
ratio, cur or
quoque iudicium de c&ecedil;teris &longs;erre oportebit, aut di&longs;criminis ratio reddenda. Sic cùm commune
&longs;it compluribus animalibus habere cor, & in quibu&longs;dam, vt in auibus ob&longs;eruemus, ip&longs;um primò
produci eodem modo de c&ecedil;teris iudicabimus: ni&longs;i cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;uccurrat, cur in re con&longs;imili diuer&longs;um
in&longs;titutum natura tenuerit. ac ni&longs;i ratio &longs;ubueniat pertinacis omnino animi &longs;it id quod con&longs;tat
Ex quo efficitur, vt nonnunquam &longs;ic argumentatus &longs;uerit Ari&longs;toteles.
Id ita euenit in hoc. Et in om nibus igitur.
&longs;uas remittit, ni&longs;i à contrariis a&longs;fligatur; neque habet in &longs;e principium quoddam, &longs;eu facultatem
cuius ope nunc aliquid accipiat, re&longs;puat aliàs; neque cur id magis nunc quàm mox expetat. cuiu&longs;modi in homine reperitur quam voluntatem dicimus.
idcirco &longs;emper nititur in &longs;ummum
quod pote&longs;t. Et cùm ea &longs;it contrariorum vis, vt &longs;e&longs;e vici&longs;sim retundant; probabile quoque e&longs;t
ip&longs;am plus ab initio valere quàm in progre&longs;&longs;u; nihilominus, quia principio materia repugnat
& plagas quæ ab efficiente infliguntur, fortiter repellit; neque facilè induci pote&longs;t vt de&longs;erat il
lam formam, qua cum diutius con&longs;ueuit; minor e&longs;t ab initio progre&longs;&longs;us. At verò cùm materia
bonum illud, quod ab efficiente obiicitur, c&ecedil;perit degu&longs;tare, libenter etiam cedit imperanti, &
qua&longs;i vires addens efficienti, magis proficit. (&longs;emper enim bene mobilior ad virtutem fit etiam
quodcunque incrementum &longs;ump&longs;erit à principio)
adillum per&longs;ectionis gradum promouet, quem, vel in &longs;e habet, &longs;ibi &longs;imile in &longs;pecie producens,
&longs;i fuerit vniuocum; (quicquid enim deficit, materiæ vitio tribuendum) vel con
tinet virtute, & modo quodam præ&longs;tantiore quàm &longs;i actu po&longs;sideret tantum eo tempore con&longs;e
rens, quantum materia pote&longs;t accipere. Nanque & id &longs;en&longs;us o&longs;tendit e&longs;&longs;e duo cau&longs;&longs;arum gene
ra, quorum vnum &longs;it vniuocum, vt cùm homo hominem gignit, alterum verò quod ab Ari&longs;to
tele nominatur actus, &longs;iue perfectio; &longs;iquidem vibex à baculo non &longs;ibi &longs;imili producatur. nun
quam prouehit vlterius: ni&longs;i fortè habilitas materiæ tanta fuerit, vt paullo momento po&longs;sit im
pelli. Nam facilius e&longs;t voluere globum quàm cubum.
Itaque nihil agit vltra gradum &longs;uum;
efficiens quidem vniuocum nihilo plus contribuens quàm in &longs;e habeat; materia verò non acci
piens, ni&longs;i id quod ip&longs;a &longs;ub&longs;tinere pote&longs;t, vbi efficiens &longs;it diuer&longs;um. ac &longs;iquando &longs;ecus appareat.
cauendum e&longs;t ne forte &longs;it accidens: nanque album per accidens e&longs;ficit animal, neúe etiam in&longs;tru
mentum; huius verò proprium e&longs;t, vt alterius virtute munitum moueat. itaque illius beneficio
plus multo pote&longs;t quàm per &longs;e ip&longs;um valeret. aut ne id propen&longs;ioni materiæ &longs;it ad&longs;cribendum:
quia &longs;æpe &longs;it vt ip&longs;a per &longs;e moueatur eodem modo, quo ab efficiente moueretur.paullo
momento plurimum impellitur. Proinde monebat Galenus
momentum maximos progre&longs;&longs;us interdum facere. quare et&longs;i vera propo&longs;itio; propter id quod
na&longs;citur ex euento, facta dubia probationem aliquam po&longs;tulare vi&longs;a e&longs;t: itaque &longs;ic confirmari
potuit. tum quòd eius oppo&longs;itum tollit aliud principium quod e&longs;t
omnes enim
fatentur vniuer&longs;a ex Deo e&longs;&longs;e, e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am omnium perfecti&longs;simam.
atqui non valeret, ex
ip&longs;o &longs;unt omnia, ergo e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;a per&longs;ecti&longs;sima, nam dicet
perfectius, ab eo produci, quod e&longs;t imperfectius, tum item &longs;i effectus quàm cau&longs;&longs;a perfectior e&longs;&longs;e
po&longs;&longs;et: diuidamus cogitatione effectum in duo, nempe in id quo
&longs;uam cau&longs;&longs;am, & in id quod exuperat: quæro vnde' nam habeat effectus ille exuperantiam, non
ex &longs;e: quia quicquid e&longs;t in effectu, habet cau&longs;&longs;am, non à cau&longs;sis: quia nihil dat, quod non habet
actu, &longs;eu virtute, Quòd &longs;iquando par fuerit, aut propemodum vtriu&longs;que contrarij robur & agen
tis & patientis, in tertium vtraque &longs;imul degenerant. Omnis verò e&longs;&longs;icientis promotio &longs;en&longs;im
fit, vt
mutationem, ni&longs;i per certa & conuenientia media &longs;eratur. Nam &longs;icuti bonus grammaticus ac
cipiens puerum informandum prius vocem componere docet; deinde mon&longs;trat vocum notas;
tum in&longs;tituit ad orationem &longs;truendam, ad extremum tradit præcepta ornatè loquendi: &longs;ic natu
ra per debitos apparatus ab imo ad &longs;ummum procedit. Neque tantum ordinatus i&longs;te progre&longs;
&longs;us in rebus producendis ob&longs;eruatur; verùm &longs;i ordinem quoque rerum &longs;pectes, ab imo quod
e&longs;t propemodum nihil, ad C&ecedil;terùm de hoc aliàs.
Nunc illud &longs;peculemur, quemadmodum natura efficiendo media tran&longs;eat. Id autem accipien
dum nobis e&longs;t, cùm in habentibus intentionem & remi&longs;sionem, tùm in omnibus aliis mutationi
bus per &longs;e, quæ &longs;cilicet non pendent ex alia mutatione, etenim ex eo dexter cùm ego tibi &longs;im, fio
&longs;ini&longs;ter; non &longs;anè, quia muter; &longs;ed quòd tu ip&longs;e moueris: at verò albus fio, aliquid ip&longs;e accipiens,
& in me ip&longs;o facta perturbatione.In omnibus autem acci
pio per hæc tempora, quod pluribus po&longs;teà perpendetur, ine&longs;&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;ario quædam media, &longs;eu
gradus quo&longs;dam, &longs;eu materiæ proce&longs;&longs;us & pote&longs;tatis, quibus ab imo & non ente ad &longs;ummum &
oppo&longs;itum perducatur, vt cùm à primo gradu ad octauum albedo &longs;it prouehenda, natura à pri
mo ad &longs;ecundum, mox ad tertium, & &longs;ic ordinatè procedendo producit albedinem. H&ecedil;c quidem
media &longs;unt, quæ vocat Ari&longs;toteles.In quod prius aptum natura e&longs;t perue
nire id quod mutatur, quàm in quod vltimum mutatur, &longs;ecundum naturam continuè mutatio
nem patiens, vbi mutatio vult e&longs;&longs;e continua, non intermi&longs;&longs;a; &longs;iquidem, vbi intermittatur, illud
momentum, in quo mutatio ce&longs;&longs;at, iam extremum e&longs;t, quo res iam mutata e&longs;t & exi&longs;tit, non am
plius mutatur. ac &longs;iquid ip&longs;i re&longs;pondeat, quod &longs;it &longs;ecundum naturam, ide&longs;t forma: &longs;in minus;
quamquàm de hoc po&longs;tea tractabitur.
& cùm hoc inter, &longs;it, dum &longs;it
motus, iam liquet ip&longs;um non pertmere ad formam & actum, &longs;ed ad pote&longs;tatem & materiam. Quapropter non e&longs;t cur expectes media, &longs;icut viride & rufum; nam &longs;unt h&ecedil;c aliquid actus; nec
omnino ea media, quæ &longs;ormæ dicuntur; &longs;ed media, quæ &longs;unt pote&longs;tatis & materiæ, qu&ecedil; dicuntur
tran&longs;itus. Itaque cùm in omni motu &longs;it aliqua pote&longs;tas, cuius actus
planum e&longs;t, quòd in omni motu &longs;eu mutatione per &longs;e tale Id omne percurren
dum e&longs;t, nec quicquam pr&ecedil;tereundum, modo ea &longs;e deinceps &longs;uaptè natura con&longs;equantur. modo à pote&longs;tate ad actum totis viribus natura contendit.
Hinc e&longs;ficitur, vt ea quæ origine ante
cedunt, &longs;int imper&longs;ectiora, & ea demum po&longs;tremò loco natura perficiat quorum productio diffi
cilior & v&longs;us maior. cùm enim eiu&longs;modi &longs;int, multa flagitant ex quibus &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tant.
Mitto hîc ea
quæ &longs;unt crigine
deant, vel vti de cordis ortu Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententia fertur. Atqui & hæc item pluribus aliàs, à pro
po&longs;ito ne di&longs;cedamus. Atque ea quidem, quæ natura producit, ita procedunt, vt perficiatur im
per&longs;ectum paullatim proficiens, donec ad &longs;ummum peruenerit. At verò &longs;ic ea quæ intercedunt,
& illa omnia quæ antecedunt, ita &longs;e re&longs;piciunt, vt proximè antecedens &longs;it gratia con&longs;equentis. &
vniuer&longs;a &longs;imul, eius gratia quod omnium Nanque omnia quæ &longs;trùit & molitur &ecedil;di
ficator, &longs;unt gratia domus: &longs;ed parietes gratia tecti, &longs;undamenta gratia parietum. Itaque priora
natura &longs;unt dupliciter, vel origine, vel per&longs;ectione ex quibus ille ordo na&longs;citur, qui à natura non
&longs;ecus &longs;eparari nequit, quàm lumen à Sole. Ex illo enim vinculo quo colligatæ &longs;unt res naturales,
id na&longs;citur vt hoc ex hoc ita pendeat, vt nec ex alio pendêre po&longs;sit, nec aliud ex illo. Etenim, &longs;i fa
&longs;tigium
queat, nec &longs;ine parietibus extaret fa&longs;tigium: neque item erigeret parietes ædificator, ni&longs;i vellet iis
ip&longs;um imponi. Atque ita rata &longs;unt tempora & vices quibus i&longs;tiu&longs;modi opera
&longs;trantur, vt ni&longs;i quid violens ob&longs;tet, eundem &longs;emper &longs;ucce&longs;&longs;um atque exitum qu&ecedil;que res habitu
ra videatur. Ea tibi tempora præfinita, quibus embryon in vtero formatur & exit in luminis oras
atque aliud maris, aliud f&ecedil;min&ecedil;. vides ætatum progre&longs;&longs;us inuariabiles.
con&longs;picis
tempe&longs;tatum &longs;umma con&longs;tantia gubernatas quæ cùm à certo naturæ principe regantur,
illam &ecedil;quabilem in mundo inferiore progignunt. M
rerum gradus
co quoque pr&ecedil;&longs;tantiora &longs;int. aciem intende in ea omnia ex quibus vniuer&longs;a rerum e&longs;&longs;entia coale
&longs;cit; &longs;ic à &longs;ummo ad ima
di&longs;cretæ, vniuer&longs;am e&longs;&longs;entiæ latitudinem
faciant, & &longs;ingula &longs;uis partibus & numeris ab&longs;oluta &longs;unt, & &longs;uis quæque locis di&longs;pen&longs;a
ta, vt æqui&longs;simè naturam
pro&longs;picere ac di&longs;tribuere in&longs;titiæ
hiberi pote&longs;t, & tanquam legislator ille cui leges à Deo dictatæ fuerint, ordine admirabili cuncta
di&longs;ponens & cuique &longs;uum tribuens, &longs;eruat illud iu&longs;titiæ genus, quod di&longs;tributiuum vocant: &longs;ic de
natura ip&longs;a confitendum e&longs;t. Quocirca & ip&longs;a e&longs;t vera rerum ratio,
& quicquid pr&ecedil;ter rationem i&longs;tam exi&longs;tit, e&longs;t omnino pr&ecedil;ter naturam. Itaque infinitum, quia po
&longs;itum e&longs;t extra omnem rationem, ab ip&longs;a natura non recipitur. ordo enim cuiu&longs;que proprius e&longs;t
natura
ad aliud. Ita.
n.
qu&ecedil;que res in natura &longs;e habet, vt pro illa ratione producatur, qu&ecedil;
de quibus h&ecedil;c
ratione materi&ecedil; ad &longs;en&longs;ilia
itaque ordo,
i natio &longs;tatuetur, quinto natur&ecedil; &longs;ignificato, de quo alibi dicetur.
Ni&longs;i etiam tu
hab
&longs;tea Nam &longs;i ita
i.
piumper &longs;e exi&longs;tit
ordo proprius e&longs;t natura
&longs;unt, qu&ecedil; rarò eueniunt, & incertos exitus in&longs;uper obtinent. Vbi ordo, ibi
mum, ibi quoque Proinde
ni&longs;i &longs;emper in
bus Et
principiis vniuer&longs;a actus vnus e&longs;t & vno
videlicet e&longs;&longs;e terminatur; pote&longs;tas, ni&longs;i &longs;umatur ambiguè, ea verò e&longs;t, quæ conuenit cum actu, vt
euenit in æternis, in quibus
ita re&longs;picit oppo&longs;ita pote&longs;tas, vt ex iis vnum poti&longs;simè &longs;pectet, alterum vel propter illud, vel
non e&longs;&longs;e autem &longs;ic appetit, vt illud quod expetit, Neque verò re perturbet, quòd
Ari&longs;toteles vno determinarit pote&longs;tates rationis exortes, & ob id ab iis &longs;egregarit, quæ ratione
participant. &longs;iquidem pote&longs;tates rationis exortes &longs;int, vel actuo&longs;æ, vel patibiles: atque actuo&longs;os
quidem vno determinantur; nos autem de patibilibus in pr&ecedil;&longs;entia di&longs;putamus: ill&ecedil; quidem
re&longs;piciunt: at no&longs;tra pote&longs;tas accipit oppo&longs;ita vici&longs;sim. Cùm verò materia &longs;it partibilis & quo
dammodo præ&longs;eferat infinitatem quæ di&longs;per&longs;a in vnum à forma colligitur. idcirco tendere ad
vnum erit formam ver&longs;us progredi, & contra regredi ad materiam idem erit, ac per&longs;equi infini
tum. Si ergo natura declinat infinitum & ad vnum propen&longs;a e&longs;t; planum quod tendere ad for
mam pror&longs;us erit naturale; progredi ad materiam non naturale cen&longs;ebitur, aut &longs;altem non na
turale &longs;impliciter & &longs;ic in melius tendet, & in ip&longs;um perpetuò collimabit, vt quoad eius fieri po
te&longs;t, præ&longs;tet id quod melius e&longs;t
cogatur ex nece&longs;sitate materiæ. &longs;iquidem rubiginem in ferro nolit efficere; &longs;ed ferrum ex tali
peramentoAtque hic melioris &longs;copus &longs;ic po
te&longs;t apud naturam, vt etiam rebus ad aliud in&longs;titutis ad aliquod bonum abutatur, vt
in animali nece&longs;&longs;e &longs;it e&longs;&longs;e aliquos meatus, vnde redundantiæ repurgentur, ei&longs;dem quoque natu
ra melioris gratia, nimirum propagationis, vt alter
abu&longs;a &longs;it. At verò ea quæ pote&longs;t exhibere natura, vel æterna &longs;unt, vel caduca, quæ &longs;anè plu&longs;quam
&longs;pecie &longs;eparantur. hæc vt natura di&longs;iuncta &longs;unt; &longs;ic varijs &longs;unt obnoxia legibus, id enim quod in
æternis effici pote&longs;t æternum e&longs;t: quod verò in caducis ex iis &longs;&ecedil;pe exi&longs;tit, quæ varietatem reci
piunt; diuino in&longs;tinctu concitata natura, rem minorem maiori po
accommodat,
non contrà maiorem nobilioren minori.
& id quod inferius e&longs;t, vult in&longs;
recta ratione vtenti, &longs;ua parat in&longs;trumenta; nec prius in&longs;trumenta &longs;abric
te cogitauerit. Nam &longs;icuti rectius tibia mu&longs;ico præbetur quàm tibiam po&longs;sidenti, peritia tibias
inflandi: &longs;ic etiam natura facit. Itaque non immeritò reprehenditur Anaxagoras qui rationem
allaturns, cur homo omnium e&longs;&longs;et animalium prudenti&longs;simus, eam exponebat quòd manus ha
beret. ac rectè quidem, &longs;i rationem, vt &longs;ignum exquirebat: &longs;ed &longs;i veras
bat; recta ratio po&longs;tulat, vt idcirco fateamur homini datas e&longs;&longs;e manus, quia &longs;it animal prudenti&longs;
fimum.Semper igitur deterius gratia melioris:
ita generale, vt per
artes & naturam &ecedil;què pertineat. Itaque &longs;apientes pacis cau&longs;&longs;a bellum gerunt;
&longs;u&longs;tentant. Sed requirat hoc loco qui&longs;piam, &longs;it ne cau&longs;&longs;a hoc quod dicimus e&longs;&longs;e melius; a
tius effectus, & cum cau&longs;&longs;a ponatur. quod nam cau&longs;&longs;æ genus &longs;it; & quemadmodum cau&longs;&longs;æ o&longs;fi
cio fungatur. Et planè inficiari non licet, hoc ab Ari&longs;totele inter cau&longs;&longs;arum genera recen&longs;eri: in
quit enim &longs;e habere quàm pote&longs;t optimè cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;e.tam pr&ecedil;cipuam exi&longs;tima&longs;le vide
tur, vt nece&longs;&longs;e &longs;it, &longs;i melius hoc modo foret: ita quoque &longs;e habere naturam: qua&longs;i nulla prior
cau&longs;&longs;a afferri queat: ideo iure optimo non &longs;eiungetur à fine, hanc enim omnium cau&longs;&longs;am poti&longs;si
mam ponit vnu&longs;qui&longs;que artifex, &longs;ed præcipue naturalis. Ita verò &longs;e habet vt finis.
Nam cùm &longs;it
in vniuer&longs;o primum quoddam immortale, & ineffabile, &longs;impliciter ens, & &longs;impliciter bonum;
ex hoc c&ecedil;tera impetrant quòd &longs;int, & quòd bona &longs;int quodam tamen ordine, vt quæ naturam,
&longs;iue e&longs;&longs;entiam illam magis imitantur: perfectiora &longs;int, huiu&longs;modi verò &longs;unt actus &
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quæ actu &longs;unt, primum materiæ exortes, deinde materiatæ: atque illæ quidem è tri
p
dis. atque adeo, vt vniuer&longs;a rerum latitudo gradibus omnibus completa &longs;it quos aliqua nota di
&longs;tinctos excipere pote&longs;t. Ergo quod e&longs;t, & quod bonum e&longs;t, cùm &longs;uoptè ingenio &longs;it finis & ex
petendum; efficitur, vt natura &longs;emper expetat id quod melius e&longs;t, & quàm maximè præ&longs;tare co
netur ita &longs;uum finem adeptura. A &longs;uperioribus ergo principiis hoc cau&longs;&longs;æ genus extitit, & de
&longs;cendit quodammodo c&ecedil;litus. Itaque &longs;ine errore natura producit, & vt melius non po&longs;sit.
ac &longs;i
quis corrigere aliquid volet, vt turpi&longs;simus ille Momus, aut deterius faciet, aut id quod fieri
non potuit, optabit. Sic cùm melius &longs;it e&longs;&longs;e quàm non e&longs;&longs;e, natura potius ine&longs;&longs;e quàm non e&longs;&longs;e
contendet: & &longs;i poterit; æternum numero faciet; &longs;i minus, vt æternum &longs;ucce&longs;sione &longs;it, & &longs;pecie,
curabit; nihil minus, quam &longs;ibi perniciem molietur, ni&longs;i fortè per accidens; vt ignis qui, cum in
aliena materia con&longs;i&longs;tat, nece&longs;&longs;ariò nutriatur; &longs;i permanere velit, eam quoque nece&longs;&longs;ariò
&longs;umit& quia res tùm perfecta e&longs;t, cum iis muneribus &longs;un
gi pote&longs;t, quibus ip&longs;am natura de&longs;tinauit, id &longs;ummopere expetet; atque expetet, &longs;iquando
beat, aut &longs;i non eo modo habeat, quo bene e&longs;t; ac &longs;i obtinuerit; tanquàm in oportuno diuer&longs;orio
requie&longs;cet. Hic
etiam nos admonet & impellit in iis ve&longs;tigandis, vt maiorem formæ rationem habeamus, quàm
materiæ, quod veteres philo&longs;ophi non per&longs;picientes toto c&ecedil;lo aberrarunt. nil enim aliud quàm
materiam, naturam e&longs;&longs;e crediderunt, &longs;ormas habuere pro accidentibus ac &longs;i quod aliud prin
minit Cicero
cingit c&ecedil;lum quem appellat Deum: aut etiam mens, vt putauit Anaxagoras, vel lis & amicitia
quas potuit Epedocles; licet ad illa confugiant vt tragici poët&ecedil;, cum explicare argumenti exitum
non po&longs;&longs;unt. I gitur cùm illis certandum &longs;uit & error eorum confutandus.
id verò cum omni
indu&longs;tria confectum fuerit ab Ari&longs;totele; facit quominus ego credam &longs;ententiam c&ecedil;teroqui ve
ri&longs;simam nempe. Naturam e&longs;&longs;e aut agere gratia rei cuiu&longs;piam, cum principiis e&longs;&longs;e
Neque verò mihi placet quod aliqui defendunt, non directò
rationibus, &longs;ed elenchicè
tractari &longs;ententiam illam qua ratione liceat inire certamen cum iis qui principia refutant. Etenim
&longs;i di&longs;putationis illius progre&longs;&longs;um animaduertas; ex propriis eius methodi principiis rem quo
que confectam &longs;ui&longs;&longs;e reperies, & aliqua vt vera a&longs;&longs;umpta, non data; qui mos &longs;eientiarum pro
prius e&longs;t; neque vt illò tendentia quò elenchica
que repugnantia, fal&longs;um, inopinabile, &longs;olœci&longs;mus, & nugatio) &longs;ed vt o&longs;tendentia &longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e & &longs;en&longs;u
munita qui certus e&longs;t index in phy&longs;icis; & eiu&longs;modi qu&ecedil; in illa principia re&longs;olui po&longs;sint, qu&ecedil; phy
&longs;icus pro certi&longs;simis accipit. Et indicat hoc propo&longs;itio quæ&longs;tionis quæ per notum exponitur qu&ecedil;
cau&longs;&longs;am &longs;ignificat, nimi
plici, quæ e&longs;t &longs;e ptofitetur afferre Ari&longs;toteles, vt
dubitationem &longs;oluat: at qui dubitationum &longs;olutiones &longs;unt ea quæ demon&longs;trantur. Itaque non
elenchicè, &longs;ed phy&longs;icè tractatum &longs;uit hoc theorema. Planum e&longs;t quidem e&longs;&longs;e finem, & ex hac
cau&longs;&longs;a reddi po&longs;&longs;e rationem complurium problematum: liquet etiam methodos accipere qua
tuor genera cau&longs;&longs;arum: &longs;ed illud ob&longs;curum & inquirendum; &longs;it'ne aliquis finis, cuius ergò natu
ra operetur: & an &longs;olus materiæ cur&longs;us, vt antiqui voluerunt; ea præ&longs;tet, quæ fini tribuit in na
tura philo&longs;ophus. Idcirco mea quidem &longs;ententia erit hoc non principium, &longs;ed theorema.
Natu
ram agere cuiu&longs;piam rei gratia. Tritum quoque illud e&longs;t apud philo&longs;ophos naturales cau&longs;&longs;am
ei præ&longs;erri cuius e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;a. Nunc cau&longs;&longs;a multis modis ea re&longs;picit quorum e&longs;t auctor.
Etenim vel
in nomine & ratione conuenit, vt cum filio pater, vel actus e&longs;t & per&longs;ectio: rur&longs;us cau&longs;&longs;a vel e&longs;t
in mente, vel in reip&longs;a: tum tertiò cau&longs;&longs;a vel princeps e&longs;t, vel in&longs;trumentum. Prætereà cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t
aut pote&longs;tas, aut actus. Po&longs;tremò cau&longs;&longs;a pertinet ad e&longs;&longs;e, cùm vbi quippiam gignitur; tùm etiam
po&longs;tquam genitum e&longs;t: nanque operatio iam e&longs;t rei genitæ & cum fine cen&longs;eri &longs;olet. Atqui per
&longs;picuum e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;am illam quæ per&longs;ectio nuncupatur, modo quodam nobiliore quàm cau&longs;&longs;as
vniuocas, effecta &longs;ua continere, ob rem ip&longs;is quoque præ&longs;tantiores e&longs;&longs;e, po&longs;tquam ex illius
gremio, vt ita dicam, effu&longs;a fuerint. Cau&longs;&longs;as item in mente, qualem ponimus e&longs;&longs;entiam, quæ defi
nitione explicatur, ip&longs;i rei quæ exi&longs;tit, præponendas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;uo loco docebimus, interim pro hypo
the&longs;i &longs;tatuatur. Omnes etiam confitentur actum pote&longs;tati, vt imperfecto perfectum præcedere,
& cùm materia &longs;it pote&longs;tas, c&ecedil;rer&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;int actus generatim, materiam excipiunt quæ &longs;ola pro
pter imper&longs;ectionem non &longs;it effectui præferenda; quapropter etiam cùm agens actu exi&longs;tat, pa
tiens verò &longs;it pote&longs;tate; agens patienti &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia præponunt. ob
rem quia &longs;e habet
in&longs;trumentum ad cau&longs;&longs;am principem vt patiens ad agens, eodem indicio perhibemus in&longs;trumen
tum non modo cau&longs;&longs;æ mouenti po&longs;tponendum, verùm etiam effectui po&longs;tponi po&longs;&longs;e; vt &longs;i effe
ctus à cau&longs;&longs;a vniuoca producatur, proptereà &longs;emen, licet imper&longs;ectum; cau&longs;&longs;a hominis quæ res
e&longs;t per&longs;ecta, e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t, cum à meliore principio de&longs;cendat, quod e&longs;t homo alter qui actu e&longs;t, at
que perfectus. notabat veteres Ari&longs;toteles, quia rationem optimi hone&longs;ti&longs;simi & pr&ecedil;&longs;tan
ti&longs;simi principiis denegarent,
e&longs;&longs;et. neque intelligerent &longs;emen non e&longs;&longs;e principium, &longs;ed in&longs;trumentum quod ex alio penderet:
id autem perfectum e&longs;let, cum actu exi&longs;teret à quo &longs;emen pararetur. Itaque principium
& hoEt certè ita &longs;it nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t; cùm actus &longs;it principium &longs;impliciter.
Nam ma
teria quoque cùm &longs;it potentia, principiorum numero excluditur.con&longs;en
tienter cum c&ecedil;teris a&longs;&longs;eruntur. De vniuocis, & fine non conuenit: apparet enim eandem e&longs;&longs;e con
ditionem Sophroni&longs;ci patris & Socratis filij; atque omnino generatim, cùm vna &longs;ub&longs;tantia indi
uidua gignat alteram, nec vna &longs;it magis minusúe &longs;ub&longs;tantia quàm altera, neutram e&longs;&longs;e præ&longs;eren
dam. Prætereà cum finis &longs;it vel generationis, vel rei genit&ecedil;, quia rei genitæ finem in ordine acci
dentium collocant, ea verò &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ cedunt omnibus modis, & hoc etiam cau&longs;&longs;æ genus effe
ctni & illi cuius e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;a, præ&longs;erendum non e&longs;&longs;e ducunt. Nos contrà in vniuocis etiam cau&longs;&longs;as
effectibus anteponimus; quippe qui cau&longs;&longs;as in actu contemplemur. tùm enim cau&longs;&longs;æ verè &longs;unt:
atqui cau&longs;&longs;æ in actu cum re coitaque ne
ce&longs;&longs;aPo&longs;teà longo &longs;ermone nob.
o&longs;tendendum e&longs;t functiones e&longs;le ex ordine
& vt actus cum pote&longs;tate con&longs;erri. Quamobrem & ab hoc v&longs;que ad illa tempora &longs;uper&longs;edeamus.
&longs;atis hoc &longs;it, quòd &longs;i actus
ciente materiæ; & illo quidem modo monet finis; altero pendet ex e&longs;ficiente, quæ con&longs;ide
ex his cau&longs;sis, quatenus mouent, alias excellunt, quare finis, dum mouet, e&longs;t nobilior, & effi
ciens, dum parat finem, antecellit, Sic dum res fit, & mouens, quatenus mouet; &longs;emper e&longs;t eo;
quod fit, præ&longs;tantius, & eo quod mouetur ab ip&longs;o, &longs;iue fuerit pa&longs;sio quæ afferat interitum, &longs;eu
perficiens; quòd inter id, quod mouer, & quod mouetur, &longs;emper quatenus huiu&longs;modi &longs;unt, in
tercedit ratio pote&longs;tatis & actus, ob id hoc principium generale redditur, quemadmodum etiam
a&longs;&longs;umptum &longs;uit aliquando ab Ari&longs;totele.
men &longs;imilitudinum notis cau&longs;&longs;a & effectus inu&longs;ta &longs;unt. Vnde etiam &longs;olet extare effa
mune philo&longs;ophis & medicis. Similem differentiam in cau&longs;&longs;a efficere &longs;imilem differentiam in
effectu.Nam cau&longs;&longs;æ per &longs;e effectus per
&longs;e producunt, eæ quæ per accidens con&longs;imiliter con&longs;tituunt effectus per accidens. Sic cau&longs;sis
actu effecta actu re&longs;pondent,
Si cau&longs;&longs;æ item communes effectus communes exi&longs;tunt: quod &longs;i &longs;ingulares fuerint; effectus quo
que &longs;ingulares erunt. Ita etiam perpetuorum cau&longs;&longs;as perpetuas e&longs;&longs;e credendum e&longs;t
&longs;en&longs;iles, &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;as proximas aecipiamus. Sed extat præcipuè &longs;imilitudo inter agentia vniuoca;
&longs;i vniuoca propriè &longs;umantur, &longs;iquidem illorum proprium &longs;it efficere perpetuò tale, qualia ip&longs;a:
exi&longs;tunt, vt &longs;iquid etiam &longs;it, quod ab alio fiat, vbi fiat per &longs;e & per verum motum, &longs;emper à &longs;i
mili producatur.
liter à &longs;ub&longs;tantia: atque ita quidem, vt à &longs;pecie &longs;pecies, & genus à genere producatur. Nam fit
homo animal & viuens homo ab homine; animal ab animali, viuens à viuente generatur. & ab
eodem omnia hæc; quòd idem homo e&longs;t & animal & viuens. Abalio verò cau&longs;&longs;arum genere,
quod e&longs;t non vniuocum ob cau&longs;&longs;æ præ&longs;tantiam &longs;imilis effectus gigni neutiquam pote&longs;t. Itaque
re&longs;tat &longs;olus materiæ con&longs;en&longs;us; &longs;iquidem tantum efficiat agens non vniuocum, quan
tum materia &longs;u&longs;tinere valet: neque enim ex hac materia equum verbig. faceret, &longs;ed apem neque
ex eadem materia virum produceret. Itaque optimè dicitur, pro materiæ merito &longs;ormas exhi
beri; quandò lumen aliter in pellucido recipiatur atque in opaco, vel polito corpore: ita vt,
uis
tet formæ conditiones & vires efficientis: & quod forma efficere melius; hæc contra reddat de
terius. Noui equidem à philo&longs;ophis multos de rebus hi&longs;ce &longs;ermones haberi: c&ecedil;terùm quia non
ad veritatem conuellendam, &longs;ed ad eorum explanationem afferuntur. atque ita retinentur, vt
tanquam vera defendantur omnium in phy&longs;ica creberrimus v&longs;us e&longs;t, ea nos itidem
more hypothe&longs;eon paucis conficere voluimus. Ac de generalibus phy&longs;iologiæ principiis ha
ctenus dixi&longs;&longs;e &longs;it &longs;atis.
Tit.
17.
c.
5.
Tit.
88. lib.
de
c.
2.
2. de part. c.
16. 17.
ner. Anim.
c.
4.
Nota hic
no&longs;tram in
terpr&ecedil;ta
tionem.
cap.
2.
cap.
1.
an.
cap.
6.
an.
cap.
vl.
3 De An.
T. 45.
1. de cau&longs;&longs;.
plan.
c.
19.
2.
Phy&longs;. T. 77
c.
5.
T. 31.
de &longs;ub.
T. 2s.
Gal.
5. de
vi&longs;u part. c.
4.
T. 15. 63.
3. de c&ecedil;l. T. 24.
an.
c.
1.
de ince
&longs;tu anim. c.
2. 10.
2. de Part. an.
c.
14.
Gal. 4. de
v&longs;u part. c.
17.
4. de part. an.
c.
9.
1. de Gen. an.
c.
4.
an c.
4.
10. Mct. T. vlt.
8. Phy&longs;.
T. 56.
an.
c.
10.
c.
4.
10 T. 34.
T. 40.
T. 19.
lib.
de d
10 T. 61.
Cap.
IIII.
Mox ad propria veniamus, & non longè ab in&longs;tituto &longs;ermone di&longs;cedentes cau&longs;&longs;arum.
Proximum igitur iis quæ diximus, e&longs;t vt con
uenientiam pote&longs;tatis & actus exponamus: & hæc po&longs;ita e&longs;t in multis quorum momentum in
omni philo&longs;ophia maximum e&longs;t. Neque verò dubium e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t pote&longs;tatem hi&longs;ce primis di
&longs;tingui differentiis remoto nimirum & proximo, quis enim aquam dicat e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;e phialam, ni&longs;i
concedat adhuc nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;&longs;e multas interuenire mutationes, vt phiala fieri queat? nam prius in
vitrum cogatur oporter, lique&longs;cat, mox e&longs;&longs;iciatur phiala.
At idem non inficiabitur
liquefactum in phialam &longs;ine vllius mutationis interuentu mutari. & tum verè aliquid po&longs;&longs;e fieri
intelliget, cum nihil aliud flagitari videat ad id, vt phiala fiat. tùm verò illa erit pote&longs;tas proxi
ma & vltima qua po&longs;ita res exi&longs;tit è ve&longs;tigio.
do ob&longs;eruari po&longs;&longs;unt. vltimus enim atque perfectus cum vltima pote&longs;tare cohæret, quicquid
antecedit, actus ille e&longs;t imper&longs;ectus, qui cum motu coniunctus e&longs;t, aliquid ab&longs;oluti præ&longs;e&longs;erens
in accidentibus in &longs;ub&longs;tantia formæ nihil attingens, quia &longs;it pror&longs;us indiuidua. Quapropter
etiam &longs;ic erit actus proximus, &longs;iue extremus atque remotus. Dicimus item è pote&longs;tatibus per
fectas e&longs;&longs;e nonnullas, alias imperfectas: ita quoque actus per&longs;ectos & imperfectos numerari con
&longs;ue&longs;&longs;e: imperfectos autem illos vocari qui &longs;unt cum aliquo motu coniuncti, vt diuidi in conti
nuo, quod nunquam eò peruenit, vt diui&longs;um &longs;it. quòd homo qui gignebatur, genitus &longs;it; ille
e&longs;t actus perfectus. Atqui &longs;ecum congruunt differentiæ pote&longs;tatis & actus.
Nam cùm pote&longs;tas
actum re&longs;piciat generatim; remota cum remoto actu coniuncta erit; proxima & extrema cum
actu proximo & extremo. Tum etiam pote&longs;tas imperfecta &longs;p&ecedil;ctabit actum imperfectum, per
fecta verò perfectum. Ex quo item tanta exi&longs;tit inter vtraque naturæ cognatio, vt quicquid pa
tiendo potentia valet, tantundem actus pr&ecedil;&longs;tare po&longs;sit;Quamquam nos hane propo&longs;itionem de facto con
cedimus (vt &longs;ertur) non de habilitate, & pote&longs;tatem communiter accipimus, non pro habitudi
ne natiua non ignari multa contingere formæ, cau&longs;&longs;a materiæ, quæ natantum abe&longs;t vt ad illa &longs;it propen&longs;a.
Ex eodem quoque fonte deriuatur illud.
quippe cùm po
te&longs;tas cum actu conueniat in eo quòd pari gradu a remotis v&longs;que ad proxima procedant. Actus
e&longs;fici in patiente bene affecto.
bit; quo plures &longs;ubierit mutationes, relinquantur; eo propior erit actus ille perfe
ctus; vbi nulla amplius mutatio relinquatur, iam aderit actus omnibus &longs;uis numeris & partibus
ab&longs;olutis. Sic ergo conuer iunt pote&longs;tas & actus.
Eiu&longs;dem quoque notæ e&longs;t.
Si vna cau&longs;&longs;a fue
rit, vnum item &longs;uturum effectum; quodidem valet, ac &longs;i dixerimus, ab vno non ni&longs;i vnum pro
fici&longs;ci. Hoc quidem vt pronuntiatum accipitur ab Ari&longs;totele: tamet&longs;i propter varias opiniones
philo&longs;ophorum abiit in theorema. Veruntamen nos hic rem totam certis legibus ad&longs;tringemus
quæ facile concedentur; alibi, &longs;iquando opportunum fuerit, cum aliis di&longs;&longs;erturi. Ac primum
quidem credimus hoc effatum omne cau&longs;larum genus complecti: neque de fine & efficiente du
bium e&longs;t apud cçteros etiam, modò conditiones adhibeantur quæ &longs;nis locis exponentur: neque
minus de &longs;orma dubitandum e&longs;t, quandò res vna maximè e&longs;t propter formam cum fi
ne & efficiente con&longs;entit. credo item eandem e&longs;&longs;e rationem materiæ, quamuis ab ea multitudo
na&longs;catur: etenim et&longs;i multitudinem facit, &longs;i naturæ &longs;uæ dimittatur: attamen in&longs;tinctu meliore
citataNunc doceamus, vt in omnibus
cau&longs;sis id defendi valeat. Ac primum accipientes cau&longs;&longs;as naturales voluntate dimi&longs;&longs;a quam ex
æquo oppo&longs;ita re&longs;picere confitemur, eas per &longs;e &longs;pectemus, vt non operantur ex accidente vt pro
ximè, vt præcipuè, non vt in&longs;trumenta; &longs;iquidem &longs;axum à natura feratur in &longs;uum locum, cadendo viatorem feriat; &longs;ed cadit quidem, vt cùm in &longs;uum locum peruenerit, ibi quie&longs;cat; via
torem lædit per accidens. & frigus hyeme cogendo calorem, per calorem calorem facit.
ac pin
nas ad volatum dedit aui natura; &longs;ed illis abutitur ad corpus contegendum. Calor per &longs;e proxi
mè & principaliter calorem producit; calorem gignit pro virium &longs;uarum ratione: pro
pterea quòd teporem efficiat, vel quòd impediatur, vel vt via &longs;it in calorem. Prætereà na&longs;citur
vnum, quod poti&longs;simum &longs;it ab vna cau&longs;&longs;a; multa verò, quæ illi quodammodo &longs;eruiant. ob
rem, quia vis &longs;ormatrix habet quidem varias pote&longs;tares, & multa &longs;ibi &longs;truit quibus vtatur; vnum
tamen e&longs;t quo peruenire &longs;tudet, in planta &longs;anè, vt vitam largiatur in equo, vt vim &longs;entiendi pro
ducat, & propter illud vnum, quod a&longs;&longs;equi conatur, c&ecedil;tera molitur vt vni illi &longs;eruientia & ad
ip&longs;um in&longs;tituta. Atque ita vnum e&longs;t quod vult, vt non plura, quæ &longs;it ordinis eiu&longs;dem ab eadem
cau&longs;&longs;a profici&longs;ci queant, quomodo etiam &longs;upradictum e&longs;t de materia quæ, &longs;i re&longs;picit oppo&longs;ita, at
ex illis vnum e&longs;t præcipuum, alterum per accidens, & propter illud. Vnum quoque ab vno in
eodem genere cau&longs;&longs;æ: nihil enim vetat idem à pluribus de&longs;cendere cau&longs;sis diuer&longs;i generis. Vnum
quoque ab vno e&longs;t per &longs;e, ni&longs;i ob&longs;ter impedimentum, aut repugnantia materiæ. Nam &longs;ic &longs;æpe
fit, vt ab eodem habitu vna actio na&longs;catur; &longs;ed ab impedimento & contrario interpelletur. Re
quiritur etiam vt cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;ub eadem habitudine ponantur. Nam præ&longs;entia formæ producit, ab
&longs;entia affert interitum; & nauta vigilans e&longs;t autor &longs;alutis, dormiens verò pernicij cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t: ac
Sol accedens calorem facit, frigus verò dum recedit. Cùm verò cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;ic &longs;e habeant, vt aut
per &longs;ingulæ per &longs;e conficiunt: &longs;iqua varietas exoritur, reliquis erit ad&longs;cribenda. Sic Sol vnum
calorem producit, eodem tamen aquea liquat & fundit, terrea cogit, ita etiam calor &longs;eu natiuus,
&longs;iue etiam auctus, cùm pro virium &longs;uarum ratione &longs;ummum producere queat; nonnunquàm,
vtile efficit, noxium aliàs, quòd pro ratione &longs;uæ naturæ agens præ&longs;tat id, quod &longs;i ad alterum re
feratur; non bene ad ip&longs;um &longs;e habet, vt cum coquendo pituitam gignit &longs;anguinem, &longs;i &longs;anguinem
coqua
&longs;as adiuuantes alterum facit quod &longs;ecundum naturam non e&longs;t, nec quidem &longs;uam, &longs;ed illius, ad
quod in&longs;tiruitur. Eodem modo, cùm Deus vnus omnino &longs;it, variis rebus, diuer&longs;is modis imper
tit e&longs;&longs;e. Non igitur ab eo na&longs;citur vlla varietas, aut multiplicitas; &longs;ed à participantibus vniuer&longs;a
profici&longs;citur. Itaque non acciperem illam
(vt Ari&longs;toteli placere puto) vnum quidem e&longs;&longs;e propter e&longs;&longs;entiam, multiplici verò facultare pol
lere; ab eo deriuari complura: &longs;ed quia c&ecedil;tera quæ pendent ex illo, non æqualiter idem
bonum accipiunt; hinc varia munera illius extare, quanuis &longs;it &longs;impliciter vnus. Atque harum
legum impo&longs;itio nobis id efficiet, quod dici &longs;olet. Ab vno vt
1.
De
T. 24. 26.
Si igitur ab vno, quà vnum e&longs;t duntaxat, vnum deriuatur; planum e&longs;t quòd &longs;i contrariorum
cau&longs;&longs;a vnica e&longs;t, de quocunque genere accipiatur (vna enim materia contrariorum e&longs;t, efficiens) eam e&longs;&longs;e remotam.
proximas igitur contrariorum cau&longs;&longs;as dicemus e&longs;&longs;e contrarias, ar
que ita di&longs;iunctas, vt nullo vnquam tempore con&longs;i&longs;tere queant; &longs;ed altera &longs;emper alteri
vt nihil &longs;ibi contrarium e&longs;&longs;e valeat, & contrarium vni &longs;olum e&longs;&longs;e queat: etenim ni&longs;i vnum foret,
id quod ponitur maximum, aliquid &longs;eip&longs;o maius haberet. aut igitur hoc vnum maximum fo
ret, & ita contrarium e&longs;fet. nanque maximum e&longs;&longs;e interuallum inter ea quæ &longs;unt generis
& quæ finiunt illud contraria vocari, non e&longs;t dubitandum. &longs;i minus ita infinitum, neque maxi
mum, neque ab&longs;olutum. nec contrarium igitur: in illo enim finis quidam nece&longs;&longs;ariò concipitur.
Ex his paret actum & pote&longs;tatem non e&longs;&longs;e contraria, neque motum & terminum ad quem ten
dit. nam pote&longs;tas in actum dirigitur, ita vt ex illis vnum per &longs;e fiat; & motus tantum abe&longs;t vt à
termino corrumpatur, vt perficiatur maximè ab ip&longs;o. ac &longs;iquid ine&longs;t inter ip&longs;a oppo&longs;iti; id a&longs;cri
bendum e&longs;t priuationi cum qua e&longs;t coniuncta pote&longs;tas, quæ &longs;anè forma præ&longs;ente corrumpitur. Ab his quæ ponuntur extrema illius &longs;patij quod finitur contrariis, alia quoque contraria na&longs;cun
tur, at non perfectè neque &longs;impliciter contraria; &longs;ed quodammodo, & qua&longs;i media; verùm hæc
plura e&longs;&longs;e non e&longs;t ab&longs;urdum. Atqui perfectè ac &longs;impliciter vnum vni contrarium e&longs;t.
Nec qui&longs;
quam medium opponat duobus extremis; neque enim illa e&longs;t oppo&longs;itio contrariorum de qua
nunc agimus; &longs;ed po&longs;ita e&longs;t in priuatione, in qua etiam æquale & inæquale con&longs;i&longs;tunr. Nam ne
que etiam hæc contraria &longs;unt, ne fortè &longs;u&longs;pice
ris medium & extrema, vt vnum vni opponi, tanquam contraria. Hæc nos affirmatione &longs;igni
ficari volumus. itaque nudum, quòd affirmatione &longs;ignificatur, licet &longs;it priuans; ab Ari&longs;totele
exi&longs;tit ad contraria, viam ad &longs;e vici&longs;sim habent. Itaque illa quæ in genere conueniunt, &longs;ecum
commutantur: quæ toto genere &longs;eparantur, vt in materia di&longs;cre pant; &longs;ic quoque nullam ad &longs;e&longs;e
pote&longs;tatem obtinuetunt, nec commutantur igitur. Proptereà neque quantum in quale muta
tur, cùm genera diuer&longs;a &longs;int. nec quale omne tran&longs;it in alterum; &longs;icuti &longs;aporin odorem, cùm &longs;int
genera diner&longs;a. illa &longs;ecum commutantur quæ in genere proximo, hoc e&longs;t, in materia pro
xima conuenere. Proinde ita &longs;e habent contraria, vt vnum actu &longs;ingula &longs;int, &longs;ed pote&longs;tate alte
rum. e&longs;t enim actu calidum, in potentia
Atque ita ex hi&longs;ce principiis con&longs;titui contraria
puto, vt ni&longs;i mihi aliter dicens Ari&longs;toteles obiiciatur; aut opponatur certa demon&longs;tratio; procon
&longs;tanti&longs;simo habeam, &longs;i tres i&longs;tæ conditiones ad hibeantur; illa nece&longs;&longs;ariò fore contraria. maximè
&longs;ub eodem genere di&longs;tare; affirmatione notari; & ad &longs;e&longs;e mutuam pote&longs;tatem habere.
&longs;ecum certant; & &longs;ibiinuicem machinantur interitum. reliqua &longs;anè, vt (vnis relatiuis exceptis:
ip&longs;a enim &longs;ola &longs;e &longs;u&longs;tinent vici&longs;sim &
Hæc verò vel per &longs;e &longs;unt, vel per accidens, & quidem &longs;pecie diuer&longs;a contraria &longs;unt, &longs;i per &longs;e con
traria &longs;int, vt album & nigrum in genere colorum, & in genere &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, &longs;i per &longs;e in &longs;int in &longs;ub
&longs;tantia, &longs;i minus: etiam eadem &longs;pecie e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;unt, vt iidem contrarij colores in homine. Quare,
cùm per &longs;e, mortale & immortale &longs;int in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, in eadem &longs;pecie con&longs;i&longs;tere nequeunt. per &longs;e
verò &longs;unt, quia nece&longs;&longs;ariò in&longs;unt: nam quod mortale e&longs;t, caducum &longs;it nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t; immortale verò
perpetuò con&longs;eruatur. Quòd autem &longs;int contraria per&longs;picuum e&longs;t; quoniam immortale e&longs;t pri
uatio, ea verò e&longs;t impotentia definita, & cum aliquo actu coniuncta, vnde &longs;ignificatur affirmatio
ne; in eodem genere maximo interuallo ab oppo&longs;ita forma &longs;egregatur.
Nam quòd
plus quàm genere &longs;egregentur, aut etiam genere, non dum &longs;icuti manife&longs;tum &longs;umimus. Illud
&longs;olum ex Ari&longs;totele &longs;uccurrit quod a&longs;&longs;erere liceat, quæ genere di&longs;crepant, apparêre quidem con
traria, veruntamen eo quòd &longs;ecum conferri nequeant & longi&longs;simè di&longs;tent, neque inter ea maxi
ma po&longs;sit a&longs;signari di&longs;tantia quæ requiritur in contrariis, non e&longs;&longs;e contraria &longs;impliciter; ad extre
mum videtur inferre mortale & immortale genere &longs;eparari; ac nos &longs;i genus &longs;ubalternum intel
ligere velimus, quod &longs;ub eandem &longs;eriem cadat, non repugnabimus. &longs;i prædicamentum
variam &longs;umimus, ex Ari&longs;totelis ip&longs;ius verbis colligi po&longs;&longs;e negamus. ac &longs;pecie &longs;olum ab Ari&longs;tote
le inter &longs;e di&longs;tingui &longs;atemur: ita enim rationem &longs;uam complectitur. Contraria &longs;pecie differunt.
Mortale & immortale contraria &longs;unt.
A&longs;&longs;umptionem verò probat.
Siquidem priuatio &longs;it quæ
dam impotentia definita. Quid ergo aliud ex his inferri pote&longs;t, quàm quòd mortale & immor
tale &longs;pecie di&longs;iungantur? itaque pro eo, qd habet
legendum puto. Hæc verò omnia iubeo te diligenter ob&longs;eruare: ni&longs;i enim aduertas; oratio per
plexa qua v&longs;us e&longs;t Ari&longs;toteles; negotium tibi exhibere po&longs;&longs;et. præ&longs;ertim quòd Græci interpretis
auxilio de&longs;tituti &longs;umus in eo loco. Quamquam neque ip&longs;e animaduertit, vbi Ari&longs;toteles docuit
genere differentia in contrariis numerari, quòd eorum maxima differentia foret, hæc e&longs;&longs;e referen
da ad ea, quæ paullò ante dixerat videri, Ari&longs;toteles; in illum errorem inductus e&longs;t, quòd
maximè di&longs;tarent ea quæ genere differunt: neque vidit eam di&longs;tantiam ab Ari&longs;totele, velut infi
nitam poni, vnde contrariorum ratio tollitur. nec enim via pote&longs;t intercedere inter genere toto
differentia quæ &longs;ola re&longs;tat inter ea quæ genere conueniunt. Et verò cur magis di&longs;ter quantum à
&longs;ub&longs;tantia quàm di&longs;tet qualitas, aut vllum aliud ex reliquis prædicamentis? Cùm verò po&longs;teà
accepi&longs;&longs;et in eum &longs;en&longs;um, quòd di&longs;tantia &longs;oret infinita, idem quoque repugnantiam maximam
inter Ari&longs;totelis dicta inculcare coactus e&longs;t, putans, quod ibi inferretur aduer&longs;um ca quæ &longs;uprà
con&longs;titura fuerant; pertinere ad illa quæ &longs;ubalterna &longs;unt, cùm c&ecedil;teroqui &longs;uperiora generali&longs;simis
accommodarentur. id verò vniuer&longs;am Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ententiam peruertebat.
quandò ea quæ diffe
runt; aliquo differunt: generali&longs;sima nullo differunt, &longs;ed diuer&longs;a &longs;unr, hoc e&longs;t &longs;eip&longs;is di&longs;tinguun
tur, ex ip&longs;is dialectici fabricant propo&longs;itiones medio vacantes;
per illa &longs;eparantur; itaque magis propriè differunt; huic verò oppo&longs;itum autore Alexandro pro
nuntia&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles. Poruit verò eos fallere dictum illud Ari&longs;torelis in extremo X. qui cùm
tina\illud adiungit
ide&longs;t ea verò,”
quæ genere diuer&longs;a &longs;unt; magis di&longs;tant, quàm ea quæ &longs;pecie. qua&longs;i antea perora&longs;&longs;e
caduco genere di&longs;crepare. Verùm neque hæc cum proximè dictis cohæreant nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t, neque
ex ante con&longs;titutis nece&longs;&longs;ariò colliguntur. &longs;ed videntur potius &longs;eparatim fui&longs;&longs;e allata
de di&longs;tantia contrariorum & eorum quæ &longs;pecie &longs;egregantur, &longs;atis di&longs;putatum foret; ea
&longs;ubiungenda quæ ad genera diuer&longs;a pertinerent, vt ab&longs;olueretur di&longs;putatio de oppo&longs;itis; itaque
docuit ea plus quàm &longs;pecie differentia di&longs;tare. Nam quæ &longs;pecie differunt, habent in quo conue
niant, nempe genus; non &longs;ic; quæ genere &longs;eparantur. Ergo illa &longs;ub eodem genere &longs;ummiam obti
nuere di&longs;tantiam, hæc in finito quodam interuallo &longs;eiunguntur. Quamquam mirum videri po
te&longs;t, &longs;i di&longs;tant multò magis ea qu&ecedil; genere &longs;egregantur quàm ea quæ &longs;pecie; quæ &longs;pecie di&longs;tinguun
tur, in eodem &longs;ubiecto non con&longs;i&longs;tere; quæ verò genere &longs;eiugantur, etiam complura e&longs;&longs;ein
indiuiduo: in eodem enim Socrate e&longs;t & &longs;ub&longs;tantia, & quantum, & quale, & omnia prædicamen
ta. nec tamen idem albus & niger, aut ratione vtens, aut carens.
An ita dicemus hæc magis e&longs;&longs;en
tia, & natura di&longs;tingui quàm ea quæ &longs;unt contraria generis eiu&longs;dem, nullam enim e&longs;&longs;enti&ecedil; partem
habent in qua conueniant: at &longs;ubiecto & materia quæ non e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;entiæ pars, propter eius habili
tatem ad omnes formas di&longs;tant minus; contraria propter in &longs;itam priuationem alterius quæ ine&longs;t
in altero, non modo e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ecernuntur, &longs;ed etiam &longs;ubiecto: repugnant enim, & &longs;e&longs;e ex eodem
&longs;ubiecto pellunt vici&longs;sim; illa e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;anè di&longs;crepant; &longs;ed non contin entia priuationem, ni&longs;i for
maliter ea differre dicamus, quòd vnum non &longs;itid quod e&longs;t alterum; nullam repugnantiam pr&ecedil;
&longs;eferunt: &longs;ic & &longs;ub&longs;tantia & quantum &longs;imul e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t; licet tota e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparetur à
quantitate. Ergo æternum & caducum &longs;pecie &longs;ola di&longs;tinguitur, non etiam genere.
Quamobrem
et&longs;i Auerroës ea plus quàm genere di&longs;tare con&longs;tituit; aut extremis illis X. verbis cum aliis e&longs;t de
ceptus, aut aliò ab interpretibus eius verba torquentur, atque ip&longs;e velit.
&longs;pecie; ergo etiam plus quàm genere. quisid dabit?
& videtur illud volui&longs;&longs;e tantum quod diffe
rant plus quàm &longs;pecie &longs;peciali&longs;sima; nanque æternum & caducum de multis &longs;pecie differentibus
prædicantur &longs;ignum e&longs;to, quòd addit e&longs;&longs;e contraria, quæ &longs;ub eodem genere collocantur. Venit
& id mihi in mentem in locum Ari&longs;totelis irrep&longs;i&longs;le quandam mendulam, & pro eo quod legitur
e&longs;t eiu&longs;dem &longs;peciei cum indiuiduis, vel ad &longs;ummam &longs;pecie &longs;peciali&longs;sima &longs;egregatur. &longs;ed æternum
& caducum genere (&longs;ubalterno) di&longs;crepant; hæc verò maior e&longs;t di&longs;crepantia quàm &longs;pecierum
&longs;peciali&longs;simarum: ergo non differunt ide&ecedil; ab indiuiduis vt immortale à caduco. Ex
contrariorum fit plus & minus. id autem &longs;ic accipiendum e&longs;t, vt faciant contraria circum idem
&longs;ubiectum, & vt eadem &longs;pecies con&longs;eruetur, vt in accidentibus v&longs;uuenire &longs;olet: nanque &longs;ub&longs;tan
tiæ &longs;ic &longs;e habent, vt quoque minimo dempto, vel addito &longs;pecies, non &longs;ecus ac numeri dempta,
vel addita vnitare mutentur. Inde natum e&longs;t tritum illud pronuntiatum in accidentibus plus &
minus &longs;peciem non immutare, quod tamen ab Ari&longs;totele negatum e&longs;t
The ophra&longs;tus, à quo Simplicius) in animi affectionibus quæ in quadam mediocritate collocan
tur, ex hac &longs;i exce&longs;&longs;erint, in vitia conuertuntur. Atque etiam plus & minus ad &longs;ub&longs;tantias per
tinere pote&longs;t & ad alia complura &longs;ine participatione contrarij; nanque indiuidua &longs;ub&longs;tantia ma
gis e&longs;t, quàm &longs;ecunda, &longs;imiliter accidens quiddam minus e&longs;t quàm &longs;ub&longs;tantia; verum id à Gr&ecedil;cis
res &longs;uis quidem partibus ab&longs;oluta e&longs;t, &longs;ed deficit tanti&longs;per à &longs;ummo; nec latitudinem complet
eius quod e&longs;t &longs;impliciter in eo genere: nam quantum perfectum e&longs;t; neque ideo pollet ea per&longs;e
ctione quam agno&longs;cimus in &longs;ub&longs;tantia, eiu&longs;modi tamen, quæ &longs;ibi conueniat. Sed po&longs;tea quibus
& quomodo &longs;ingula aptentur. Hocitem ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;emel atque iterum acceptum e&longs;t.
quod ex duobus &longs;it conflatum; vbi alterum exi&longs;tere &longs;eor&longs;um queat; alterum quoque &longs;eparari
po&longs;le. vt, &longs;i hydromeli ex aqua & melle componitur, ac mel ab&longs;olutum ab aqua exi&longs;tit, nece&longs;&longs;e
item e&longs;t aqua &longs;eparetur à melle. At verò, &longs;i &longs;ententiam hanc ita generaliter accipiamus,
ne veritas illius minuatur: quippe quòd, tamet&longs;i &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparatur ab accidente, non idcirco Præterea ne tollatur eius v&longs;us.
Nam &longs;i vtrunque &longs;eparatum e&longs;&longs;e
velint, id pro comperto accipiunt quod inquirimus: ex hac emm propo&longs;itione alterum ex illis
&longs;eor&longs;um exi&longs;tere conamur o&longs;tendere; atqui &longs;i ita &longs;umatur, e&longs;t principinm, non conclu&longs;io. Nec non
id mihi veniebat in menrem, Ari&longs;totelem, vbicunque eiu&longs;modi propo&longs;itionem &longs;ump&longs;i&longs;let; per
petuò ad mouentia & mobilia accommoda&longs;&longs;e:
ipecialius &longs;umptam fui&longs;&longs;e dicemus; nempe in motu c&ecedil;le&longs;ti &longs;olùm in quo mobile &longs;impliciter e&longs;t;
quippe orbes planetarum, & mouens, & mobile &longs;imul &longs;ph&ecedil;ra &longs;cilicet inerrans, & primum
ab omni corpore &longs;egregatum. Accedit quòd &longs;i generaliter & indefinitè accipiamus vnum &longs;eiu
gatum; poterit intelligi primum; at non eSed quoniam
negare non po&longs;lumus, quin, &longs;i rerum e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;pectetur, accidentis item e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;eparata &longs;it ab
e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, alia enim e&longs;t vtriu&longs;que e&longs;&longs;entia: quia tamen non efficeret Ari&longs;totelesid quod
in&longs;tituerat: etenim primum motorem à corpore c&ecedil;le&longs;ti non e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;olùm, &longs;ed re &longs;ecretum o&longs;ten
dere volebat: idcirco dicemus Ari&longs;totelem de rei &longs;eparatione verba facere, & in eam partem ac
cipiemus effatum, vt &longs;i de priore dubium &longs;it, &longs;it'ne &longs;eparatum; à po&longs;terioris &longs;eparatione conclu
damus etiam prius e&longs;&longs;e ab&longs;olutum; rerum natura patietur.
Nam &longs;i po&longs;terius ex aliquo pen
det, per &longs;e &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tit; multò magis exi&longs;tet per &longs;e prius; quia non pendeat ex alio.
atque illud
po&longs;terius, &longs;ic ab altero &longs;eparari debere putamus, vt ab aliis omnibus ab&longs;olutum &longs;it. Idcirco etiam
&longs;i materia &longs;eparetur à forma: quia non &longs;impliciter à forma &longs;eparatur, neque formam (de mate
riata nunc agimus) à materia liberam e&longs;&longs;e continget. Vbi igitur ab&longs;olutum &longs;it po&longs;terius; prius it&untilde;
multò magis ab&longs;olutum &longs;it, nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. ab&longs;olutum, inquam, vt &longs;ub&longs;i&longs;tens, non autem, vt e&longs;&longs;entiæ
priuilegio, &longs;iue functionis ab alio pendet. Nam Socrates e&longs;t res ab&longs;oluta, quia con&longs;i&longs;tit partibus
vniuer&longs;is, ex quibus illud deriuatur, quod dicimus Quòd &longs;i pendeat
ab alio, tanquam mouente; nil veritati propo&longs;itionis ob&longs;tar, modò cau&longs;&longs;as internas & affectus, vt
in &longs;ubiecto, velut patiente in&longs;unt, c&ecedil;teris cogitatione &longs;euocatis aduertamus, non excludentes à
Deo reliqua pendere, propterea quòd &longs;int, aut quòd illum imitando operentur: illud verò ap
probantes, qu
nullo pendeat ex con&longs;equentibus, neque vt &longs;it, neque vt operetur. Sed illud mihi placet magis
hæc non generatim, &longs;ed appo&longs;itè ad motum primum pronuntiata fui&longs;&longs;e ab Ari&longs;torele. Et illud
item ab Ari&longs;totele receptum.
animo vnum fieri per &longs;e, cuius nulla demon&longs;tratio po&longs;sit afferri, quippe quòd ea &longs;it illorum vis
& natura, nec in alia principia re&longs;oluatur. Nam quamuis Ari&longs;toteles olim pronuntiari
rum in medio afferens aliud principium,
fit: tunc enim requiritur efficiens quod iungat hæc duo principia diuer&longs;a; & finis cuius gratia &longs;ic
agat efficiens; nos autem hîc verba facimus de re, po&longs;tquàm genita e&longs;t & interna principia &longs;cru
tamur; Vnum igitur fit ex illis non vt colla, glutine, aut clauo, neque item compo&longs;itione, aut
tinuationemodo materia &longs;e habet ad formam, & corpus animalis ad animam.
hoc totum,
e&longs;t ex eorum natura. Cùm enim e&longs;&longs;e dicatur multis modis, vt pore&longs;tate & actu; illud verè e&longs;t
quod e&longs;t actus, vnde impetrarunt alia quòd &longs;int. Cùm ergo materia &longs;it pore&longs;tas, forma verò
actus, materia per &longs;e non con&longs;tat, &longs;ed &longs;ocietatem formæ requirit, vt &longs;it: &longs;ic etiam corpus organi
cum, quia potentia vitam habet, non actu, vt eam habeat, animæ præ&longs;entia opus e&longs;t. Quoniam
igitur oportet vt illi pr&ecedil;&longs;to &longs;it forma, huic autem animus; &longs;i e&longs;&longs;e debent: idcirco vnum fit ex ma
teria & forma. Et per analogiam ad hæc quòd certum efficiens incutiat actum certo &longs;ubiecto,
quod item indem on &longs;trabile te&longs;tatur e&longs;&longs;e Philo&longs;ophus,
In rebus etiam natura con&longs;tantibus certa e&longs;t & determinata ratio magnitudinis, & paruitatis,
cùm vt forma con&longs;i &longs;tat, tùm etiam vt efficienti parere valeat: nanque et&longs;i materiæ cau&longs;&longs;a diui&longs;io
procedit in infinitum; at vbi illa ratio corrumpatur; intereat forma nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t priuata in&longs;trumen
tis quibus &longs;uis muneribus fungi debebat: neque enim patitur natura aliquid otio&longs;um. Et debita
rei magnitudo de&longs;ideratur in patiente; quandò magna magnam vim pro ratione
corpotis habentia valdè re&longs;i&longs;tunt, parua eludunt agentia.
principio ad principium tendere nempe ab efficiente quod e&longs;t actu, ad finem &
ratione & e&longs;&longs;entia priora, licet vltima generatione.
beat, dum fit, ac po&longs;tquàm facta fuerit: nam quæ po&longs;teriora generatione, hæc &longs;unt natura prio
ra, & contra quæ prius natura &longs;unt ea &longs;int vltima generatione. Hæc de communibus phy&longs;io
logiæ totius effatis dicere libuit quæ maioris ponderis e&longs;&longs;e intelligeremus, quibus theoremata
fundarentur quæ de motu generatim in&longs;tituimus, alia reiicientes ad illa, quæ de reliqua re natu
rali &longs;cribere cogitamus.
T. 13.
T. 19.
T. 26.
dem T. 26
Di&longs;pu.
2.
Sol. 1.
c.
vlt.
lib.
paqw_n
d 8. Phy&longs;. 12. Met.
T. 35.
Theo.
174.
b 8. Met. T. vlt.
2. de An.
T. 7.
T. 51.
c.
propo&longs;uit Ari&longs;toteles an non.
Cap.
V.
Atqve ea quidem nob.
nota &longs;unt annum illa, à quibus initium &longs;u&ecedil; phy&longs;iologi&ecedil; &longs;ump&longs;it
Ari&longs;toteles; Equidem neque hæc excepta fui&longs;&longs;e puto, neque &longs;ola comprehen&longs;a; &longs;ed aliud
genus eorum quæ &longs;int nota nob. ab Ari&longs;totele proponi credo quæ
eorum notitiam, quæ nobis ignota &longs;orent, & cùm &longs;impliciter nota e&longs;&longs;ent; nobis quoque nota fie
rent: vbi verò notui&longs;&longs;ent, lucem rebus afferrent quæ licet no&longs;cerentur à nob. &longs;impliciter, tamen
ignorabantur; ita enim no&longs;cebantur à nob. vt &longs;en&longs;ui &longs;e&longs;e offerebant; & cum cau&longs;las haberent ex
quibus apt&ecedil; e&longs;&longs;ent, &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a no&longs;cebantur; rerum verò cau&longs;&longs;as habentium legitima cognitio pa
ratur auxilio cau&longs;&longs;arum: &longs;ed his inuentis per re&longs;olutionem eorum quæ &longs;unt nota nob. adhibito
quodam gyro rationis, in iis agno&longs;cuntur ea vici&longs;sim quæ nob. nota &longs;unt.
vt &longs;i hydromeli &longs;ubij
ceretur oculis no&longs;tris, id rotum &longs;pectaremus, neque tamen intelligeremus quid e&longs;&longs;et, quibusúe ex
partibus con&longs;taret; &longs;epla&longs;iarius verò ip&longs;um accipiens in mel & aquam re&longs;olueret, ex hydromeli
re quidem mel, & aquam digno&longs;ceret, & ex iis hydromelitos e&longs;&longs;entiam indicaret. Atque hic qui
dem progre&longs;&longs;us accommodatur ad omnia quæ nobis nota &longs;unt, ni&longs;i fortè eadem &longs;int nobis, & na
tura nota, quemadmodum euenire &longs;olet in mathematicis. &longs;ed apud phy&longs;icum &longs;anè pauca, ne di
xerim nulla, &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi. Cùm verò communiter hoc conueniat in illa omnia quæ nob.
nota &longs;unt; nos hîc &longs;peciem quandam tractare volumus, vbi videre quoque oportet, quo hæc
quibus de nunc agimus à c&ecedil;reris &longs;eiungantur, & quodnam peculiare præ&longs;eferant
quod attinet ad eorum con&longs;titutionem & modum quo nobis afferunt auxilium ad reliqua co
gno&longs;cenda qu&ecedil; ignoramus; ac principia primùm, quæ cùm &longs;e&longs;e demer&longs;erint in profundum, à no
&longs;tris &longs;en&longs;ibus longi&longs;simè rece&longs;&longs;erunt, vt iis optimè per&longs;pectis, illa vnde primùm voluere, pro
bè intelligerentur. antè enim erat inchoata illorum cognitio, quippe ex &longs;en&longs;u & per accidens; po
&longs;tea per&longs;ecta & per &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as, mox alia quæ cùm pendeant ex illis, à nob. nullo pacto cogno
&longs;cuntur; neque enim &longs;entimus ea, quæ in centrum mundi &longs;e&longs;e abdidere; &longs;ed ratio dictat ibi quid
dam e&longs;le torpidi&longs;simum; quia nimirum maximè omnium di&longs;tet à c&ecedil;lo à quo calor ad elementa
permanat. ea verò deducitur ex iis principiis quæ nob.
antea patefacta fuerant.
Hæc ergo &longs;peciali
quodam nomine confu&longs;a vocauit Ari&longs;toteles, Græcè
vox frequenti&longs;sima qua &longs;ignificatur res conturbata & non pura, vt &longs;pecies confu&longs;æ dicerentur
imagines illæ quæ apparent in aquis, vbi concitantur, a&longs;piciuntur enim di&longs;tortis & perplexis, vt
certam nullam delineationem præferre videantur. quin ita exiles &longs;unt, vt ægrè di&longs;cerni po&longs;sint.
atque h&ecedil; quidem huiu&longs;modi e&longs;&longs;e &longs;olent in pueris, dum ab immoderato calore &longs;anguis
turbantur, con&longs;imiles in ebriis exi&longs;tunt.
Sic te&longs;tabatur Ari&longs;toteles, gentem aliquam ab ortu notam
in auis apparui&longs;&longs;e di&longs;tinctam, po&longs;t
modo in nepotibus reliquum e&longs;&longs;e nigrum quoddam confu&longs;um, vt di&longs;cernere non liceret, nota'ne
foret, an potius imago notæ. Eodem quoque modo cùm redderet cau&longs;&longs;am Philo&longs;ophus,
nati &longs;imiles interdum parentibus e&longs;&longs;ent, nonnunquàm matribus, ac nepotes auis aut auiis docet
ex longiore nepotum &longs;ucce&longs;sione figuras maiorum confundi, & proce&longs;&longs;u temporis ita conturba
ri, vt nulli amplius affinium, aut con&longs;anguineorum &longs;imiles &longs;int. Verùm quod ad rem no&longs;tram
pertinet, cùm Galenus, tùm etiam Ari&longs;toteles v&longs;i &longs;unt huiu &longs;cemodi voce, &longs;ignificantes doctrinam
rudem & inchoatam &
opponit confu&longs;o Planius adhuc idem Galenus
faciens de doctrina qu&ecedil; tradenda e&longs;t rudibus, conferre docet in compluribus indefinitum & con
fu&longs;um magis quàm
prolixiorum &longs;ermonum & longioris temporis indigeat quod item alio nomine
dius dictum & oppo&longs;itum ei, quod e&longs;t exqui&longs;itum, ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;ignificatum fui&longs;&longs;e nouimus. M.
Tullius
reddidit.
Audit igitur, quid
&longs;ibi velit in methodo con&longs;u&longs;um. Sed enim hoc in omnem di&longs;putationem quadram pote&longs;t, &longs;iue
&longs;it de principiis, &longs;iue de rebus quæ pendent ex ip&longs;is. Atqui nunc aduertamus quæ velit Ari&longs;tote
les e&longs;&longs;e confu&longs;a Hæc, &longs;i rerum ip&longs;arum conditionem
&longs;pectes; illa generatim vocantur quæ vix à nob. cogno&longs;cuntur, hoc e&longs;t, vt tamet&longs;i ea no&longs;camus,
quòd &longs;int; cùm habeant cau&longs;&longs;as; imperfectè tamen cogno&longs;cuntur, quòd eorum cau&longs;&longs;æ ignoran
tur. itaque cùm con&longs;tent ex cau&longs;sis; non fuerit error opinor, &longs;i etiam
nuncupentur: præ&longs;ertim quòd habemus graui&longs;simos huius loci interpretes Alexandrum, Sim
phcium, & Auerroëm qui confu&longs;a interpretantur compo&longs;ita. Quapropter etiam nos facilitatis
ergò con&longs;u&longs;a tran&longs;umemus in compo&longs;ita. & ea partiemur in tria membra, ea &longs;cilicet quæ &longs;unt
compo&longs;ita compo&longs;itione formali, reali, & logica. formali quidem compo&longs;itione intelligentes e&longs;
&longs;e compo&longs;ita illa, quorum rationi &longs;upponitur alterius ratio, veluti rationi accidentis ratio &longs;ubexi&longs;tunt.
Compo&longs;itionem logicam compo&longs;itionem vel rationum, vt &longs;ubiectarum par
tium in genere; continet enim genus in &longs;e vniuer&longs;o quodam modo & virtute rationem &longs;uarum
partium, vel etiam à ratione factam, cùm &longs;impliciter, & &longs;ine vlla conditione &longs;umitur id quod
aliqua lege & modo audiendum e&longs;t. Ex horum numero &longs;unt &longs;ententiæ veterum.
Omnium
v&longs;us e&longs;t in omni doctrina, & in phy&longs;ica præcipuè. Nam 7. Met.
illa repo&longs;uit in notis nobis quo
rum auxilio principiorum notitia paretur quæ parum participant ip&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e, tamen ea &longs;ic habe
re compertum e&longs;t, quamuis cau&longs;&longs;a lateat; hæc &longs;unt accidentia & inhærentia rebus: parum enim
con&longs;i&longs;tunt; quia non per &longs;e, &longs;ed in &longs;ub&longs;tantia con&longs;i&longs;tunt; & cùm cau&longs;&longs;as habeant, &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a verò
no&longs;cantur, exiliter admodum cogno&longs;cuntur. Ex eodem ordine &longs;unt compo&longs;ita ex materia, &
quæcunque &longs;unt hoc aliquid: quandò compo&longs;ita multò minus participent ip&longs;um e&longs;&longs;e quàm for
ma: nam con&longs;tant ex materia &longs;en&longs;ili quæ e&longs;t potentia, non actu, & per &longs;e ip&longs;a &longs;unt caduca atque
mortalia. quibus omnibus vtitur &longs;cientia naturalis, dum ab iis qu&ecedil; in&longs;unt in loco, vel increm ento
eorum venatur e&longs;&longs;entiam, & auxilio motus inuenit materiam, functionis ope formam, atque ex
in&longs;pectione partium corporis animæ naturam ve&longs;tigat. Valet multum (vt de tertia compo&longs;itione
dicam) genus ad aperiendas differentias, & partes &longs;ubiectas: etenim ex eo, qua&longs;i ex toto earum
ratio communis o&longs;tenditur, quæ partiendo illu&longs;tratur; & cuique propria redditur; vt dum in ani
mali &longs;en&longs;um per&longs;picimus; & varios &longs;en&longs;uum gradus
modos progrediendi no
tantes animalium &longs;pecies con&longs;tituimus. Illorum certè fructus maximus quæ generatim & ab&longs;o
lutè pronunciata fuerunt; hæc enim cùm per ex perientiam nobis notuerint; facilè creduntur; maximè, quòd vniuersè vera &longs;unt; quia tamen flagitant modum; pariunt
dam cognitionem quæ tùm ab&longs;oluitur, &longs;i debitum
omne quod fit, fieri ex eo quod e&longs;t; & ex eo quod non e&longs;t, collegimus materiam quæ partim e&longs;t,
partim non e&longs;t. Sed his omnibus veterum &longs;ententiarum expen&longs;io præponitur.
iubet enim phi
lo&longs;ophus, apparentibus.
In quibus &longs;i cum dicendis omnes homines con&longs;entire videantur, optimum.
Si minus quodammodo quidem omnino, quod ab opinione deducti facient.
habet enim vnu&longs;
qui&longs;que peculiare quoddam procliue ad veritatem ex quibus nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t aliquo pacto demon
&longs;trare de ip&longs;is; ex iis enim quæ verè &longs;anè dicuntur, at non per&longs;picuè procedentibus exi&longs;tet & id
quod e&longs;t per&longs;picuè, tran&longs;umentibus &longs;emper ea quæ &longs;unt notiora inter illa quæ confusè dici con
&longs;ueuerunt.
po&longs;t inuenire per&longs;picuè quid e&longs;t illud de quo laboramus, vt in morali quid e&longs;t beaticudo; in qua
quidem tractatione accipit hoc in quo con&longs;entiunt omnes, eam nimirùm e&longs;&longs;e bonum præ&longs;tanti&longs;
&longs;imum.
e&longs;&longs;e monet; &longs;ed in aliis omnibus in quibus aliquid rei propo&longs;itæ cogno&longs;centes ea quærimus quæ
ne&longs;cimus. Quamobrem oportere per ea quæ verè quidem pronunciantur, non autem per&longs;picuè,
eruere conari quod verè e&longs;t & per&longs;picuè. Hæc nos igitur ea dicimus e&longs;&longs;e quæ nonmodo in ethi
cis, &longs;ed in philo&longs;ophia quæ &longs;equitur naturalem, & in phy&longs;ica proponit nob. Ari&longs;toteles, vt eorum
auxilio principiorum notitiam comparemus, omnium con&longs;en&longs;um fundamentum firmi&longs;simum
e&longs;&longs;e putantes; ac &longs;i non omnes &longs;anè con&longs;entiant, conari tamen o&longs;tendere, vt ea dicere volui&longs;&longs;e vi
deantur, quæ &longs;i mon&longs;trata fuerint, propter innatam propen&longs;ionem ad veritatem facillimè nobis
concedentur. itaque tran&longs;umptis, ide&longs;t, ad bonum &longs;en&longs;um deductis iis quæ verè quidem, &longs;ed ob
&longs;curè pronunciantur, &longs;cientiarum prima principia comperiemus. Ex his multa &longs;unt, vt illa con
traria e&longs;&longs;e principia, non contraria; con&longs;imiliter ex non ente, aut ex ente fieri id quod
fit, quæ cùm vniuersè vera &longs;int, ob&longs;curè tamen dicuntur. hæc &longs;i illu &longs;trentur, & in bonam partem
accipiantur, & accommodentur ad ea quæ verè & cum ratione con&longs;tituta fuerunt; vera pror&longs;us
habebuntur; & in iis
di&longs;&longs;oluendas dubitationes, & tollenda contraria; nam &longs;ic omnia quæ videntur in e&longs;&longs;e, con&longs;eruan
tur, & quæ contraria cen&longs;entur; mon&longs;trantur di&longs;tinguendo non e&longs;&longs;e contraria: &longs;ic enim verè pro
nunciantur, aliter non verè, vt verbis Ari&longs;totelis vtar. Itaque hæc quæ veteres a&longs;&longs;ump&longs;erunt, ea
nota nobis e&longs;&longs;e arbitror, vnde via muniatur qua po&longs;simus ad principia nobis ignota peruenire. Proinde fuit con&longs;uetudo philo&longs;ophi veterum &longs;ententias in exordio cuiu&longs;que methodi &longs;edulò
di&longs;cutere, quòd veritatem, &longs;i non planè eloquuntur, at balbutiunt. & cùm maiore ex parte veræ
&longs;int: nanque &longs;en&longs;ibus plerunque fundantur; non difficile e&longs;t illas repurgare; in omni me
thodo conandum: præterquàm quòd &longs;i inde ducatur initium; vitatur negotium congrediendi
cum imperitis, nec omnia reuocanda &longs;unt in controuer&longs;iam, cùm aliqua item ex illis periti rece
perint quorum iudicium videtur e&longs;&longs;e approbandum, & præcipuè veterum de principiis,
enim veteres ortui rerum viciniores e&longs;&longs;ent, vim principiorum magis tenere potuerint; quia periti
principia cominus intuentur. Accedit eodem, quòd &longs;uppeditant veterum dicta copiam theore.
aliquid addente. Con&longs;u&longs;a igitur nobis nota &longs;unt; ea verò &longs;e habent vt tota.
Quare cùm &longs;en&longs;ui
notius &longs;it totum quàm partes; à notis autem nobis ex in&longs;tinctu naturæ procedendum &longs;it; à toto
ad partes progredi cogimur. ita que diuidendo paratur notitia partium qu&ecedil; certa e&longs;t atque di&longs;tin
cta: vt enim primo intuitu ampli&longs;simas ædes a&longs;picimus; nec tamen quid commen&longs;i; quid com
modi, aut artificiosè di&longs;po&longs;iti contineant intelligere valemus; tùm verò probè h&ecedil;c omnia percipi
mus, cùm particulatim &longs;peculamur, atque lu&longs;tramus: &longs;icitem euenit in &longs;cientiis.
cortex re
rum nobis apparet, penetralia latent; h&ecedil;c animo peragrare oporter, &longs;i rem accuratè tenere voluë
ris. Vniuer&longs;alis illa notitia
perlu&longs;tratis vniuer&longs;a rei notitia completur. Idem quoque confirmat auctoritas Ari&longs;totelis
inuehitur in antiquos, quòd de natura quidem vniuersè di&longs;&longs;ererent; partes eius intactas omitte
rent; quanquàm id difficultatis &longs;ignum po&longs;uit. eius verba hæc &longs;unt, quæ propter interpr&ecedil;tes ani
maduertenda propono
autem non po&longs;&longs;e, indicium difficultatis, & hoc e&longs;t illud totum, vnde ad &longs;ingularia procedere iu
bet diuidendo Ari&longs;toteles;
ferentias; vel re&longs;oluimus effectus & compo&longs;ita in &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as, &longs;eu complexas, &longs;iue incomplexas;
vel adhibita conditione di&longs;tinguimus; vel diiudicamus; & verùm à fal&longs;o di&longs;cernimus. Et planè
totum quodcunque illud &longs;it nobis e&longs;t euidentius: etenim de partibus quanti per&longs;picuum e&longs;t, &
genus &longs;pecie notius e&longs;t, prius enim nouimus hoc e&longs;&longs;e animal, quàm tale animal; & tota &longs;pecies
per nomen indicatur, e&longs;&longs;entiæ verò partes definitione eluce&longs;cunt, diuidit enim definitio totam
&longs;peciem in
nes in nomine ip&longs;o continebantur. & vniuer&longs;ale etiam quod magna ex parte verum e&longs;t, nobis no
tius e&longs;t, non tamen accuratè notum, ni&longs;i ip&longs;um in partes &longs;uas di&longs;tinxeris, & quod
&longs;eparaueris. Et hoc equidem ab Ari&longs;totele notatum fui&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eo, vnde peteret initia phy&longs;icæ quæ
nos cum totis in modo, vt dialectici dicunt, non &longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a numeramus. &longs;iquidem, &longs;i &longs;ubiecta re
&longs;picias, per vniuer&longs;a pertinent; &longs;i tamen partes ip&longs;ius aduertas, non &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed cum modo
vera e&longs;&longs;e intelliges. vtputa, vniuersè verum e&longs;t in omni generatione contrarium ex contrario fie
ri, non tamen &longs;impliciter; quia non omni ex parte fit ex contrario; &longs;ed aliqua pars exi&longs;tit in eo
quod fit, quæ contraria non e&longs;t. Sic quicquid fit, ex non ente fit; non tamen omnes eius partes ex
non ente fiunt, &longs;ed aliquæ ex ente; nec omnibus modis ac &longs;impliciter fit ex ente, aut ex non ente;
&longs;ed partim ex ente, partim ex non ente, & ex ente hoc modo, illo verò ex non ente, ex quibus
exi&longs;tunt propo&longs;itiones quæ magna ex parte veræ exi&longs;tunt; non quia tales &longs;int eo quòd vt pluri
mùm, vt fortè in dialecticis; &longs;ed quia non omni ex parte, nec omnibus modis, & vt dici &longs;olet, &longs;im
pliciter. quas item nos in logicis non iniuria collocabimus; quippè quòd communiter veræ &longs;int
& vniuer&longs;ales, quòd partes vniuer&longs;as minimè complectantur; ad proprias tamen partibus ip&longs;is
di&longs;tinctis atque &longs;ecretis optimè reduci queant: nam tum ver&ecedil; omni ex parte exi&longs;tunt. vt quòd,
quicquid fit, partim fiat ex contrario, partim ex non contrario. verum e&longs;t vndequaque, quo
probè per&longs;pecto principiorum vis nece&longs;&longs;ariò patebir; & cuncta illu&longs;trabit, tùm qu&ecedil; prius confusè
no&longs;cebantur, tùm etiam quæ nobis ob&longs;cura &longs;unt ex iis quæ pendent ab ip&longs;is. Atque hic erit pro
ce&longs;&longs;us ab vniuer&longs;is ad &longs;ingula, dimi&longs;sis indiuiduis quæ nullo modo &longs;unt &longs;cientiæ partes.
via &longs;iue per circulum illum, quem regre&longs;&longs;um vocant, nota nobis ex notis natura cogno&longs;cuntur,
&longs;iue notis principiis, recta demon&longs;tratione, rerum per &longs;e & nobis ignotarum notitia comparatur. Neque enim &longs;emper effectus per&longs;picui &longs;unt.
Iam verò quòd &longs;ingularia non &longs;ola dicantur indiui
dua, patet: nam &longs;ingularia &longs;pecies generis alicuius dicuntur:
rerum quæ &longs;unt ab omni materia &longs;egregatæ, vel per e&longs;&longs;entiam, vel per indifferentiam, cuiu&longs;modi
&longs;unt vniuer&longs;alia logica, vel primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, triplex e&longs;t enim ab&longs;tractio phy&longs;ica, &longs;cilicet ab in
diuiduis, mathematica à materia &longs;en&longs;ili; & metaphy&longs;ica ab omni genere materiæ, quam item lo
gica imitatur: his hoc modo ab&longs;tractis &longs;ingularia opponuntur. & Auerroës &longs;ingulare nuncupa&longs;&longs;e
videtur omne, quod di&longs;tinguitur à compo&longs;ito.
intelligibilia &longs;ingularia, cùm tamen profe&longs;&longs;us &longs;it cogitatiuæ munus e&longs;&longs;e di&longs;currere de indiuiduis;
itaque nuncupata e&longs;t mens particularis. ob
tiam, &longs;ic verba eius doctoris interpr&ecedil;tabimur, cogitatiuam non componere &longs;ingularia intelligibi
lia, ide&longs;t terminos &longs;implices qui &longs;unt partes compo&longs;itorum vniuer&longs;alium. Zimara quod
in phy&longs;icis a&longs;&longs;ecutus non e&longs;t, tandem loco alieno; & vbi minus oportuit, veram vocis interpr&ecedil;ta
tionem eo&longs;dem &longs;implices terminos &longs;ingularia vocauit Ari&longs;toteles, cùm admonuit
definitionem diuidere in &longs;ingularia. Ab his igitur quæ rudia &longs;unt & inchoata natura perpetuò
progreditur, & dum rerum productioni vacat, & dum dirigit nos ad &longs;cientiam. Nam primùm in
vtero certus &longs;anguis concre&longs;cit; inde quædam carnis moles exi&longs;tit; mox paullatim incipit deli
neari; ad extremum ab&longs;oluitur, vt nihil addi prætereà po&longs;sit. Hic autem progre&longs;&longs;us cum erudi
Tullio
(opinor) &longs;i in hunc locum apti&longs;simè illius verba conferantur. Ip&longs;e igitur primum de iis agens in
quibus appetitus exercetur, ea &longs;cribit quæ certè ex media philo&longs;ophia deprompta fui&longs;&longs;e fatebe
ris, & cum placitis Ari&longs;totelis maximè congruentia. De prima ergo hominis con&longs;titutione di
&longs;putans &longs;ic ait. “Hanc initio con&longs;titutionem confu&longs;am habet & incertam, vt tantummodo &longs;e
tueatur,” qualecunque &longs;it. Iam enim accepimus, omne animal &longs;eip&longs;um diligere, & &longs;imulac or
tum e&longs;t, id agere, vt &longs;e con&longs;eruet, quòd hic primus ad omnem vitam tuendam appetitus à natu
ra datur, &longs;e vt con&longs;eruet, atque ita &longs;it affectum, vt optimè &longs;ecundum naturam e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit. &longs;e in
quàm tantummodo tueatur, “qualecunque &longs;it. &longs;ed nec quid fit, nec quid po&longs;sit, nec quid ip&longs;ius
natura &longs;it, intelligit. Cùm autem proce&longs;sit paullulum, & quatenus, quicquid &longs;e attingat, ad
pertineat, per&longs;picere cœpit.
tùm &longs;en&longs;im incipit progredi, &longs;e
agno&longs;cere & intelligere, quam
ob cau&longs;am habeat eum quem diximus, animi appetitum: & ea quæ naturæ apta &longs;en
tit,” appetere & propul&longs;are contraria. Sed illud pror&longs;us diuinum quod ex Accio profitetur,
vnde contemplationis origo deducta e&longs;t, qua &longs;e&longs;e v&longs;que ad Deum Optimum Maximum, &longs;olus
homo euexit ab ignorantiæ gradu per admirationem eorum quæ &longs;en&longs;ibus & confusè &longs;ubiiceren
tur, ad exqui&longs;itam & di&longs;tinctam notitiam rerum procedens, & &longs;ummas eorum cau&longs;&longs;as attin
gens. Ecce pa&longs;tores He&longs;peridum, Columbi nauem, pan&longs;is velis ad littus appellere con&longs;piciunt:
rem nouam procul admirantur; quid e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit ignorant; in&longs;ulam moueri &longs;u&longs;picantur. aut con
citarinimbum, propè Deos illam vehi cen&longs;ent. itaque &longs;ecum fremunt, Quare, vt apud Accium
pa&longs;tor ille qui nauem nunquàm ante viderat, “vt procul diuinum & nouum vehiculum Argo
nautarum è monte con&longs;pexit, primò admirans & perterritus loquitur: &longs;ic & ip&longs;i murmurant
hoc modo.”
anim.
c.
6.
an.
c.
3.
crit.
c.
1.
p
3.
P. ti
de rep.
2d Eu.
c.
3.
c.
3.
c.
4.
c.
3.
c.
1.
T. 19.
1. Rhet.
2. Met.
c.
1.
T. 4.
1.
Phy&longs;. T. 5.
anim.
c.
3.
12. Met. T. 4.
c.
33.
-Tanta moles labitur
“Fremebunda ex alto ingenti &longs;onitu & &longs;piritu:
Præ &longs;e vndas voluit: vertices vi &longs;u&longs;citat:
Ruit prolap&longs;a: pelagus re&longs;pergit: reflat:
Ita dum interruptum credas nimbum voluier,
Dum quod &longs;ublime ventis expul&longs;um rapi
Saxum aut procellis, vel globo&longs;os turbines
Exi&longs;tere ictos vndis concur&longs;antibus,
Ni&longs;i quas terre&longs;tres pontus &longs;trages conciet:
Aut fortè Triton fu&longs;cina euertens &longs;pecus,
Subter radices penitus vndanti in freto
Molem ex profundo &longs;axeam ad cœlum vomit.”
Dubitat primo, quæ &longs;it ea natura, quam cernit ignotam:
nautico cantu,
Sicuti inciti atque alacres ro&longs;tris perfremunt
Delphini -Item alia multa.
-Syluani melo
Con&longs;imilem ad aures cantum & auditum refert.
“Ergo vt hîc primo a&longs;pectu inanimum
quiddam
dubitauerat incipit &longs;u&longs;picari: &longs;ic philo&longs;ophi & vniuersè omnes qui ex ignorantia traducuntur
ad &longs;cientiam, primo a&longs;pectu mundi conturbati, cùm po&longs;teà vidi&longs;lent motus eius finitos & æqua
biles, con&longs;tantia, intellexere ine&longs;&longs;e aliquem,
non &longs;olum habitatorem in hac cœle&longs;ti ac diuina domo, &longs;ed etiam rectorem & gubernatorem,
& tanquàm architectum tanti operis & tanti muneris. Hæc M.
Tullius præceptorem Platonem
imitatus qui oculos ex tam admirabilium rerum con&longs;pectu nobis ad Dei cognitionem duces
optimos extiti&longs;&longs;e prædicauit. Ita ergo peruenitur ad ea quæ &longs;unt nota natura, &longs;iue &longs;impliciter,
& per &longs;e nota, fortè etiam &longs;ecundum naturam quæ dici &longs;olent maximè vniuer&longs;alia; quòd per
plura pertinere &longs;olent. Quanquam vereor, ne quod di&longs;crimen inter hæc exi&longs;tat: neque &longs;olum
in eo quòd ita propter varias cau&longs;&longs;as appellentur; “verum etiam quòd reip&longs;a di&longs;tinguantur. Etenim natura nota & per &longs;e, illa dicere con&longs;ueuimus, quæ ex aliis tanquam ex fidem facienti
bus &longs;olum; non vt explicantibus quid, aut cur &longs;int, colligantur. immò cùm primum ex notis
nobis indicata &longs;unt, in &longs;eip&longs;is &longs;uæ lucis & veritatis cau&longs;&longs;as habent, atque illas quidem ita effica
ces, vt lucem
re opus e&longs;t: & planè non hæc ex notis nobis, vt nota nobis ex ip&longs;is apta &longs;unt. Cùm enim cognitio
no&longs;tra à &longs;en&longs;u nece&longs;&longs;ariò ducat at &longs;i
aut &longs;pecies obiecta libera foret à materia, progre&longs;&longs;us hic vtique nece&longs;&longs;arius non e&longs;&longs;et. Signo illud
Verùm &longs;en&longs;ilia & effectus ita &longs;e habent, vt ni&longs;i è cau&longs;sis illis cogno&longs;ci nequeant. Itaque etiam no
ta &longs;impliciter appellantur, quòd menti bene affectæ nota &longs;unt, qua&longs;i certi&longs;sima &longs;int; vt &longs;i aliter
e&longs;&longs;e videantur; non rei &longs;anè, &longs;ed mentinon benè affectæ &longs;it ad&longs;cribendum, nec &longs;ecus àc dulce
&longs;impliciter illud iudicetur, quod gu&longs;tatui bene &longs;ano tale apparet, quòd &longs;i &longs;ecus appareat; non id
rei vitium e&longs;t, &longs;ed gu&longs;tatus. vitium pelle, iam dulce apparebit.
Atque hæc ab&longs;olutè reip&longs;a & na
tura priora e&longs;&longs;e puto, quomodocunque priora &longs;int, vel origine, vel perfectione, quia &longs;int cau&longs;&longs;æ,
C&ecedil;terùm notiora & priora &longs;ecundum rationem, nil vetat e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;teriora natura.
quæ hoc modo priora &longs;unt, ita &longs;int, quòd à c&ecedil;teris per indifferentiam &longs;eparari queant, hoc e&longs;t, vt
&longs;int hoc vel illo definitè concipi po&longs;sint, nec eorum cognitio plus ex hoc quàm alio pendeat,
vt ens quantum non plus quàm quale &longs;ignificat, ita &longs;e habent vniuer&longs;alia, qu&ecedil; prædicantur in
quid. &longs;unt enim prima &longs;ecundum rationem, quòd ab intelligentia &longs;ingularium &longs;uperantur:
At cùm ex his quæ per indifferentiam communia &longs;unt, quæ prædicantur in quid &longs;int princi
pia rei, formalia &longs;unt item natura priora; quæ verò communia &longs;unt ad vnum (quod po&longs;teà mon
&longs;trabitur) &longs;int apta ex &longs;uis partibus &longs;ubiectis, hæc priora tantummodò erunt ratione; re autem &
natura po&longs;teriora. Nil igitur prohibet quominus ea quæ &longs;unt ratione priora, &longs;int po&longs;teriora na
tura. Quamobrem pater hæc non e&longs;&longs;e nota &longs;impliciter, neque &longs;uaptè natura nota.
quinimmò il
lorum cognitionem ex aliorum notitia nece&longs;&longs;ariò pendere. Illa igitur quo priora natura &longs;unt,
neque &longs;ecundum rationem &longs;olum, verum etiam reip&longs;a priora, &longs;unt illa principia quæ per nota
nobis exquirimus, & in methodorum fronte per&longs;equimur in eorum ve&longs;tigatione &longs;ententias ve
terum &longs;crutantes, & qu&ecedil; verè dicta &longs;unt ob&longs;curè tamen explanantes & cuncta in bonum &longs;en&longs;um
transferentes. quam &longs;anè partem in methodo ne&longs;cio' num condemnandi &longs;imus, &longs;i reiiciamus ad
principium &longs;cientiæ, quæ e&longs;t mens qua terminos & principia cogno&longs;cimus: nanque et&longs;i compa
ret aliquis progre&longs;&longs;us rationis: is demum mente finitur. Quòd &longs;i opponas eandem e&longs;&longs;e verorum
demon&longs;trationem & confutationem fal&longs;orum. igitur
eam partem fore &longs;cientiæ. Re&longs;pondebo, &longs;i &longs;uerit di&longs;ceptatio de principiis in aliqua &longs;cientia pri
mis: quia non pote&longs;t eorum &longs;cientia tradi progre&longs;&longs;um quidem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;apientiæ vel dialecticum:
eius verò terminum fore mentem; &longs;ecus, &longs;i di&longs;&longs;eramus de his quæ non &longs;unt prima, vel pendent
à principiis, quòd horum pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;tratio quæ item &longs;i probabilia fuerint; propter ma
gnum lumen principiorum, multò fidei plus efficiunt quàm &longs;i demon&longs;trationis certi&longs;simæ vis
adhiberetur; e&longs;t enim demon&longs;tratio rerum per &longs;e ignotarum; ideò multam operam flagitant, vt
& per&longs;piciantur & credantur per &longs;e nihil afferentia lucis. Neque de omnibus e&longs;t &longs;electio veri
cum demon&longs;tratione, verùm de iis quæ &longs;unt ex principiis, aut demon&longs;tratio communiter accipi
tur pro omni genere probationis. Sic ergo nota nobis in primo phy&longs;iologiæ limine ab Ari&longs;to
tele &longs;umpta e&longs;&longs;e defendimus.
c.
2.
10 T. 100.
Cap.
VI.
In quaque di&longs;ceptatione magnus v&longs;us haberi &longs;olet ex di&longs;cu&longs;sione &longs;ententiarum quas alij pro
fe&longs;si fuerint, ac mea quidem &longs;ententia multas ob cau&longs;&longs;as, quarum aliquæ &longs;anè ab Ari&longs;totele
recitantur: attamen & vna maximè nece&longs;&longs;aria mihi &longs;uccurrit quam neque in po&longs;tremis haben
dam e&longs;&longs;e iudico. Talis autem e&longs;t.
Nimirum in &longs;cientia facienda præcipuè con&longs;ulendum e&longs;&longs;e ca
ptui di&longs;centis. Neque enim eadem di&longs;cipulo nota &longs;unt, ac præceptori; &longs;iquidem præceptor ve
ra rerum principia no&longs;cat, & ex plicationem rei ab ip&longs;ius propria natura po&longs;sit exordiri. di&longs;cipu
lus contrà, cum rudior &longs;it, multis eget tanquam apparatibus quibus erudiatur, & tanti&longs;per infor
metur, dum vera principia rerum a&longs;&longs;equatur, & apud ip&longs;um plus &longs;æpè pote&longs;t auctoritas quàm
quæuis efficax ratio. In euoluendis igitur aliorum &longs;ententiis mulra deteguntur quæ mentem
di&longs;cipuli præparent ad concipienda principia quæ veterum auctoritas probabilia facit. Tùm
etiam rerum natura cognitu perdifficilis e&longs;t; & quamuis vna &longs;it vnius rei &longs;cientia, quæ ducitur
ex principiis quæ veri&longs;sima &longs;int; neque omnia &longs;cientiæ &longs;unt obnoxia; nec &longs;i &longs;ciri
queant, ab omnibus eodem modo tenentur; cum varia mihi eiu&longs;dem rei euenta & attri
buta &longs;e&longs;e obtulerint ex quibus iudicia variantur. Itaque non idem ab vnoquoque principium
di&longs;ciplinæ &longs;olet adhiberi. Fit igitur, vt &longs;i varia principia quæ in mentem veniunt ex aduer
&longs;ione plurium &longs;ententiarum, in promptu &longs;int; & id &longs;uccurrere po&longs;sit quod impleat animum
auditoris: & illud etiam, quod &longs;it maximè accommodatum, ad docendum quod &longs;cili
cet ab auditore facilè capiatur, & vera rei principia mon&longs;tret. Aliæ quoque talis con&longs;ilij
tionibus rudibus &longs;cilicet & inchoans, vt quid in illis veri continetur, accipi po&longs;sit; illud
pudiari, quod ine&longs;t falli. Proinde in us ita ver&longs;andum, vt medici in corporum curatione; &longs;icu
mus; ni&longs;i ante pellantur errores. Effi
facilius,
hærentibus & comitantibus explorentur, atque illa quidem quæ videantur aduerla (nam nece&longs;
&longs;ariæ contrariorum conclu&longs;iones & rationes, qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones &longs;unt de contrariis) pa
tionem; dubitatio verò copiam facit, & dum animum huc & illuc conuertit, viam mon&longs;trat ad
inueniendum quod qu&ecedil;ritur, cùm ita eueniat, vt ex aduer&longs;orum collatione quod plus valeat ob
&longs;eruari po&longs;sit, & ex oppo&longs;itarum rationum conflictu, non &longs;ecus àc ignis ex attritu &longs;ilicis, excutia
tur veritas, & fallaciarum cau&longs;&longs;æ facilius detegantur, vnde omnis ignorantiæ caligo di&longs;pellitur
Neque enim oratio vera &longs;olùm e&longs;&longs;e debet; &longs;ed aperienda quoque cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t, cur &longs;al&longs;a pro veris
habita &longs;int. cùm ita fiat, vt ratio per quam fal&longs;a colligebantur, probabilis &longs;anè, verùm non nece&longs;
&longs;aria videatur. Proptereà vero tum magis adhære&longs;cimus.
Oppo&longs;ita enim (vt fertur) in proximo
magis elucent. Ex hac igitur
Philo&longs;ophus. ita enim principia vera cogno&longs;cit & credit, vt ijs oppo&longs;ita fal&longs;a pror&longs;us exi&longs;timer;
ex quo efficitur immutabilis; id quod &longs;cientis e&longs;t maximè proprium. Nec reticendum illud e&longs;t
quòd aliqui ratione in&longs;i&longs;tunea,
verò &longs;&ecedil;pè &longs;ecum pugnare contingit, ex quo &longs;ententiæ repugnantes oriuntur. Igitur ob eam cau&longs;
lam rationes & apparentia &longs;unt con&longs;erenda, dæ rationes:
Nunc autem ni&longs;i illas
&longs;oluere liceat, fidem iis habere cogimur, & inuiti decipimur. Tùm etiam quia verum ex &longs;al&longs;is col
ligi pote&longs;t, conclu&longs;ionis cau&longs;&longs;æ &longs;pectandæ &longs;unt; ne fortè id quod
non pendet. Prætereà maiorem auctoritatem habebunt ea quæ dicentur apud illos qui&longs;antè au
diuerint rationes earum &longs;ententiarum quæ controuer&longs;iam faciunt.
habebimur, &longs;i omnium cau&longs;&longs;as audiamus. Arbitros enim præ&longs;tare'nos oporter, non ad
&longs;i iudicando verum inuenire volumus. Cæterùm præterea, quæ valent ad rectè
lud ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;criptum e&longs;t, ea videnda e&longs;&longs;e quœ dixerint alij, ne &longs;i decepti fuerint, in
&longs;emur erroribus. & &longs;i quod nobis commune cum illis decretum &longs;it, ne priuatim mole &longs;tiam nobis
ip&longs;is exhibeat,
quæ&longs;tionem &longs;u&longs;tinere non valeamus, itaque ad excu&longs;ationem &longs;ocios qu&ecedil;rimus; & crime
volumus cum alijs e&longs;&longs;e commune: neque id affine culpæ habendum e&longs;t; quia tam et&longs;i nihil de il
la quæ&longs;tione &longs;uccurrit quod aliter con&longs;tirui po&longs;sit; gratum tamen e&longs;&longs;e debet non modò per om
nia melius; &longs;ed quòd aliqua &longs;ahè meliora faciamus, alia verò Hic quidem no&longs;tri con&longs;ilij fructus.
Verumenimuerò, cùm variis modis &longs;ententiæ
tractari &longs;oleant, & di&longs;&longs;olui rationes quibus confirmantur & probabiliter & demon&longs;tratiu
de&longs;unt etiam (vt commune e&longs;t omnibus falli) qui &longs;e cauillis inuoluant, quibus cùm &longs;e extticare
ne&longs;ciant, multa commini&longs;cuntur quæ toto cœlo di&longs;tent à vero. Nonnul&longs;i item demon&longs;trationi
bus vtantur quæ propriæ &longs;int aliarum Nos in hac methodo con&longs;tituimus illa di&longs;&longs;olue
re quæ vel ex no&longs;tris principiis malè deducta &longs;int, vel conclu&longs;a mediis per accidens, vel etiam in
uoluta &longs;ophi&longs;matis; illud in animo perpetuò fixum habentes, vt quæ ponuntur à nobis cum &longs;en
&longs;ilibus primum, tùm deinde cum Ari&longs;totelicis dogmatis congruant: &longs;iqua præter h&ecedil;c adhibean
tur; nihilominus &longs;tudebimus, vt ad ea ip&longs;a, quæ primi propo&longs;iti &longs;unt, aliquo pacto conducant. Nouerat enim Ari&longs;toteles Parmenidem & Meli&longs;lum, tollere naturam principij, nedum natura
lis &longs;cientiæ fundamenta demoliri. quia verò præ&longs;eferret ea di&longs;putatio philo&longs;ophiam, ide&longs;t, pate
faceret aditum ad inueniendam veritatem (talis enim e&longs;t vis eius locutionis
ide&longs;t, habere philo&longs;ophiam: ita vt etiam alibi Ari&longs;toteles ita &longs;ctiptum reliquerit aliquid e&longs;&longs;e à;
ciuili philo&longs;opho con&longs;iderandum, quòd haberet
dubitationem & philo&longs;ophiam ciuilem & alibi
illu&longs;trat, & valet ad fundanda phy&longs;iologiæ principia, non dettectauit Philo&longs;ophus ei
gre&longs;&longs;um. Nanque et&longs;i non naturales quæ&longs;tiones ad di&longs;cutiendum proponebant, de natura &longs;elo
qui profitebantur quæ, cùm principium foret, impellebat item ip&longs;os ad di&longs;ceptandum quoda
modo de principio. Itaque ob affinitatem quam habebat illa po&longs;itio cum phy&longs;iologiæ princi
piis, ab Ari&longs;totele con&longs;iderata e&longs;t. De natura autem &longs;e di&longs;&longs;erere autumabant, idcirco quod nulla
alia &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;upra naturam ab illis per&longs;pecta fui&longs;&longs;er. Et Epicurus etiam omnia naturæ nomino
appellauit quiita diuidit. Omnium qu&ecedil; &longs;int, naturam e&longs;&longs;e corpora & inane,
Nam quæcunque eluent aut his coniuncta duabus (corporibus & inani) rebus ea mue
Ex hoc efficiebatur, vt apud illos ens & natura idem e&longs;&longs;et.
Vnde Galenu
rationem reddens in&longs;criptionis libri denatura humana, docuit omnes veteres in&longs;cribere
&longs;uos libros de natura. Proinde naturalis erat prima philo&longs;ophia, ne dixerim quoque &longs;olam:
dò
&longs;ed po&longs;teà cognitis aliis &longs;ub&longs;tantiis materiæ immunibus ex &longs;upremo gradu deiecta fuit, & ph
lo&longs;ophiæ primæ proximos honores occupanit. Quamobrem latius pater naturæ &longs;ignificatum
quàm id quod in no&longs;tra methodo concipitur & definitur, principium motus & quietis. idem
enim valet atque ens Quapropter qui naturam in eo &longs;ignificato &longs;pectat, multa quidem tractar&ecedil;
cogitur qu&ecedil; cancellos methodi no&longs;tri tran&longs;iliunt, quod certè non ob&longs;eruans Themi&longs;tius, præ&longs;er
tim, cùm paullò antè affirma&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles, eos non agere de natura, quia motus initia &longs;u&longs;tuli&longs;
&longs;ent, locum ita legebat. De natura quidem non; naturales autem quæ&longs;tiones, & tamen illud om
nino fal&longs;um qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones ab illis inductas e&longs;&longs;e naturales. Id quod etiam videtur per&longs;pexi&longs;&longs;e Gale
nus Ob id igitur de natura di&longs;&longs;ere
batur à cunctis; &longs;ed quæ&longs;tiones erant aliquan do non naturales. Eiu&longs;modi fuerunt quas pro&longs;e&longs;si
&longs;unt Parmenides, & Meli&longs;&longs;us, & alij nonnulli eiu&longs;dem not&ecedil; philo&longs;ophi. Sed antequam
noto &longs;ententias, de philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ectis aliqua generatim dicere con&longs;titui. Quamuis
locum, vt cçteros omnes Pererius docti&longs;simus vberrimè tractarit; nec qui&longs;quam
illius indu&longs;triam diligentiamúe in hac tractatione con&longs;equi po&longs;sit; &longs;tudebimus tamen ea &longs;eliger&ecedil;
qu&ecedil; ad Ari&longs;totelem magis attinere cen&longs;ebimus, & &longs;i qua &longs;uccurrent quæ no&longs;tro labore compara
nimus, ea quoque nos in medio ponemus. Ergo philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ectæ quæ tempore Ari&longs;totelis
vel floruerant, vel florere inc&ecedil;perant, variæ fuerunt, at queillæ quidem varia nomina &longs;ortitæ, vel
ab eo qui in&longs;tituerat, vt à Pythagora Pythagor&ecedil;i, vel à genere vitæ, vt Cynici, quòd vitam canis
imitarentur; ab actione nonnulli, vt à deambulando Petipatetici. à patria quidem, vt Cyrenaici,
& Megaren&longs;es, & à loco poti&longs;simum, velut Academici & Stoici à porticu. Sed ea princeps di&longs;tri
butio &longs;ectarum quæ à loco Nec defuerunt qui nomen ex profe&longs;sione ducerent, hinc quidam morales, alij dialectici dicti,
nonnulli Theologi, & illi phy&longs;ici qui motum pro principio &longs;tatuerent. Atque vt ab Italica exor
diar quæ (ni&longs;i fallor) eadem e&longs;tcum Pythagorica, auctor eius fuit Pythagoras Samius Pherecy
dis Syriauditor qui cum He&longs;iodo numeratur in Tneologis, fuit
talitatem profe&longs;&longs;us fuerit, & cùm apud veteres my&longs;teria naturæ &longs;ub fabulis traderentur; grauiter
& &longs;eriò philo&longs;ophari cœpit. Eins ergo auditor Pythagoras.
Huius &longs;ectatores de quibus meminit
Ari&longs;toteles, Empedocles, Epicharmus, Archytas Tarentinus, Alem&ecedil;o Ciotoniates, &longs;ed hic floruit
&longs;ub Pythagora iam &longs;eniore, Hippa&longs;us Merapontinus. Eleaticæ dicitur auctor fui&longs;&longs;e Thelauges
Pythagoræ filius; eius patroni fuerunt Xenophanes, Parmenides, Meli&longs;&longs;us, Zeno Eleates; cum eiş
quoque Lycophronem numeremus; Leucippus, Democritus, & Heraclitus quorum ætate vixit
Hippocrates. Ionicæ princeps fuit Thales Mile&longs;ins: hic omnium primus naturalem
profe&longs;&longs;us e&longs;t; ip&longs;um &longs;equutus e&longs;t Anaximander; huic &longs;ucce&longs;sit Anaximenes; hic auditorem ha
buit Anaxagoram. is Archelaum docuit qui primus ex Ionia philo&longs;ophiam vexit Athenas, hunc
po&longs;t audiuit Socrates. Sed ip&longs;e rerum naturalium &longs;crutatione po&longs;thabita, ac nonnullis de defini
tionis regulis explicatis &longs;e totum dedit officüs ciuilibus, & animos
mare con&longs;tituit vtilia per&longs;equens; ea verò qu&ecedil; nullius v&longs;us e&longs;&longs;ent, àc &longs;i &longs;upra hominis captum fo
rent, omittens. A Socrate de&longs;cendit Plato auctor &longs;ectæ Academiæ, Anti&longs;thenes Cynicæ, Ari&longs;tip
pus Cyrenaicæ cum quo recen&longs;etur Eudoxus, à Platone fluxit Spere&longs;ippus qui &longs;e&longs;e tenuit in Aca
demia. Ari&longs;toteles, tamet&longs;i Platonis auditor, in&longs;tituit &longs;ectam Peripateticam valdè ab Academica
differentem. Quia verò huius philo&longs;ophi in&longs;titutionem &longs;equimur, neque ab re nos facturos e&longs;&longs;e
cen&longs;emus, &longs;i de illius familia nonnulla &longs;ubiungamus. Fertur verò
tarum. Po&longs;t Theophra&longs;tum Eudemus tenui&longs;&longs;e legitur.
atque hactenus Ari&longs;totelis decreta retenta
&longs;unt. Nam &longs;trato Lamp&longs;acenus, quanquam Theophra&longs;ti di&longs;cipulus, multa
illi Peripati fontes conturbati fuerunt, pr&ecedil;tereo complures alios quorum nulla extat hodie nota
apud no&longs;tros
f&ecedil;datam. Mox graui&longs;simus ca&longs;us perculit non modo profe&longs;&longs;ores, verùm etiam libros occultauit,
vt demum L. Syllæ beneficio libri Ari&longs;totelici po&longs;t aliquot &longs;æcula qua&longs;i reuixerint; eos habuit
M. Varro; tractauit etiam M. Tullius, Iterum afflicta e&longs;t illa
Byzantij fuit propè à mortuis excitata. Sed eius extat &longs;ola memoria, ab
propagata Hinc &longs;ucce&longs;sit Alexander, cuius iudicium ita pr&ecedil;&longs;tans
nemo Ari&longs;torelicus exi&longs;timaretur, qui non e&longs;&longs;et Alexandr&ecedil;us. ignoratur
eius So&longs;igenes Ab Alexandro The
mi&longs;tius emanauit, Hinc Michaël Ephe&longs;ius v&longs;que ad
Anima,
ip&longs;um Ari&longs;totelis
affirmari valeat. Aliquanto ante hæc
Ammonij & Ex interpretibus Ari
&longs;totelis illi etiam Platoni dediti; ne&longs;cio verò tenuerint'ne; cùm è Gr&ecedil;cia pul&longs;i fuerint, Simplicius,
Pri&longs;cianus Lydus, & Olympiodorus; & hic Inde ad Arabas di
&longs;ciplina Petipatetica permanauit; apud hos Auerroës & Auicenna floruerunt;
&longs;pania tenuere: pò&longs;t ad Britannos & Germanos; inter hos excelluit quamquam longo po&longs;t
poreA Britannis & Germanis opera Karolimagni, qui Longobardis &longs;ubiugatis, & Italia
ab
temporis interuallo migrauit ad Italos: horum omnium Coryph&ecedil;us D. Thomas.
c.
3.
10 T. 101.
c.
1.
c.
c.
1.
lem.
Ari&longs;toteles, dum veterum &longs;ententias de principijs conuellit. Cap.
VII.
Caetervm &longs;ententiæ de rerum &longs;umma exi&longs;tunt, quippe quòd initia phy&longs;iologiæ per
tentent, & ex his aliquæ &longs;ic labefactent, vt ip&longs;i nil planè relinquant, quo firmari po&longs;sit. Quare con&longs;tituendum quippiam fuit quo phy&longs;icè in&longs;i&longs;teret.
id ab Ari&longs;totele confectum fui&longs;&longs;e
&longs;cimus: &longs;ed qua ratione, qua via, & quatenus factitatum, non æquè con&longs;tat apud omnes. Igitur
antequàm cominus accedamus ad ea perpendenda quæ veteres philo&longs;ophi decreuerint, breui
ter explicare præ&longs;tabit, quemadmodum &longs;cientiæ in &longs;uorum principiorum tractatione ver&longs;entur. Ab iis verò exordium di&longs;putationis no&longs;træ ducetur quæ monuit
que qu&ecedil;&longs;tione ve&longs;tiganda.
ad phy&longs;icen facilè tran&longs;umuntur. ita enim illa prçcepta traduntur, vt ab vnius
de omnibus idem fiat iudicium. Quamobrem è di&longs;putationibus qua&longs;dam naturales e&longs;&longs;e pone
mus, alias autem
naturalis. Non naturales autem, vel quòd phy&longs;iologiæ principia non a&longs;&longs;umant, vel quòd iis ab
utantur. Cùm tot modis tractentur qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones, illud ratum e&longs;&longs;e oportet, dum ver&longs;amur in &longs;cien
tia naturali, de non naturalibus ab&longs;olutè nihil e&longs;&longs;e dicendum. Proinde etiam Plato quendam de
rebus ad Geometriam
naturali philofopho de qu&ecedil;&longs;tionibus illis qu&ecedil; &longs;unt non naturales aliqua ex parte. Quocirca &longs;i di
&longs;putationes naturales pendent è principiis &longs;cientiæ naturalis. contrà, cùm qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones de principiis
rerum naturalium non po&longs;sint e&longs;&longs;e ex hoc genere, neque ordine, & qu&ecedil;&longs;tiones igitur de principiis
rerum naturalium, erunt omnino non naturales. oportebit enim e&longs;&longs;e
&longs;cienti&ecedil; pror&longs;us aduer&longs;atur. Verùm fac incidere controuer&longs;iam de principirs huius methodi, cu
ius'nam officium erit illa tractare? Profectò principia cuiu&longs;dam &longs;cientiæ, aut in alia principia re
&longs;oluuntur, aut &longs;unt ab&longs;olutè prima. Rur&longs;us, &longs;i tractanda &longs;unt, aut ita illa tractare oporter, vt de
mon&longs;trentur, aut vt re&longs;pondeamus ad obiectiones. Ac &longs;i ea demon&longs;trari contingat; aut per cau&longs;&longs;as
demon&longs;trantur, aut per nota nobis. In&longs;uper obiectiones ad quas re&longs;pondendum e&longs;t, aut pendent
ex illius &longs;cientiç principiis, aut illa euertunt. Si igitur illis alia principia pr&ecedil;cedant, eorum proba
tio pertinet ad eam &longs;cientiam quæ ver&longs;atur in notitia principiorum &longs;uperiorum, h&ecedil;c autem &longs;ub
alternans à dialecticis appellatur. Si verò principia prima fuerint ab&longs;olutè, aut hæc euidentia per
&longs;e &longs;unt, ita vt &longs;olius &longs;en&longs;us auxilio note&longs;cant, aut &longs;i non adeò
item; &longs;ed admonitione quadam per&longs;uadentur, ea verò communis e&longs;&longs;e cuique &longs;cientiæ pote&longs;t, aut
quanquam con&longs;picua, &longs;i negentur propter proteruientes vna redargutione confirmantur. id au
tem præ&longs;tat habitus dialecticus. Generatim verò in illa &longs;cientia in qua tanquàm principia &longs;umun
tur, ea &longs;upponi oporter, et &longs;i quo pacto tractentur, ita tractentur, vt aut declarentur per nota no
bis, aut vt tollantur obiectiones, non omnes &longs;anè, &longs;ed illæ quæ è principiis eius &longs;cientiæ ducuntur. Itaque aut vbi non &longs;upponantur phy&longs;iologi&ecedil; principia, aut afferantur rationes, qu&ecedil; ip&longs;a funditus
è medio tollant, non abutentes neque detorquentes illa, non erit munus philo&longs;ophi naturalis ea
tractare. Verùm &longs;i de principiis exi&longs;tant, aut erit &longs;ubalternantis officium, aut communis
&longs;iue ea fuerit prima philo&longs;ophia, &longs;iue dialectica. Sed cùm &longs;cientiæ principia varia &longs;int,
&longs;cientiarum ordines: age nunc particulatim &longs;ingula percurramus, & ius
dere nitamur. Quid verò controuer&longs;i&ecedil; &longs;it adhibitis hi&longs;ce di&longs;tinctionibus facilè intelligetur.
nera aut enim &longs;unt ex cau&longs;sis, aut ex effectis, aut ex notis no
bis; quid Pr&ecedil;tereà principia &longs;unt illa ex quib.
demon&longs;tramus, aut de quibus, i.
ip&longs;a &longs;ubiecta.
h&ecedil;c
vel propria cuiu&longs;dam partis, atque illa ve&longs;tigantur.
in principiis
cognnionis &longs;unt axiomata Principia rei &longs;un
Ex his
&longs;unt nota nobis ad inuentionis potius quàm cognitionis initia referuntur. ac &longs;i cognitionis initia
libeat appellare,
&longs;cientia quæque ver&longs;etur in iis quæ vulgo latent, neque in euidentibus tractandis &
Ari&longs;toteles hæc
re uera non &longs;unt &longs;cientiæ principia. quocirca à nob.
optimo iure omittentur.
dum &longs;cruta
bimur po&longs;sint'ne &longs;cientiæ tractare &longs;ua principia, definitiones, & axiomata &longs;olum, & cau&longs;&longs;as; cùm
&longs;ubiecti totius, tùm eius partium Po&longs;tremò cùm principia &longs;umi po&longs;sint, vt illa quibus accidit e&longs;&longs;e principia, aut etiam cum habi
tudine ad ea quorum principia &longs;unt, vtrunque caput in controuer&longs;iam reuocare volumus. Sed
enim illud præc&ecedil;teris &longs;tatuendum e&longs;&longs;e videtur neminem v&longs;quam aggredi &longs;cientiam, quin iam
animo præoccuparit aliquas e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;as & eorum principia quorum &longs;cientiam quærit. Nam qui
&longs;cientiam per&longs;equitur, is certè in cau&longs;&longs;arum notitiam contendit. Nec etiam vulgò ignotum:
proptereà dixit aliquando Ari&longs;toteles,
cinationi cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;upponi quæ quæruntur. inuectus e&longs;t in Parmenidem & Meli&longs;&longs;um,
quia naturam principij tollerent. quòd hæc hypothe&longs;is mirum in modum &longs;cientiæ leges euertat.
Idcirco vereor ne Theophra&longs;tus
hoc
&longs;ico delegarit, ita enim ratiocinatur. Compo&longs;ita &longs;unt.
Compo&longs;ita con&longs;tant è principijs.
Et prin
cipia &longs;unt igitur. Quis enim non per&longs;picit id concludi, quod accipitur?
dum enim compo&longs;ita
cipioNec cur id officium phy&longs;ici &longs;it, pror&longs;us &longs;cio.
quip
pe quòd eadem ratione po&longs;&longs;et vti mathematicus. ac primus philo&longs;ophus, & omnis artifex, dum
ponit qui&longs;que &longs;ubiectum, cums principia, partes, Itaque ratio communis
e&longs;t, nec è principiis rei ducta, nec demon&longs;tratiua; nec phy&longs;ica igitur. Verùm quia po&longs;&longs;et qui&longs;piam
repugnare dicens, quamuis id ad phy&longs;icum non pertineat; e&longs;&longs;e nihilominus habitum quendam
quitractet ita principia, vt doceat aliqua e&longs;&longs;e ex quibus con&longs;tent demon&longs;trationes. Monert Sim
plicius nullum habitum exi&longs;tere qui hoc munere fungatur. Neque verò nece&longs;&longs;arium e&longs;&longs;e, quòd
&longs;ua cuique &longs;upponantur. Et illud per&longs;picuun.
e&longs;&longs;e principia, & philo&longs;ophiam naturalem habere principia.
quocirca nec illius
cipiorum cognitione haberi po&longs;&longs;e. & &longs;tatim conuertere &longs;e &longs;cientiam ad exquirendum qualis &longs;it
principiorum vis; vt quamuis quæ&longs;tio &longs;it'ne res, anteponenda &longs;it: nihilominus ea non requira
tur in omnibus, &longs;ed in iis quæ &longs;int, nec'ne ignoratur. Atqui principia no&longs;cuntur.
Veruntamen
finge tu nunc ignorari principia, neque itidem ad phy&longs;icam pertinebit eorum explicatio, &longs;ed ad
aliam methodum. C&ecedil;terùm ni&longs;i h&ecedil;c in bonam partem accipiantur'nec rectè contra Theophra
&longs;tum inferuntur, nec progre&longs;&longs;um Ari&longs;totelis admodum &longs;eruant. Hæc enim quæ a&longs;&longs;umit Simpli
cius, &longs;i transferantur ad &longs;ignificandum certa principia, v. g.
formam, aut finem; nihil id ad rem
no&longs;tram, qui cum Theophra&longs;to de ratione principij di&longs;putamus: nec quærimus &longs;it ne forma, aut
finis; &longs;ed vtrum principia &longs;int ab&longs;olutè nec'ne. quod nos in omni methodo, vt per&longs;picuum &longs;umi
defendimus. Quòd &longs;i Simplicius principij rationem accipiat; etiam fallit quandò item ratio prin
cipij demon&longs;tretur; vt cùm prima contraria concluditur e&longs;&longs;e principia. Quocirca ratio principij,
nec à phy&longs;ico, nec à primo philo&longs;opho, aut dialectico, nec demum in vlla methodo peragetur
quæ &longs;implici quæ&longs;tione colligatur; &longs;iquidem natura per &longs;e, dum ingenuit &longs;ciendi cupidinem,
excitat nos ad ob&longs;curarum rerum cau&longs;&longs;as indagandas, & ita notitiam cuiu&longs;dam principij quod
inquirendum &longs;it, &longs;ubmini&longs;trat. Verùm principij rationem veluti complexum concludi nil pro
hibet. Nec quicquam vetat, quominus opiner eam tractationem à philo&longs;opho confici po&longs;&longs;e; &
quamquam methodum ita &longs;uorum principiorum rationem habere, &longs;i oporteat. Mox ad ip&longs;a
principia tran&longs;eamus. Quia verò to
&longs;cientia tractantur, & id quo vniuer&longs;a referuntur, & cuius gratia reliqua &longs;pectari debent, de illo
primùm di&longs;&longs;eramus. In primis verò accipimus &longs;cientiam &longs;ubiecto definiri & ab ip&longs;o &longs;ic determi
nari, vt illius gratia cuncta di&longs;quirantur. quia primum pellit &longs;en&longs;um, & animo de&longs;iderium &longs;uæ
cognitionls incutit. Porrò dum quidpiam no&longs;cere volumus, con&longs;ectamur quid & cuiu&longs;modi &longs;it.
illud definitione conficitur.
hoc ab&longs;oluit demon&longs;tratio.
Quare definitiones & demon&longs;trationes
illò tendunt, vt ip&longs;arum auxilio no&longs;catur &longs;ubiectum. v&longs;que adeò, vt tamet&longs;i methodus rem quæ
&longs;en&longs;ibus &longs;e&longs;e obtulerit, in &longs;ua principia re&longs;oluat & vbi re&longs;oluerit, ibi demum quie&longs;cat; at non ce&longs;
&longs;at mens, quin reditu quodam facto cau&longs;&longs;as re&longs;olutione inuentas applicet ad id quod anteà quæ
rebatur. Hocigitur non modò ignotum &longs;impliciter e&longs;&longs;e nequit, &longs;ed neque etiam omni ex parte
notum. &longs;iquidem aliquod &longs;en&longs;ile,
noti&longs;simum nobis pro &longs;ubiecto &longs;umatur nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t, vt ad
&longs;ui di&longs;qui&longs;itionem excitet mentem no&longs;tram, ac ni&longs;i tale fuerit, non rectè con&longs;tituetur &longs;ubiectum.
rum principia ve&longs;tigan ur.
Nec vlla methodus e&longs;t, quæ non accipiat aut vnum ex
his, aut Neque verò &longs;ic
nota e&longs;&longs;e oportet ea, quæ &longs;cientiaium &longs;ubiecta facimus, vt &longs;ingulæ illorum partes nece&longs;&longs;ariò te
neantur: neque &longs;ic totius &longs;cientiæ
pliciter, ita &longs;ub&longs;tantiam e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter nouimus, etiam &longs;i vna aut altera &longs;ub&longs;tantia cogno&longs;catur à
nobis quia demptis indiuidui cond tiombus vniuer&longs;alibus &longs;ub&longs;tantia remanet. Itaque ex illo
quòd &longs;i non omnia; &longs;altem aliqua moueantur; motum quoque e&longs;&longs;e colligitur. item
e&longs;t de quanto, quod &longs;ine actu cognitione partium poni pore&longs;t, vt &longs;ubiectum. Ea po&longs;tmodo quæ
ignota &longs;unt, &longs;iue partes, &longs;eu principia, &longs;iue proprietates in methodo &longs;uis viis & ingeniis exquirun
tur, de quibus mox agendum e&longs;t. Et de proprietatibus non e&longs;t dubitandum, quin ip&longs;arum
&longs;tratio
& quòd &longs;it, &longs;i fugiat &longs;en&longs;um. cau&longs;&longs;as enim habent, cur in&longs;int in &longs;ubiecto.
Partes &longs;anè multis mo
dis accipiuntur in methodis. vel vt &longs;ubiectum, &longs;icut animal &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis, vel vt pars eius
quod e&longs;t ad vnum, velut accidens ad ens. & cçlum ad reliqua corpora &longs;implicia, vel vt pars me
thodi, quia &longs;cilicet in aliqua eius parte proponatur ad examinandum, velut ortus qui duobus li
bris &longs;eparatis explicatur, licet referatur ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quæ phy&longs;icæ totius e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum. huius
generis e&longs;&longs;e queunt ea quæ non &longs;unt, vt inane, lineæ in &longs;ectiles, infinitum, & huiu&longs;modi. Sed quo
modocunque pars accipiatur de illa controuer&longs;ia na&longs;citur inter Auerrois interpretes propter re
pugnantiam quæ in eius philo&longs;ophi verbis deprehenditur. Nam
concedit Auerroës
pattes &longs;ubiecti in eadem &longs;cientia po&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;trari.
e&longs;&longs;e aliquando concludebat.
partes. neque ip&longs;i videbatur ab&longs;urdum, partes &longs;ubie
cti vbi fui&longs;&longs;ent ignot&ecedil;, cùm
vel ex effectu demon&longs;trari. Corroborarunt alij Zimaræ &longs;ententiam nonnullis argumentis.
In
quiunt enim. Siquis &longs;it ad quem perrineat o&longs;tendere rem e&longs;&longs;e, ad eundem quoque &longs;pectare o&longs;ten
dere quid &longs;it. Sed ad geometram verbig.
pertinet con&longs;ideraie, &longs;it'ne triangulus qui pars e&longs;t, &longs;eu
&longs;pecies &longs;ubiecti. Ergo etiam ip&longs;e docebit quid &longs;it.
Si igitur illi &longs;ciendum e&longs;t, &longs;it'ne triangulus;
quoque &longs;ciet quid &longs;it. Atqui hæc cognitio e&longs;t à priori & ex cau&longs;&longs;a.
Prætereà definitio pote&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e
nota aliqua ex parte, quamuis definitum &longs;it ignotum. Ergo definitum ex definitione demon&longs;tra
bitur. & ex cau&longs;&longs;a igitur.
Quòd item ex effectu partem &longs;ubiecti demon&longs;trare liceat, Ari&longs;totelis au
ctoritate confirmatur qui docet nos po&longs;&longs;e no&longs;cere rem e&longs;&longs;e, vel per &longs;e, vel per accidens, ide&longs;t quan
do fuerint nota nobis euentu rei propo&longs;itæ. permulta verò huiu&longs;ce progre&longs;&longs;us exempla &longs;ubiicere
po&longs;&longs;em. vt cùm ignem e&longs;&longs;e probatur ex eo quòd terra &longs;it & e&longs;&longs;e mentem agentem, quia &longs;it pote
&longs;tate mens. Sed opponam ego huic &longs;ententiæ rationem Ari&longs;totelis ita concludentis.
&longs;traretur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum; ergo & quid e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum demon&longs;trari po&longs;&longs;et. Sed quid e&longs;t demon&longs;tra
tioni non e&longs;t obnoxium. Nec quòd &longs;it igitur.
Quapropter, vt cum Ari&longs;totele con&longs;entiamus &
Auerroëm purgare po&longs;simus; accipiemus primùm nullum e&longs;&longs;e genus demon &longs;trationis quo &longs;im
pliciter aliquid e&longs;&longs;e probari po&longs;sit. Et quamuis à definitione progrediamur ad definitum; nec id
etiam vel auctore Auerroë genus e&longs;t argumentationis, &longs;ed numeratur in admonitionibus. &longs;iqui
dem in ip&longs;a definitione rei definiendæ natura &longs;tatim appareat: cùm idem &longs;int definitio & defini
tum, &longs;ed in definito natura ip&longs;ius
partes. Ac &longs;iquis e&longs;t proce&longs;&longs;us rationis in definitione, is e&longs;t à parte definitionis ad partem, vt à ge-,
nere ad differentias & à partibus ad totam definitionem. & &longs;i rectè animaduertas, e&longs;t via &longs;eu me
thodus, non in&longs;trumentum cognitionis. Demum omni genere &longs;yllogi&longs;mi &longs;impliciter excluditur
definitio, per &longs;e. Sed neque demon&longs;tratione ab effectu concludi pote&longs;t quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex.
&longs;iquidem
id quod demon&longs;tratione concluditur, vt in alio concluditur, & efficit quæ&longs;tionem complexam. Re&longs;tar igitur, vt quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex ab&longs;oluatur &longs;yllogi&longs;mo quem diximus hypotheticum per natu
ram. Quapropter ad ea quæ aduer&longs;arij dicebant, ita re&longs;pondemus.
Primùm notantes accipi falsò
vbi procedimus à definitione ad definitum, e&longs;&longs;e genus argumentandi; &longs;ed euolutionem &longs;olam &
di&longs;tinctionem definiti in &longs;uas partes.
&longs;ticè progrediamur. id quoque nego.
Et no&longs;cimus quidem e&longs;&longs;e rem, vel per &longs;e vel per accidens;
nec tamen per &longs;yllogi&longs;mum &longs;impliciter. Quod verò ad repugnantiam pertinet quæ ex verbis
Auerrois exor
&longs;ed quemcunque rationis progre&longs;&longs;um quem nos tum e&longs;&longs;e dicimus &longs;yllogi&longs;mum hypotheticum
per naturam; 6. verò Met. dicimus ip&longs;um &longs;yllogi&longs;mum &longs;impliciter ei denegare.
Succedunt his
principia cognitionis quæ dicimus axiomata. Hæc &longs;anè nullum genus demon&longs;trationis ad mit
tunt, quia nihil habent neque prius &longs;eip&longs;is, neque notius, neque natura, neque nobis Habent
dem
nus artificis communis, &longs;eu dialecticus &longs;it, &longs;eu primus philo&longs;ophus; redarguere &longs;olùm ea negan
tem, neque vllo modo demon&longs;trare, quippe quòd omnino &longs;int indemon&longs;trabilia. Qua véròid ra
tione efficiatur, hac facta partitione cogno&longs;cemus. Scire enim licet, inter axioma
quod e&longs;t omnium primum & principium ceterorum pronuntiatorum,
&longs;ed vt per &longs;e noti&longs;simum. De quolibet verum e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;erere, aut negare.
Ex hoc
mata fidem &longs;umere. Philo&longs;opho igitur nulla via &longs;uccurrit qua primum illud confirmet.
Itaque
&longs;ubuenit philo&longs;opho dialecticus, & ea ratione confirmat deducendo neganter in ab&longs;urda, repu
gnantia, nugas, & con&longs;imiles &longs;copos qui &longs;unt dialectici. Hoc principio &longs;tabilito c&ecedil;terorum proba
tionem &longs;u&longs;cipit. Primus philo&longs;ophus quæ &longs;ic confirmat, vt eò deducat aduer&longs;arium quod fieri
nequir, id verò e&longs;t quod opponitur illi primo principio. Nam &longs;iquis exemplig.
neget.
Quæ vni
tertiò &longs;imilia &longs;unt, inter &longs;e quoque e&longs;&longs;e &longs;imilia. dicet primus philo&longs;ophus.
Siminus; ergo inter &longs;e
&longs;imilia non e&longs;&longs;ent. quare nec illi eidem &longs;imilia erunt, &longs;ed di&longs;similia.
Quapropter eadem eidem
fimilia erunt & non &longs;imilia. Sic de quolibet non erit verum a&longs;&longs;erere & negare, quod & euiden
ri&longs;simè fal&longs;um e&longs;t, & nullo modo fieri pote&longs;t. & hac ratione reliquarum &longs;cientiarum principia
probantur. Nec ob id te &longs;u&longs;picari velim,
ficere, &longs;i illarum principia probet. Neque enim omne genus probationis con&longs;tituit gradum &longs;ubal
terni; &longs;ed vbi procedat ex cau&longs;sis, quod in no&longs;tra hypothe&longs;i non v&longs;uuenit. Deinde moneo prin
cipia noti&longs;sima non &longs;ic à philo&longs;opho tractari, quia contracta &longs;int ad cuiu&longs;piam cert&ecedil; &longs;cienti&ecedil; &longs;ub
iectum, vt in quaque &longs;cientia &longs;umi debent, accipiuntur enim &longs;ecundum analogiam,
ita tractantur à primo philo&longs;opho, quà communia &longs;unt. at tum principia &longs;unt entis, quatenus e&longs;t
ens: non probantur, quà c&ecedil;terarum &longs;cientiarum principia &longs;unt, &longs;ed vt principia entis,
quibus ine&longs;t per accidens, vt contracta ad certa &longs;ubiecta fiEx his &longs;oluere licet Eudemi dubitationem qui &longs;ic argumentabatur.
Cùm probatio principiorum
ad nullam &longs;cientiam &longs;pectet, &longs;ed aut ad &longs;uperiorem, aut ad communem quampiam. S
illa in &longs;uperiore aut communi nota non e&longs;&longs;e. Nec igitur hæ &longs;cientiæ &longs;ua principia con&longs;irmare po
terunt. quare ad aliam illas con&longs;ugere oportebit.
Aut igitur in infinitum hoc fiet;
efficie
tur, vt nullius rei &longs;cientia e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;sit, aut aliqua &longs;cientia poterit &longs;ua principia probare contrà
con&longs;tituerit Ari&longs;toteles, inquiens. Nulli de princip
&longs;pondens ad Eudemum, h&ecedil;c &longs;cientia perueniet ad ea quæ per &longs;e nota &longs;unt, quæ nemo &longs;ane mentis
vnquàm negaret ni&longs;i proteruiens, in quem &longs;ic inuehetur, vt paullò antè docuimus. Secundum ab
axiomate locum hypothe&longs;es obtinent, quas ab axiomate differre nouimus, quòd axioma de do
mo affertur, h&ecedil; tanti&longs;per illi cedentes præmon&longs;tratorem de&longs;iderant, &longs;ed tamen vt primùm decla
rantur, credit auditor eas aut communes e&longs;&longs;e accepimus in vniuer&longs;a &longs;cientia, cuiu&longs;modi illa e&longs;t. Statuatur omnia aut qu&ecedil;dam moueri; aut &longs;peciales, & ad probationem cuiu&longs;piam certæ conclu
&longs;ionis in ea facultate &longs;umi, attamen ip&longs;as per &longs;e demon&longs;trari po&longs;&longs;e; vt &longs;i infinitum non e&longs;&longs;e pona
mus cum Anaxagora di&longs;&longs;erentes de naturæ principiis, quod po&longs;teà pluribus tran&longs;igendum &longs;it. C&ecedil;terùm &longs;i communes fuerint, per &longs;en&longs;um note&longs;cunt, quemadmodum reliqua principia de qui
bus &longs;uprà dictum e&longs;t.
tio pertinet ad aliam methodum, &longs;iue ea commuais &longs;it, &longs;iue habeat illam, &longs;ubalterna. vtputa ma
thematicus accipit à phy&longs;ico in infinitum diuidi po&longs;&longs;e continuum. Si verò fuerint &longs;peciales &
&longs;cientiæ partem re&longs;piciant; non video, cur in eadem &longs;cientia probari non po&longs;sint. Nam prius ali
quid habent in illa &longs;cientia ex quo demon&longs;trari queant. Itaque non de illis ad aliam facultatem
quæ&longs;tio reuocari debet, &longs;ed de principiis illius primis, &longs;i fortè negentur, iis po&longs;itis re&longs;iqua ex illis
nece&longs;&longs;ariò con&longs;equuntur. Ad hoc tamen dialecticen valere non nego.
nullis enim cancellis coër
cetur; &longs;ed ex datis procedens, aditum haber ad quodlibet problema; at que ita latè patet, vt &longs;iquis
principia primo philo&longs;opho negaret, facultas illa probandi &longs;uppeteret dialectico. Neque enim
illos audiendos e&longs;&longs;e puto qui æqualem ambitum dialectico & primo philo&longs;opho concedunt,
quòd vtrique de ente &longs;peculentur. &longs;iquidem non &longs;eruant eandem proportionem vtriu&longs;que me
thodi vires. cùm tamet&longs;i primus philo&longs;ophus de ente di&longs;&longs;erit, accipiat tamen ip&longs;um terminis qui
bu&longs;dam & certa con&longs;iderandi ratione definitum, itaque definitus habet quæ&longs;tiones. contrà dia
lecticus omne ens peruagatur, nullis certis quæ&longs;tionibus ad&longs;tringitur. idcirco non minus di&longs;tar
dialectica à prima philo&longs;ophia, quàm à reliquis &longs;cientiis. &longs;ed &longs;i id præ&longs;tare pote&longs;t eadem &longs;cientia,
cur opem dialectici implorare debemus? Quod igitur ad cognitionis principia pertinet, ita
&longs;titutumReliquum modò e&longs;t, vt principia rei conficiamus.
Porrò principia rei cau&longs;&longs;as
nitionesquecomplectuntur.
cùm generales, tùm item &longs;peciales.
De genera
Auerroës
res extent. Si primæ fuerint, putat eas ex effectibus o&longs;tendi po&longs;&longs;e; nos agamus communius, &
dicamus ex notis nobis, quòd &longs;i in alias &longs;uperiores cau&longs;&longs;as re&longs;oluantur; propter quid ip&longs;æ &longs;int,
miita opponentes. Primùm quòd non ex cau&longs;sis efficiatur &longs;cientia principiorum.
Cùm enim
&longs;cire quòd e&longs;t, & &longs;cire cur e&longs;t ita &longs;e habeant, at aliquando in eadem &longs;cientia vterque &longs;ciendi mo
dus habeatur, nonnunquàm verò &longs;cire quòd res e&longs;t, &longs;it inferioris &longs;cientiæ, cur autem &longs;uperioris. Si in eadem &longs;cientia &longs;int, quòd e&longs;t & cur e&longs;t, patet reditum fieri po&longs;&longs;e à demon&longs;tratione, quòd e&longs;t
ad demon&longs;trationem cur &longs;it. Non igitur ex alia &longs;cientia
&longs;ed vna &longs;cientia vtraque hæc munera præ&longs;tabit.
Quòd &longs;i &longs;inguli &longs;ciendi modi pertineant
ad &longs;ingulas &longs;cientias, neque item cum vero con&longs;onabit id quod dicit Auerroës. Quoniam &longs;cire
quòd res e&longs;t maximè pertinet ad eam Cùm igitur accipiat Auer
roës ip&longs;um cur e&longs;t ad &longs;uperiorem &longs;cientiam pertinere; & ip&longs;um quòd e&longs;t, igitur ad eandem &longs;cien
tiam pertinebit. Neque item ex effectiş o&longs;tendi queunt principia &longs;ubiecti.
Signo illud e&longs;to, &longs;iqui
dem o&longs;tendere quòd res &longs;it, &longs;it o&longs;tendere cau&longs;&longs;am quòd &longs;it. Verùm &longs;i &longs;cientia cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;e demon
&longs;traret, po&longs;&longs;et item retrocedendo cau&longs;&longs;am eiu&longs;dem o&longs;tendere. Itaque &longs;cientia &longs;ubalterna po&longs;&longs;er
docere, cur e&longs;&longs;ent &longs;ua principia, oppo&longs;itum verò pronuntiabat Auerroës. Sed mirandum e&longs;t ho
mines bene doctos in re tam ludicra lap&longs;os e&longs;&longs;e, & &longs;ophi&longs;mate leui&longs;simo ita &longs;e&longs;e implica&longs;&longs;e. quan
doquidem et&longs;i in eadem &longs;cientia continetur vterque &longs;ciendi modus: at non idcirco pote&longs;t inferri
etiam principia cogno&longs;ci cur &longs;int. Neque enim &longs;ic intelligitur vtrunque &longs;ciendi modum referri
ad eandem rem, vt accipitur in obiectione: &longs;ed quòd vnius &longs;it &longs;cientia quòd e&longs;t, alterius Quemadmodum &longs;e habent propè e&longs;&longs;e & non &longs;cintillare.
quòd ex eo quòd non &longs;cintillent noni
mus e&longs;&longs;e propè: ex eo quòd &longs;int propè nouimus quamobrem
uimus ab effectu quòd propè &longs;int, idcirco etiam nouimus cur propè &longs;int. Cùm &longs;ecundo loco affer,
tur. Neque id euenire, vbi diuer&longs;a &longs;it &longs;cientia qua cogno&longs;cimus cur e&longs;t ab ea qua nouimus quòd
e&longs;t. quoniam, dum cogno&longs;cimus cur e&longs;t, &longs;imul item nouimus e&longs;&longs;e rem.
Dicimus ip&longs;um, quòd e&longs;t
e&longs;&longs;e duplex, aut quod e&longs;t notum nobis &longs;en&longs;u & per accidens, aut quod e&longs;t per &longs;e notum & per
cau&longs;&longs;as. quod notum nobis e&longs;t, vt &longs;en&longs;u & experientia notuerit, in alia &longs;cientia & in arte plerun
que con&longs;picuum e&longs;t, quòd ars tractet &longs;en&longs;ilia; cau&longs;&longs;a ad &longs;uperiorem &longs;cientiam pertinet. & de hoc
&longs;ciendi modo agebat Auerroës. Vbi tertiò dicitur o&longs;tendere quòd e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e o&longs;tendere cau&longs;&longs;am quòd
&longs;it. Id non videtur perpetuò verum, &longs;ed valebit &longs;olùm in cau&longs;&longs;am habentibus.
Nam &longs;iqua &longs;it pri
ma cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;impliciter, vbi ad illam re&longs;oluendo peruenero & nouero quòd &longs;it: at non idcirco
&longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e nouero, quia nouerim eius aliquam e&longs;&longs;e cau&longs;&longs;am; &longs;ed quia per &longs;e nota &longs;it. Aut erit cogni
tio quòd cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;it, quæ &longs;it eadem cum eo cuius e&longs;&longs;e quæritur. Nam in &longs;implicibus quatenus &longs;im
plicia &longs;unt, idem e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e & e&longs;&longs;entia, cau&longs;&longs;æ verò &longs;unt huin&longs;modi: Re&longs;tant modò principia rei &longs;pe
cialia, vt cau&longs;&longs;æ hominis & di&longs;ciplinæ compotis. Atque horum quidem notitia paratur ex notis
nobis, & poti&longs;simè demon&longs;tratione quòd e&longs;t, &longs;i complexa fuerint. dictum e&longs;t ab Ari&longs;totele
accidentia magnam partem conferre ad cogno&longs;cendum quid e&longs;t. &longs;i incomplexa, iis &longs;anè in&longs;tru
mentis de quibus antea dictum e&longs;t, cùm de incom plexorum probationibus ex
phiæ diceremus. His ergo modis &longs;cientiarum principia tractantur.
Verùm poterit nobis oppone
re qui&longs;piam. Cùm de principiis exi&longs;tere po&longs;sit quæ&longs;tio duplex, an &longs;int, vt an &longs;it materies, an &longs;it
Deus; & an hæc principia &longs;int; cur po&longs;teriotem hanc quæ complexa e&longs;t, ab Ari&longs;totele tractatam
comperimus; alteram &longs;implicem videmus fui&longs;&longs;e neglectam? præcipuè quòd non negatur &longs;cientiç
cuilibet ex notis nobis ad &longs;ua principia profici&longs;ci. Prætereà &longs;i quæ&longs;tionem &longs;implicem damus in
partibus &longs;ubiecti &longs;pecialibus, ecquid e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;æ quominus etiam de illis excitari po&longs;sit
quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex? An plures &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;æ propter quas omittitur &longs;implex quæ&longs;tio de cau&longs;sis pri
mis; cùm quòd propter ob&longs;curitatem vim methodi fugit; tùm etiam quòd quæ&longs;tio &longs;implex e&longs;t
de eo quòd e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter; at quæ&longs;tio de eo, quòd res &longs;it &longs;impliciter, e&longs;t quæ&longs;tio meraphy&longs;ica:
Sed valeat hocia &longs;cientiis particularibus; nanque opponet illico qui&longs;piam, cur non id pre&longs;tat pri
ma philo&longs;ophia? Quin etiam &longs;i quis in controuer&longs;iam reuocer principia communia; videtur in
currere in hoc periculum, ne de tota &longs;cientia dubitet; ergò eam profiteri nequit: at de cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;pe
ciali dubitans adhuc &longs;cientiam tueri pote&longs;t; & de cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;peciali qu&ecedil;&longs;tio &longs;pecialis e&longs;t à qua primus
philo&longs;ophus abhorret perpetuò tractans vniuersè. Qui dixerit hanc quæ&longs;tionem fugere metho
dum, patronum habebit Auerroëm; is enim &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas per &longs;e ip&longs;as &longs;pectari po&longs;&longs;e tùm
monet, cùm adepti &longs;umus alias &longs;cientias, &longs;unt verò principia entis, quare methodo excedunt. Ita
ego de reliquis principiis primis &longs;imile iudicium faciam; præ&longs;ertim quòd &longs;cientiam & habitum
demon&longs;tratiuum &longs;ic definiri per&longs;picio, quòd &longs;it vnius generis &longs;ubiecti principia partes &
proprietates doceat. qui periculum &longs;cientiæ proponet Græcos auctores &longs;ui con&longs;ilij proferet.
Re
liquum e&longs;t nunc, vt explicemus, quemadmodum iam enim
patuit à phy&longs;ico negotium hoc peragi non po&longs;&longs;e. Nanque et&longs;i habet aliquid fortè quòd afferat
Video
cen&longs;ere quo&longs;dam eo tempore phy&longs;icum primum philo&longs;ophi per&longs;onam &longs;u&longs;tinere, quod itemens verò pertinet ad primum philo&longs;ophum.
Terminos alij docent e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi, Mihi non placer Ati&longs;to
telem primi philo&longs;ophi per&longs;onam &longs;u&longs;cipere. Nam &longs;i ita dicamus, vercor ne habitum primi phi
lo&longs;ophi phy&longs;ico præponere cogamur; cùm tamen ea vox
moneat habitum phy&longs;icum e&longs;&longs;e præponendum. Neque illud prorlus verum, ens e&longs;&longs;e terminum
primi philo&longs;ophi.
ne ver&longs;entur. Proinde cùm dialecticus etiam de ente di&longs;&longs;erat, cum em&longs;dem quoque facultatis
principia re&longs;piciat; illi probans de quolibet a&longs;&longs;erere, vel negare verum e&longs;&longs;e; cum item modus di&longs;
&longs;erendi &longs;it dialecticus; id quod &longs;copi &longs;ignificant quos in ea di&longs;putatione &longs;pectat Ari&longs;toteles;
video cur congre&longs;&longs;us non &longs;it dialecticus. Etenim deducere in ab&longs;urda contradicentia quæ fieri
nequeant, & &longs;olœci&longs;mos &longs;unt &longs;copi dialectici quos in tota illa di&longs;ceptatione con&longs;ectatur Ari&longs;tore
les. Atque hactenus de ratione qua prmcipia &longs;cientiarum in &longs;cientiis generatim tractantur, &
que&longs;nadmodum in methodo natura
Max.
de optima
lecta.
T. 27.
T. 1.
T. 8.
lo T c. 32.
lo T. 18.
T. c.
27.
6. Mc. T. 1.
I.
T. 1.
T. 5.
Ad II. Ad III.
T. 7. 8.
&longs;um.
2. c.
2.
T. 8.
T. 11.
T. c.
22.
T. 5.
c.
3.
Cap.
VIII.
Si Phy&longs;icus per&longs;onam dialectici &longs;u&longs;tiner, dum inuehitur in eos qui tollunt motum & moueri,
complura accipit à &longs;en&longs;u; facilè coniicere po&longs;&longs;umus inter phy&longs;icen & alias &longs;cientias, nullam
affinitatem &longs;ubalternationis intercedere; &longs;iue ea &longs;ola conditio requiratur, vt nos opinamur, &longs;iue
reliquit, cùm indefinitè pronuntiauit, vbi principia negentur, officium ea probandi, aut e&longs;&longs;e alte
r
ca, tum eriam prima philo&longs;ophia, quòd &longs;i dialecticen &longs;ignificare volui&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles, lam prima
philo&longs;ophia quæ in principiorum probatione ver&longs;atur, ad alterum membrum reiicienda foret, & Nec minores difficultates affert natura &longs;ubalternantium quam in philo &longs;ophia
Peripaterica non ni&longs;i coniectura a&longs;&longs;equi licet. Itaque non ab re mihi facturum videor, &longs;i rem
accuratius exquiram. Igitur de conditione &longs;ubalternarum tot propè &longs;ententias celebres ob&longs;eruo,
vnlgarem vnam quæ ab antiquis accepta fuit: iuniorum duas. Pa&longs;sim defendi &longs;olet hæc triä con
&longs;tituere &longs;ubalternam, &longs;i &longs;ubiectum inferioris in &longs;uperioris &longs;ubiecto contineatur. Cùm verò &longs;ub
iectum accipio, vel totum intelligo, quod ex duabus partibus con&longs;tat, altera, vt materia nimirum
re tractanda, altera, vt forma, nempè con&longs;iderandi ratione qu&ecedil; vtraque &longs;i in &longs;ubalternante & &longs;ub
alterna &longs;eruentur vt mihi in phy&longs;ica & medicma videtur, efficiunt
nibus ab&longs;olutam, vel alteram ex his partibus &longs;eor&longs;um, vt &longs;iqua res naturalis mathematicè lpecte
tur, &longs;iue aliqua res mathe matica naturaliter;
ritur. Deinde vt inferioris &longs;ubiecto accidentaria quædam conditio &longs;uperueniat, vt lineæ videri
po&longs;&longs;e. Po&longs;tremò vt inferioris principia petantur à &longs;uperiore.
Sed reuoluenti complures facultates
quæ &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia numerantur in &longs;ubalternis, aut non omnes his legibus ad&longs;tringi videntur,
aut non ita &longs;impliciter acciprenNanque opponam A&longs;trologiam quæ &longs;ubalter
na e&longs;t, A&longs;tronomiæ. Siquidem vbi vna accipiat quòd res e&longs;t, altera doceat cur ita &longs;it, iam ratio &longs;ub
alternationis intercedit. Atqui A&longs;trologia petit ab A&longs;tronomia rationes motuum; quapropter
e&longs;t &longs;ubalterna. Neque ramen &longs;ubiectum e&longs;t pars.
etenim in vtraque c&ecedil;lum ob&longs;eruatur, aut vniuer
&longs;um. Præterea quòd accidens alterius &longs;ubiecto accedat non licet ab&longs;olutè defendere: quandò ex
&longs;ubiecto & eo quod ad
mma parte con&longs;tirutum ex materia nimSed &longs;ubiectum per &longs;e e&longs;t
vnum, idem e&longs;t methodi &longs;
quod accidens e&longs;&longs;e non pote&longs;t. Ter tiò non nece&longs;&longs;atium, quòd omnia principia &longs;ubalternæ re&longs;ol
propterea quòd &longs;unt ea principia, vel complexa, vel incom
plexa. atque incomplexa quidem à nullo demon&longs;trantur, & eadem &longs;unt in &longs;ubalterna & &longs;ubal
ternanquòd &longs;i complexa fuetint, non videtur negare Ari
&longs;toteles
tum fuit in ita enim &longs;crip&longs;it Ari&longs;to
tzia e)/sin, h)/ a(\ e)k tw_n a)utw_n deh&ecedil;c enim in
geomerrica e&longs;t, quæ e&longs;t ex us principns ex quibus aliquid o&longs;tenditur, “quod ad geometriam p
net, antilla quæ ex ei&longs;dem, ex quibus aliquid in geomecuiu&longs;modi &longs;unt optica
qua&longs;i eadem accipiantur ad probandum geometrica & optica theoremata.” Quocirca viri præ
&longs;tanti&longs;simi veterum via relicta non multis, &longs;ed vna tantum lege contenti &longs;uerex iis enim ali
qui ex &longs;olo tran&longs;itu de genere in genus & &longs;ubalternationem effici voluerunt. tamei&longs;
modis fieri cen&longs;uêre. Vel, quia
demon&longs;trationis propo&longs;itio &longs;umatur in duabus &longs;cientijs. vel
Ita vt non omnia hæc in &longs;ubalternatione
requirantur, &longs;ed vbi vna ex his conditionibus ad&longs;it, continuò &longs;ubalterna exi&longs;tat. Illud optimè, &longs;i
vna conditio &longs;it &longs;atis ne plures inculcentur. fru&longs;tra enim multa afferuntur, &longs;i vnum &longs;it &longs;atis.
Nec
improbandum e&longs;t, non omnes &longs;imul requiri, cùm difficile &longs;it in vniuer&longs;is quas &longs;ubalternas dici
mus, omnes has leges &longs;imul ob&longs;eruari. Cæterùm mihi videtur Ari&longs;toteles vnicam tantummodò
formulam tran&longs;itus indica&longs;&longs;e, videlicet, vbi eiu&longs;dem effectus, aut principi
altera verò cur &longs;it. Adde quòd &longs;i phy&longs;icus o&longs;tendit e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantias à materia liberas, &longs;iue &longs;int &longs;ub
iectum primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, &longs;iue etiam principia, nil enim refert, immò magis idem efficietur. &longs;i
principia fuerint, quo principia &longs;ubiecto priora &longs;unt. prima philo&longs;ophia phy&longs;icæ &longs;ubalterna erit:
quod nefas e&longs;t. & quanquàm &longs;uprà negatum e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum po&longs;&longs;e probari; at id ip&longs;i non
nec probationum genera di&longs;tinguebant à viis in illa hy pothe&longs;i. Quod &longs;i fortè probationem ex
cau&longs;sis accipi velint, nulla ex iis tribus &longs;cientiis, prima, &longs;cilicet philo&longs;ophia, naturali & mathema
tica, &longs;ubalternæ locum occupabit, quod mihi &longs;at e&longs;t, illuc enim tendo, vt nullam ex his alteri &longs;ub
alternam e&longs;&longs;e doceam. quippe quòd &longs;ingulæ ex his &longs;cientiis &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as impetrarint.
atque illas
quidem ab&longs;olutè, vt nulla alterius auxilium imploret, quantum ad illud &longs;pectat, quòd rationem
&longs;ui &longs;ubiecti reddere valeat. Si verò continuum opponas, quod cum mathematicò &longs;ubiiciatur, à
phy&longs;ico tractatur accurati&longs;simè; re&longs;pondebo continuum vtriu&longs;que &longs;cientiæ proprium e&longs;&longs;e & ab
vtroque vt &longs;uiip&longs;ius proprium e&longs;t explicari, neque enim reddit rationem phy&longs;icus eius quanti
quod e&longs;t &longs;eparatum à materia &longs;en&longs;ili, cuiu&longs;modi accipitur à mathematico: &longs;ed reddit rationem
phy&longs;icus eorum quæ in&longs;unt in corpore c&ecedil;le&longs;ti quod ab A&longs;tronomo &longs;pectatur, quia vtrobique c&ecedil;
lum cum accidentibus &longs;en&longs;ilibus accipitur, & eorum quæ con&longs;iderat medicus, quandò vtrique in
&longs;en&longs;ilium tractatione occupantur. modo mathematicus eorum reddit cau&longs;&longs;am quæ
docet opticus. &longs;iquidem vtrique lineam mathematicam explorant.
Quòd &longs;i has tres principes.
&longs;cientias exceperis, difficilè e&longs;t negare id e&longs;&longs;e commune omnibus &longs;ubalternis.
omnes enim
res &longs;en&longs;iles, aut mathematicas, aut etiam primæ philo &longs;ophiæ, quarum principia &longs;impliciter à pri
mis illis &longs;cientiis exponuntur. Neque mihi &longs;ingulare videtur, immò commune, &longs;ubiecto &longs;ubalter
nantis addi aliquam conditionem in &longs;ubalterna; &longs;ed hoc nece&longs;&longs;arium e&longs;t, mea quidem &longs;entenria
&longs;iquidem res &longs;impliciter à tribus illis &longs;cientiis tractantur, à c&ecedil;teris cum aliqua conditione, &longs;iue ea
&longs;it conditio contrahens &longs;ubiectum &longs;uperioris ad pauciora &longs;ubiecta, &longs;iue etiam &longs;it modus quo non
res ip&longs;a, &longs;ed rei notio re&longs;tringitur. Attulerunt & vnicam alij conditionem, nimirum, &longs;i altera rem
&longs;impliciter tractet, altera verò cum habitudine ad opus, aut actionem. vt geometer lineam &longs;impli
citer: faber autem ferrarius lineam in ferro cuiu&longs;dam v&longs;us gratia.
con&longs;iderant res &longs;impliciter, habeant cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ui &longs;ubiecti; reliquæ verò tractent &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;olum, &
per ea cogno&longs;cant, rationum principia ab illis accipiant; ex hoc efficitur, vt &longs;iquando
cau&longs;&longs;as euentorum &longs;uorum perquirere velint, ad illas confugiant. artes & facultates om
nes erunt &longs;ubalternæ: tres verò &longs;cientiæ &longs;ubalternantes. Et planè nulla ex his tribus &longs;cientiis ad
alteram confugit, vt cau&longs;&longs;as petat &longs;uorum theorematum, aut principiorum; &longs;ed omnes &ecedil;què pro
cedunt ex primis & maximè notis. Equidem ob&longs;truo id perpetuò apud Ari&longs;totelem, &longs;icuti men
tionem facit de &longs;ubalternis artis exempla in medio ponere, & ex ingenio &longs;ubalternarum conclu
di artes e&longs;&longs;e ex eo numero, quòd vbi vna doceat quòd e&longs;t altera cur &longs;it, ea qu&ecedil; docet e&longs;&longs;e rem, &longs;ub
alterna e&longs;t. Sed artes docent e&longs;&longs;e rem, cau&longs;&longs;as primas a&longs;signare non po&longs;&longs;unt.
Ergo artes &longs;unt &longs;ub
alternæ. At verò illud dubito, &longs;it'ne hæc cau&longs;&longs;a proxima & vt dici con&longs;ueuit, ratio formalis &longs;ub
alternationis e&longs;&longs;e artem, &longs;eu &longs;pectare aliquid cum conditione, præ&longs;ertim quòd id nunquàm non
modo expre&longs;&longs;um; &longs;ed ne indicatum quidem fuerit ab Ari&longs;totele. Quamobrem ego puto aliam
primam &longs;ubalternationis cau&longs;&longs;am & rationem afferri po&longs;&longs;e, atque illam quidem à pr&ecedil;ceptore no
&longs;tro &longs;ignificatam. Siquando vna rem e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;en&longs;ilia doceret, altera verò cur e&longs;&longs;et.
per&longs;uadeor au
tem ad id credendum hoc argumento. Nanque illa e&longs;t ratio rei cuiu&longs;piam quæ &longs;imiles differen
tias illi communicat: Sed differentias &longs;ubalternantibus & &longs;ubalternis communicant differentiæ
eius, quòd e&longs;t & cur e&longs;t. Ergo ratio &longs;ubalternarum & &longs;ubalternantium e&longs;t, quòd &longs;it res & cur &longs;it.
Propo&longs;itio fidem ex eo &longs;umit.
quia &longs;imilis differentia in cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;imilem differentiam creat in effe
ctu. A&longs;&longs;umptio &longs;umitur ex Ari&longs;totele.
cùm docet exeo &longs;ubalternas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter, vel quodam
modo. quòd vna doceat cur hoc &longs;it &longs;impliciter, ide&longs;t reddat cau&longs;&longs;as maioris partis eorum quæ ac
cipiuntur in &longs;ubalterna, vt apparet in phy&longs;ica & medicina; altera doceat aliqua ex parte, vt geo
metria, quòd vulnera rotunda tardius curentur. Ex hoc ea nece&longs;&longs;ariò na&longs;cuntur.
quòd &longs;ubalter
nans tradat cau&longs;&longs;as eorum quæ &longs;ubalternæ &longs;upponuntur. quòd fiat tran&longs;itus de genere in genus,
dum ea quæ à &longs;ubalternante o&longs;ten&longs;a &longs;unt, ad illa probanda transferuntur quæ in &longs;ubalterna du
bitantur. Cætera quæ tribuuntur &longs;ubalternis, nil prohibet, opinor, e&longs;&longs;e per accidens, & aliun
de peti quàm à ratione &longs;ubalternationis. His ita con&longs;titutis ad propo&longs;itum de&longs;cendamus, &
doceamus &longs;it'ne phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalterna primæ philo&longs;ophiæ. Qui conditionis à Latinis impo&longs;itas
Con&longs;imili
ratione qui defendunt rationem &longs;ubalternæ po&longs;itam e&longs;&longs;e in eo quòd vna rem &longs;impliciter tracter,
altera cum habitudine ad opus & actionem; quia dicerent tres e&longs;&longs;e
&longs;e di&longs;tinctas; quippe quæ proprium genus habeant & ex propriis &longs;uis ip&longs;arum principiis quoque
procedant. Atqui non de&longs;unt rationes quæ affinitatem &longs;ubalternationis inter vtra&longs;que interce
dere per&longs;uadeant. Primum.
Quoniam vbi fit tran&longs;itus de genere in genus ibi ade&longs;t &longs;ubalterna
tionis affinitas. Sed fit tran&longs;itus à prima philo&longs;ophia ad phy&longs;icen.
Et gradus igitur &longs;ubalternatio
nis extat in phy&longs;ica & prima philo&longs;ophia. Nam tum fit tran&longs;itus, vbi propo&longs;itio &longs;uperioris &longs;cien
tiæ re &longs;umatur in inferiore. id verò in phy&longs;icis euenit.
Siquidem Ari&longs;toteles primo de cœlo pro
baturus æternum fieri non po&longs;le quod caducum e&longs;t. ita con&longs;truit argumentationem.
Non pote&longs;t
idem &longs;imul e&longs;&longs;e & non e&longs;&longs;e. Nullum igitur mortale perpetuum effici pote&longs;t.
Attamen antecedens
accipitur à primo philo&longs;opho.
lo&longs;ophia, quærere po&longs;sit, &longs;it'ne &longs;uum &longs;ubiectum. quia non pote&longs;t mentionem facere &longs;impliciter
de ip&longs;o quid e&longs;t. Et &longs;olus igitur &longs;uppeditabit
principia reliquis, & &longs;ubiectum & quid e&longs;t ip&longs;ius. Vltimò Ari&longs;toreles o&longs;tendit primam philo&longs;o
phiam &longs;pectare &longs;umma principia & cau&longs;las poti&longs;simas.
terit reddere rationem principiorum quæ in aliis &longs;cientiis a&longs;&longs;umuntur. Quòd &longs;i ex his conuinci
tur gradus & affinitas &longs;ubalternationis, profectò prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;ubalternans erit, phy&longs;ica
&longs;ubalterna. Verumenimuerò &longs;i no&longs;tra &longs;ententia defendi pote&longs;t, vt opinamur, eam &longs;cilicet e&longs;&longs;e ra
tionem &longs;ubalternationis, cum altera docet, cur &longs;it id quod altera e&longs;&longs;e nouit, prima illa ratio nihil
officeret. Neque enim propo&longs;itiones i&longs;tæ communi&longs;simæ rationem cau&longs;&longs;æ continent, &longs;ed notifi
cationis duntaxat. Sed vt c&ecedil;teris qui de &longs;ubalternarum conditionibus aliter &longs;entiunt, opem fera
mus; nullam e&longs;&longs;e vim dicimus eius quod opponitur. Neque enim ille tran&longs;itus e&longs;&longs;et, &longs;ed a&longs;&longs;um
ptio principij communi&longs;simi &longs;ecundum analogiam, vt no&longs;ti ex Analyticis. hoc enim commune.
De quolibet verum e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;erere, aut negare, dum confertur in demon&longs;trationem, non accipitur
vt &longs;eruat &longs;uam communitatem, &longs;ed quantum opus e&longs;t &longs;olùm, & pro ratione materiæ &longs;ubiectæ. Vt verò c&ecedil;tera tolli queant, monebimus antè geminum ordinem in &longs;cientiis ob&longs;eruari, alterum
quidem naturæ, atque alterum mentis. Ordo quidem naturæ multiplex e&longs;t, de quo nos aliquid
po&longs;tea. Sed intereà quantum &longs;pectat ad rem no&longs;t
tenus mutuas &longs;ibi operas præ&longs;tant in fide facienda duplex e&longs;t, alter qui à finis natura deducitur,
atque alter qui pendet ex ordine materiæ &longs;ubiectæ. à finis autem natura deducitur ordo earum
quæ ita &longs;e habent, vt mini&longs;træ ad Architectonicas, vt vocat Ari&longs;toteles, &longs;int vt Plato
ide&longs;t, præcipuas & duces. ab ordine &longs;ubiectæ materiæ &longs;umitur earum ordo quarum vna e&longs;t
Ordo mentis in eo po&longs;itus e&longs;t, vt vna quoddam
&longs;implex con&longs;ideret, altera illi aliquid adiiciat. vtputa mathematica &longs;pectat quantum &longs;impliciter,
at phy&longs;ica quantum in materia. In hoc &longs;anè ordine
per naturalia pertinet: non autem contrà. Sed hoc ordine dimi&longs;&longs;o ad cuius plenam
multa &longs;ubiicere oportebit, de ordine naturæ di&longs;&longs;eramus. Et fanè magnum di&longs;crimen inter Archi
tectonicas & &longs;ubalternantes intercedit. Quandò &longs;ubalternans præbet cau&longs;&longs;as & principia.
nec vn
quam in oculis e&longs;t &longs;ubalternæ, ni&longs;i aliquod è &longs;uis principiis ex ip&longs;ius manibus eripiatur. Archite
ctonicæ non e&longs;t cau&longs;&longs;as afferre principiorum. Neque enim nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t mini&longs;tras ex iis procedere
perpetuò, quæ demon&longs;trari po&longs;sint; &longs;ed pote&longs;t habere &longs;ua principia pror&longs;us prima. & h&ecedil;c &longs;impli
citer &longs;cire pote&longs;t, &longs;ubalterna non item. &longs;iquidem &longs;ciamus, cùm habemus demon&longs;trationem.
hæc
verò ex primis e&longs;t. atqui rerum naturalium prima quædam principia &longs;unt quæ nouit phy&longs;icus, &
mathematicus habet &longs;ua principia quæ in alia &longs;uperiora neutiquam re&longs;olui queunt. Rur&longs;us &longs;ub
alternans ea con&longs;iderat quæ &longs;unt natura priora; non item Architectonicus. Neque enim ens,
quod à primo philo&longs;opho con&longs;ideratur, quem facimus Architectonicum, natura prius e&longs;t, quàm
ens naturale, &longs;ed &longs;i prius, ratione &longs;ola prius e&longs;t. Docet Architectonicus quid tractandum & qua
tenus, quo ordine & via di&longs;ponendum: & &longs;emper in oculis geritur
Architecton. Nam mini&longs;træ quicquid agunt, &longs;ic agunt, vt ad eum finem perueniant.
Architecton
autem quia con&longs;iderat finem (ab eius autem ingenio na&longs;citur, vt c&ecedil;teris &longs;ua cuiu&longs;que officia præ
&longs;cribantur) &longs;ingula pro &longs;ui finis adeptione di&longs;ponit. Subalternans mea quidem &longs;ententia, cùm
doceat cur &longs;it & rem &longs;impliciter animaduertat, e&longs;t contemplator. Architecton item numeratur
in artificibus. Nunc dicimus inter primam philo&longs;ophiam & reliquas &longs;cientias exi&longs;tere ordinem
Architectonicç & mini&longs;træ, non autem &longs;ubalternantis & &longs;ubalternæ. Cùm enim con&longs;ideret ens
&longs;ub communi notione entis, &longs;it verò &longs;eparatum vel re ip&longs;a vt mentes beati&longs;simæ, vel &longs;ecundum
rationem, quod dici &longs;olet per indifferentiam. finis verò intelligentiæ no&longs;træ &longs;int beati&longs;simæ men
res, omnia docendo huc dirigere oportet, vt earum notitiam a&longs;&longs;equi po&longs;simus. Itaque mathema
tici nos a&longs;&longs;ue &longs;aciunt ab&longs;tractioni, cuius beneficio, iam aliquid de ingenio rerum verè & phy&longs;icus auxilio motus, tanquam rei noti&longs;sim&ecedil;, nos eò perducit,
vt tale entium genus e&longs;&longs;e no&longs;camus. Idcirco prima philo&longs;ophia
turalia nuncupatur. Cùm &longs;pectet
entia &longs;unt è quibus &longs;unt corpus mobile & quantum &longs;ingulis exhibet &longs;ua &longs;ubiecta. eadem quoque
propter vmuer&longs;alem illam
e&longs;t, & id quod Quia nouit partes entis & quæ
di, & quanquàm &longs;cientiam &longs;uis cancellis circun&longs;cribit. Cùm etiam proprium
methodi &longs;it
tractare certum &longs;ubiectum, partes eius, affectiones, & principia, ius habet in principia
ma
dat. &longs;unt enim vbique prima, nec vllo modo obnoxia demon&longs;trationi: vt potius in prima philo
&longs;ophia prima
cipitProinde
non verè &longs;ubalternans, &longs;ed Architecton optimo iure perhibetur. Sed
cogitationis &longs;it no&longs;&longs;e quid e&longs;t & quòd &longs;it. videbitur alicui pr&ecedil;&longs;tare c&ecedil;teris quòd
mon&longs;trare po&longs;sit. At verò neque id efficere pote&longs;t (vt falsò
nullo pacto demon&longs;trationi &longs;ubiiciatur, &longs;ed alio modo
tia, at que Ad
mam
&longs;olent, quod in &longs;ubalternante requiritur: &longs;ed per&longs;uadere principia entis
cipia fuerint
pia &longs;ubaltern&ecedil; probentur. Neque Ari&longs;toteles
confirmaret, qualem nonnulli
& indefinitè &longs;cientiam &longs;ummam accipit, qualis e&longs;&longs;e po&longs;&longs;et &longs;ubalternans: aut &longs;i &longs;umma principia
perquirit, non ex hoc efficitur eam e&longs;&longs;e & hanc dicimus e&longs;&longs;e
primam philo&longs;ophiam quæ ob tale &longs;ummum ius, Hoc
loco memini mihi opponi. Principia entis per &longs;e &longs;unt, nulli accidunt; eius verò, quod non accidit,
con&longs;ideratio per accidens e&longs;&longs;e non pote&longs;t. Itaque nec
cidens &longs;pectari poterunt. Re&longs;pon&longs;um e&longs;t in &longs;cientia quaque duo contineri, rem qu&ecedil; con&longs;ideratur
& modum, &longs;eu
tiarum principiis: at continent accidens propter
principia corporis mobilis, &longs;ed vt entis quatenus ens. Porrò
inter methodos
artes prout
n.
materiam faciunt &longs;im
pliciter, Inter eas verò quæ practicæ &longs;unt, & à fine politi
cæ nuncupantur, eas actiones præ&longs;tant, &longs;ine quibus cæteræ non con&longs;i&longs;tunt, vt &longs;ine pace con&longs;erua
tio legum. itaque
uentur. con&longs;imili ratione inter
vt &longs;ine his illa &longs;uas exhibere non po&longs;sit. Mini&longs;tra igitur phy&longs;ica & in ordine doctrin&ecedil;
T. 27.
4. Met.
III.
lo T. 6.
Ad III.
T. 24.
Cap.
IX.
Hoc, quod à nobis in pr&ecedil;&longs;entia ve&longs;tigandum e&longs;t, altius aliquantò repetetur, propter
tem eorum v&longs;um quæ ad
ripatetica,
re&longs;piciunt. Verumenimuerò
& conditio
ergo quot erunt differentiæ
nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. Et quanquàm res aut &longs;en&longs;u, aut mente cogno&longs;cuntur, omi&longs;sis &longs;en&longs;ilibus
thodi &longs;tudium po&longs;tulant, de intelligendis agamus. Hæc &longs;anè aut nece&longs;&longs;aria &longs;unt, & habent princi
pia quæ aliter &longs;e habere non contingit, aut variari po&longs;&longs;unt. ex quo efficitur, vt etiam intelligentis
animæ facultas &longs;it duplex, altera quæ in
mutabilia concipit. de po&longs;tremis hi&longs;ce exi&longs;tit opinio.
C&ecedil;terùm ea quæ aliter eueniunt, aut con&longs;ide
rantur vt talem habent naturam, aut quo pacto pertinent ad nos & in no&longs;tra manu &longs;unt. prior il
la animaduer&longs;io &longs;oli opinioni relinquitur, iis nulla, neque &longs;cientia, neque ars exi&longs;tir.
&longs;teriorum aliquæ &longs;ub effectionem cadunt, ide&longs;t, relinquunt ex operatione opus aliquod perma
nens, vt ædificium & nauem quæ Græci
nihil ex actione &longs;uper&longs;tes habent, hæc Græci quorum item duo genera &longs;unt, vel
enim à con&longs;ilio pendent, & attenditur
arque in aliis qu&ecedil; opus relinquunt, neque enim deliberant quid ex quo agendum, &longs;ed hoc ex hoc
efficiunt nece&longs;&longs;ariò, &longs;i finem con&longs;equi volunt, & ab illis non confilium &longs;olum, &longs;ed actio de&longs;idera
tur; ad eam mentis partem hæc relegantur quæ tractat illa quorum finis e&longs;t opus. aliæ practicæ
nuncupantur. Ita que ttes habitus mentis exi&longs;tunt, vnus practicus, alter artificio&longs;us.
po&longs;tremus
contemplans qui &longs;i principiorum e&longs;t aut ea &longs;olum concipit & e&longs;t propriè mens, aut illa contem
platur & euoluit, & &longs;ic e&longs;t &longs;apientia. aut contemplatur conclu&longs;iones ex principiis, & e&longs;t &longs;cientia.
Mens propriè vtriu&longs;que principium e&longs;t & pari cum illis gradu procedit, vt &longs;cientiæ
&longs;cientiam referatur, & principium &longs;apientiæ ad &longs;aprentiam, quandò principiorum
eandem pertinet methodum cuius principia &longs;unt. quare etiam dimi&longs;&longs;a mente quæ e&longs;t comprehen
&longs;io pura principiorum, de &longs;apientia di&longs;putemus quas item, quòd in con&longs;titutione me
thodi &longs;imiles &longs;unt, vtra&longs;que communibus regulis metiemur. Porrò
rerum e&longs;&longs;entias explorate, cau&longs;&longs;as perquirere & veritatem propter &longs;e
non ad alterius v&longs;um inuenire. Tamet&longs;i genus hoc cognitionis omnes omnium
uagatur. &longs;iquidem omnia per &longs;eip&longs;a, aut quàm ad v&longs;um
ciantur. & prius hoc in contemplationem cecidi&longs;&longs;e oporter, quàm nos moueat ad agendum.
& caduca & contingentia &longs;ubiacent contemplationi, illis philo&longs;ophia exi&longs;ter, quia &longs;ic etiam
nece&longs;sitatem quandam præ&longs;eferunt.
&longs;unt, philo&longs;ophia &longs;e&longs;e tenet in ijs quæ agi po&longs;&longs;unt
digna. Quocirca animi perfectio, non &longs;ine optima cau&longs;&longs;a philo&longs;ophia perhibetur.
Nam tùm res
perfecta exi&longs;timatur, vbi &longs;it idonea fungi munerib, illis ad quæ in&longs;tituta e&longs;t à natura velut equus,
cum à domitore factus idoneus e&longs;t ad vehendum placidè &longs;e&longs;&longs;orem, & ad currendum, aut certan. dum & domus, &longs;i commodè inhabitari queat.
huius enim rei gratia exædificata e&longs;t.
&longs;ic homo per
fectus e&longs;t, po&longs;tquàm ea præ&longs;tare pote&longs;t quæ hominis propria &longs;unt & quorum gratia producitur à
natura. Atqui duo &longs;unt in homine principia, mens & appetitus.
at que hic quidem homini datus
e&longs;t, vt bona per&longs;equatur, mala declinet: illa verò vt
præ&longs;cribat. Hominis ergo perfectio po&longs;ita erit in eo, vt bona per&longs;equi, mala autem vitare con&longs;ue
&longs;cat, &
alterum contemplando, quod ijdem appellarunt Hæc officia &longs;ola homine libero digna
reputarunt, & ad ea prærogatiuam philo&longs;ophia pertinere voluerunt. &longs;iquidem ab hi&longs;ce duobus
officiis extitit duplex philo&longs;ophandi genus, alterum quod appellatur practicum, atque alterum,
quod dicitur contemplans, quod per habitus illos pertinet qui &longs;cientiæ vocantur.
philo&longs;ophandi genus, in rerum naturis & e&longs;&longs;entiis explorandis
erunt quandò
habitus ex fine & obiecta &longs;pecie di&longs;tinguuntur. At verò rerum
quid e&longs;t a&longs;signatur, aliæ ita cum corpore & materia &longs;en&longs;ili coniunctæ &longs;unt, vt &longs;ine illis neque con
&longs;i&longs;tere, neque concipi queant, vt &longs;imum & ambulare,
nentur. Ali&ecedil; &longs;unt in materia, vt &longs;ine ip&longs;a
tur, veluti
lignoúe affiguntur; &longs;ed i.
non includunt
interuallo
&longs;int, aut in certa materia, aut præ&longs;eferant
ratio agendi ip&longs;is &longs;upponatur, vt reliquis quæ ex primis qualitatib.
oriuntur.
Aliæ &longs;unt,
quæ vt D.O.M.
in &longs;e contineant, motus verò ex hoc &longs;cientia quæ in
tur, appellatur naturalis, quæ verò tractat res quæ &longs;ine motu
mathematica,
tur à materia &longs;en&longs;ili, cuiu&longs;modi &longs;unt vniuer&longs;alia
lo&longs;ophia, &longs;eu theologia; ab ordine doctrinæ po&longs;t naturalia vocatur. Eius methodi partes du&ecedil;
rentia dicuntur, vel ab omni concretione materiæ &longs;ecreta, vt Deus. cuius
humana mens, & huc omnia itaque duas
partes &longs;u&ecedil; methodi facit,
niat, quatenus
explicantur. Mathematicæ multæ &longs;unt partes.
Nam &longs;icut duplex e&longs;t genus quantitatis,
&longs;. &
nuo di&longs;&longs;erit, arithmetica de di&longs;creto. In &longs;en&longs;ilibus quantitas di&longs;creta ab harmonico &longs;pectatur, con
tinua ab A&longs;trologo & optico, multas alias eius partes con&longs;ultò dimitto, Practicarum finis e&longs;t generatim bonum humanum cuius habitus
prudentia nominatur. eius verò tria &longs;unt membra &longs;icut etiam bonum humanum tres
bitudines, aut enim habenti ip&longs;i bonum e&longs;t, quod cùm ex a&longs;&longs;uetudine partum &longs;it cuius gubernatio dicitur œconomia,
à qua prudentia œconomica denominatur aut e&longs;t bonum reip. cuius gubernatio cùm politia dica
tur à Gr&ecedil;cis etiam facultati & prudenti&ecedil; politic&ecedil; nomen dedit. H&ecedil;c ergo philo&longs;ophia &longs;pectar, qu&ecedil;
in &longs;e&longs;e rationem continet boni, quod agendo
nihil infra ip&longs;a re&longs;piciens, qua&longs;i quicquid infra e&longs;t, &longs;eruile habendum &longs;it. Cùm tamen & &longs;&ecedil;pe de
artibus incidat &longs;ermo, in methodis Ari&longs;toteleis, aliqua de ip&longs;is vniuersè &longs;cribere placet qu&ecedil;
&longs;cilicet ad pr&ecedil;ceptoris no&longs;tri &longs;ententias illu&longs;trandas. Iam docuimus, vt in artibus illæ quoque re
ponantur qu&ecedil;
tur& quòd imitantur.
artes operando, non con&longs;ultantes
quid ex quo agendum &longs;it, & &longs;i nihil ex operatione relinquunt, non ex eo na&longs;citur, quia &longs;int actio
nes animi, ex eorum genere quas immanentes vocant; &longs;ed quòd in ea materia &longs;e exercent qu&ecedil;
retinet &longs;peciem impre&longs;&longs;am ab artifice, vt lignum retinet &longs;camni formam, exemplig. &longs;oni
e&longs;t aër, &longs;ed eius &longs;pecies ex ab&longs;entia &longs;onantis euane&longs;cit. ita & motionis &longs;pecies quæ oritur ex arte
&longs;altandi, manet in ip&longs;a motione, & cum ip&longs;a tantum propagatur. itaque & mens qu&ecedil; in eiu&longs;modi
ver&longs;atur operationibus effectricis non autem practic&ecedil; nomine digna e&longs;t habita. Nunc eas multi
fariam partiri philo&longs;ophi videntur. Primùm quidem ex modo quo finem &longs;uum
aut enim earum finis e&longs;t in facientis pote&longs;tate po&longs;itus, ita vt nunquàm artifex &longs;uo fine fru&longs;tretur,
&longs;i omnia aptè & appo&longs;itè fecerit, vt finem Sunt & artes quarum finis non ab artifice,
&longs;ed ab alio pendet, in quibus etiam magnam partem &longs;olet habere fortuna, has facultatis nomine
notare voluerunt, quia facultas incertum euentum præ&longs;eferat, & & cùm incertos &longs;uc
ce&longs;&longs;us habeant, locum dare
vt propo&longs;ito fine potiantur, (&longs;emper. n.
re&longs;piciunt finem, licet ip&longs;um non &longs;emper a&longs;&longs;equi po&longs;sint)
à tales &longs;unt Dialectica, Oratoria, Medicina, Nautica, Militaris.
Proinde cùm finis in
Secundò di&longs;tribuuntur artes ex modo faciendi.
vt quamuis & marmorarius & lutarius & fu&longs;or
&longs;tatuam faciant, quia Non &longs;anè dico
eo&longs;dem non e&longs;&longs;e artifices, quòd Nanque
idem artifex e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t, qui fundendo &longs;tatuam facit ex auro & plumbo. Itaque notabat Galenus
Rom&ecedil; e&longs;&longs;ent ocularij medici, nonnulli auricularij, neque. n.
id ex artis natura c ùm vna &longs;it
victum &longs;ibi parare po&longs;&longs;e &longs;perarent, c&ecedil;teras negligebant. quòd &longs;i victui nece&longs;&longs;aria
ea portio medicin&ecedil;,
alias artis medic&ecedil; partes exercere. Tertiò vel artes materiam faciunt, vel parant, vel perficiunt id
quod natura faciunt
ab&longs;oluunt ea qu&ecedil; natura pr&ecedil;&longs;tare non pote&longs;t, vt lanifices; mini&longs;trant, vel qu&ecedil; faciunt in&longs;trumenta.
vt frenorum fabricatrix eque&longs;tri, vel qu&ecedil; impedimenta remouent, & applicant agentia principia
ad patientia. Quamobrem Medici clamant, Naturas e&longs;&longs;e
&longs;tros. Po&longs;tremò ex fine di&longs;tinguuntur.
quòd variis modis ad humanos v&longs;us
etenim
aut nece&longs;sitatis ergò operantur, aut ex hoc ordine &longs;unt
ide&longs;t ornatrices & fortè imitatrices, vt poëtica.
hæ qu&ecedil; in &longs;olam
mea quidem &longs;ententia &longs;unt omnium abiecti&longs;sim&ecedil;; quippe qu&ecedil; &longs;olum illam animi no&longs;tri partem
re&longs;piciant, qu&ecedil; bruta e&longs;t. qu&ecedil;
mini &longs;it: atqui multò pr&ecedil;&longs;tantius e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e bene, quàm e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter.
gi&longs;simo tractu practicis & contemplantibus cedunt, & ip&longs;is origine & natura po&longs;teriores, &longs;unt:
etenim politicæ &longs;eruiunt cuius vniuer&longs;a officia po&longs;ita &longs;unt in eo quòd ociosè contemplari valea
mus, ill&ecedil;
uentæ
menti,Omnibus his analytica vilior &
origine po&longs;terior.
e&longs;&longs;icientes, & practicæ recta ratione agentes, quæ Porrò rectæ rationis regu
las analytica docet: itaque omnibus ancillatur. & prius generatim bon&ecedil;
terunt quàm regul&ecedil; traditæ, vt prius aliquis
quibus Sed his
omi&longs;sis in quæ nulla dubitatio cadit, ad practicas accedamus & eas
& &longs;ingulis ciuibus &longs;ua munera præ&longs;cribens, necnon illa curans quæ pertinent ad
&longs;tituens quas &longs;cientias in ciuitate, & quou&longs;que ciues eas recepturi &longs;int. officium e&longs;t
&longs;ancire & decerneremanife&longs;tum e&longs;t ciuilem
omnibus aliis facultatibus & &longs;cientiis e&longs;&longs;e præponendam. Attamen, &longs;i vera &longs;unt Ari&longs;totelis docu
menta, vt de facultatibus ex functione &longs;it iudicandum, & de functione ex rebus obiectis, aliter &longs;en
tire oporter. Nam contemplatio rerum æternarum e&longs;t, formarum & mentium, quæ ab omni
materiæ concretione liberæ &longs;unt, vnde omnis imperfectio deriuatur, omnia verò per &longs;e ip&longs;a pul
cherrima & hone&longs;ti&longs;sima habentur. Et contemplatio ip&longs;a per &longs;e&longs;e munus e&longs;t præ&longs;tanti&longs;simum,
cùm &longs;it bonum continuum. neque enim requirit in&longs;trumenta corporea, aut parum admodum,
ex quorum v&longs;u defatigatio na&longs;citur, eadem quoque æterna e&longs;t, cùm re&longs;piciat obiecta, nulla habi
ta ratione materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis, vnde omnis mutatio na&longs;ci &longs;olet. & cùm res nece&longs;&longs;arias contemplatio
tracter, miras affert voluptates, nanque in eo po&longs;ita e&longs;t voluptas, vt expleatur de&longs;iderium, & ita
&longs;edetur, vbi fine potitum fuerit, at tùm maximè no&longs;tra mens &longs;edatur, vbi rem &longs;ic e&longs;&longs;e nouit, vt ali
ter &longs;e habere non po&longs;sit; id quod &longs;ola contemplatio præ&longs;tat, officia verò ciuilis &longs;emper laborio&longs;a
&longs;unt, de fine &longs;emper anxia, quia facilè mutatur; itaque &longs;emper cogitant, & quid agendum &longs;it a&longs;si
duè con&longs;ultant. Contemplatio in &longs;eip&longs;a &longs;pem omnem &longs;ui repo&longs;itam habet, auxilia re&longs;puit, in &longs;o
litudine exerceri pote&longs;t. Proinde Scipio nunquam &longs;e minus &longs;olum quàm cùm &longs;olus e&longs;&longs;et, e&longs;&longs;e di
cebat. Tùm etiam propter &longs;e expetitur & libera e&longs;t.
c&ecedil;terarum functionum alius e&longs;t finis.
nulla actio &longs;iue effectio pote&longs;t exhiberi, ni&longs;i contemplatio præcedat, qu&ecedil; quid agendum, quomo
doúe agendum &longs;it, dictatur. Conuerte te nunc, quæ&longs;o ad actionem.
hæc, vt dictum e&longs;t, auxilium
contemplationis implorat, aliud ex &longs;eip&longs;a producit, vt ex fortitudine pacem, virtus indiget exter
nis. nam liberati ad largiendum pecuniis opus e&longs;t.
iu&longs;to ad pr&ecedil;&longs;tandam iu&longs;titiam &longs;atellitibus forti
viribus & armis. eadem &longs;edat animi perturbationes; tranquilla autem mens optimè &longs;peculatur.
Actio re&longs;picit hominem quatenus humana con&longs;tat natura: contemplatio beatarum mentium
munus e&longs;t & hominis, quà partem propè diuinam in &longs;eip&longs;o continer. Quanto igitur Deus homi
ni præ&longs;tat; tanto quoque actioni contem plationem pr&ecedil;&longs;tare putandum e&longs;t. Etenim actio e&longs;t fun
ctio &longs;ecundum virtutem moralem; atqui functio quæ &longs;ecundum mores e&longs;t, ad res pertinet huma
nas. nam functio &longs;ecundum fortitudinem & iu&longs;titiam,
virtutes atque omnino quæ na
&longs;cuntur ex prudentia &longs;pectant affectus internos, vel actus externos, quæ &longs;unt res humanæ. Nam
cum virtutibus prudentia coniuncta e&longs;t, cùm eius principia quæ &longs;unt fines humani boni con&longs;e
quendi profici&longs;cantur à virtutibus. Eæ verò ab ip&longs;a prudentia ad bonum finem dirigantur: quan
dò virtus efficit rectum propo&longs;itum: prudentia verò vniuer&longs;a regit quæ ad ip&longs;um producunt, vt
qua&longs;i clauum tenens virtutum moralium, &longs;ecundum dirigat cur&longs;um, quo in optimum finem tan
quam in portum &longs;ecuri&longs;simum ferantur. Itaque tanta e&longs;t cognatio prudentiæ cum virtutibus, vt
à &longs;e inuicem diuelli nequeant: proinde prudentia virtus e&longs;t hominis propria. Huc accedit quòd
virtutes & prudentia &longs;unt compo&longs;iti, quia pertinent ad illam animi facultatem, quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in
&longs;en&longs;ibus, Deos autem quos
&longs;ed multò quoque ab&longs;urdius illis attribuere prudentiam quæ po&longs;ita e&longs;t in delectu bonorum &
malorum; quibus mali nihil e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t. quid item illis opus e&longs;t ratiocinatione qua vtimur ad eam
rem, vt apertis ob&longs;cura a&longs;&longs;equamur. aut enim Deo nihil ob&longs;curum e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t, aut id ip&longs;um non
curat. Quid iu&longs;titia, qu&ecedil; &longs;uum cuique tribuit, pertinet ad Deos?
hominum enim &longs;ocietas & com
munitas iu&longs;titiam procreauit. Quo etiam pacto fortis Deus intelligetur?
in dolore, an in labore,
an in periculo? quorum Deum nihil attingit.
Quis erit locus in c&ecedil;lo temperantiæ,
voluptatibus ob&longs;cœnis ibi e&longs;t locus? ni&longs;i ea dicamus & &longs;tulti&longs;simè credamus qu&ecedil; plena &longs;unt futili
tatis leuitatis, ætates, ve&longs;titus, ornatus, coniugia, cognationes, cupiditates, ægritudines,
iracundias, bella, prælia, vel quòd duos exercitus
defenderent, vel quòd cum Titanis aut gigantibus propria bella ge&longs;&longs;erunt. Quid illud quòd
T. 4.
Met. &longs;um.
3. c.
2.
lib.
de mo
tu an.
T. vlt.
lib.
de part.
ar.
med.
an.
c.
10.
c.
2. 6. Eth.
c.
Sæpe etiam Iuno maxima c&ecedil;licolûm'
Coniugis in culpa flagrauit quotidiana
No&longs;cens omniuoli plurima furta Iouis?
Et Mercurius, cuius ob&longs;cœnius excitata natura traditur, quòd a&longs;pectu Pro&longs;erpinæ commotus
&longs;it. & ea quæ de Vulcano Vergilius
Optatos amplexus,
petiuit
Coniugis infu&longs;us. gremio per membra &longs;oporem.
Iam verò dij ab&longs;ci&longs;si, exoleti, ver&longs;ipelles, fures, in vinculis habiti, fulminibus appetiti, vulnera
ti, qui dies &longs;upremos obierint, Saturnus item cum obunca falce cu&longs;tos ruris, vt aliquis ramorum lux
gnatus Mai&ecedil;, declinet,
Meminit Plutarchus in eo libro, quo
di&longs;putat, &longs;it ne &longs;eni admini&longs;tranda Re&longs;p. &longs;eniores Mercurios à veteribus, ita fingi &longs;olitos &longs;ine ma
nibus & pedibus membris virilibus arrectis: quanquàm &longs;ignificare voluerunt &longs;enes à c&ecedil;teris mu
neribus quæ corpore obeuntur, immunes; oratione, & con&longs;ilio remp. adiuuare, & publicorum
commodorum e&longs;&longs;e &longs;œcundos: non erat nihilominus quòd &longs;ymbolum tam ob&longs;cœnum excogita
rent. Plena erant non modo poëtarum volumina con&longs;imilibus figmentis, &longs;ed ædes & rempla.
Quanto &longs;tultius illi qui brutorum formas attribuebant dijs immortalibus; qui error etiam per
man&longs;it v&longs;que ad tempora Num&ecedil;. Quamobrem illi eo nomine gratia e&longs;t habenda, quòd primus
vetuerit Romanos (vt Plutarchi verbis vtar)
ide&longs;t imaginem Dei &longs;peciem præ&longs;eferre hominis aut bellu&ecedil; putare. Verùm h&ecedil;c mi&longs;&longs;a faciamus, &
redeamus ad Deos, quos neque otio contabe&longs;cere natura rerum patitur, neque ratione vti, aut
manere in officio, Siqua igitur functio
voluptas e&longs;t, eam omnem in contemplatione meritò collocabimus.
Itaque c&ecedil;teris
ctionibus contemplatio præ&longs;tabit, & quamuis prudentia facultas de &longs;cientiis & con
templandi ratione multa con&longs;tituat, vt ip&longs;i &longs;apienti&ecedil; quodammodo imperare videatur; &longs;cire licet
permagni intere&longs;&longs;e imperare de aliquo, & illi imperare. Nanque imperare de aliquo &longs;ignificat
imperare gratia illius, alicui verò imperare idem e&longs;t atque illo vti tanquam mini&longs;tro. hoc &longs;upe
rioris officium e&longs;t, illud arguit &longs;eruitutem. Porrò in ædibus atrien&longs;is omnibus præe&longs;t, omniaque
di&longs;pen&longs;at; &longs;ed nondum idem imperat omnibus; verùm domino otium parat, ne is præpeditus
rerum nece&longs;sitate di&longs;&longs;oluatur, quominus hone&longs;tè Sed dominus atrien&longs;i
imperat. Eadem ratione prudentia tanquam &longs;apientiæ quidam atrien&longs;is illi otium parat, vt &longs;uo
fungatur officio cohibendo affectus,
humanum ingenium tolerat; &longs;ed temperando &longs;olùm. Non ergo præcipit politica &longs;apientiæ, &longs;ed
ip&longs;ius gratia tantum. Quare tantum abe&longs;t vt hic imperandi modus indicet politicæ nobilitatem,
vt potius conuincat oppo&longs;itum; &longs;icut etiam quòd Deos curet non &longs;ignificat ip&longs;am dijs e&longs;&longs;e præ
&longs;tantiorem. nec quòd medicina magis eligenda
&longs;it quàm bona valetudo, quamuis pa
ret valetudinem & imperet ægro; quia imperat propter illam. Hactenus igitur o&longs;ten&longs;um e&longs;t con
templationem actioni præ&longs;tare & idcirco &longs;cientias facultati ciuili anteponendas e&longs;&longs;e.
Cap.
X.
Praestat &longs;anè &longs;cientia duobus nobilitate rei, quæ tractatur &
Sed huius
vocis etenim latinè diligentia dici po&longs;&longs;e videtur.
Quam
obrem iubet Ari&longs;toteles, non in omnibus eandem diligentiam e&longs;&longs;e requirendam.
bat M. Tullius in epilogis nihil nimis enucleandum; minutam e&longs;&longs;e enim omnem diligentiam,
verò locum grandia requirere: hoc verò e&longs;t cùm &longs;ingula ponuntur ob oculos & ad tenue eliman
tur. Proximè puto ego illa voce &longs;ignificari certitudinem quam item per&longs;picuitati maximè
e&longs;&longs;e credo: &longs;iquis hæc idem valere non recipiat. hanc verò non in eo ponerem tantùm quòd &longs;in
gula exponantur: &longs;ed quòd res in ea principia di&longs;&longs;oluatur quæ per &longs;eip&longs;a con&longs;picua &longs;unt & pro
bè intelliguntur, & maxima illis fides habetur. Prior illa
natura po&longs;ita e&longs;&longs;e videtur. vnde in &longs;cientias nihil nobilitatis, pr&ecedil;&longs;tantiæúe redundare facilè opina
bor. altera naturam methodi videtur attingere.
H&ecedil;c verò à duobus fontibus peti &longs;olet, ab ingenio
demon&longs;trationis & rei &longs;ubiectæ.
vniu&longs;modi. &longs;iquidem certior ea demon&longs;tratio perhibeatur quæ fidem facit ex cau&longs;sis quàm illa
quæ rem e&longs;&longs;e tantummodò o&longs;tendit. aut &longs;i vtraque ducatur ex cau&longs;sis, erit illa certior quæ ex
cau&longs;sis certioribus pendebit, hoc e&longs;t ex cau&longs;sis natura prioribus & notioribus. At verò &longs;i cau&longs;&longs;æ
potiores vim finis obtineant, inde colligetur ea præ&longs;tantia quam in architectonicis anteà colloca
uimus. Certior item demon&longs;tratio dicetur quæ con&longs;tabit ex cau&longs;sis quæ non modo natura; ve
rumetiam nobis notiores &longs;int. Hæc po&longs;trema certitudo conuenit quoque &longs;ubiecto.
&longs;ubiectum certius dicitur quod nobis notius e&longs;t, cuiu&longs;modi e&longs;t animal in methodo naturali. Pro
ptereà docebat Ari&longs;toteles &longs;cientiam de animantibus e&longs;&longs;e præ&longs;tantem, quòd à nobis plenius co
gno&longs;ci po&longs;&longs;unt: quandò &longs;tirpes & animantis &longs;ocias & familiareis habemus, quapropter eas vbe
rius no&longs;&longs;e valemus: quippe cùm multa ine&longs;&longs;e in quoque genere po&longs;sit ille ob&longs;eruare, qui
non recu&longs;at. quòd igitur propiora &longs;unt nobis &
cum rerum diuinarum &longs;tudio rependunt. Sed enim alia certitudo, &longs;eu per&longs;picuitas accipitur
à &longs;ubiecto. quoniam certior e&longs;t ea methodus qu&ecedil; non de &longs;ubiecto, quàm ea qu&ecedil; de &longs;ubiecto, ide&longs;t
illa certior qu&ecedil; de &longs;ola forma quàm ea qu&ecedil; formam &longs;pectat in materia &longs;en&longs;ili. Sic arithmetica cer
tior e&longs;t quàm hatmonica; quòd illa numerum ab omni qualitate &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;egregatum examinat,
hæcillum cum &longs;ono &longs;pectat. His ita con&longs;titutis &longs;atis apparet omnium pr&ecedil;&longs;tanti&longs;simam e&longs;&longs;e philo
Nam quid ad per&longs;picuitatem &longs;ubiecti pertinet, noti&longs;simum e&longs;t,
quippe ens quod ab omnibus no&longs;citur, nihil &longs;eip&longs;o notius habet. Idem quoque &longs;implicins quàm
&longs;ubiecta c&ecedil;terarum facultatum; cum &longs;it ens vniuersè ad nullam certam rem applicatum &longs;ine ap
po&longs;itione aliqua: quod verò &longs;ubiicitur cæteris &longs;it aut ens mobile, aut quantum. Prætereà diuina
philo&longs;ophia cau&longs;sis vtitur, atque illis omnium primis, vnde cætera omnia imperrarunt quòd
&longs;int; itaque &longs;unt omnium maximè.
ti&longs;simæ: idcirco e&longs;t maximè &longs;cientia & ob id maximè docere pote&longs;t. eadem quoque, cùm &longs;um
mum finem &longs;pectet c&ecedil;teris præferenda, quòd ad eas &longs;e habet vt Architecton, reliquas vt mini
&longs;tras re&longs;piciens, quod olim à nobis expo&longs;itum e&longs;t. nec parcat dicto; &longs;ed omnibus pr&ecedil;cipiat, &
c&ecedil;teras regat, quo facilius perducantur in contemplationem primi entis, vnde etiam prima phi
lo&longs;ophia nominatur. Siquo ip&longs;i dee&longs;t conditio per&longs;picuitatis, illa e&longs;t, quia non accipit nota no
bis &longs;ed natura nota. Quapropter et&longs;i ordine naturæ &longs;uperat reliquas &longs;cientias ordine tamen do
ctrinæ po&longs;tponenda e&longs;t. Phy&longs;ic&ecedil; proxima &longs;en&longs;ui per&longs;equitur & familiaria nobis, &longs;ed illa po&longs;te
riora natura &longs;unt: neque enim de primo fine &longs;ermonem facere pote&longs;t,
tingere &longs;ufficit, nihil habens quod de eo diligenter tractare po&longs;sit. Itaque non prima philo&longs;o
phia; &longs;ed &longs;ecunda iure optimo cen&longs;etur. At verò proximè pendet à prima, vt ni&longs;i h&ecedil;c &longs;it, naturalis
prima & &longs;ola reputari deberet, quemadmodum eam illi perhibebant, qui vltra ens &longs;en&longs;ile nullum
aliud no&longs;&longs;ent, & mathematicen &longs;cientiæ nomine non dignarentur.
decernendum &longs;it po&longs;teà videbimus. Interim illud &longs;ilentio non videtur inuoluendum, vtpotè,
non alienum à con&longs;ilio no&longs;tro, Sit'ne futura prima phy&longs;ice, &longs;i diuina tollatur. id a&longs;&longs;erit Ari&longs;tote
les. Scoti&longs;t&ecedil; cau&longs;&longs;am afferunt; quia &longs;ola philo&longs;ophia naturalis de &longs;ub&longs;tantia di&longs;&longs;ereret, qu&ecedil; prima
e&longs;t omnium entium. &longs;iquidem &longs;ublata &longs;ub&longs;tantia quæ &longs;ecreta e&longs;t à materia, ab&longs;tractionis ratio de
medio tolleretur in qua po&longs;ita e&longs;t prima philo&longs;ophia: &longs;uper&longs;tes enim foret &longs;ola &longs;ub&longs;tantia na
turalis quæ ab&longs;trahi non pote&longs;t. Alij contrà et&longs;i phy&longs;icen primam e&longs;&longs;e fatentur, diuina &longs;ublata
philo&longs;ophia, rationem tamen Scoti&longs;tarum non recipiunt & primam non origene phy&longs;icen e&longs;&longs;e
futuram defendunt, &longs;ed dignitate &longs;olùm atque præ&longs;tantia. Nam contra id quod acciprunt Sco
ti&longs;tæ, nullam rationem ab&longs;tractionis &longs;upere&longs;&longs;e, opponunt multa. Tùm quia &longs;uper&longs;tes e&longs;&longs;et aliqua
vis ab&longs;tractionis quæ ad res naturales & mathematicas generatim pertineret, cuius explicatio fo
ret muneris primi philo&longs;ophi. Tùm etiam quia multa &longs;uper&longs;unt à primo philo&longs;opho con&longs;ide
randa quæ ab&longs;tractione illa non continentur quam Deo Non
igitur erit origine prior &longs;cientia naturalis; &longs;ed &longs;i fortè, præ&longs;tantior. & certè ita erit, inquiunt, quia
&longs;ola &longs;pectabit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;impliciter: cùm c&ecedil;teroqui mathematicæ quantum con&longs;iderent. Quòd
&longs;ivideatur item requiri tractatio communium illorum attributorum & vt &longs;olet dici, tran&longs;cenden
tium, adhuc philo&longs;ophia naturalis erit natura præponenda, quia cùm pauca admodum ea &longs;int
quæ ab&longs;trahi queant, &longs;cientiam &longs;eparatam non efficient, &longs;ed vt partes vni ex his &longs;cientiis adiun
gentur. & &longs;icut in mathematicis aliqua, tamet&longs;i magnitudini
conuenientia communi
ter, non idcirco &longs;eor&longs;um tractantur, &longs;ed vel in geometria, vel in arithmetica traduntur, idem quo
que iudicium de naturali &longs;cientia fiet. Quantum &longs;anè attinet ad Scoti&longs;tas, hæc aduer&longs;us illos for
ta&longs;&longs;e plurimum valent, contra nos non item qui ens non vniuocum ponimus,
& magnitudinem vniuocè volumus e&longs;&longs;e quantitates & planè nouimus Euclideum progre&longs;&longs;um
ab Ari&longs;totele notatum, qui non vniuersè concluderet,
&longs;uppeteret; & ab Alexandro de&longs;ignationes illas p&longs;eudographos habitas.
quominus e&longs;&longs;et alia &longs;cientia ad quam earum rerum tractatio pertineret, tamet&longs;i paucæ forent,
quia &longs;cientiæ non ex rerum magnitudine, &longs;ed fine, v&longs;u, & modo di&longs;tinguuntur: nec tollit quomi
nus &longs;it ars ludendi &longs;cacchis à c&ecedil;teris &longs;eparata, quamuis paucis admodum verbis
Sed hoc mi&longs;&longs;o &longs;pectemus argumenta oppo&longs;ita. Profectò ni&longs;i &longs;it aliqua &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparata, ne&longs;cio
futura'ne &longs;it aliqua &longs;cientia de communibus rei naturali & mathematicæ, quia reip&longs;a eadem e&longs;t
magnitudo naturalis: nec vlla communis &longs;cientia nece&longs;&longs;aria foret. Ac &longs;i rectè rem animaduertas,
omnis tran&longs;cendentia (&longs;ic enim notionem nouam nouo nomine appellare mihi licear) na&longs;citur
ex affinitate & pendentia quæ inter &longs;ub&longs;tantias naturales & &longs;eparatas intercedit. his ergo &longs;ub&longs;tan
tiis de medio &longs;ublatis pendentia, & &longs;ubinde tran&longs;cendentis ratio tolleretur. Adde quòd &longs;iqua fo
ret &longs;cientia de tra&longs;cendentibus illis e&longs;&longs;et natura po&longs;terior, vt o&longs;tendemus qua de illorum vi di&longs;&longs;e
retur, aut ad &longs;ummum prior &longs;ecundum rationem. itaque adhuc phy&longs;ica & origine & natura an
teiret. Ergo &longs;i &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ non e&longs;&longs;ent; nec philo&longs;ophia diuina; prima omnium foret na
turalis. Mathematicæ cùm ex notis nobis, & natura &longs;imul efficiant id quod cupiunt, &longs;ic c&ecedil;teris
demon&longs;trationis per&longs;picuitate præponentur, nam vis rerum quas ip&longs;æ tractant, non e&longs;t
nobilis; quippe quòd &longs;int accidentia, ide&longs;t habeat rationem &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quatenus &longs;ubiicitur, & de
terminatur quanto; con&longs;iderentur longè &longs;ecus atque in natura exi&longs;tant; v&longs;que adeò vt non
nullis non naturæ, &longs;ed mentis opera e&longs;&longs;e credatur. Attamen nonnullarum rerum ingenium tale
mam. Sed eius e&longs;t non definitio, verùm de&longs;criptio, nec forma igitur.
Nec non ea quæ probantur,
externa &longs;unt, nec intrin&longs;ecus à rei &longs;ub&longs;tantia pendent. Et ad idem confirmandum valet auctoritas
Ari&longs;torelis aientis, principia mathematices e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;imilitudinem, neque propria.non
&longs;ine cau&longs;&longs;a ab Ari&longs;torele acceptum; proptereà quòd omnes cau&longs;&longs;æ definiuntur per motum: effi
ciens enim e&longs;t principium motus, finis cuius gratia motus e&longs;t, forma & materia &longs;unt naturæ; & mo
tusigitur principia &longs;int nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t. At verò mathematica &longs;unt immobilia.
Et nullum igitur ibi
cau&longs;&longs;æ genus exi&longs;tit. Tùm etiam nulla affertur poti&longs;sima demon&longs;tratio.
Siquidem definitio non
a&longs;&longs;umitur: & e&longs;to quòd a&longs;&longs;umatur, ea non interna e&longs;t, &longs;ed externa. Quin etiam vna e&longs;t cuiu&longs;que
rei demon&longs;tratio. Sed in his plures exhibentur; & recta, & quæ deducat ad id quod fieri nequit;
& mediis adeò diuer&longs;is eadem conclu&longs;io Mathematicæ quoque rationibus vtun
tur quæ deducunt ad id quod fieri nequit: eæ verò non &longs;unt ex primis, &longs;ed à &longs;igno. Po&longs;tremò ve
rè &longs;cientia tractat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam. proptereà tot philo&longs;ophiæ partes quot &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ.
matice relinquit eam naturali. C&ecedil;terùm toto c&ecedil;lo veteres
quandoquidem bonum duplex e&longs;t hone&longs;tum & honore dignum
alterum, cui conuenit laus; Græcè dicitur
dandum propter aliud expeti pote&longs;t. hone&longs;tum e&longs;t in immobilibus alterum motu & actione
paraturNunc
Quapropter
&longs;cientia vocata e&longs;t à &longs;tatu,
bus id quod præ&longs;tat virtus, nobis accedat, & id ita proprium &longs;apienti&ecedil; habitum e&longs;t, vt M. Varro in
&longs;eriis quoque di&longs;ceptationibus imperet quietem. Romanus, inquiens, &longs;edendo &longs;apit.
Hoc genere
boni præditæ &longs;unt mathematicæ; & verum continent, quòd per &longs;e expetendum e&longs;t; & ex hi&longs;ce
principiis originem duxi&longs;&longs;e mon&longs;trat id quòd otij vitandi gratia &longs;acerdotes apud Aegyptios in
cubuerint mathematicis. Itaque ad illud.
Omne bonum finis e&longs;t, concedo finis cuiu&longs;dam actus
e&longs;t finis; & id quoque do. Omnis actus cum motu: hoc verò nego.
Sed actio vel imperfecta e&longs;t,
vel perfecta. atque imperfecta quidem e&longs;t cum motu; perfectam &longs;ine motu con&longs;i&longs;tere po&longs;&longs;e pla
num e&longs;t. Et contemplatio e&longs;t bonum hone&longs;tum & actus, &longs;ed &longs;ine motu.
Nunc
&longs;um o&longs;tendamus mathematicas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;cientias. Atque iam patet ex fine eas in &longs;cientiis e&longs;&longs;e nume
randas. &longs;iquidem contemplatio, & veritas &longs;int &longs;cientiæ finis, aliquam verò partem contemplatio
nis, & veritatis mathematicæ præ&longs;eferant. Per&longs;uadet nos ordo rationum quibus ip&longs;e vtuntur.
Nam cùm ad tot capita vniuer&longs;æ referantur, Rhetoricæ enim &longs;unt, aut Dialecticæ, aut demon&longs;tra
tiuæ. Sed non Rhetoricæ, non Dialecticæ,
Pr&ecedil;tereà
quinque &longs;unt habitus, quibus verum dicere contingit, mens, &longs;apientia, prudentia, ars, & &longs;cientia. Sed mathematicæ non mens, non &longs;apientia, non prudentia, non ars.
igitur &longs;cientia.
Quin etiam
efficiuntur ex nobis & natura notis. ea verò &longs;unt natura priora & cau&longs;&longs;a.
ex cau&longs;sis autem, &longs;i con
templatio veritatis proponatur; efficitur &longs;cientia. Accedunt & Ari&longs;totelis, & Ptolomæi &longs;ententi&ecedil;;
Quoniam ille primam figuram &longs;cientiæ faciend&ecedil; maximè accommodatam e&longs;&longs;e te&longs;tatur,
auctoritate mathematicorum conditiones ver&ecedil; demon&longs;trationis explicat. Ptolom&ecedil;us item cæte
ris &longs;cientiis tribuit Quòd &longs;i nece&longs;&longs;arium; & per &longs;e igitur;
in primo, vel in &longs;ecundo modo; proptereà continent
quid e&longs;t; quod e&longs;t principium demon&longs;trationis. Et cùm mathematica &longs;int entia; vel &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;æ
vel ex cau&longs;sis: tale enim e&longs;t rerum genus in natura, quod nullum certum materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis genus
&longs;ibi vendicat: ergo &longs;unt obnoxia demon&longs;trationi. At verò vt rationes oppo&longs;itæ diluantur, aduer
tere oportet con&longs;ilium Philo&longs;ophi 4. Met. vnde &longs;caturit omnis fallacia propemodum.
Non te la
tet ex his, quæ nos anteà &longs;crip&longs;imus, ab eis qui præce&longs;&longs;erunt Ari&longs;toteli, mathematicen è
numero eiectam fui&longs;&longs;e, & habitam veluti philo&longs;ophiæ in&longs;trumentum, quod item re&longs;pexi&longs;&longs;e vide
tur præceptorum præceptor, dum 3. Met. probabiliter argumentatur in eis non e&longs;&longs;e bonum.
Au
di&longs;ti quoque ante Ari&longs;totelem fui&longs;&longs;e ignotum genus illud &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quod ab omni materiæ &longs;e
cretum foret, & apodictice &longs;olùm ab Ari&longs;totele confectum. proinde non extiti&longs;&longs;e locum primæ
philo&longs;ophiæ, &longs;ed primas &longs;ibi vendica&longs;&longs;e naturalem: ex quo effectum e&longs;t, vt eo &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum ge
nere comperto naturalis qu&ecedil; tunc erat prima, locum cederet alteri philo&longs;ophiæ, iure optimo
prima haberetur, quòd de primis &longs;ub&longs;tantiis ageret; naturalis autem &longs;ecunda, quia de &longs;ecundo
&longs;ub&longs;tantiarum ordine di&longs;putaret. Hæc quoniam confecta in phy&longs;icis vt per&longs;picua &longs;tatuuntur: de
mathematicis erat di&longs;&longs;erendum, quod in eius philo&longs;ophiæ calce peractum e&longs;t. Ergo cùm de ma
thematicis eo tempore nil decretum fui&longs;&longs;et; ex iis quæ tum con&longs;tituta erant, accipit Ari&longs;toteles
tot e&longs;&longs;e &longs;cientias quot &longs;unt genera &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum, qua&longs;i certum & confectum ex vi apodixeos, &
communiter approbatum, & &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia receptum, duo &longs;cilicet e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiarum gene
ra, necnon totidem &longs;cientias. quod fortè non dixi&longs;&longs;et Ari&longs;toteles, po&longs;tquàm (id quod in extre
mo illo volumine fecit) docui&longs;&longs;et quemadmodum item bonum ad mathematica pertineret.
titudinem: culpandi &longs;unt mathematici qui quantum ab omni &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genere &longs;eparatum
mini&longs;cunturVt enim ante &longs;ignificaui
mus, accidens &longs;ine &longs;ub&longs;tantia neque e&longs;&longs;e, neque cogitari pote&longs;t, & in mathematica &longs;ic &longs;ubit ab&longs;tra
ctionem, vt primùm fit in ab&longs;tractione aliorum accidentium, determinando notionem &longs;ub&longs;tan
tiæ tali forma accidentis, vt con&longs;iderando &longs;ub&longs;tantiam quatenus e&longs;t quanta, non vt &longs;ubiectum
quanti, deinde liberatur quantum conditionibus materiæ &longs;en&longs;ilis, hoc e&longs;t, alteratricibus calore &
frigore, & quæ na&longs;cuntur ex illis, &longs;ibi relinquens extentionem &longs;olam
xilio no&longs;træ mentis: e&longs;t autem di&longs;tantia infinitum quid, & intrin&longs;ecus in hæret in materia, immò
e&longs;t ip&longs;a materies, vt &longs;uo loco demon&longs;trabitur. & quamuis non &longs;it &longs;en&longs;ilis, e&longs;t
da: in&longs;inita verò non quòd omni termino excedat, &longs;ed quia mens in ea terminum vbicunque fi
gere queat, & quadrans & rotundans. nam termini naturales &longs;unt in materia iam qualitatibus
alteratricibus & &longs;en&longs;ilibus affecta. Accedit eodem quòd nomen &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; multiplex e&longs;t, & inter
c&ecedil;tera comprehendit Proinde' tria
&longs;unt genera ip&longs;ius quid e&longs;t, vnum formarum ab omni materiæ &longs;ecretarum, quod e&longs;t primi philo
&longs;ophi, alterum quod e&longs;t in materia &longs;en&longs;ili & naturale, & tertium quod &longs;ecernitur à materia &longs;en&longs;i
li, & e&longs;t mathematicum. Quòd &longs;i accidens &longs;pectare dicuntur; ita accipito, quia
demon&longs;trationes in principia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, quemadmodum aliæ &longs;cientiæ, &longs;ed in principia quanti
inuentio mediæ. Quanquam illud &longs;atis e&longs;&longs;e poterat ad per&longs;uadendum in mathematicis e&longs;&longs;e rei
cau&longs;&longs;am & &longs;i illis Hæc.
n.
&longs;unt Ari&longs;totelis verba 5. primæ phil.
c.
de termino.
Ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e terminum cognitionis, &longs;i verò
cognitionis & rei. Et planè &longs;i ita res e&longs;t veram habeat cau&longs;&longs;am tetragoni&longs;mus; propter quam &longs;it
oportet, aut &longs;it Quapropter et&longs;i non &longs;unt ver&ecedil; cau&longs;
&longs;æ, ide&longs;t, præcipu&ecedil;, &longs;unt tamen primæ, &longs;i referantur ad &longs;uos effectus, id quod Memento verò ip&longs;um quid e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e duplex vel propriè, quod rei formam
per omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera &longs;eor&longs;um tradi pote&longs;t. Atqui ea definitio, quæ continet formam, &longs;u
mitur à Mathematicis, nec à phy&longs;ica definitione differt: quandò non aliter definiret phy&longs;icus re
ctum, aut curuum, vel Sexagonum, cum docet cur iris lapis &longs;it Hexagonus; itaque etiam nos do
cuit Ari&longs;toteles
te&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e commen&longs;io. Vtitur etiam materia Mathematicus, vt cùm totum rectum ex duobus &longs;e
mirectis concludit. & cùm in omni prædicamento contineatur ratio pote&longs;tatis & actus, & quod
e&longs;t in&longs;tar materiæ ac formæ, vtrunque principiorum genus v&longs;urpat; & quamuis non &longs;int ab&longs;olu
tè prima, &longs;at e&longs;t &longs;i in &longs;uo genere &longs;int huiu&longs;modi. Neque tibi negotium face&longs;&longs;at, &longs;iquando ex nobis
audies dimidia, aut aliud &longs;imile partium genus e&longs;&longs;e toto po&longs;teriora; proptereà non po&longs;&longs;e ex illis
demon&longs;trationem confici; aut &longs;i
pronunciatum &longs;it ab Ari&longs;totele, eas partes e&longs;&longs;e toto po&longs;teriores. Etenim alia ratio e&longs;t eiu&longs;modi
partium apud mathematicum & c&ecedil;teros philo&longs;ophos: apud hos enim &longs;unt accidentia e&longs;&longs;entiæ;
proptereà toto po&longs;teriores habentur; at apud mathematicum qui di&longs;tantiam per &longs;e con&longs;iderat
quæ per &longs;e con&longs;tat ex iis partibus iure principia reputantur. In&longs;uper &longs;cire licet certitudinem &longs;eu
per&longs;picuitatem e&longs;&longs;e vel per
qu&ecedil; &longs;anè per&longs;picuitas &longs;cientiam non oppugnat. hoc autem modo multa note&longs;cunt in mathema
ticis, quæ tanquàm &longs;en&longs;u de&longs;criptionibus exponuntur. Necnon affectiones e&longs;&longs;e proprias, vel &longs;pe
ciei, vel generis, neque omnes vno &longs;ubiecto fundari. Specta primùm tu ea qu&ecedil; &longs;unt ad aliquid,
h&ecedil;c profectò &longs;altem duobus innituntur, ratione &ecedil;quale, & in&ecedil;quale quæ &longs;unt propria
quanti, & &longs;imile & di&longs;simile qu&ecedil; &longs;unt propria qualis. Et multa &longs;unt huiu&longs;modi apud mathema
ticos qu&ecedil; in relatione po&longs;ita &longs;unt, vt anguli & latera oppo&longs;ita. Po&longs;tremò memini&longs;&longs;e oportet,
vnius rei definitionem e&longs;&longs;e, ea verò, &longs;i ex multis cau&longs;sis ordinem inter &longs;e habentibus componatur; nil refert.
Sed cur non e&longs;t
&longs;&ecedil;pè culpa mathematicorum, qui vera effectuum cau&longs;&longs;a neglecta propter difficultatem, alia pro
pria quæ &longs;int annexa, con&longs;ectantur? vt &longs;i in phy&longs;icis cùm ri&longs;us & habilitas ad di&longs;ciplinam &longs;e con
&longs;equi per&longs;picuum &longs;it ex inductione, tamet&longs;i illa habilitas habet cau&longs;&longs;am, ob facilitatem per ri&longs;um His ergo &longs;ic po&longs;itis facilè e&longs;t diluere rationes oppo&longs;itas.
Nanque negatur a&longs;&longs;umptio
&longs;ecund&ecedil; rationis. Eam confirmant opponendo demon&longs;trationem 32. primi Elem.
quæ accipiat
aliquid extrin&longs;ecus. Equidem, vt hoc gratis dabo, quòd mathematici &longs;&ecedil;pè principiis ijs videntur
e&longs;&longs;e contenti qu&ecedil; &longs;int euidentia: &longs;ic confidenti&longs;simè a&longs;&longs;euerabo re&longs;olui talia principia quæ &longs;unt
euidenti&longs;sima, in cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ui generis; vt in re no&longs;tra ex&longs;uperantia duorum angulorum ad
tertium, qu&ecedil; per Quod deinde
&longs;iquidem ad rem propo&longs;itam
exanalytico præcepto contrahantur. Et illud etiam quòd medium non &longs;it ratio formalis conclu
&longs;ionis; & quòd vna cau&longs;&longs;a plurium effectuum e&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t.
An id &longs;ufficit, vt talis &longs;it cau&longs;&longs;a
qua po&longs;ita ponatur effectus, quæcunque illa cau&longs;&longs;a &longs;it, aut in eam re&longs;oluatur: & &longs;i plura &longs;int me
dia, vt ex ijs vna cau&longs;&longs;a fiat, aut ni&longs;i res ita &longs;e habeat, vitium in ratione latebit; & erit p&longs;eudogra
phema, neque mathematicæ conditio; &longs;ed demon&longs;trantis error erit culpandus. Quòd forma ca
reant mathematicæ, aut materia: tùm patebit, cum docebimus terminos e&longs;&longs;e formam interualli
quod mathematico &longs;ubijcitur. & in rebus mathematicis e&longs;t materia, &longs;i non &longs;en&longs;ilis; at quæ men
te comprehendi queat; & partes quæ materiæ vim obtinent: carent planè fine & efficiente, quo
niam cau&longs;&longs;æ i&longs;tæ &longs;unt principia motus; mathematica verò &longs;unt immobilia: &longs;ed materia quæ &longs;ub
mentem cadit & forma quæ re&longs;pondeat illi, nequaquàm. & id fal&longs;um e&longs;t, quòd talium
non &longs;it definitio. Ea, quæ probantur externa e&longs;&longs;e; &longs;i extrà idem &longs;ubiectum, fateor.
&longs;i verò extra
genus; id verò pernego. Addis auctoritatem Ari&longs;totelis negantis principia propria mathemati
cis, te deludit ambiguum, quod culpa interpretis in codicem latinum irrep&longs;it. nanque duæ &longs;unt
voces apud Græcos, quas vnico nomine proprij Latini verterunt. Porrò
requirunturin &longs;cientiis;
cau&longs;&longs;arum genera nimirum finis & efficiens, &
ab Ari&longs;totele mathematicis. Dices hæc e&longs;&longs;e principia metaphoricè.
An &longs;unt principia metapho
ricè mutationis, non principia &longs;impliciter accepta, quòd aliquid de illorum ratione minuatur. immò &longs;unt principia maximè; vnde aliquid pendeat; cuius &longs;ignum quòd illo immutato, aliquid
etiam &longs;ecum immutetur, quæ nonnulliè Latinis &longs;ic explicant, quòd &longs;int efficientia formaliter,
effectiuè. quemadmodum forma & priuatio dicuntur agere, non quia moueant; &longs;ed quòd &longs;ui pr&ecedil;
&longs;entia faciant aliud. & ratio peccat à coniunctis ad diui&longs;a.
De his ergo, quæ
Ari&longs;toteles, non de propriis, quæ quatenus ip&longs;um in&longs;unt. Neque verò rationem &longs;cientiæ tollit,
quòd principia &longs;int metaphoricè; &longs;iquidem etiam inibi conce&longs;&longs;erit Philo&longs;ophus idem
genus primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, quæ e&longs;t omnium maximè &longs;cientia. Quanquàm non erat etiam, vt ve
reremura&longs;signare principia propria mathematicis, qui ob&longs;erua&longs;&longs;emus notari
orbe quadrando communibus vteretur, repudiari rationem eius à Mathematicis; necnon
audi&longs;&longs;emus Ari&longs;totelem nos admonentem, quemadmodum principia mathematicæ, quæ c&ecedil;tero
qui
pliciter, &longs;ed ex analogia &longs;umerentur. Quamuis autem cau&longs;&longs;æ omnes definiantur per
in dicto fallacia con&longs;equentis. &longs;iquidem et&longs;i omnes definiuntur per motum, non idcirco omnis
earum con&longs;ideratio comprehendit motum: id quod v&longs;ueuenire dicimus in mathematicis. & e&longs;t
verè dictum &longs;yncategorematicè, quia &longs;ingulæ efficiunt motum, non tamen categorematicè, quia
non omnibus modis acceptæ. Non licet etiam negare, quin externæ cau&longs;&longs;æ & externa quid e&longs;t, in
demon&longs;trationibus a&longs;&longs;umantur. Nanque demon&longs;trationes ab&longs;olui po&longs;&longs;unt etiam ip&longs;is quid e&longs;t lo
gicè acceptis.
& hic demon&longs;tratorem arguemus. Porrò quòd idem valeant demon&longs;tratio recta, & ea quæ termi
natur eo quod fieri nequit; &longs;uo loco declarabitur. itaque ex hoc etiam tollitur ratio &longs;eptima.
Tollitur autem po&longs;trema ratio &longs;ignificata fallacia con&longs;equentis.
&longs;iquidem cùm &longs;atis &longs;it ad
vt &longs;it de &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;iue &longs;en&longs;ili, &longs;eu intelligenda, traducunt &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; nomen ad &longs;ignificandam tan
tummodo &longs;en&longs;ilem. Nos autem defendimus etiam mathematicen comprehendere alterum illud
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ genus. Quare
multi, philo&longs;ophi nobili&longs;simi hoc tempore negant.
1. Eth.
T. 42.
1. de An.
an.
c.
5.
T. 7.
c.
7.
T. 4.
1. de An.
T. 31.
1.
T. 12.
T. 68.
T. 46.
1. Phy&longs;.
1. Elen.
T. 59.
Cap.
XII.
Neqve ab in&longs;tituto no&longs;tro videtur abhorrere, &longs;it'ne quæ&longs;tio naturalis, an diuina de eo
quòd &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ pror&longs;us à materia liberæ. Cùm enim ex eo po&longs;t naturalia vocemus
philo&longs;ophiam diuinam, quòd naturalia theoremata ordine doctrinæ præponantur; & illud præ
cipuè, quòd o&longs;ten&longs;um e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e primum mouens omnibus modis immobile, & ob id à materia &longs;e
paratum; cen&longs;ebit aliquis eam quæ&longs;tionem e&longs;&longs;e naturalem. Et tamen profitetur Ari&longs;toteles &longs;e in
methodo naturali di&longs;&longs;erturum de formis quæ re&longs;piciunt materiam, diligentiorem verò tractatio
nem de forma aliò reiecturum, non &longs;ine valida ratione pronuntiatum, quòd cùm &longs;int etiam
formæ quædam &longs;ine materia; de his agere non erat munus philo&longs;ophi naturalis. alibi
firmatumQuæcunque mouent immobilia permanentia,
Neque de&longs;unt argumenta quibus hæc pars problematis approbari po&longs;sit.
tis &longs;it no&longs;&longs;e, &longs;it'ne res, & quid &longs;it. Verùm &longs;olus primus philo&longs;ophus nouit quid &longs;it primus motor.
ergo is &longs;olus no&longs;cet etiam quòd &longs;it.
e&longs;t enim forma illius motoris penitus à materia &longs;eiuncta, &
In hanc &longs;ententiam Auerroës Auicennæ infen&longs;i&longs;simus inuehitur pluribus
locis,Primum.
Nulla, inquit, &longs;cientia probat e&longs;&longs;e &longs;uum
&longs;ubiectum, &longs;ed ip&longs;um accipit, vt noti&longs;simum. Cùm ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quæ &longs;unt extra materiam, &longs;int
primæ philo&longs;ophiæ &longs;ubiectum, nequit prima philo&longs;ophia illas e&longs;&longs;e demon&longs;trare. Deinde demon
&longs;tratio rei cuiu&longs;piam ad eam &longs;cientiam pertinet, vnde promitur medium. Sed
&longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, vtitur medio naturali, nempe motu. Ergo & ea demon&longs;tratio naturalis
habebitur. Tertiò demon&longs;trat Ari&longs;toteles &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas e&longs;&longs;e 8. Phy&longs;.
quinimo ea&longs;dem argu
mentationes ad verbum re&longs;umit 12. po&longs;t natural. Illa igitur di&longs;putatio naturalis erit, non autem
diuina. Nam quòd 8. Phy&longs;.
&longs;it pars methodi naturalis, non e&longs;t quòd ambigamus, cum 1. de ortu
citetur cum libris de motu. Quapropter Auerroës &longs;ic omnem controuer&longs;iam tollere putauit.
Cùm enim de &longs;ub&longs;tantiis quæ &longs;unt extra materiam, quæ&longs;tio duplex excitari po&longs;sit, an'ne &longs;int, &
quid &longs;int, priorem quæ&longs;tionem à naturali di&longs;&longs;oluendam e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;uit, po&longs;teriorem verò à primo
philo&longs;opho. Cæterùm, &longs;i eiu&longs;dem mentis e&longs;t no&longs;&longs;e, &longs;it'ne res & quid &longs;it.
cùm philo&longs;ophus natu
ralis norit e&longs;&longs;e tale genus &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, pro&longs;ectò etiam no&longs;cet quid ip&longs;um &longs;it. Et contrà quia primus
philo&longs;ophus nouit quid ip&longs;um &longs;it, illud item e&longs;&longs;e cogno&longs;cet. Itaque inanis erit illa di&longs;tinctio de
quæ&longs;tionibus, quæ pertinent ad &longs;ub&longs;tantias ab omni materiæ concretione &longs;ecretas. Pr&ecedil;tereà con
tingeret, inquit Scotus,
bet ab&longs;urdum, Sed h&ecedil;c forta&longs;&longs;e leuia. Nam quantum &longs;pectat ad primum, no&longs;&longs;e licet tem e&longs;&longs;e bi
fariam, vel per &longs;e, hoc e&longs;t, per &longs;ua principia, vel per accidens, ide&longs;t, per euenta quædam. Verùm
nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t, vbi &longs;ciamus rem e&longs;&longs;e per accidens, vt ibidem quoque &longs;ciamus quid e&longs;t.
euenire dicebat Ari&longs;toteles in &longs;ubalternis qu&ecedil; &longs;olum norunt rem e&longs;&longs;e per &longs;en&longs;ilia qu&ecedil; &longs;uperiores,
per &longs;uas cau&longs;&longs;as cogno&longs;cunt. Ex quo item efficitur, vt argumentum Scoti nullius &longs;it roboris; pro
ptereà quòd vbi &longs;cientia quædam no&longs;cat aliquid per accidens quod no&longs;citur ab alia per &longs;e; nihil
forta&longs;&longs;e prohibet, quominus ordine doctrinæ antecedat; at ordine naturæ nequaquam; &longs;icuti ne
que etiam &longs;ubalterna præcedit &longs;ubalternanti natura: &longs;ed &longs;iquo modo pr&ecedil;cedit, id &longs;olum e&longs;t ordi
ne doctrinæ. quo pacto etiam naturalem diuinæ philo&longs;ophiæ præcedere non negamus.
Illa &longs;ine
dubio grauiora quæ te&longs;tatur ip&longs;emet Ari&longs;toteles. n.
nos admonet e&longs;&longs;e
rius &longs;cientiæ, &
immobilia. prætereà docet officium e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi di&longs;&longs;erere vtrum è &longs;ub&longs;tantiis &longs;olæ &longs;en&longs;i
les, an aliæ præter has exi&longs;tant. Prætereà
&longs;e, atque illa quidem &longs;eparabilis. Clarius item 6. Met.
vtrunque problema, an &longs;int & quid &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;uprà naturam. 7.
Necnon lib. 11.
Sed quid apertius afferri pote&longs;t quàm ea quæ
pronuntiat in eodem libro?Demum
eodem libro perorans, Quin & ip&longs;e Auer
roës. 1. Met.
2. Met.
4. Met.
7. & 12. Met.
uinum philo&longs;ophum pertinere te&longs;tatur. Quare non ad phy&longs;icum, vt ip&longs;e in calce primi phy&longs;ici
profe&longs;&longs;us e&longs;t. Non po&longs;&longs;unt &longs;anè qui cum aliqua diligentia legunt Ari&longs;totelem, id negare: &longs;ed
cò con&longs;ugiunt, quòd et&longs;i eiu&longs;modi contemplatio diuina e&longs;t; nihilominus non e&longs;t &longs;impliciter; &longs;ed
conclu&longs;io duntaxat: nam concluditur medio naturali, &longs;cilicet motu. Indignaretur profectò hæc
audiens Auerroës qui theorema ad eam &longs;cientiam referri voluerit, vnde promitur medium. qua
re apud ip&longs;um, &longs;i medium e&longs;t phy&longs;icum, efficitur etiam phy&longs;icam &longs;ore conclu&longs;ionem. Sed enim
hoc mi&longs;&longs;o manife&longs;ti&longs;simè per&longs;piciemus, notitiam motus diuino a habitu In primis
enim 4. Met.
atqui motus e&longs;t &longs;pecies entis. Prætereà
cùm prima philo&longs;ophia non habeat &longs;ubalternam, ad hanc alia tran&longs;itus fieri nequit. Ne igitur fiat
tran&longs;itus, oportet in eadem &longs;cientia con&longs;iderari definitum in qua partes definitionis habentur. At
verò partes definitionis ip&longs;ius motus &longs;unt de prima philo&longs;ophia. & motus igitur.
Motus etenim
definitur. Actus eius quod e&longs;t in potentia, quatenus in potentia.
omnes autem norunt, actum &
pote&longs;tatem ad diuinam methodum pertinere. Omitto
etiam &longs;tudio breuitatis multa loca Alexandri & Auerrois
Accedit eodem, quòd termini communes qui ab Ari&longs;totele 5. primæ philo&longs;ophiæ de&longs;cribuntur,
ex omnium philo&longs;ophorum &longs;ententia &longs;unt eius methodi. ergo & cau&longs;&longs;æ.
quare etiam cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;&longs;i
ciens. Atqui genus hoc cau&longs;&longs;æ per motum definitur.
& eius igitur definitio
definitionis.
quamobrem & motus per quem cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;&longs;iciens definitur.
Po&longs;tremò &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ aliquid
efficiunt in entibus & rebus naturalibus per motum. itaque etiam phy&longs;ice mouent.
mo philo&longs;opho cogno&longs;cendæ &longs;unt, vt e&longs;&longs;iciunt: ergo & per motum cogno&longs;cantur oporter. Motus
igitur ad primum philo&longs;ophum pertinebit. ergo & demon&longs;tratio quæ vtitur motu, non erit ab
ip&longs;o aliena. Sed hæc &longs;atis hactenus dubitata &longs;int.
nunc docebo quid &longs;entiam.
id verò
Primo quidem.
Philo&longs;ophum naturalem no&longs;&longs;e &longs;olum quòd &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ
materiæ immunes exi&longs;tant. Altero verò Philo&longs;ophum diuinum no&longs;&longs;e quòd &longs;unt & quid &longs;int.
Ve
runtamen quandò naturalis illas
e&longs;&longs;e cogno&longs;cit per accidens potius C&ecedil;terùm non id dico,
in earum
contingat: &longs;ed quòd notio
tum, vel quòd efficiat n.
phy&longs;icè; vel quia notatur per
Nam quia
e&longs;t nobis ignota, &longs;ic de&longs;cribatur oporter per ea qu&ecedil; &longs;unt nota nobis. ob
cau&longs;&longs;am octauus phy
&longs;icorum pars erit methodi naturalis, tamet&longs;i explicat
&longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; genus non modò mouet
gnationem; neque &longs;unt
entia beati&longs;sima; nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t Itaque vt hanc
ad Ita fit, vt eius
nequeat philo&longs;ophus naturalis, quòd habeat
cludant cùm verò primus philo&longs;ophus con&longs;ideret ens quod e&longs;t, vel &longs;en&longs;ile, vel &longs;eparatum, &
cau&longs;&longs;as eius, liceat illi eius & quà
res Sed primus philo&longs;ophus illius vniuer&longs;as functiones intelligens attingit
operari & e&longs;&longs;e
quòd &longs;it. quanquàm habitus huiu&longs;ce notiti&ecedil; nulla methodo explicatur;
thodus, vt Ergo, inquies tu, cogno&longs;cetur à
nobis e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, quod Pr&ecedil;tereà
&longs;i Si igitur nouit phy&longs;icus quae &longs;unt;
&longs;entiamVelim
quae.
&longs;.
illam attingimus, quia &longs;e&longs;e
nobis maximè prodit: attamen quia mens Et planè
Iam verò quòd phy
&longs;icus no&longs;&longs;e nequeat
cogno&longs;cit. n.
ip&longs;am cum habitudine ad materiam, at qui illa habitudo facit, quominus
& e&longs;&longs;entia in &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparata. &longs;iue vt rectius dicam, quòd nos h&ecedil;c, veluti diuer&longs;a concipimus
qu&ecedil;
ea &longs;it
per nubem ad&longs;pexeris, totus
homo & animal rationis compos, & ex toto, &longs;ed homo
di&longs;tinctè & perfectè; &longs;ic mentes diuin&ecedil; tot&ecedil;, &longs;ed confusè no&longs;cuntur à phy&longs;ico, à primo verò philo
&longs;opho di&longs;tinctè. Itaque accurata explicatio
& id &longs;ibi voluit Ari&longs;toteles, vbi Ex his
me ad rationes in fronte capitis allatas. Et
e&longs;t, vbi ip&longs;am per &longs;e cogno&longs;camus; &longs;ecus &longs;i no&longs;catur per accidens;
verus e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;us, &longs;icuti quòd e&longs;t,
quid e&longs;t: ideò nihil ad nos: &longs;ed detur hoc. Ergo quia primus philo&longs;ophus nouit &longs;ub&longs;tantias &longs;epa
ratas per &longs;e, &longs;imul explicat vtranque qu&ecedil;&longs;tionem. non &longs;ic philo&longs;ophus naturalis.
cùm ens ex acci
dente cogno&longs;cat. Diluuntur item rationes Auerrois.
Nanque vbi probat primum
probare quòd &longs;int &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;eparatæ, quia &longs;uum Falsò dicimus &longs;umi &longs;ub
&longs;tantias &longs;eparatas e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum prim&ecedil; philo&longs;ophiæ.
dicamenta, eius Et &longs;i
quis eas fubiecti
&longs;urdum apud n.
pars &longs;ubiecti totius.
Et quamuis ex motu
ratio procedat, dicam ego
di Quod obiicitur eius &longs;cientiæ
&longs;i po&longs;terius &longs;it facilè negabo, vt patet, &longs;i &longs;ubalternans accipiat quòd e&longs;t à &longs;ubalterna.
gamus cùm ibi &longs;olùm explicetur quoad re&longs;picit
Video te his
prima philo&longs;ophia. atqui
e&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t theorema vtit hoc medio,
pertineat: at
phi naturalis. Quòd
confirmatur, quòd auctore Ari&longs;totele mouentia quæ &longs;unt immobilia,
tionis. At.n. (vt mea &longs;ert opinio)
de prima philo&longs;ophia;
&longs;ed
qui tamet&longs;i phy&longs;icè
rentibus attributis à diuino concludatur ea &longs;acta tran&longs;umptione, vt quod in tali corpore naturali
&longs;pectatur, & in hoc corpore accommodetur ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem &
veruntamen quòd non rerum
factum e&longs;&longs;e veri&longs;imile e&longs;t, vt in methodo diuina pro
in materiæ contemplatione factum fui&longs;&longs;e diximus. Itaque & alibi demon&longs;tratum, & propter
moditatemAd illud item quod &longs;ecundo
loco opponitur. Aeternitatem motus attollere mentem
quam pr&ecedil;tereà de entis principio &longs;ignificare. Tamet&longs;i e&longs;t infringere auctoritatem Philo&longs;ophi, qui
8. Phy&longs;. vtilem &longs;peculationem motus e&longs;&longs;e te&longs;tatur, quòd etiam recludit viam ad
vel via qua diuinus perducit nos in notitia primi principij, & eius
fuerit ingre&longs;&longs;us; etiam re&longs;pondemus, cùm ex motu primo
primum principium; nanque non excluditur primus motor ratione finis. At hoc modo primus
motor e&longs;t principium etiam in prima philo&longs;ophia: &longs;ic enim e&longs;t principium omnis entis. Ergo
&longs;ic tractatur; tractatur item vt principium entis. Idcirco & o&longs;ten&longs;io diuina.
Atqui, inquies, id non
poterit præ&longs;tare motus, quamuis æternus: neque.n.aliò mentem no&longs;tram deducet, ni&longs;i eò vt
cum relatione ad motum cogno&longs;camus. At tu nihil
entia &longs;ine materia, nec viribus principiorum quæ, cùm patefacta &longs;unt, illu&longs;trant mentem, vt &longs;eip&longs;a
nobis o&longs;tendant, & illuminent alia quæ na&longs;cuntur ex ip&longs;is. Ad tertium pater ea quæ adducuntur
non priuare phy&longs;icum aliqua contemplatione primarum mentium; &longs;ed exqui&longs;ita earum &longs;pecu
latione. Et
cipia motus naturalis, e&longs;&longs;e item phy&longs;ic&ecedil; contemplationis. Ita igitur vterque philo&longs;ophus, licet di
uer&longs;a ratione tractabit entia &longs;eparata vtetur.
c.
1.
1. Phy&longs;. T.
c. 83.
II.
2. Phy&longs;. T.
c. 26.
III.
10 T. 2.
3. Me. T. 7.
T. 18.
1. 2.
8.
T. 41.
8, 15
T. c. 6.
T. c. 1.
T. c. 5.
T. 8.
T. 78.
T. 6. 21. 22
23.
3.
de An. T.
c. 39.
T. 43.
Cap.
XIII.
Tametsi &longs;atis notuit quod' nam &longs;it propo&longs;itum methodi naturalis, dum ex obiectis rebus
&longs;cientias &longs;eparauimus; nanque ea &longs;ibi vendicat phy&longs;icus qu&ecedil; materiam
attamen hæc omnia &longs;olent ad vnum genus referri, quod vnum propriè &longs;ubiectum e&longs;t, quod pro
pter euidentiam excitat mentem no&longs;tram ad eius principia, partes, perquirendas,
& valet, opinor, multum ad
tia Nam dum in pauca atque illa
repetitio, dum qu&ecedil;
dens inh&ecedil;rent, ad ea reuocantur quibus per &longs;e conueniunt.
nos rem quæ pluribus atque illis
mus, illa
tur. Etenim illud in primis accipiemus.
vt
verò habitus recta ratione efficiens: vel Sic non
& habitus, vt in hac & c&ecedil;teris artibus opere definitur, fru&longs;tra, n.
&longs;it medicus, ni&longs;i medeatur, & edifi
cator, ni&longs;i ædificet. At methodus acquie&longs;cit in &longs;ola cognitione,
illa exquirere qu&ecedil; in &longs;ola contemplatione &longs;unt po&longs;ita. Nam medico &longs;atis e&longs;t, &longs;i de loco &longs;uperiore
doceat
thodi, &longs;ed habitus erit Non de&longs;unt habitus, à quibus actio & ef
fectio nulla expectatur, &longs;ed &longs;ola veritas attenditur, quos &longs;cientiæ nomine decoramus. Cùm igitur
habitus &longs;it duplex, ratio, vnde habitus definiri &longs;olent, &longs;tatuenda erit.
At
que in arte qu&ecedil; re&longs;picit opus vltra alia mate
ria; at que habitus ip&longs;ius. &
h&ecedil;c Exemplig.
facultatis medicæ finis e&longs;t bona
valetudo, huc enim vniuer&longs;a medici munera &longs;pectant & hic finiuntur. nanque illud e&longs;t, quod affici oportet vt bene valeat:
hoc&longs;ecatur, vritur, purgatur, inediam patitur, in hoc e&longs;t bona valetudo, vt in &longs;ubiecto. Sed in me
thodo non eritfinis opus, vt bona valetudo; nihil enim docendo efficitur; &longs;ed explicari volunt
cau&longs;&longs;æ, proprietates, & partes eius &longs;ubiecti quod pote&longs;t obtinere bonam valetudinem, quatenus
huiu&longs;modi. nanque horum no&longs;cendorum gratia laboramus,
cognitis acquie&longs;cimus,
talem reddiderit medicus auditorem, vt hæc optimèteneat, finem &longs;e
& hoc
e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum, quia &longs;ubiectum e&longs;t id cuius principia, partes, & affectiones Itaque
e&longs;t in methodo finis & &longs;ubiectum. In &longs;cientiis igitur, in quibus nulla ratio operis habetur, idem
erit &longs;ubiectum, quapropter etiam
vocatur à Gr&ecedil;cis. Quanquàm ego latius patere puto vim &longs;copi, quàm &longs;ubiecti.
Quandò
&longs;cientiæ totius appello, ad quod omnia referuntur in illa &longs;cientia, & quod per &longs;e expetitur & ex
plicatur, Sic ortum & interitum, non &longs;ubie,
ctum, &longs;ed &longs;copum con&longs;tituam, quia propter aliud tractatur, illud &longs;ubiectum perhibebo proptes
quod con&longs;ideratur ortus. Itaque faciam, vt &longs;ubiectum per omnes partes alicuius &longs;cientiæ perti
neat, vt id ad quod &longs;emper ea referantur quæ in &longs;ingulis &longs;cientiæ partibus exponuntus non ali
quod generale quod partes & proprietates contineat, motus auctoritate. Ari&longs;totelis 1. Po&longs;t,
analyt. & 4. primæ philo&longs;ophiæ, vbi ensip&longs;e con&longs;tituit &longs;ubiectum, non quod omnia generatim
complectitur, &longs;ed cuius principia, partes, & propria ve&longs;tigantur. Hoc verò vnum e&longs;&longs;e debet, vel
vniuocè, vel vt ad vnum quod &longs;anèlatius accipiendum e&longs;&longs;e duco, vt non modò illud, cuius id
quod primum e&longs;t in notione formali reliquorum includatur, velut &longs;ub&longs;tantia in notione acciden
tis, verùm etiam quomodocunque in alio includatur, vt cau&longs;&longs;a, per quam explicatur quid e&longs;t lo
gicè. Genus igitur, quod res materiatas & &longs;en&longs;iles complecteretur, variis modis con&longs;tituêre, qui
Ari&longs;totelis ve&longs;tigia &longs;ecuti &longs;unt. Cùm enim ens &longs;impliciter à primo philo&longs;opho tractaretur,
quæ &longs;cientiæ portionem entis acciperent, eam entis portionem vel generis &longs;ubalterni nomine ex
pre&longs;&longs;ere, vtputa, &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ corporis, vel aliquam conditionem ad ens, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, corpusúe ad
iecere, velut quòd &longs;it mobile, aut naturale. Sic cùm corpus e&longs;&longs;et per &longs;equantum quod mathema
ticæ con&longs;iderationis e&longs;&longs;e videbatur, vt ip&longs;um à mathematico &longs;eiungerent, adiunxere quoque
&longs;imilesVideamus nunc, quid mouerit illos, vt hoc potius,
illud approbarent. D. quidem Thomas accepit ens ea ratione per&longs;ua&longs;us, nimirum.
Illud e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub
iectum, cui primo & per &longs;e prima affectio conueniret, atqui prima affectio motus e&longs;t: is autem
comienit ènti primò; &longs;iquidem illi primò conuenire putandum e&longs;t, per quod definitur. Sed mo
tus definitur perens: ita enim definitur. Actus eius quod e&longs;t in potentia, quatenus in potentia
Subiectum igitur e&longs;t ens. Quia verò credendum e&longs;t D.
Thomam non accepi&longs;&longs;e ens vniuersè: quia
non omnia &longs;unt capacia motus, Deus enim prot&longs;us immobilis e&longs;t veritati con&longs;entaneum e&longs;&longs;e vi
detur, etiam ens conditione mobilitatis e&longs;&longs;e re&longs;trictum & illud ens pro &longs;ubiecto fui&longs;&longs;e receptum
quod haberet in &longs;eip&longs;o principia motus. At qui &longs;i ita e&longs;t, cur mobile magis appellatur, quàm na
turale? qu&ecedil; ratio mutandi conditionem & formulam &longs;ubiecti?
Rur&longs;us cur ens potius quàm &longs;ub
&longs;tantia? quandò &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis e&longs;t, vbi in &longs;eip&longs;a principia motus habeat.
& mutatio in &longs;ub
iecto videatur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantia, cùm anima &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia, ad
vt ip&longs;e D. Thomas a&longs;&longs;euerat, nec repugnat Ari&longs;toteles, qui dum motum
dit, etiam motum phanta&longs;iæ complexus e&longs;t. Pr&ecedil;tereà, &longs;i re&longs;tringitur ens nouam notionem facit
vt cum animali rationis compos accedit. itaque non amplius ens &longs;impliciter: aut &longs;i ens &longs;im plici
ter, affectio illius propria non erit: quippe quòd latius pateat &longs;ubiectum, quàm appo&longs;iMitto quòd &longs;ubiectum debet e&longs;&longs;e ab&longs;olutè
non po&longs;sit. At mobile per naturale de &longs;ubiecto
dius, vt puta, quòd phy&longs;ica &longs;ubalterna foret primæ philo&longs;ophiæ. Tùm etiam quòd ens mobile &longs;it
diuin&ecedil; con&longs;iderationis. quorum alterum ita probabat.
quòd cùm ens mobile &longs;it pars entis, & acci
piat conditionem qu&ecedil; non fluit ab eius principiis, illi ine&longs;t per accidens. at vbi condition per acci
dens alicui parti &longs;uperueniat, ibi intercedit affinitas &longs;ubalternationis. Itaque phy&longs;ica etit &longs;ubal
terna, id verò vt ab&longs;urdum reputari debet. Alterum verò quòd illa con&longs;ideratio phy&longs;ica
&longs;iquidem prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;pectat ens, partes, & modos, ac differentias per quæ illud
proximè diuiditur. Ergo cùm per mobile & immobile diuidatur ens, efficitur, vt ens mobile
&longs;anè phy&longs;ic&ecedil; &longs;it Mitto hæc, inquàm, vel quia controner&longs;a
&longs;unt cùm apud nos, tùm apud alios; & quia, vel non con&longs;entiunt cum us qu&ecedil; anteà con&longs;tituimus,
vel quòd fal&longs;a videntur, nullam vim afferunt. Nam quod ad primum illud &longs;pectat'. & primum &
&longs;ecundum etenim mobile, vt conditio qu&ecedil; per accidens enti
in&longs;it, accipitur. po&longs;t verò, vt pars, modus, &longs;eu differentia entis.
declaret nobis animi &longs;ui &longs;ententiam
Aegidius.
rarepulla.
n.
&longs;cientia &longs;pectat illa qu&ecedil; in&longs;unt per accidens.
&longs;ubalternatio po&longs;tulat conditionem accidentariam. Sic nos deludit Ægidius.
Sed eò minus h&ecedil;c
valent apud nos, qui de &longs;ubalternæ conditionibus di&longs;&longs;entimus. & quod attinet ad &longs;ecundum vi
demus primùm ob eam rationem quàm proponit Aegidius &longs;ic euerti omne &longs;ubiectum phy&longs;ic&ecedil;,
immò &longs;cientiarum omnium: quia nulla res e&longs;&longs;et quæ non e&longs;&longs;et pars, aut modus, aut differentia
entis. Adde & illud, quòd non differt primus philo&longs;ophus à c&ecedil;teris in rebus tractandis, &longs;ed in
ratione tractandi. quippe quòd vniuersè contempletur ea quæ reliqui &longs;cientes particulatim &longs;pe
ctant. His igitur po&longs;terioribus repudiatis primis illis in &longs;i&longs;tamus.
Eadem quoque per&longs;uadent phy
&longs;icæ &longs;ubiectum non e&longs;&longs;e ens naturale; licet hoc facilius defendi queat: cùm naturale prius e&longs;&longs;e
quàm mobile videatur: &longs;ed quatenus ponitur ens, ei&longs;dem difficultatibus implicatur. Spectemus
nunc, &longs;it' ne corpus mobile aut naturale &longs;ubiectum. & planè tale &longs;ubiectum accipiendum e&longs;&longs;e
cen&longs;ebimus, &longs;i conditiones intueamur quibus ad&longs;tringitur. Etenim phy&longs;iologiæ fubiectum mo
tu defi& corporis igitur erit &longs;ubiectum.
Præterquàm quòd
te&longs;tatur non &longs;emel Ari&longs;toteles &longs;cientiam de natura plurimum impendi in explicatione
& magnitudinum. Tùm prætereà: quia &longs;ubiectum illud e&longs;t, cuius principia partes & proprieta
res in illa methodo &longs;pectantur cui &longs;ubiicitur. Sed &longs;iquis vniuer&longs;am phy&longs;iologiam animo lu&longs;tret,
nihil aliud ab ea tractari cogno&longs;cet. Et hoc igitur erit &longs;ubiectum.
Veruntamen id D.
Thomæ non
placuit, cùm quia motus qui tractatur à phy&longs;ico per ea quoque pertinet quæ corpora non &longs;unt
vt motus cogitationis: tùm etiam quòd &longs;ubiectum neque &longs;eor&longs;um, &longs;iue &longs;ecundum materiam, &longs;i
ue &longs;ecundum formam, neque complexum o&longs;tenditur, at mobile de corpore demon&longs;tratur,
corpus item de mobili, illud quidem ex eo quòd e&longs;t naturale: alterum verò ex illo quòd omne
id quod mouetur, e&longs;t partim in termino à quo, partim in termino ad quem, & partibile igitur. Neque minus partes & proprietates & principia &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis, aut mobilis explicantur à
phy&longs;ico quàm partes & proprietates, ac principia corporis mobilis, &longs;eu naturalis. Accedit &
auctoritas Ari&longs;totelis, qui &longs;ubiectum phyficæ con&longs;tituit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam,
motus & quietis. Itaque alij, quibu&longs;cum ego &longs;entio, &longs;ub&longs;tantiam mobilem, &longs;en naturalem phy
&longs;icæ po&longs;uere &longs;ubiectum. Quod item confirmare libet auctoritate Ari&longs;totelis qui, dum principia
talis fubiecti &longs;e tradere profitetur, id verò e&longs;t, quod habet naturam, dicit e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, eo
quòd è &longs;ub&longs;tantiis con&longs;tat. modo nos ea mouent quæ &longs;crip&longs;it Ari&longs;toteles.
denatura ferè plurima videtur circum corpora & magnitudines & horum pa&longs;siones atque mo.”
tus; adhuc autem circum principia quæ ta&longs;is &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;unt, & cùm ignotum &longs;it, &longs;it' ne corpus
hoc & probandum: &longs;ubiectum verò noti&longs;simum e&longs;&longs;e velit, mihi &longs;it veri&longs;imile illud &longs;tatui po&longs;&longs;e
&longs;ub&longs;tantiam naturalem, &longs;eu &longs;ub&longs;tantiam mobilem. Cæterùm dicet qui&longs;piam, velutiens repu
diatum e&longs;t, quia non e&longs;t proprium mobilitaris &longs;ubiectum, nec bene congruit, cùm ratione forma
li; &longs;ic neque &longs;ub&longs;tantia, quiddam enim amplius e&longs;t fub&longs;tantia, quàm mobilitas, &longs;iquidem aliquæ
fub&longs;tantiæ &longs;int ad quas nullo modo pertineat motus, vt illæ &longs;unt quæ ab omni materiæ concre
tione vindicantur. audiet is, quantum hoc valeat, &longs;i antè con&longs;tituatur, quemadmodum &longs;ub&longs;tan
tia naturalis, &longs;eu mobilis &longs;it &longs;ubiectum. Nam tres leges adhibendas e&longs;&longs;e cen&longs;eo, &longs;i defendere
velimus tale &longs;ubiectum. Primùm quidem, vt torum hoc coniunctum quod dicimus &longs;ub&longs;tan
tiam mobilem, pro &longs;ubiecto ponatur. Neque enim &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eor&longs;um, neque &longs;eor&longs;um mobile
&longs;unt &longs;ubiectum; &longs;ed totum hoc quod e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis; arque adeò, vt æquiualeat hoc ter
mino cuidam &longs;implici, itaqueneque mobile de &longs;ub&longs;tantia, neque &longs;ub&longs;tantia de mobili probari
po&longs;&longs;unt; id autem notum nobis e&longs;t notitia confu&longs;a qua ope &longs;en&longs;us accedit, dum cogno&longs;cimus
omnia, aut quædam moueri, vel dum nouimus e&longs;&longs;e motum, nam &longs;imul nouimus hoc aut illud
moueri. Ex quo efficitur, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantia non &longs;impliciter & vniuersè ponatur &longs;ubiectum, &longs;ed &longs;ub
&longs;tantia in qua motus ine&longs;t qu&ecedil; e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis, &longs;eu &longs;implex, &longs;eu compo&longs;ita, & primò &longs;ub&longs;tan
tia, &longs;i non &longs;ecun dum naturam, at nobis vndè ordine quodam c&ecedil;ter&ecedil; &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ quæ &longs;en&longs;um fu
giunt & exortes materiæ &longs;unt, nuncupantur. Itaque Platonici Deum non &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed
ou_sion
&longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;eparantes. Proinde vt in communibus ad vnum (id verò infrà docebimus) notio
&longs;implex ad primum in illo ordine coarctatur, &longs;ic euenit in notione &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, hæc enim quæ &longs;en
&longs;ilis e&longs;t, primò concipitur, & hæc pro &longs;ubiecto con&longs;tituitur. Neque ob&longs;tat, &longs;i nos armis no&longs;tris op
pugnare coneris; quia &longs;i &longs;uppo&longs;itum ex adiectione conditionis arctatur; erit item confu&longs;io in par
tibus merhodi naturalis; quandò generalior erit animi commentatio, in qua res con&longs;iderantur, vt
&longs;en&longs;iles, quàm libri de elementis: oportet enim rationem formalem vniuer&longs;a complecti. necnon
aliquid per accidens &longs;cientiæ &longs;upponetur: nam &longs;ub&longs;tantia per accidens e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;ilis: euitamus enim
hæc omnia &longs;umentes &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem &longs;ecundum materiam: cùm in his obiectionibus accipia
tur &longs;en&longs;ile &longs;ecundum formam. Tertiò mobilitas in hac &longs;ub&longs;tantia, ide&longs;t habilitas ad motum nota
tur, non actus ip&longs;e mouendi. quapropter idem e&longs;t e&longs;&longs;e mobile, ac naturale; hoc e&longs;t, quod habet
& cùm motus &longs;it duplex, verus & metaphoricus, vt verus e&longs;t notior
nobis ita mobilitas habilitatem indicabit ad verum motum primò & præcipuè, non autem ad
non autem ad metaphoricum. hæc &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis nece&longs;&longs;ariò corpus e&longs;t, &longs;olùm ab eo differr,
modo
quidem, non vniuer&longs;itate pr&ecedil;dicationis; totidem enim &longs;ubiecta comprehendit &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis,
quot corpus de prædicamento &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, &longs;ed vniuer&longs;itate modi, quia &longs;ine limitatione, &longs;cilicer ea
dem &longs;ub&longs;tantia comprehenditur quæ &longs;ub nomine corporis quantitare quodammodo limitatur,
Et cùm ens etiam in prima notione &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;ignificet, atque illam quidem &longs;en&longs;ilem, efficitur
item, vt ens ad eandem &longs;ub&longs;tantiam contrahatur. Ergo reuera idem &longs;unt ens mobile &longs;eu natura
le. &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis, &longs;eu naturalis: & corpus mobile, &longs;eu naturale.
Nec vllum argumentum po
re&longs;t opponi, quin his &longs;tantibus euerti po&longs;sit. Ac primùm, quod extremo loco oppo&longs;itum e&longs;t, quòd
&longs;ub&longs;tantia non e&longs;t &longs;ubiectum congruens cum mobilitate. Iam enim patuit &longs;ub&longs;tantiam accipi, vt
in prima &longs;ui notione & vt id ad quod c&ecedil;teræ &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ referuntur. ea verò e&longs;t &longs;en&longs;ilis &longs;ub&longs;tantia
cum qua motus conuertitur: nulla enim talis &longs;ub&longs;tantia e&longs;t quæ non &longs;it mobilis, nec vllum mo
bile, quin &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;en&longs;ilis. Sic contra nos argumentum D.
Thomæ non valer, vbi probar
ens e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubiectum, non &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, aut corpus, quia &longs;it ens proprium motus &longs;ubiectum, vt ex
definitione apparet. quandò ens, quod in illa definitione &longs;umitur, aut adæquat &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en
&longs;ilem, aut vt rectius dixerim, e&longs;&longs;eibi e&longs;t non res, &longs;ed apprædicatum, ide&longs;t, non &longs;ignificat vt termi
nus, &longs;ed vt copula: &longs;ed cùm dicitur eius, quod e&longs;t, & re&longs;oluitur copula in terminum & copulam,
& hoc quid communius e&longs;&longs;e videtur, quàm corpus & &longs;ub&longs;tantia. dico ip&longs;um non vniuer&longs;itate
prædicationis e&longs;&longs;e Sic quoque defendetur D.
Thomas quiens
pro &longs;ubiecto &longs;ump&longs;it: neque enim ens vniuersè accepit, &longs;ed quod æquipollet &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ &longs;en&longs;ili. Iam verò quòd accipitur corpus, etiam facilè re&longs;ponderelicet; &longs;i &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;en&longs;ilem idem e&longs;&longs;e
re cum corpore cogitemus. Itaque dum corpus efficitur &longs;ubiectum motus, dum principia, partes,
& proprietates afferuntur, etiam talis &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;ubiectum motus efficitur; & eius principia, par
tes, & proprietates explicantur. Nec ea nos perturbant, quæ D.
Thomas oppo&longs;uit qui in prima
notione mobilitatem re&longs;picere volumus, motum verum qui corporis e&longs;t, non metaphoricum qui
e&longs;t animi. Atque vbi opponitur demon&longs;trari id quod mouetur e&longs;&longs;e corpus, multos exitus habet
oppo&longs;itio: tùm quia probatur de corpore motus qui e&longs;t actus, in ratione verò &longs;ubiecti accipitur
mobilitas quæ e&longs;t habilitas. Prætereà non idem probatur & con&longs;tituitur.
con&longs;tituitur &longs;anè in cor
pore mobilitas, at corpus de mobili probatur. Ne verò mirum videatur, vt vnum &longs;it
& reciprocum &longs;it ob&longs;curum, cùm &longs;&ecedil;pe in mathematicis v&longs;ueueniat probari reciprocum, quod
optimi mathematici docent ad 6. primi, quanquam id quod pro &longs;nbiecto accipitur, vnum e&longs;t vt
totum hoc corpus, &longs;eu &longs;ub&longs;tantia mobilis, & e&longs;t veluti terminus &longs;implex. ideo nullo pacto
&longs;trationiDe ratione autem quæ affertur è 1. de c&ecedil;lo rur&longs;us &longs;e&longs;e offeret occa&longs;io di&longs;pu
tandi. Veruntamen & iterum repugnet qui&longs;piam.
eo quòd omnes affectiones ine&longs;&longs;e videntur in
&longs;ubiecto per rationem quam formalem vocant. at non per mobilitatem ine&longs;t corpori e&longs;&longs;e in loco,
&longs;ed per &longs;uperficiem. Prætereà &longs;ubiectum vult e&longs;&longs;e vniuocum, aut ad vnum.
Sed hoc quod nos
&longs;ubiectum facimus, nihil ex his e&longs;t. Nanque &longs;ub&longs;tantia naturalis e&longs;t, vel elementum, vel ex ele
mentis, & corpus c&ecedil;le&longs;te quæ nihil habent vniuocum. quandò differunt vt caduca & æterna.
Nec &longs;unt ad vnum.
&longs;iquidem ea quæ &longs;unt ad vnum, &longs;ic &longs;e habeant, & vnum &longs;it, à quo c&ecedil;tera mu
tuant e&longs;&longs;entiam; Sed non ita &longs;e habent inferiota ad cœlum. cuius rei &longs;ignum: quia non vtuntur
illò in &longs;uis definitionibus. Adde etiam quòd de &longs;ubiecto præno&longs;&longs;e oportet, quòd &longs;it, & quid &longs;it.
At vbi' nam habetur definitio &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturalis?
Dicimus &longs;anè ad primam etiam locum e&longs;&longs;e
proprietatem quæ pullulat à rei natura, vt po&longs;ita res in &longs;ua natura &longs;it etiam in &longs;uo loco. vnde
dici &longs;olet. Dans formam, quæ e&longs;t natura; dare etiam con&longs;equentia fotmam, in quibus numeratur
locus. e&longs;t etiam locus naturalis terminus motus naturalis.
Ad &longs;ecundam &longs;ic re&longs;pondemus ad con
&longs;eruandam rationem eorum quæ &longs;unt ad vnum, &longs;atis e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;i prius accipiatur in quid e&longs;t po&longs;te
riorum logicè, hoc e&longs;t, in quocunque genere cau&longs;&longs;æ. Cùm igitur c&ecedil;lum habeat vim efficientis ad
ea qu&ecedil; intra orbem Lunæ continentur, ita etiam in illorum definitione comprehendetur. h&ecedil;c nos
docuit Auerroës. Subiectum generale cuiu&longs;que facultatis ita &longs;e habere,
vt genus generali&longs;simum. quare non re&longs;oluitur in alia principia &longs;uperiora.
quocirca neque defi
nitione &longs;ubiicitur. Verùm &longs;ufficit inchoata quædam notitia rei illius quæ per nomen &longs;ignificatur
quam vnu&longs;qui&longs;que etiam &longs;ine præmon&longs;tratore pote&longs;t habere. in methodo po&longs;teà principia ex
quiruntur, ex quibus con&longs;tat. hanc re&longs;olutionem &longs;iquis ad definitionem dirigi putet haud repu
gnabo (e&longs;t enim propriè de&longs;criptio) atque illam colligi autumabo non Primo de c&ecedil;lo, vt Auer
roës opinatus e&longs;t, quoniam ibi ita definiri puto corpus naturale, quatenus continet interuallum
& pendet à quanto; &longs;ed initio &longs;ecundi. Phy&longs;.
o&longs;tenditur quid &longs;it habens Sic igitur &longs;ub&longs;tantia naturalis ponetur phy&longs;iologiæ
an.
ad Eud.
c.
1.
lo T. 5.
10 T. 5.
6. Phy&longs;. T. 32.
T. 1.
T. 4.
lo T. 1.
I.
Me.
T. 4.
T. 4.
Cap.
XIIII.
Methodvs naturalis ad contemplationem dirigitur, & numeratur in &longs;cientiis.
Scire
autem e&longs;t no&longs;ce quid, & quale &longs;it genus &longs;ubiectum per proprias cau&longs;&longs;as, principia & ele
menta quæ &longs;cilicet in &longs;ubiecto, per &longs;e & quatenus ip&longs;um in&longs;int, quod cùm certum genus
tumquecau&longs;&longs;as admittit,
Porrò cau&longs;&longs;arum genera multa &longs;unt,
vt variis modis afficiantur ad &longs;cientias: neque omnes pariter, aut omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera per
quirant, aut eiu&longs;dem generis omnibus vtantur. Itaque ad con&longs;tituenda phy&longs;iologiæ fundamen
ta de hac renobis item in hac methodo tractandum e&longs;t. Quia verò ab eiu&longs;dem generis &longs;ubiecti
principiis cùm demon&longs;tratio, tùm definitio ducuntur, ad omnem quoque notitiam quouis in&longs;tru
mento comparetur, in&longs;tituta quæ&longs;tio pertinebit, & principia non cognitionis, vt aliquibus place
re video; &longs;ed rei ip&longs;ius attinget quæ idem valent àc cau&longs;&longs;æ quarum quatuor &longs;pecies &longs;unt omni
bus con&longs;picuæ, ex quo vt materia, per quod vt forma, à quo vt efficiens, cuius gratia vt finis, ta
met&longs;i veteres, cùm materiam &longs;olam, vt cau&longs;&longs;am agno&longs;cerent, aut &longs;i prætereà cau&longs;&longs;am mouentem
ob&longs;etuarent, velut Empedocles & Anaxagoras; quia tamen vel eam non v&longs;urparent in reddenda
ratione problematum naturalium, ni&longs;i fortè cur ita fieret à materia non &longs;uppeteret,
&longs;olet in iis quæ &longs;unt ad vnum, vt res à notiore nuncupetur; quia materia quam elementum pro
priè vocant, notior e&longs;&longs;et, eodem quoque nomine reliquas cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ignificari voluerint. Itaque
di&longs;cordia illa Empedoclea quam &longs;ine controuer&longs;ia cau&longs;&longs;am efficientem ponimus ab Ari&longs;totele
ip&longs;o elementi nomine vocata e&longs;t; de elemento, quòd primo &longs;ignificat materiam, non principio,
aut cau&longs;&longs;a mentionem facerent. Quicquid igitur &longs;it & quomodocunque vocetur, &longs;eu
&longs;iue cau&longs;&longs;a, &longs;iue elementum, cùm &longs;cientia quæque ex notitia principiorum, &longs;eu cau&longs;&longs;arum, &longs;iue ele
mentorum oriatur; à nobis di&longs;&longs;erendum e&longs;t, an omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera phy&longs;icus a&longs;&longs;umat, &
omnes cau&longs;&longs;as ex omni genere accipiat à prima v&longs;que ad vltimam. Neque enim &longs;olùm cau&longs;&longs;æ
genere di&longs;crepant, &longs;ed in eodem genere aliqua propinquior e&longs;t, alia remotior, vt animalis mate
ria proxima &longs;unt partes difformes, remotior vniformes, remoti&longs;sima quatuor elementa, & ratio
forma hominis proxima, remotior anima: per omnes verò re&longs;pondere liceat interrogatis cur &
quid aliquid &longs;it, vt &longs;igillatim vnaquæque cau&longs;&longs;a
ab&longs;olutam rei cuiu&longs;que &longs;cientiam omnes &longs;imul a&longs;&longs;umere oportear, &longs;iue genere, &longs;iue etiam ordine
di&longs;tinguantur. Et omnes &longs;imul accipiendas e&longs;&longs;e monet Ari&longs;toteles, dum inuehitur in
& Democritum, qui principia rerum naturalium infinita po&longs;uerunt; quòd ex omnibus cau&longs;sis
&longs;cientia con&longs;tat, ex quibus res &longs;cienda con&longs;tituta e&longs;t, quæ &longs;i infinitæ forent, nullo modo concipi
po&longs;&longs;ent. Si igitur non ex omnibus cau&longs;sis ex quibus res &longs;cienda conflatur, &longs;cientia fieret; etiam &longs;i
principia forent infinita, contingeret vt haberemus &longs;cientiam; nanque aliqua &longs;olùm ex infinitis
&longs;ufficerent ex quibus efficeretur &longs;cientia. Prætereà docuit Ari&longs;toteles ab exemplo finis à prima
v&longs;que ad &longs;upremam cau&longs;&longs;am e&longs;&longs;e procedendum; e&longs;t verò illa &longs;uprema qua allata nihil amplius
inquiritur, vt cur indutus e&longs;t pallio? vt prodeat in forum.
cur hoc?
vt offendat amicum.
cur item
i&longs;tud? vt &longs;oluat debitum.
Contrà verò neque omnia quæ &longs;ciri po&longs;&longs;unt, omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera
flagitant: neque item omnes à prima v&longs;que ad vltimam accipi queunt. etenim &longs;i ex eodem gene
re omnes a&longs;&longs;umendæ &longs;int, in infinitum progredi cogemur, quod plurimum abhorret à &longs;cientia:
&longs;iquidem vt &longs;it Franci&longs;cus infinita præcedant indiuidua quæ ni&longs;i extiti&longs;&longs;ent, neque hoc exi&longs;tere
po&longs;&longs;et. Et cùm res quæ &longs;ub &longs;cientiam cadunt, &longs;int æternæ, vel mortales, & ex his quædam &longs;ub&longs;tan
tiæ, nonnullæ accidentia: planum &longs;it æterna carere efficiente naturali, quia non e&longs;t ibi principium
motus quo definitur efficiens: accidentia verò forma: quandò nulla e&longs;t qualitatis qualitas,
ex accidentibus complura fine vacare, quippe quæ ex materiæ nece&longs;sitate &longs;uboriantur.
ter
num non &longs;ine i&longs;to paruo malo habendum e&longs;t. Itaque cùm varia rerum genera &longs;int, necomnia
cau&longs;&longs;as omnes admittant, rerum ex propriis ip&longs;arum principiis &longs;ingulæ &longs;cientiæ &longs;int
&longs;pectatrices; profectò neque omnes &longs;cientiæ per omnes cau&longs;&longs;as vnamquanque rem edocebunt,
neque poterunt, etiam &longs;i contendant:
aut definitiones. Verumenimuerò cùm id in non omnes cau&longs;&longs;as accipientibus, nullam habeat
trouer&longs;iam
po&longs;uimus in quibus nulla neque efficientis, neque boni ratio &longs;olet haberi. At &longs;tatuatur aliquid
omnes cau&longs;&longs;as habens ex omni &longs;cilicet genere ab imis v&longs;que ad &longs;ummas, an'ne demon&longs;trationes
eiu&longs;modi con&longs;trui poterunt qu&ecedil; omnes illas cau&longs;&longs;as complectantur, & erit'ne aliqua &longs;cientia qu&ecedil;
tale demon&longs;trationum genus v&longs;urpare queat? Hìc dici con&longs;ueuit.
Scire &longs;impliciter accipi tribus
modis. etenim dicitur vbi quæque res per omnem rationem note&longs;cit, & &longs;ub omni notione expli
catur, qua concipi pote&longs;t, vt homo quà ens, quà &longs;ub&longs;tantia naturalis, quà magnitudine preditus, Secundò quà &longs;ub certa ratione con&longs;ideratur, & in certum genus refertur, velut
&longs;i &longs;pectetur, quòd &longs;it &longs;ub&longs;tantia in qua fons in&longs;it & origo motus. Tertiò quoque &longs;impliciter &longs;ci
tur, vbi in eo genere &longs;ub propria ratione &longs;pecterur, vt quatenus homo. Quantum certè attinet ad
primum illum modum &longs;ciendi &longs;impliciter, vel id omnes &longs;cientiæ præ&longs;tant vnà, & omnes artes &
facultates, aut vna erit &longs;cientia quæ omnem con&longs;iderandi rationem complectetur, qualem non
nulli ponunt, qui vniuer&longs;am contemplationem in tres partes di&longs;tributam e&longs;&longs;e volunt, non ex re
rum natura, &longs;ed ex v&longs;u no&longs;tro, & ob doctrinæ commoditatem, ob quam &longs;anè cau&longs;&longs;am &longs;æpe fit, vt
id quod vnius e&longs;t methodi & loci, in aliam methodum locumúe transferatur, aut aliunde tracta
tum petatur. ita dicunt primum philo&longs;ophum tran&longs;ump&longs;i&longs;&longs;e rationes ex 8. Phy&longs;.
& vocis tracta
rionem quæ loci illius propria e&longs;t in qua &longs;en&longs;ilium natura declaratur, accipi è 2. de Anim. necnon
vim ridiculorum quæ ip&longs;ius e&longs;t oratoris, à poëtarum arte de&longs;umptam. Nec ratio dee&longs;t qua con
firment illud admirabile. Quandò &longs;cientiæ &longs;e habent veluti res.
Sed vnum e&longs;t omnium genus &longs;i
ne vniuocum, &longs;iue ad vnum, nihil refert ad &longs;tatuendum &longs;cientiæ &longs;ubiectum, nimirum ens. Ergo
& vna &longs;cientia, cuius reliquæ &longs;int partes, quemadmodum reliqua entia &longs;unt partes entis. Sed
&longs;it hoc fal&longs;um, rerum obiectarum varietas mon&longs;trat, difformitas principiorum & di&longs;similis de
mon&longs;trandi modus, vnde &longs;cienti&ecedil; di&longs;tinguuntur, vt anteà vi&longs;um e&longs;t. quid enim cum rebus diuinis
haber affinitatis, quòd æqualibus demptis ab aliis æqualibus re&longs;idua &longs;int æqualia? & accuratio re
quiritur in mathematicis, quæ negligitur in prima philo&longs;ophia propter illiberalitatem. naturalis
flagitat demon&longs;trationes quæ cum &longs;en&longs;u conueniant, Naturalis & mathematica res &longs;peciatim
tractant; vniuersè prima philo&longs;ophia. & omnes tractare &longs;cientias, vt aliqua res reneatur, præter
quàm quòd erit Stoicorum dogmate in&longs;i&longs;tere, quòd idem quem
bonus, & &longs;utor bonus, quod ri&longs;u explodendum e&longs;t; etiam cogetur primus philo&longs;ophus de&longs;cende
read particularem cuin&longs;que rei con&longs;iderationem, vt cum &longs;pectabit hominem quatenus e&longs;t ens,
quod nos nulla ratione approbamus, tùm etiam &longs;cientiæ non habebunt præfinitas interrogatio
nes, &longs;ed &longs;ciens de omni quæ&longs;tione di&longs;&longs;erere valebit. Quòd &longs;i id ab Ari&longs;totele perpetuò negatum.
atque id ip&longs;um acceptum de &longs;ecundo genere &longs;ciendi &longs;impliciter; planum e&longs;t Ari&longs;totelem non no
ui&longs;&longs;e primum &longs;ciendi modum; &longs;ed planè &longs;ecundum accepi&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub quo tertius item continetur:
&longs;upponitur in quaque demon&longs;tratione ratio generalis eius generis quod in ea &longs;cientia tractatur, propriis ve&longs;titur attributis.
Nam quòd vna &longs;it &longs;cientia, quia &longs;it vnum rerum omnium genus;
nihil officit planè, etenim &longs;pectare licet res, vel vt habent inter &longs;e ordinem prædicationis, vel vt
habent in &longs;e ip&longs;is rationem &longs;cibilis, vt &longs;cibiles autem habent certos terminos quibus continentur,
& certos tractandi modos. At ens c&ecedil;tera complectitur vt prædicabile, vnde &longs;cientiarum partitio
non accipitur. Non &longs;equitur igitur, vt etiam &longs;i ens de omnibus prædicetur; &longs;it vna fcientia com
munis. Igitur accipiamus &longs;ecundum genus &longs;ciendi &longs;impliciter quod ab Ari&longs;totele definitum fui&longs;
&longs;e credimus: & cùm duo &longs;int cau&longs;&longs;arum ordines, primus qui po&longs;itus e&longs;t in quatuor diuer&longs;is gene
ribus, alter qui gradibus cau&longs;&longs;arum generis eiu&longs;dem con&longs;i&longs;tit; &longs;i primum ordinem &longs;pectemus, ita
decernetur. Effectum, &longs;eu quæ&longs;tionem non e&longs;&longs;e nece&longs;&longs;ariò re&longs;oluendam in &longs;ingula genera cau&longs;&longs;a
rum, &longs;ed in ea duntaxat à quibus pendet. Cauendum verò e&longs;&longs;e, vt omnia &longs;ub illa ratione ponan
tur quæ illius &longs;cientiæ propria e&longs;t in qua ver&longs;amur. vt &longs;i de re naturali, quatenus e&longs;t huiu&longs;modi,
quæramus; eius &longs;cientiam con&longs;equemur ex iis ip&longs;is cau&longs;sis quæ pertinent ad rem illam
damIta
fiet vt mathematicus tractans quantum, etiam &longs;i quantum ab efficiente producatur; & &longs;it form&ecedil;
in&longs;trumentum, materiæ extentæ terminus, nihil horum attinget; quia repudiant h&ecedil;c ab
&longs;tractionem & immobilitatem quam con&longs;ectatur mathematicus. Verùm quod &longs;pectat ad cau&longs;&longs;a
rum gradus, res ip&longs;a re&longs;oluenda e&longs;t in cau&longs;&longs;as v&longs;que &longs;ummas; modo tamen cau&longs;&longs;æ per &longs;e ad effe
ctum dirigantur. &longs;i minus; quantumuis &longs;e con&longs;equantur, non omnes accipiendæ &longs;unt.
vtputa,
inuentio the&longs;auri, cau&longs;&longs;am habet proximam nimirum effo&longs;sionem, effo&longs;sio quoque
cau&longs;&longs;am, nempe ru&longs;ticum effodientem. Inuentio tamen the&longs;auri per &longs;e à ru&longs;tico effodiente non
pendet, &longs;iquidem the&longs;aurus præter &longs;pem effodientis inuentus fuerit.
Quamuis ergo
&longs;it alia prima cau&longs;&longs;a effo&longs;sionis, non nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t ab ea per &longs;e pendere effo&longs;sionis effectum, quando
quidem prima illa cau&longs;&longs;a non huc per &longs;e contendit, &longs;ed per accidens &longs;olùm, effodiebat enim ru&longs;ti
cus terram, vt &longs;ereret arbores, arborum &longs;atio per &longs;e optabatur; &longs;ed dum &longs;ationis gratia foderet,
euenit fortuito, vt the&longs;aurum inueniret. Atque ita &ecedil;tiam &longs;i in infinitum indiuidua &longs;ibi &longs;uccedant,
po&longs;teriora tamen exi&longs;tunt, & cogno&longs;ci po&longs;&longs;unt; proptereà quòd et&longs;i alterum ex altero na&longs;citur in
infinitum: vt à Saturno Iuppiter, à Ioue Tantalus, non tamen Saturnus e&longs;t per &longs;e cau&longs;&longs;a Tantali,
&longs;ed per accidens. Quocirca non cogimur di&longs;&longs;oluere po&longs;terius hoc indiuiduum in reliqua omnia
præcedentia, nec in immen&longs;um, &longs;ed in illis cau&longs;sis acquie&longs;cimus quas per &longs;e nouimus ad eius in
diuidui Proinde etiam &longs;i Ati&longs;toteles omnes cau&longs;&longs;as in demon&longs;tratione
definitioneúe &longs;umendas &longs;ignificauerit, eius &longs;ententiam vt collectim,
omnia genera cau&longs;&longs;arum, non tamen per illa omnia vnumquodque demon&longs;trare cogatur. Nunc
ad illa veniamus quorum cau&longs;&longs;a hæc præfati &longs;umus, ac doceamus quibus cau&longs;sis, & quatenus
phy&longs;icus vtatur. Profectò &longs;i phy&longs;icus &longs;pectat &longs;ub&longs;tantias quà mobiles &longs;unt, mathematicus autem
res immobiles, modo primus philo&longs;ophus: phy&longs;icus &longs;anè cau&longs;&longs;as illas accipere debe
bit à quibus pendet motus, eas negligent primus philo&longs;ophus & mathematicus, &longs;olas reci
pient, quæ &longs;ine motu &longs;uos præ&longs;tabunt affectus, hoc quidem prima fronte &longs;ic decernendum vide
bitur: attamen non &longs;ine diligenti inqui&longs;itione approbandum; &longs;iquidem oporteat de cau&longs;&longs;arum
&longs;peculatione di&longs;tinguere. Nanque pluribus modis cau&longs;&longs;æ
quædam & entia ab&longs;oluta veluti Deus, quà Deus e&longs;t; vel etiam vt cau&longs;&longs;æ,
quòd illarum natura & e&longs;&longs;entia cum diligentia ve&longs;tigetur, &longs;iue quod ad cognitionem
pertinet, &longs;iue quod ad complexam, aut in demon&longs;trationibus &longs;olùm a&longs;&longs;umuntur. Rur&longs;us &longs;pecu
latio principiorum aut e&longs;t habitus, aut methodi. Permagni verò intere&longs;t &longs;it'ne &longs;peculatio metho
di an habitus. Nam methodi e&longs;&longs;e dicitur, quia doceri po&longs;sit; habitus autem, quia cognitio
pendeat ex alicuius &longs;cientiæ &longs;undamentis, attamen explicariaut non nece&longs;&longs;e &longs;it, aut nequeat. Et
planè principiorum cognitio, quà &longs;unt entia & incomplexa & ab ea con&longs;ideratione ab&longs;trahuntur
quæ principij, hoc e&longs;t, relatiui cuiu&longs;dam rationem præ&longs;e&longs;ert nullius e&longs;&longs;e methodi iure optimo iu
dicabitur, quemadmodum de mente actu cen&longs;etur ab Auerroë.
procedendo à nobis notis ea &longs;olum indicat, e&longs;&longs;entiam per &longs;e menti con&longs;iderandam relinquit, hæc
autem habitu &longs;apientiæ pollensalla contemplatur Itaque cùm metbodum in præ&longs;entia con&longs;ecte
mur, de illis di&longs;&longs;eramus, quà methodo &longs;ubilciuntur. Ea primum quà principia, ide&longs;t, cum relatio
ne & habitudine concipiuntur: deinde vt complexa tractantur, hoc e&longs;t, vt doceatur, hæc e&longs;&longs;e prin
cipia, neque id qui&longs;quam negare audebit, opinor, qui primum phy&longs;icum &longs;edulò ob&longs;eruabit, vbi
contraria prima & &longs;ubiectum e&longs;&longs;e principia concluditur.
forma, priuatio, & &longs;ubiectum; &longs;ed formam, priuationem & materiam e&longs;&longs;e principia. verùm quòd
&longs;int, præterquàm quòd demon&longs;trationi non e&longs;t obnoxium, &longs;icuti docuimus antè, methodi mune
ra tran&longs;ilit, Illud video non &longs;atis ab Ari&longs;totelis interpretibus animad
uer&longs;um, ne dixerim, confu&longs;um; quod e&longs;t, cau&longs;&longs;am tractare & illam v&longs;urpare in Etenim vt facile me o&longs;ten&longs;urum confido phy&longs;icu
fic omne cau&longs;&longs;arum genuscum diligentia ab ip&longs;o tractari confurabo. Quòd enim per omne cau&longs;
&longs;æ genus demon&longs;tret, præter Ari&longs;totelis te&longs;timonia, Ad na
turalem philo&longs;ophiam pertinet illas cau&longs;&longs;as in demon&longs;trationibus a&longs;&longs;umere ex quibus pendent
&longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturales, quà naturales &longs;unt. Sed &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ naturales, quatenus huin&longs;modi, pendent:
ex omni genere cau&longs;&longs;arum. Et omneigitur cau&longs;&longs;arum genus, ad naturalem philo&longs;ophiam perti
nebit. Iam enim con&longs;titit &longs;cientiam,
&longs;as in demon&longs;tratione e&longs;&longs;e v&longs;urpandas ex quibus res ip&longs;a con&longs;tat, quatenus in ea &longs;cientia tractari
pote&longs;t. At verò in rebus naturalibus quà &longs;unt naturales, e&longs;t forma, vt quod quid erat e&longs;&longs;e homi
nis; materia men&longs;trua, mouens pater, finis cuius gratia vel qui cum forma conuenit, vel eius ope
ratio perfecta. Et profectò cum rerum naturalium ingenio congruit omnis cau&longs;&longs;arum generis
a&longs;&longs;umptio, quippe quòd &longs;int &longs;uoptè nixu mobiles. Atqui in motu &longs;ubiectum requiritur quod e&longs;t
materia; de&longs;ideratur efficiens, vnde principium motus exi&longs;tat. exoptatur finis quo efficientis ope
ra terminantur, flagitatur forma per quam &longs;it id quod natura per motum con&longs;equi voluit; neque
enim mouet, in immen&longs;um, &longs;ed aliquid permanens mouendo cupit adipi&longs;ci,
&longs;cere, id autem e&longs;t forma. C&ecedil;terùm hoc facilè dabitur: illud non approbabitur à pleri&longs;que philo
&longs;ophum naturalem demon&longs;trando accipere primam formam & primum finem, & ad id confir
mandum multa loca & rationes adducentur. Quoniam ea quæ con&longs;iderat phy&longs;icus, re&longs;piciunt
motum. At primus finis & prima forma &longs;ine motu con&longs;i&longs;tunt & concipiuntur.
Igitur à phy&longs;ico
non a&longs;&longs;umuntur. Prætereà cùm res naturales &longs;ine motu, &longs;eu materia non definiantur, illæ cau&longs;&longs;æ
&longs;unt à phy&longs;ico a&longs;&longs;umendæ quæ cum motu operantur. Cùm ergo primus finis & prima forma &longs;e
parentur à motu; dicemus item ha&longs;ce cau&longs;&longs;as cum &longs;cientia naturali non congruere. Tum etiam
ip&longs;emet Ari&longs;toteles affirmat phy&longs;icum &longs;pectare quæcunque mouendo mouentur,
verò manent immobilia non e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;icæ con&longs;iderationis, a&longs;&longs;erit.
De principio
formam Et multo
clarius adhuc 1. a&longs;&longs;euerat, de immobili principio di&longs;tinguere prioris e&longs;&longs;e philo&longs;ophi.
Quamobrem naturalis à c&ecedil;teris philo&longs;ophijs &longs;eparatur, quòd motum & materiam perpetuò &longs;u
mit. Sed prima forma
finis motum non re&longs;piciunt.
Non ergo v&longs;urpantur à phy&longs;ico.
Sed enim, &longs;i philo&longs;ophus naturalis a&longs;&longs;umere debet omneis cau&longs;&longs;as corporis naturalis, quatenus
e&longs;t huiu&longs;modi, in eius verò cau&longs;sis prima forma finis numerantur. (e&longs;t enim primus fi
nis primum quid e&longs;t) finis a&longs;&longs;umentur à philo&longs;opho naturali.
nem, cui omnia parent, & quod imProptereà, vt omnes cau&longs;&longs;as ab imis v&longs;que ad
&longs;ummas adhiberi à phy&longs;ico iuis demon&longs;trationibus affirmo: &longs;ic omnes cum diligentia ab eodem
tractari po&longs;&longs;e nego; &longs;ed eas tantùm cum diligentia in hac methodo explicandas e&longs;&longs;e quæ non &longs;e
parantur à motu, reliquarum explicatio diligens &longs;uperiori officio delegabitur. & cau&longs;&longs;a e&longs;t, quia
cùm includant rationem & notionem motus, quia motus à phy&longs;ico diligenti&longs;simè exponitur; er
go, & illa, in quorum notione ine&longs;t motus optimè à naturali cogno&longs;centur. Nam veri&longs;imile e&longs;t
ibi aliquid maximè cogno&longs;ci, vbi illud maximè cogno&longs;citur per quod explicatur. Itaque omnia
illa loca quæ nuper allata
non exponere & pro merito tractare: nihil ob&longs;tabunt, quominus eas in demon&longs;trationibus v&longs;ur
pari po&longs;&longs;ecredamus. illud &longs;olum per&longs;uadebunt: demon&longs;trationem qu&ecedil;in cau&longs;&longs;as illas re&longs;oluitur,
vt e&longs;t ex maximè primis in hac philo&longs;ophia, ita non e&longs;&longs;e ex nobis noti&longs;simis, quòd illò phy&longs;icæ
methodi vis non tuebatur. Re&longs;tat igitur, vt efficiens & materia cum omni diligentia tractentur à
philo&longs;opho naturali & demon&longs;trationes quæ è tali cau&longs;&longs;arum genere conflantur in methodo na
turali, fint &longs;uis numeris ab&longs;olutæ.
& omnibus modis; cùm è çeteris ab&longs;olutæ quidem
&longs;int, &longs;ed in proprio genere; quia &longs;cilicet illis &longs;it contentus, quatenus referuntur ad motum. Nam
quicquid vlterius cogno&longs;citur, &longs;i facit ad rei notitiam pleniorem; non tamen facit ad
quatenus e&longs;t naturalis, &longs;ed vt cadit in aliam rationem, vtputa, entis. Neque ob&longs;tat quòd operen
tur prima forma finis &longs;ine motu: quare non re&longs;piciant &longs;ub&longs;tantiam naturalem; quia
id &longs;ibi vult illud dictum, quòd omnis earum ratio
liquas cau&longs;las hæ quoque &longs;ine motu con&longs;iderari queunt, cùm &longs;unctiones habeant qu&ecedil; &longs;ine corpo
re obiri po&longs;sint. Ideo quatenus re&longs;piciunt motum, pertinent ad methodum naturalem: &longs;ed cùm
habeant item alia officia qu&ecedil; &longs;egregantur à motu, illa res natura plenè cogno&longs;ci nequit à phy&longs;ico
qui non excedit limitibus motus; &longs;ed ab eo philo&longs;opho cogno&longs;cetur qui con&longs;iderat entia quæ
&longs;unt immobilia; hic verò e&longs;t primus philo&longs;ophus. Quanquam de iis quæ nuper con&longs;tituta &longs;unt,
non leues exi&longs;tunt dubitationes: &longs;iquidem &longs;ubiectum philo&longs;o phi&ecedil; naturalis perfectius in alia
tiaQuia verò facilè hoc dabis obiiciens locum Ari&longs;torelis,
e&longs;&longs;e præbere &longs;ubiecta c&ecedil;teris &longs;cientiis; qua&longs;i no&longs;cat ip&longs;e &longs;olus illa e&longs;&longs;e &longs;impliciter: anima luerte ob
&longs;ecro Ari&longs;totelem agere de eo quòd &longs;int; itaque verè dicere: quandò vnus primus philo&longs;ophus
tenet rem e&longs;&longs;e, quatenus e&longs;t: &longs;ed nos hîc &longs;ub&longs;tantiam naturalem &longs;ub ratione naturæ concipimus;
eam verò nulli notiorem fore quàm philo&longs;opho naturali prædicamus. Tùm etiam &longs;citu dignum
e&longs;t an'ne materia plenè cogno&longs;catur à philo&longs;opho nacurali; ecquid'nam amplius afferat ad hanc
cognitionem primus philo&longs;ophus. At verò quantum e&longs;t de primo: cùm &longs;it hoc in no&longs;tris placitis
con&longs;titutum principia &longs;pectari in methodis cum habitudine ad ea querum principia &longs;unt, etiam
&longs;equenti auctoritatem Ari&longs;totelis &longs;ctupulum inuciet ea &longs;ententia.
&longs;tinctè no&longs;&longs;e velit, alterum quoque di&longs;tinctè no&longs;cat nece&longs;&longs;e e&longs;t: neque enim &longs;atis e&longs;t percunctanti
cuius ego &longs;im filius, &longs;i parentis filium me e&longs;&longs;e audiuerit: &longs;ed tùm acquie&longs;cet, &longs;i me Nicolai filium
e&longs;&longs;e doceatur, qui nobiles cau&longs;&longs;as aliquando perorarit: aliter non plus certior abierit, quàm curio
&longs;ior ille qui quærens ex quodam &longs;eruo, quò iret, & cuius e&longs;&longs;et; re&longs;pon&longs;um tulerit. Huceo, heri
&longs;um &longs;eruos; nunquid nunc es certior? Hîc ego te con&longs;iderare velim, longè aliud e&longs;&longs;e rei merita
tractare, & methodi in qua ver&longs;amur, etenim methodus procedit ex propriis, & certis
terminis cohibetur: itaque &longs;atis e&longs;t illi ea continere quæ ip&longs;ius propria &longs;unt, reliqua negligit; neo
idcirco quicquàm de iure &longs;uo deminuit rei notitia latius patet, &
rum opem flagitat: itaque c&ecedil;lum & à naturali & ab A&longs;tronomo con&longs;ideratur; quia &longs;ubit diuer&longs;as
rationes; cùm c&ecedil;teroquin vna &longs;it cuiu&longs;que methodi ratio qua determinatur: quamobrem ea prin
cipiorum notitia contenta e&longs;&longs;e debet, qua &longs;ubiectum &longs;ub propria ratione tractatur, vlteriorem
requirit; & quicquid vlterius adhibetur, alienum e&longs;t, & ad rei quidem notitiam faciens, &longs;ed nihil
adiuuans illam methodum. Neque no&longs;le oportet, vt aliquem certò patrem alterius e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ciamus,
&longs;it'ne animal rationis compos an brutum; neque po&longs;tulat ea notitia certam atque accuratam fun
damenti, vt ita dicam, explicationem: itaque di&longs;tincta alterius relatiui cognitio v&longs;que ad
terminum peruenit, & cum di&longs;tinctione illa adhuc connexam habet aliquam con&longs;u&longs;ionem: aliter
immineret periculum, ne &longs;ciremus bis duo facere quatuor, ni&longs;i perfectè lciremus quid e&longs;&longs;et nume
rus, quid quantitas, & an &longs;it materi&ecedil; proprietas, an form&ecedil;. neque no&longs;&longs;et expugnare oppidum Im
perator, ni&longs;i cogno&longs;ceret quid &longs;it victoria, quid beatitudo, & cuncta politic&ecedil; principia tenerer, qu&ecedil;
&longs;anè res e&longs;t venia potius, quàm admiratione digna. Hoc iudicio
Tul
hum
de quacunque re &longs;ubtiliter di&longs;ceptandi negat oratori. Sed Ari&longs;totelis ip&longs;ius iudicium, & aliorum
philo&longs;ophorum per&longs;equamur. quotasqui&longs;que e&longs;t ex A&longs;tronomis, qui de ecly p&longs;i ita di&longs;putet, vt
genere con&longs;ter, quæ &longs;it eius forma; vtrum'necaducum &longs;it corpus, an mortale? eo contentus etit,
quòd Luna à Sole
atque vbi ex interuentu terræ lumen Solis amittat, tùm fieri eclyp&longs;in: itaque ve&longs;tigabir quo tem
pore terra &longs;ic inter vtraque lumina interponatur, vt Luna in eius vmbram incurrat, & eclyp&longs;in ita
de&longs;ignabit. & illa di&longs;cens nihilo plus erit bonus mathematicus.
Et medicus v&longs;que ad quendam
terminum materiam nerui no&longs;cere volet; accuratam eius perqui&longs;itionem phy&longs;ico relinquet; ni
hilominus Alexandro dignus e&longs;&longs;e poterit. Etiam logicus illa breui in&longs;tructione
contentus erit, certam doctErgo fines &longs;uos aliquando tuebi
tur methodus, dum rem pro &longs;uo munere explanabit; etiam &longs;i principia non pro rei dignitate, &longs;ed
pro &longs;uo ip&longs;ius merito tractet. & tamen tanta lux erit principiorum, vt quamuis non ab&longs;olutè co
gno&longs;cantur; ea tamen illu&longs;trate queant quæ &longs;unt ex ip&longs;is; & &longs;i non quatenus ea res pateretur, at
&longs;altem quoad ab eius methodi pro&longs;e&longs;&longs;ore de&longs;ideratur. Proin de Phy&longs;ico &longs;at e&longs;&longs;e dicemus, &longs;i pri
mum motorem &longs;ic tractet, vt re&longs;picit materiam &longs;en&longs;ilem; attribura doceat, quatenus erum
punt ex illa habitudine; nec aliter explicatur abip&longs;o, quòd e&longs;t indiniduus & æternus, & extra
omnem materiæ contagionem
munus redundat in materiam: quod fine illa habitudine concipi pote&longs;t, id alterius officium e&longs;&longs;e
dicimus. & hoc modo 3. Phy&longs;.
pars erit no&longs;træ methodi; & in illo regre&longs;&longs;us phy&longs;icus; &longs;i
re&longs;picias, ab&longs;olutus; &longs;i rem perpendas, aliqua ex parte deficiens. At verò tibi fortè negotium fa
ce&longs;&longs;et, quòd &longs;i ita nouit phy&longs;icus primum motorem, & eius accurata notitia pertinet ad alterum
philo&longs;ophum; videbitur e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubalternus, quod ramen anteà confutatum e&longs;t: etenim non poterit
explicare quid &longs;it illud principium, nec afferre propter quid &longs;impliciter, &longs;ed
&longs;it; cur ita &longs;it, ab altero arce&longs;&longs;et, atqui vbi hic gradus intercedebar; &longs;ubalternationis ratio poneba
tur. Ad hoc dicam primum motorem quoque primum, quà primus e&longs;t motor, à phy&longs;ico no&longs;ci
quid &longs;it, quantum fert eius ing
deinde tum re&longs;pondebo affinitatem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ubalternationis, vbi in genere conueniant &longs;ubaltern a &
&longs;ubalternans: at cùm &longs;ublimior &longs;peculatio primi motoris &longs;it alterius generis; cùm hæc &longs;pecter &longs;ub
&longs;tantiam naturalem; illa verò &longs;ub&longs;tantiam &longs;impliciter (erenim genus in &longs;cientiis à ratione formali
dueitur qu&ecedil; omnino diuer&longs;a e&longs;t in phy&longs;ica & prin
na. Tertiò defendimus primum mororem &longs;e habere vt finem; at qu&ecedil; con&longs;iderat finem, non habet
rationem &longs;ubalternantis, &longs;ed Qnapropter e&longs;t gemina &longs;acultas, quæ in motoris pri
minotitia vertitur; & &longs;ingulæ in &longs;uo genere perfectæ. Tran&longs;eo nunc ad alterum caput, quo de no
titia materiæ di&longs;ceptandum e&longs;t, qu
plena cuiu&longs;que rei cognitio tunSed materia cau&longs;&longs;as omnes in &longs;
Igitur materia cau&longs;&longs;atum omnium
flagitat. Atqui non omnes ca
Neque igitur phy&longs;icus plenècogno
&longs;cet materiam. Nanque maretia formæ gratia e&longs;t & finis; eade
con&longs;equitur. Præterea materia, vt nobis placet, e&longs;t pote&longs;tas.
ca verò &longs;ine actn cogno&longs;ci
Cæterùm neque actus neque pote&longs;tas à phy&longs;ico, vel auctorc Ari&longs;toConfitnro etiam, quia forma f
Sed forma
non cogno&longs;citur à phy&longs;ico per&longs;ectè; multò minus igitu
&longs;te Atierroë.
v&longs;que ad vltimas. At materia prima non pote&longs;t à phy&longs;ico no&longs;ci.
Neque item vltima & proxima.
quia omnes artifices mentionem faciunt de materia proxima, non de remota & prima, vt medi
cus de materia proxima nerui, quæ fortè &longs;unt elementa. Verùm phy&longs;icus e&longs;t artifex particularis:
neque onim &longs;pectat ens &longs;implicner, &longs;ed aliqua conditione re&longs;trictuns, vt puta mobilitate. Neque
igitnr phy&longs;icus &longs;pectabit materiam primam. Tùm etiam; quòd &longs;i eam tractaret phy&longs;icus, &
&longs;trare po&longs;&longs;et. non demon&longs;trat autem, quia princrpium e&longs;t.
Nos item in confirmationem adimus.
Drima philo&longs;ophia materiam cogno&longs;cit. Sed prima philo&longs;ophia e&longs;t maximè &longs;cientia, quippe quæ
&longs;ciat ex maximè primis. Ergo & ip&longs;a magis &longs;cit quàm phy&longs;ica.
Sic materiæ tractatio non erit pr&ecedil;
cipua philo&longs;ophi naturalis. Sed quantum &longs;pectat ad Auicennæ decretum; fal&longs;om pror&longs;us exi&longs;ti
mo phy&longs;icum materiæ primæ cognitionem detrectare. Tùm quòd artifex, et&longs;i materiam
ni&longs;simam
minus Itaque cùm phi
lo&longs;ophus naturalis con&longs;ideret omnes formas naturales, etiam con&longs;iderare cogetur materiam
munem
mentorum formas accipiat. Accedit eodem, quòd &longs;i phy&longs;icus demotu differit, etiam principia
motus omnia ve&longs;tigare debet in quibus cum materia prima reponatur, efficit item, vt materia pri
ma &longs;it à phy&longs;ico no&longs;cenda. Quamobrem non id puto nunc in controuer&longs;iam e&longs;&longs;e reuocandum;
no&longs;cat materiam primam quàm primus philo&longs;ophus. Rationes autem Auicennæ cum reliquis
po&longs;teà diluentur. nam vi&longs;um e&longs;t prius di&longs;ceptare de cau&longs;sis, quas tractant primus philo&longs;ophus &
mathematicus.
c.
4.
T. c.
36.
T. 70.
8. Met. T. 12.
T. 71.
T. 83.
T. 48.
T. 78.
Auic nnæ
ratio I.
T. c.
22.
Cap.
XV.
Eadem quoque di&longs;tinctio propemodum quadrabit in primam philo&longs;ophiam.
dicemus enim
genus omne cau&longs;&longs;arum v&longs;urpari ab illo philo&longs;opho demon&longs;trando: accuratam verò expli
cationem primi finis, formæ &longs;olius e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi.
Nanque & id quod aiebat Ari
&longs;toteles, principio &longs;ecundum &longs;peciem determinare alterius quàm phy&longs;icæ methodi munus e&longs;&longs;e,
& omnino de immobili principio &longs;atis per&longs;uadent, eas cau&longs;&longs;as ab ip&longs;o &longs;olo cum
reliquas autem cau&longs;&longs;as, materiam nimirum & efficiens monet Ari&longs;toteles in illa methodo propo
ni ad explicandum, Omne item cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; ge
nus accipiet in demon&longs;trando primus philo&longs;ophus: &longs;iquidem contempletur ens, quatenus ens:
itaque contemplatur omneis cau&longs;&longs;as entis, quatenus ens. Sed omnia cau&longs;&longs;arum genera &longs;unt cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil;
entis. Igitur & per omne cau&longs;&longs;arum genus demon&longs;trabit.
Et cùm entium quædam &longs;en&longs;ilia &longs;int,
alia &longs;en&longs;um fugiant, & immunia &longs;int à materia: &longs;en&longs;ilium verò principia &longs;int materia & efficiens. Ergo materia & efficiens non modò à primo philo&longs;opho tractabuntur, &longs;ed demon&longs;trando item
accipientur. Itaque omne cau&longs;&longs;æ genus ab vtroque philo&longs;opho a&longs;&longs;umetur.
&longs;ed ea quæ re&longs;piciunt
motum, vt ab illo &longs;eparari non po&longs;sint, diligenter à phy&longs;ico tractabuntur: illa verò qu&ecedil; ab&longs;oluun
tur à motu, diligenter ve&longs;tigabit primus philo&longs;ophus, vt
quia &longs;cilicet phy&longs;icus ea cau&longs;&longs;arum genera tractabit, quà &longs;unt principia corporis naturalis; pri
mus autem philo&longs;ophus quatenus &longs;unt principia entis. quod item docuit
niorem, quippe qui etiam con&longs;iderando &longs;en&longs;ilia ad particularia At verò cùm è cau&longs;
&longs;is quædam proximæ &longs;int, aliæ remotæ, &longs;eu quædam vniuer&longs;ales, aliæ &longs;peciales, haud facilè dede
rim omnes æquè accipi aut &longs;pectari à primo philo&longs;opho, &longs;icut à naturali. quandò primus philo&longs;o
phus e&longs;t vniu er&longs;alis admodum, nec particularia contemplatur quæ &longs;pectantur à phy&longs;ico: aliter
cæteræ &longs;cientiæ redundarent. Proinde cau&longs;&longs;arum proximarum tractationem pror&longs;us denegarem
primo philo&longs;opho. & naturali committerem.
Neque ob&longs;tant illa quæ opponi &longs;olent.
vt primum
philo&longs;ophum non concipere motum; naturalem nihil &longs;ine motu Aut etiam quòd
hæ methodi &longs;ecum differunt, quòd prima philo&longs;ophia &longs;ine motu con&longs;iderat illa quæ naturalis
non diuellit à motu. Neque enim hæc nos ita credere cogunt, vt quæ &longs;ine motu exi&longs;tunt, &longs;ic à pri
mo philo&longs;opho tractentur, aut accipiantur, quin & illa &longs;pectet, aut a&longs;&longs;umat, quæ
aut quòd phy&longs;icus ita illa a&longs;&longs;umat quæ motum re&longs;piciunt, vt cætera negligat. Sed illud notant,
quo vtræque methodi &longs;eparantur. ex hoc enim di&longs;tinguuntur quòd prima philo&longs;ophia cum dili
gentia tractat immobilia principia, phy&longs;ica verò mobilia, neque tamen ob id ab oppo&longs;itorum no
titia excluduntur. &longs;ufficit phy&longs;ico, &longs;i principia quæ &longs;unt immobilia con&longs;ideret, aut &longs;u
mat, quatenus re&longs;piciunt motum. Quapropter non erit &longs;impliciter verum primum philo&longs;ophum
&longs;ine motu & materia contemplari. Sed verum erit ea quæ tractat phy&longs;icus, à materia
ab&longs;olui. Idcirco neque dici poterit.
omnem con&longs;iderationem quæ materiam
includit,
e&longs;&longs;e naturalem. Sed illud verè a&longs;&longs;euerabitur, omnem con&longs;iderationem qu&ecedil; re&longs;puit motum & ma
teriam e&longs;&longs;e primi philo&longs;ophi, &longs;eu rectius, non naturalem, quia mathematicæ quoque repudiant
motum. Ad quas nunc accedentes, ijs
fuerunt: nimirum quòd cau&longs;&longs;as habent, & quòd cùm immobilia &longs;tatuant, fine & efficiente carent,
addemus. Si mathematicorum morem Euclidis, Archimedis, & Ptolem&ecedil;i con&longs;ulamus, nullam de
vllo cau&longs;&longs;arum genere mentionem fieri intelligemus. Etenim &longs;crip&longs;ere per lemmata; rem &longs;cilicet
ip&longs;am nudam qua &longs;cientia
tem omi&longs;ere, quæ pertinet ad modum &longs;ciendi, & ad informandos animos auditorum, qua gene
ralia quædam capita exponuntur quibus illa &longs;cientia gubernatur: rerum &longs;cilicet conditio
riæque&longs;ubiectæ edi&longs;&longs;eritur, enarratur quod demon&longs;trationum genus admittat, & denique illa pr&ecedil;
cepta, quæ generaliter à primo philo&longs;opho & analytico tradita &longs;unt, ad materiam &longs;ubiectam ac
commodantur. Hæc &longs;anè omnia ab auctoribus mathematicæ neglecta, aut &longs;iquid ad hoc pertinet,
vnus Ptolemæus id præ&longs;titit. Sed veri&longs;imile e&longs;t, &longs;icut Ari&longs;toteles in cæteris &longs;cientiis atque faculta
tibus con&longs;cribendis perpetuò fecit; &longs;ic & in ijs edocendis fui&longs;&longs;e facturum: & &longs;icuti aliorum erro
res detexit, dum ea neglexere, quæ quatenus ip&longs;um in&longs;unt & aliena per&longs;ecuti &longs;unt; dum rationes
&longs;ophi&longs;ticas, & p&longs;eudographos adnotauit, dum rerum mathematicarum & quantitatis vim &longs;igni
ficauit, dum docuit quo'nam vterentur, ita quoque
Facigitur mathematicorum commentarios ea
methodi parte, quæ modus &longs;ciendi vocatur, fui&longs;&longs;e &longs;uppletos. cùm immobilia tractent;
neque de fine, neque de efficiente &longs;ermonem ab iis fui&longs;le faciendum. Cæterùm neque de materia
&longs;en&longs;ili, quandò &longs;ubiicitur mutationibus. Itaque re&longs;tat, vt de forma & ad &longs;ummum de altero ma
teriæ genere quod intelligendum vocatur, &longs;ermonem facturi fuerint. quod autem &longs;it id materi&ecedil;
genus po&longs;thàc docebimus. At cùm mathematica &longs;int formæ naturales, in eo &longs;olum differentia,
quòd vt &longs;unt in materia &longs;en&longs;ili, citra notionem illius concipiuntur, ex hoc efficitur, vt iis re uera
materia &longs;upponatur, atque illa quidem &longs;en&longs;ilis. &longs;ed id non e&longs;t methodi mathematicæ.
Verum
enimuerò, quia quantum accipitur
interuallum: etiam quod attinet ad hanc methodum, tale materiæ genus e&longs;t mathematici mune
ris. Nunc videndum, quo cau&longs;&longs;æ genere demon&longs;trando vtatur.
ac de forma dubium non e&longs;t apud
Ari&longs;totelem, aut aliquem ex eius interpretibus de genere formæ dubium e&longs;t, & vtrum materiam
adhibeat
appellant declarantem, hoc e&longs;t medium, in cuius virtute conclu&longs;io no&longs;citur. Sed nos olim docui
mus, ea&longs;dem eiu&longs;dem e&longs;&longs;e definitiones naturales & mathematicas, & rei principia &longs;umi; ac &longs;i
do
mur, quæ tamen à mathemaricis aut neglecta fuerint, quia &longs;atis foret illis ad v&longs;um properantibus
veritatem a&longs;&longs;equi theorematum, aut forta&longs;&longs;e ignorata, quia proprias affectiones quanti &longs;igillatim
con&longs;ectati fuerint, non eius naturam & quod per &longs;e ine&longs;t in quanto. aut etiam non omnia quæ
ignorantur, e&longs;&longs;e obnoxia demon&longs;trationi, &longs;icut in cæteris &longs;cientiis, &longs;ed aliqua à &longs;igno declarari,
nulla
quodammodo &longs;e habentia, vt neque per&longs;picua &longs;int. nanque h&ecedil;c principia &longs;unt, neque per &longs;e igno
ta, quòd horum &longs;it demon&longs;tratio, &longs;ed ignota quodammodo. quapropter admonitione &longs;ola, aut
aliquo &longs;igno confirmantur. Materiam multi negant accipere demon&longs;trando mathematicum.
Et
certè &longs;i (vt aiunt) mathematici non con&longs;iderant &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, materia verò e&longs;t &longs;ub&longs;tantia, non po
terunt illam a&longs;&longs;umere. Veruntamen ab Ari&longs;totele notatur illa demon&longs;tratio
gulum in &longs;emicirculo e&longs;&longs;e rectum, quòd accipiat materiam. Nanque accipit partes.
atqui partes
quanti ad totum &longs;unt vt materia. Et quod a&longs;&longs;umitur Mathematicum non con&longs;iderare
&longs;i id &longs;it non con&longs;iderare &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, quod e&longs;t rationem &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; non habere in &longs;uis contempla
tionibus, & ego quoque con&longs;entiam: &longs;ed &longs;i id &longs;ibi velit, quia cum quanto &longs;ub&longs;tantiam non con
cipiat, omnino negabo ob eas &longs;cilicet rationes quibus docuimus accidens à &longs;ub&longs;tantia, neque re,
neque cogitatione po&longs;&longs;e &longs;eparari. & quas &longs;uperius attulimus, dum de eius &longs;cienti&ecedil; meritis agere
mus, admonebo &longs;olùm &longs;ub&longs;tantiam illam actu non e&longs;&longs;e, &longs;iquidem inter mathematicos A&longs;trologus
vnus, &longs;ed eam quæ potentia e&longs;t, & interuallum nomine
proprio nuncupatur, quod etiam cùm Simplicio &longs;ub&longs;tantiam e&longs;&longs;e defendemus, & à quanto diuer
&longs;am,
materiam intelligendam quæ mathematicis &longs;upponitur. Itaque a&longs;trologus non purè mathemati
cus; &longs;ed inter mathematicos naturalis con&longs;tituitur. Non ergo &longs;ub&longs;tantia &longs;impliciter, vt cen&longs;uit
Albertus, &longs;ed pote&longs;tate &longs;ub&longs;tantia: non ip&longs;um quantum, vt ij qui &longs;ectantur Auerroëm, licet ratio
nibus quibu&longs;dam confirmare nitantur eiu&longs;modi &longs;ententia. Tùm quòd in definitionibus quæ in
geometria & arithmetica ponuntur nulla materiæ notitia per&longs;piciatur. Tùm etiam, quia doceat
Ari&longs;toteles mathematicum relinquere &longs;olum quantum, & continuum.
accedat Alexandri & aliorum Græcorum
quantum: qua&longs;i verò ip&longs;e Euclides,
vnitatem e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ecundum quam vnum quod que eorum quæ &longs;unt, vnum dicitur, & ip&longs;e Auerroës
in definitione quanti & continui non moneat &longs;ubintelligendam e&longs;&longs;e &longs;ub&longs;tantiam.
dixerint Græci quantum e&longs;&longs;e
Auerroës interminatum vocauit; &longs;i minus explodendi &longs;int. quòd &longs;i accipiant, vti debent,
non id quod e&longs;t actu, &longs;ed pote&longs;tate, pari quoque ratione Auerroës defendi poterit. Neque me ad
huc de &longs;ententia deducere pote&longs;t eruditi&longs;simus ille Pererius, dum conatur o&longs;tendere mathemati
cas e&longs;&longs;entias & affectiones quæ de quantitate demon&longs;trantur, nullo modo illi conuenire in ordine
ad &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed per &longs;e, vt e&longs;&longs;e diuiduum, inter &longs;e commetiri, admittere &ecedil;qualitatem, proportio
nem & c&ecedil;tera id genus: triangulum habere treis angulos æqualeis duobus rectis: lineam rectam
in puncto circulum tangere, multa quæ pa&longs;sim in ea di&longs;ciplina occurrunt: cuncta enim &longs;ine
vllius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ re&longs;pectu, inquit, in&longs;unt in quantitate. Neque enim hæc ita &longs;e habent &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ
beneficio, &longs;ed quantitatis vnius, vnde exi&longs;tit extentio, terminatio, ratio deriuatur æquali
tatis & inæqualitatis, in quibus definiendis tota geometria planè occupatur. ratione
cubum tantum &longs;patij pote&longs;t occupare, non propter &longs;ub&longs;tantiam, &longs;ed per &longs;eip&longs;um, vt &longs;i qua vis
tantum valeret, vt &longs;ub&longs;tantiam à quantitate &longs;eiungeret, quantitas ip&longs;a tantundem &longs;patij &longs;emper
&longs;et implere. Siquidem hæc omnia con&longs;iderentur in potentia quanto quod e&longs;t materia, &longs;ed
plorata natura materi&ecedil;. philo&longs;ophus
materia, tanquam ex fundamento deriuari, cui terminos, quibus po&longs;itis verè
bimus aliàs, qui à forma imponuntur in natura, mens ip&longs;a con&longs;tituit in mathematicis. itaque verè
pote&longs;tate quantum e&longs;t; actu &longs;olùm e&longs;t Quapropter, non potentia quan
tum e&longs;t mentis opus, &longs;ed naturæ, ac &longs;iquo pacto mens in
ip&longs;a in potentia quanto de&longs;ignauit. Neque refert quòd eidem termini ab Ari&longs;totele ponantur na
turales & mathematici. Nanque & ij qui de&longs;ignantur, &longs;unt eorum &longs;imulachra qui &longs;unt in natura,
vt quadratum quod ego de&longs;igno in charta, præ&longs;entat quadratum quod ine&longs;t aut ine&longs;&longs;e pote&longs;t in
corpore naturali. Quamobrem neque accedam ad eorum
omne &longs;ub&longs;tanti&ecedil; genus pr&ecedil;termittere; ad id quod à nobis opponi &longs;olet. Po&longs;terius à priore
&longs;e di&longs;iungi, re&longs;pondent id
&longs;ine ip&longs;o po&longs;terius intelligi nequit: neque. n.
id ita euenire puto in &longs;ub&longs;tantiam ad accidens; cùm
placeat &
Met.
T. c.
5.
T. 44.
T. 3.
T. 35. 39.
lo T. c. 2.
primi philo&longs;ophi. Cap.
XVI.
Redeo nunc ad rationes illas quibus probari videbatur materiam primam nihil attinere
ad philo&longs;ophiam naturalem, &longs;ed materiam
primi philo&longs;ophi. Rationes autem
oportet: &longs;ed prius aliqua veluti fundamenta &longs;ubiicienda &longs;unt.
aliquid magis &longs;cire contingat, altero verò quid &longs;ibi velit id quo plurimum nititur Auicenna, nimi
rum primum In primis igitur lcire
magis e&longs;t tum, cùm &longs;citur per cau&longs;&longs;as id quod per effectum, & &longs;igna no&longs;cebatur, &longs;iue id in eadem
&longs;cientia contingat, &longs;iue &longs;ciatur per &longs;igna in &longs;ubalterna, & in &longs;ubalternante per cau&longs;&longs;as. Pr&ecedil;tereà &longs;i
quid per priores cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;ciatur, magis &longs;citur. priores
bus &longs;cilicet effectus pendet principalius. vel è generibus diuei &longs;is: qu&ecedil; &longs;eries ab Ari&longs;totele &longs;ignifica
tur 2. Po&longs;t. vbi materies omnium infima, finis autem
quod item &
ad eandem Et &longs;cire magis ille dicitur qui nobiliore modo
nouit quàm qui modo ignobiliore, vt Rex magis &longs;cit, quàm
nouit, ip&longs;e rex vniuersè cogno&longs;cit. Necnon magis ille &longs;cit, qui plura de aliqua re nouit, quàm qui
pauciora. Et ille quoque magis &longs;cit qui rei ip&longs;ius e&longs;&longs;entia & quid e&longs;t, maximè nouir.
e&longs;t & e&longs;&longs;entia logicè &longs;umi po&longs;sit & phy&longs;icè: aclogicè quidem omne cau&longs;&longs;&ecedil; genus &longs;it quid e&longs;t: phy
&longs;icè vero &longs;ola forma aut ad &longs;ummum quod definitione &longs;ignificatur, nos hic e&longs;&longs;entiam non logicè,
&longs;ed phy&longs;icè accipimus, & magis illum &longs;cire dicimus qui per formam nouit, & denique per intrin
&longs;eca principia. Et ille planè optimè &longs;cire videtur qui per formam nouit.
Signo illud e&longs;t.
quòd de
finitio poti&longs;simè nobis euoluit illa principia quæ rem
omnium perfecti&longs;sim&ecedil; &longs;unt; &longs;unt verò &longs;peciei &longs;peciali&longs;sim&ecedil; de prædicamento &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ, nam
&longs;tant
con&longs;titura e&longs;t: aliæ cau&longs;læ omittuntur, ni&longs;i fortè cùm forma
ralibus euenit. &longs;ed pror&longs;us attenditur forma
ita mens contemplando fine &longs;uo potitur: materia vt form&ecedil; pars e&longs;t, Sed de his aliàs.
Vltimò &longs;cire dicitur hic magis, quàm alter, quòd alterius cognitio illi &longs;uppona
tur. vt &longs;ubalternans &longs;cit magis, quàm &longs;ubalterna, quia pr&ecedil;ter id quod rem e&longs;&longs;e nouit vt &longs;ubalterna,
nouit pr&ecedil;tereà cur ita &longs;it. Quantum verò e&longs;t de &longs;ecundo fundamento; multis item modis aliquis
&longs;ciens vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;&longs;e fertur. Etenim ille vniuer&longs;alis qui &longs;pectat genus, &longs;i
&longs;olam &longs;peciem tractat; veluti phy&longs;icus vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;t, medicus particularis, quòd ille
nataralium vires explorat. hic in homine con&longs;iderando &longs;uam operam impendit.
Proinde vniuer
&longs;ales artifices appellare &longs;olet Ari&longs;t primum
licet oratorem. Nanque orator de
Ni&longs;i quod hi vniuersè tractant, vt quid hominem deceat; ille quid deceat Socratem & &longs;igillatim
con&longs;iderat. qui omnes &longs;ic appellati fui&longs;&longs;e videntur, quòd ens vniuersè
aut illam portionem entis. vt mathematicus habet quantum.
Secundo loco vniuei &longs;alis arti&longs;ex ille
dici pote&longs;t qui efficit id quod vult ex
dialecticus, &longs;ophi&longs;tes, & orator vniuer&longs;ales &longs;unt: primus philo&longs;ophus non e&longs;t vniuer&longs;alis,
et&longs;i de omni ente di&longs;&longs;erit, at illa quæ &longs;unt entis propria ve&longs;tigat, & qu&ecedil; per &longs;e in&longs;unt,
tuitaquereijcit.
Tertiò vniuer&longs;alis ille dici pote&longs;t qui rem vniuersè con&longs;iderat:
tribus modis,
(ni&longs;i fallor) intelligi pote&longs;t, vel quia nullis legibus obligetur, &longs;ed euagetur quà velit, & talem vi
detur po&longs;ui&longs;&longs;e Philoponus affines, quippe qui de rebus naturalibus mathema
ille propria principia denegauit, attribuit aliena. Vel etiam vniuer&longs;alis e&longs;t, quia con&longs;ideret aliquid
nulla differentia contractum, vt &longs;iquis hominem
quà bonam vbi &longs;anè nulla
ambitus ratio habetur, &longs;ed notionis. idem enim homo e&longs;t qui
indiuidua funditur, atque is in quo ri&longs;us capacitas aduertitur, aut recuperatio &longs;alutis, &longs;ed
rei notio re&longs;tringitur acce&longs;&longs;u nouæ conditionis. Tertio dici pote&longs;t artifex vniuer&longs;alis qui rem ge
neratim con&longs;iderat, nec ad eius &longs;pecies de&longs;cendit, vt &longs;iquis animal con&longs;ideraret, hominis, aut equi
con&longs;iderationem prætermitteret. His ita po&longs;itis facile e&longs;t di&longs;&longs;oluere problema & diluere rationes
quibus auferebatur facultas naturali philo&longs;opho di&longs;&longs;erendi de materia prima, & illam plenè co
gno&longs;cendi.
&longs;it, nec eius internas affectiones explicare, & &longs;iqua &longs;unt quæ intrin&longs;ecus ad eius
tineant, vt relatio & habitudo ad formam & compo&longs;itum & omnino facultas, vberrime tractare
valeat. atque adeò vt ad hanc
Idem quoque
philo&longs;ophus naturalis v&longs;um &
materia, &
hatur, & per formam euadat in naturam. Proinde etiam phy&longs;icus materiæ notionem re&longs;oluit in
cau&longs;&longs;as &longs;uperiores v&longs;que ad Non &longs;ic pri
mus philo&longs;ophus. quippe qui per externa principia melius
implent cognitionem quibus nihil addit præter illa quæ naturalis philo&longs;ophus indicauit, & cùm
vniuersè cogno&longs;cat, magis
non quia tractet accuratius. accurati&longs;simè autem tractare
quid planè phy&longs;icus explanat formam; quòd forma &longs;impliciter accepta aliud e&longs;&longs;e habet, quàm vt
re&longs;piciat materiam, à philo&longs;opho naturali
&longs;itum e&longs;t in habitudine ad formam illam quæ probè cogno&longs;citur à philo&longs;opho naturali, Sed iam
pondus Obijcitur primùm
cognitione pendere; Propo&longs;itio fallaciam pre&longs;efert.
quippe quòd
&longs;cientia &longs;it ab&longs;oluta, vbi cau&longs;&longs;æ internæ &
rei propo&longs;it&ecedil; notitiam in omne genus cau&longs;&longs;arum di&longs;&longs;oluere, id quoque pr&ecedil;&longs;tat phy&longs;icus. At non
nouit planè vim externarum Sed quis e&longs;t auctor, vt ad cu
iusque rei &longs;at e&longs;t, &longs;i optimè te
neat cau&longs;&longs;as illas, quà re&longs;piciunt rem propo&longs;itam; vt
&longs;ed quatenus efficit motum in materia. quicquid nouit vlterius, iam non e&longs;t officium naturalis.
Atque h&ecedil;c
mihi
internarum Quod dicitur.
Materiam quia &longs;it pote&longs;tas, à phy&longs;ico
po&longs;&longs;e cogno&longs;ci: &longs;ic diluitur. quoniam actus & pote&longs;tas &longs;unt nomina ad vnum, & per alias res per
tinent quam naturales, itaque ad Sed cùm
a&longs;&longs;umuntur in certa methodo, propria fiunt eius methodi, vt de circulo
cos 1. Po&longs;t. ideò quantum e&longs;t de illorum notione quæ
ibi optimè cogno&longs;cuntur, & plus &longs;ine dubio, quàm prima philo&longs;ophia. quia for
ma cogno&longs;citur magis quàm materia. Sed forma non plenè cogno&longs;citur à naturali.
Re&longs;pondeo,
&longs;i forma cum materia conferatur, maiorem haberi cognitionem formæ quàm materiæ. Cæterùm
non id inquiritur nunc: &longs;ed propo&longs;ita cognitione materiæ quæritur an'ne eius cognitionem, qua
li&longs;cunque &longs;it, plenè phy&longs;icus a&longs;&longs;equatur, an primus philo&longs;ophus. & obiectio fallaciam continet
elenchi.
gno&longs;citur à phy&longs;ico. quapropter nihil ob&longs;tabit, quominus phy&longs;icus,
&longs;cat A&longs;&longs;umit Auicenna
certè &longs;i minoris ambitus e&longs;&longs;e vo
luit Auicenna vterque.
n.
con&longs;ide
rat vterque primò &longs;ub&longs;tantiam
accidentia vult indagare.
Nec
vel à dialectico tractatur, Nec quae quacunque euagetur.
n.
qua&longs;i cancellis
ac
qu&ecedil;uis methodus habet & dialecticus illud habet, vt ex
tiam faciens. Itaque
careret, & di&longs;&longs;erens de mathematicis a&longs;&longs;umeret principia mathematica.
cùm &longs;ic de
& illud ab Ari&longs;totele pr&ecedil;ceptum &longs;it dialecticum e&longs;ficere quod vult
ex principtis
non &longs;unt alterius. vt finis eius facultatis & loca quibus vtitur di&longs;&longs;erendo.
Proinde &longs;i methodi li
mites &longs;pectetur, omnes habent quod &longs;uum e&longs;t cuiu&longs;que proprium,
&longs;ta, & rhetore comperitur, quoad omnia, &longs;ed tamen certo quodammodò &longs;ibi vendicant. Re&longs;tar
igitur vt primus philo&longs;ophus &longs;it vniuer&longs;alis, quia &longs;impliciter id &longs;pectet quod aliæ &longs;cienti&ecedil;
qua conditione con&longs;iderant, vt ens, cùm phy&longs;ica tractet idem ens, &longs;ed quatenus e&longs;t naturale, aut
vltimò, quia rerum genera & hi&longs;ce modis primus philo&longs;ophus e&longs;t
artifex vniuer&longs;alis. Sed quia nil vetat, quominus
tollit etiam id, quin propter ambitum &longs;uum po&longs;sit tractare materiam primam; pr&ecedil;&longs;ertim cum ali
qu&ecedil; res naturales ex materia prima con&longs;tent, & forma. Verùm quidem e&longs;&longs;et id quod a&longs;&longs;ump&longs;it
Auicenna, &longs;i ita &longs;e haberet phy&longs;icus ad Incidit quinta
&longs;implex, obnoxium &longs;it
nece&longs;sitas iuncta e&longs;t, qu&ecedil; plus patet,
aut admonitione per&longs;uadentur. Prima verò
biliore modo cogno&longs;cat,
teriam
tractata fui&longs;&longs;e dicimus, Ni&longs;i fortè, quia primo philo&longs;opho &longs;upponitur
cognitio naturalis; ip&longs;um aliquid vlterius attamen neque id
prehibebit, quo minus &longs;i no&longs;cat de materia naturalis
primus philo&longs;ophus. Nam totum id quod &longs;upponit primo philo&longs;opho, proprium e&longs;t naturalis.
T. 1.
T. 1.
c.
8.
Ad VI.
Cap.
XVII.
Accepimvs antè ea quæ mouendo mouentur, e&longs;&longs;e phy&longs;ic&ecedil; contemplationis.
hæc verò
&longs;ic in materia &longs;unt, vt quem admodum vulgò dici &longs;olet, con&longs;lituant Itaque tale formarum genus à materia nunquam diuellitur, atque illa
&longs;en&longs;ili. Videbatur
parandi. Verumenimuerò Philoponus, vt perpetuus ho&longs;tis Ari&longs;totelis, etiam rationibus & repu
gnantiis oppugnare conatur hoc decretum. Nequid igitur pr&ecedil;termittamus,
quod valeat ad
modi placitum H&ecedil;c opponit Philoponus quibus conuellat
Primùm quidem quia
nouit à forma. Quinetiam di&longs;tinguitur ab Ari&longs;t, &longs;ub&longs;tantia in tria
&longs;ed natura & e&longs;&longs;entia &longs;eparari po&longs;&longs;unt, materiam nimirùm, formam, & Quòd &longs;i tria
&longs;ecum Adde etiam quòd ea nomi
num pote&longs;tas e&longs;t, vt primum &longs;ignificent formam, mox compo&longs;itum; po&longs;tremò in primo
igitur temporis puncto, quo mens audit & concipit ex nomine formam, non Rur&longs;us re&longs;tatur Ari&longs;t.
è formis naturalib.
&longs;eparari profitebimur, cùm etiam reip&longs;a &longs;eparari queant? Nanque materia
has, modò illas formas accipit. Rur&longs;us facit Ari&longs;t.
uallum expers Verùm quid nos
certius optamus quàm quòd prius à po&longs;teriore nonmodò cogiratione, &longs;ed Cùm igitur forma prior &longs;it quàm materia, ab ip&longs;a quoque &longs;eparabitur.
Quapropter docet Ari&longs;t.
rationem verè formas e&longs;&longs;e a&longs;&longs;euerat qu&ecedil;
à materia &longs;en&longs;ili &longs;euocantur.
cat ad motum, & principia con&longs;iderat eius &longs;ub&longs;tantiæ in qua motus initia continentur, & quod
cunque ip&longs;a concipit, re&longs;picit materiam, &longs;eu po&longs;itiuè, quia &longs;cilicet ortum